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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the origins of unemployment insurance (UI) in Britain, Sweden 
and the United States. In order to gain a clear insight into the relationship between the 
characteristics of Ul in these three countries and their policy contexts, Easton's systems 
theory is utilised as a basis for developing an analytical framework. Easton's theory is 
important in that it regards a political system as a dynamic domain in which there is a 
direct correlation between inputs, in the form of demands and supports, and outputs, in 
the form of decisions. However, due to the broad and general nature of this theory and 
its tendency to underestimate the impact of ideological factors on the outcome of the 
policy process, it is supplemented here by two other variables, namely, the power 
structure and the dominant ideology of the society in question. While the former makes 
it clear that the differing roles played by different segments of society are dependent 
upon their position in society, the latter emphasises the importance of the beliefs of the 
participants, especially those occupying influential positions, in comprehending the 
political dimensions of a problem. 
The empirical part of the thesis utilises this analytic framework, developed in line with 
pluralist thinking, in examining the introduction of unemployment insurance in Britain, 
Sweden and the United States. The reason for choosing three countries is that 
comparative research highlights the importance of cross-national variations as well as 
the unique contribution one nation can make in the same policy area. These three 
countries are representative of Esping-Andersen's three welfare-state regime-types. 
However his theory refers to the subsequent development of the welfare systems rather 
than to the initial introduction of social security schemes, which did not, at the outset, 
contain all the characteristics of the relevant regime-types. A chronological account is 
adopted in order to assess the significance of 'social policy legacies' in establishing UI 
in these three countries. The analysis is divided into two stages. The first examines the 
multiple causes of legislation concerning unemployment relief, while the second 
considers the contrasting characteristics of the UI schemes in the three countries. Thus, 
differences in financing, coverage (eligibility), benefit levels and administration are 
explained in terms of the different policy contexts in each case. 
Compared with work creation, cash support was regarded as of secondary importance 
by policy makers in dealing with unemployment. UI schemes were political 
experiments, resulting from politicians' attempts to deal with crisis situations. Although 
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flat-rate benefits attempted to express the principle of equality, their level was based on 
'social minimum' or 'subsistence level'income. The low level of benefits led to the dual 
arrangement in which the poor rely on the state and the better-off on the market. As a 
result, as with earnings-related benefits, the principle of equality was weakened. 
Selective coverage reflected the policy makers'concern with the financial viability of UI 
schemes, but, in contrast to universalism which treats all citizens in the same way, it 
also increased the gap between the better off and the poor who are more vulnerable to 
unemployment. 
This thesis concludes by emphasising that, although policy makers' ideologies 
influenced their policy preferences, pragmatic considerations were also important: they 
made their decisions not only on the basis of their beliefs but also on the political and 
financial grounds. Based on'top-down'and 'bottom-up' approaches, the thesis implies 
that the adoption of a policy reflects not only the political preferences of policy makers, 
but also the assertiveness of those who demand their rights. While in theory it is 
essential to consider the impact of organised labour on the policies most closely related 
to their interests, the experience of these three countries highlights the danger of 
overestimating its role in the policy making process. Other factors, such as the 
considerable power exercised by political elites and business groups and the different 
ideological traditions found in different countries are equally influential. 17hus, although 
it is important to introduce ideology and power structure as two complementary 
elements in order to increase the power of Easton's theory, the historical legacy of the 
country under investigation is of crucial importance in explaining the outcomes of the 
policy making process. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and General Background to the Study 
In his Unemployment. A Problem of InduEtry in 1909, William Beveridge of Britain 
argued that unemployment was a necessary accompaniment to industrial organisation 
and effectively destroyed the case for individual responsibility. Based on his 
understanding of the problem, Beveridge turned his attention to the best methods of 
minimising unemployment and providing effective help for those already unoccupied. 
Since the beginning of the century, western countries, one after another, have 
introduced unemployment insurance as part of a public compensation programme in 
order to maintain the economic and political equilibrium. While the politicians and 
reformers have attempted to develop and revise unemployment insurance, like any other 
welfare scheme, as a reply to the changing economic and political situations of the 
countries, intellectuals in the field of social policy have debated the problems, such as 
the negative effects, accompanying the operation of welfare systems on the economy 
and individual people. 
In this context, one question seems to be inevitably raised and considered: now that 
unemployment is a social problem, and the job loss is not necessarily a person's own 
responsibility, how can society as a whole provide adequate help for those unfortunates 
threatened by insecurity? Should this group of people receive public support which is 
subject to changes in government policy and sometimes not sufficient at all? 
Just as in industrial nations, unemployment is also becoming an important issue and 
attracting increasing attention from politicians and intellectuals in developing countries, 
such as China. Accompanied by economic reform which has changed the pattern of 
permanent employment in state enterprises in which an 'iron rice bowl' had been 
guaranteed to a person, the issue of unemployment in China has already occupied an 
important position among the reforming policies of the government. In the transition 
from a rural and less developed economy to an industrialised one, unemployment is 
certainly appearing as an economic, political and social issue within society. 
The Chinese government introduced an unemployment insurance entitled 'Interim 
Regulations for State-Owned Enterprise Workers' Wait-for-Employment Insurance' in 
July 1986, as an integral part of its labour market policies. Since then it has played a 
symbolic role in the Government's effort to protect the living standards of the 
unemployed which, in turn, is intended to help secure the social stability and public 
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support for the economic reforms. However, as it is still early to make a general 
judgment concerning the impact of the unemployment insurance system on individual 
enterprises, the 1986 scheme needs to be fleshed out in crucial respects (Atkinson, 
1990), and therefore the study of the provisions of unemployment compensation 
systems in the advanced countries should be of benefit ýo China. As Rimlinger said, 
'(Ohe developing countries are in a special situation. They can borrow from a wide 
range of patterns of social protection that have proved successful in countries that 
industrialised earlier. The developing countries, ... their problem is one of choosing 
the most suitable pattem. ' (Rimlinger, 1971, p. 334). 
In this chapter, I shall discuss, first, the aims and objectives of the research, the 
reasons why a comparative policy study in unemployment insurance has been chosen 
as my research subject and the significance behind the choice of the countries for my 
case studies; secondly, a brief description of the research method that will be carried 
out in the study and its limitations. 
Part One The Aims and Objectives of the Research 
Studies of public policy are normally divided into two kinds: one is concerned with 
developing sophisticated models of policy process and through them making 
prescriptions about how to improve policies, while the other concentrates on the 
development of public policies in order to gain a better understanding of how they 
came about (Elcock, 1992). In this section of the doctoral study, which can be 
alternatively named 'the theoretical study of policy choices of social security in the 
structure of the decision-making process', the primary focus will be on policy choices 
in the original social insurance systems for the unemployed in Britain, Sweden and the 
United States. In order to explain the dynamics behind the selection of some alternative 
and available policy choices for unemployment insurance systems in these three chosen 
countries, I will concentrate on how the initial proposals were discussed and how state 
provisions were finally formulated, and how the differing results of the process were 
influenced by the different social, economic and political contexts of these countries. 
The ideological influence of the elites and the role played by groups, such as political 
parties, trade unions and business organisations, will be particularly examined. The 
main goal of the study is to draw conclusions about the active interaction between 
policy choices in social security and the circumstances in which these choices are 
made. 
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Section One The Reasons for the Subject 
One of the major purposes of any academic research in social science is to discover 
what the problem is, why it exists, and how to solve it. When the economic recession 
has already, or is making a large group of people vulnerable to unemployment and 
poverty in western countries, 1 it is necessary for the politicians and intellectuals in 
social policy to study the emerging problems in their present Ul systems and seek 
improvements in the state programmes. While focusing on the current situation may 
lead to a discovery of the appropriate solutions to the problems before they become 
politically and economically more damaging, it may also be meaningful to look at the 
problem from a historical perspective. A study of the past will not just offer us a useful 
guide to the circumstances in which unemployment was regarded as a social problem 
for the first time in the developed countries and the similarities and differences in their 
original schemes to help the unemployed. 2 It may also inspire our better understanding 
of the present problem in these countries and our efforts to discover more efficient 
measures to deal with the problem. In addition, through the study, the initial efforts of 
these countries may serve as a useful precedence and experience for those developing 
countries in their exploration of how to handle their unemployment problems. 
In his book, 'Principles of Political Economy', Mill (1848) made a distinction between 
the laws of production and the laws of distribution, in which the former was 
considered to be natural and technological, the latter'social'. According to Ringen, a 
practical application of this theory would mean that economic goals should be 
influenced by one set of policies and social goals by another set and that social policies 
should be introduced late in the process so as not to interfere with the mechanisms of 
production. Based on this distinction, Ringen defines the welfare state in terms of 
'redistribution policies'; they are used towards the end of the distribution process to 
modify primary distributions or to repair damages or compensate for dis-welfare which 
have arisen in earlier stages of the process. Thus, 'social policy is not and has hardly 
ever been seen as an instrument to tame the forces of the market, but is primarily a way 
of modifying some of the effects of these forces'(Ringen, 1989, pp. 5-6). 
Ringen's definition of the welfare state reflects a vision which has been one of the most 
important inspirations for the development of social policy: we need the policy because 
1. The studies of the importance of benefits for the unemployed from both governmental and 
independent sources showed the tight link- between poverty and unemployment. The unemployed was 0 
regarded as 'amongst the poorest of the poor' (Sinf ield, 1981,1991 and Atkinson 1989). 
2. Fisher also said that one lesson that we could learn from policy study was to 'respect the uniqueness 
of each pro-ram in the light of its historical antecedents, social policy, and economic and political 00 
constraints' (quoted in Hcidcnheimer. 1976, p. 298). 
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it can promote our social goals i. e. equality, integration etc. Since the 19th century, 
western capitalist countries, facing various social problems, have adopted different 
ways to remedy the flaws of the system and reduce tensions (one of the causes of 
which was unemployment), for example, between capital and labour, in order to 
ensure the stability of the capitalist market system. Social security systems are one of 
the means used to try to solve these problems. There have been divergent approaches 
employed for explaining the need for social security systems in industrialised society: 
functionalists examined some of the effects of industrialisation on people's life, 
Marxists emphasised the role of class conflict, while Marshall put forward a theory in 
which social rights were regarded as a component of citizenship. 
The changing economic and political situations of the 20th century, especially after the 
1970s, have opened a debate on the advantages and disadvantages of these systems, 
and the so-called 'crisis in the welfare state'(OECD, 1981) has persuaded people to ask 
whether the welfare state is still useful and feasible. The dominant critiques of the 
welfare state are that its means are not effective and that the strategy of redistribution 
has proved to be merely a surface phenomenon which does not have much real impact. 
This gives rise to the problem of how to maximise the efficiency of the social security 
system, i. e. its maximum capability, how the adopted policy choice can best fit its 
environment and bring about better results. 
In order to assess the public welfare programmes in the advanced countries, such as 
unemployment policies, some principles related to decision making should be first 
taken into account, as they can be regarded as preconditions which decide the priority 
and selection of a certain policy. The elements of decision making in social policy may 
in general include: 
A. The economic environment. This is a basic factor when governments make 
decisions on social security. The productive ability of the country, the state of 
employment, the income level of people in terms of present international standards, and 
the changing structure of the labour force will be elements which are considered by 
decision makers. The economic situation and level of unemployment in the country 
tend to directly anticipate the public debate on introducing relevant policies, such as 
unemployment insurance. The relationship between 'labour' and 'capital' in a country, 
the governmental labour market policy and the policies of the government in dealing 
with the country's economic problems can affect the features of its unemployment 
insurance scheme. 
4 
B. The political system. This includes the different political factions, the 
representatives of different interests in a power structure and their effects upon the 
decision-makers, as well as the level of participation of people in the policy process. 
While some groups or parties can exert a great deal of influence during the policy 
making process, the others may find it difficult to get their demands and needs noticed 
by those who are in the position of making final decisions 
C. The ideology of the government. This may influence a government's political 
preference of one policy over another. 'Me ideological element can function as a bridge 
which links certain conditions with certain policies and determines the different 
evaluations of the governments depending on their beliefs. Ilis is taken partly from the 
tradition of the party, partly from the general cultural heritage in the country and partly 
from the effect of former policy, all of which may constitute a 'social policy legacy of 
the country. 'Me different groups of thinkers demonstrate their influence with a varying 
degree of success, in accordance with their beliefs such as pro-collectivism, anti- 
collectivism, and reluctant-collectivism in the welfare system. 
The elements discussed above can be summarised by the three basic principles or 
criteria used by Hall, Land, Parker and Webb (1975), by which we judge policy 
choices in the context of social security, i. e. legitimacy, feasibility, and support. 
Legitimacy always involves assumptions about the proper role and sphere of 
government action, feasibility determines that one step or remedy is taken to deal with a 
problem rather than another according to what is possible, while the concept of support 
refers to the 'political possibility' which relates to the satisfactions of some people and 
the discontents of others for certain policies. The above factors determine, and are 
reflected in, selection of social security policy. Reasons for the distinctive features of 
the policies and the different approaches of setting them up in Britain, Sweden and the 
United States are to be found through studying their differing connections with these 
elements. 
As any decision making always involves the politicians' considerations of these factors 
and the solutions they find for matters concerned are accordingly influenced by their 
views, a doctoral thesis which covers such a range will unavoidably lead to very 
general and superficial conclusions. Concerned with this problem, I shall deal with 
these factors and problems in a specifically limited way. While the political structures 
of these three countries, the ideologies of the different groups and parties and their 
attitude toward the unemployment problem will be given a prominent position in this 
study, other factors, such as the economic situation and labour market aspect, shall be 
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considered as essential background knowledge used in my discussion of the former. 
The development of an economy based on industrialisation and democracy provides 
both the necessity and the possibility of social security. For the followers of 
'convergence theory', the economic level and its demographic and organisational 
correlates are important causes of welfare-state development, regardless of the type of 
political system (Cutright, 1965, Pryor, 1968 and Wilensky, 1975,1981). 3 However, 
Pryor (1968) concludes that the economic level is an underlying but not an immediate 
cause of the level of social security effort. His argument may imply that the outcome of 
the decision making process for welfare programmes would reflect the power of the 
different political parties and groups and their ideologies concerning provision of 
public help. 
According to democratic policy, the state of public opinion about unemployment 
protection at any one time and the government's response to it are crucial elements. As 
far as the former is concerned, the demands from pressure groups and the various 
parties in the power structure, especially the Opposition often play significant roles in 
initiating and changing policies. The aims of their proposals, the motives of their 
campaign, the methods they used and the result of their efforts should all be considered 
in policy analysis. Accordingly, the second one, the government's response, involves 
the measures taken by the government to deal with the challenges from those who 
represent the interests of the unemployed and its political rivals. During this process, it 
is sometimes necessary for the government to make compromises between the demands 
of different groups, or pay particular attention to the arguments of any one group if 
required. If the situation is not favourable for the government plan, modifications and 
reforms will be considered. 
The impact of ideological factors on policy outcomes should also be given a thorough 
investigation. The prevailing ideas among policy makers are likely to impose 
constraints on policy making for unemployment protection. We should especially 
examine the reasons for the popularity of certain ideologies and their effects on the 
politicians' attitudes in handling the problem. The different thoughts of other 
organisations, such as trade unions, employer organisations and other pressure groups, 
and political parties, may also be accepted by the party in power, therefore the 
3. Wilensky argued that for many countries economic development determines the extent of 
government involvement in income maintenance programs. Nations with a high level of economic 
development and with the different types of political regime in power have with very few exceptions 
extended the boundaries of government transfer payments much further than have poorer nations 
(Wilensky, 1981). 
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similarities and differences in ideas concerning unemployment protection between the 
political parties and other organisations should be carefully considered. 
Section Two The reasons for choosing the three countries 
Drawing on the observations of Kuhnle and Solheim (1981) and Heclo (1974) namely 
that, after the initiation of German sickness and accident schemes in 1883, policy 
makers in other nations directed their attention to the German system by appointing 
committees to study its legislation and sending delegations to obtain first-hand 
information, diffusion hypothesis sees social policy initiation in one nation as a copy of 
the efforts of welfare-state pioneers. However the spatial ordering of programme 
initiation in Western Europe coincided with patterns of economic growth and the spread 
of liberal ideologies, so that the independent influence of innovations on the 
neighbouring societies should be questioned. 
Arguing for undertaking comparative longitudinal studies, Wilensky et al (1985) 
declare tha basic comparative research can make three contributions to top policy 
makers. Firstly, policy deliberations can be improved by a better grasp of the degree to 
which social spending and programme development are constrained by distant social, 
economic, and historical causes and the degree to which social policy is a matter of 
political choice. Secondly, by specifying broad policy options and programme 
emphases chosen by diverse countries that are confronting similar problems, this 
research brings a wider range of policy options to view. Finally, insofar as this 
research uncovers the social, political, and economic consequences of different types of 
social policy and levels of social spending, it can improve the policy maker's 
understanding of real opportunities and constraints (Wilensky, Luebbert, Hahn and 
Jamieson, 1985, p. 4). 
In selecting countries for a comparative study of social policy, several different 
approaches can be adopted. One possibility is to compare some developed (rich) 
countries and some developing (poor) countries. Another is to compare some countries 
with market economies (free enterprise) and some with planned economies 
(communist) (Kaim-Caudle, 1973, p. 16). Yet, there is another approach which selects 
those countries which have economically and politically reasonable similarities, rather 
than fundamental differences, as comparative subjects. This enables the analysts to 
identify the differences within generally similar structures. Among the selected 
countries in this piece of study, Britain, Sweden and the United States share several 
common characteristics. One similarity among these three countries is that they are all 
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developed economies which have provided a base for the development of their social 
security systems. '[Iln a society where average incomes are barely above the 
subsistence level it is inherently difficult to provide social services ... the high average 
income makes it possible to divert large sums, both in relative and absolute terms, to 
provide social security as well as other social services (Kaim-Caudle, 1973, p. 14). 
The reasons why rich nations spend a higher proportion of the national income on 
welfare policies for poor people than poor nations do are partly because that in these 
countries not only poor people but also all citizens at many income levels take part in 
the income support programmes (see the following chapter). According to 
'convergence theory', industrialisation transforms the nature of the labour force, the 
self-employed are replaced by workers 'employed' for a wage. Regular income from 
employment becomes a main source of livelihood for an increasing proportion of the 
work force. Industrial employment also imposes a clear-cut distinction between those at 
work and those out of work. As a result, unemployment, sickness, work injury, old 
age and the like can bring about a sudden interruption in earnings, and the problem of 
the protection against such contingencies becomes acute. Alongside these changes, 
geographical and occupational mobility have been increasing and the traditional 
agencies of support such as families have been weakened (Mishra, 1981, p. 40). People 
are therefore eager to protect, through government, what they have, and prevent any 
insecurity. 
As far as political characteristics are concerned, these three countries also have two 
important characteristics in common. One is constitutional. All are democracies in 
which the survival of governments depends on the support of, or at least not being 
opposed by, the majority of the electorate. The governments could be changed as the 
result of a election. Citizens are allowed to criticise the policies of the government and 
argue about their strengths and drawbacks through public media. The need to consult 
the voters at fairly short intervals makes it necessary for the government to strive for 
popularity and give preference to measures which are supposed to bring some benefits 
to, at least, some people. In Sweden, for instance, the trade unions have been a key 
influence in policy making, and the Swedish Social Democratic Party's policy heavily 
relied on the unions. Another common characteristic is the prevalence of the rule of law 
in the administration of social security, and that claimants can use the law to ensure 
their entitlement to get what is legally theirs. 
Even though the backgrounds of these three countries are quite similar in some aspects, 
it is still easy for us to find differences between them and these differences cannot 
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easily be explained by one or two simple factors. In the context of social insurance, 
after its invention and diffusion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in 
one western nation after another, a large part of the population were freed from 
dependence on charity, local poor laws, and the prevalent stigma surrounding means- 
tested assistance. Eligibility is based on nationally standardised rules rather than the 
discretion of local poor-law officials or private charity workers (Heidenheimer, Heclo 
and Teich-Adams, 1976, p. 213). However, different nations have varied considerably 
in their rationale and emphasis in terms of using different techniques because of 
different historical experiences. 
Compared with its counterparts, the Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP) was able 
to take more advantage of the situation during the Depression to establish a firm 
political and institutional base which led to the subsequent development of the welfare 
state. This was partly due to the political power of the Social Democratic Government 
and the large centrally organised trade union confederation (LO); the latter made a quick 
political shift from industrial conflict to political pressures for social and economic 
reforms. The reforming strategy of the SAP in the 1930s also originated from the co- 
operative and consultative feature of the Swedish policy making process, with a 
centralised state and strong bureaucracy as a mediator, which ensured bargaining and 
compromises between the participants (Weir and Skocpol, 1983; Heidenheimer, Heclo 
and Teich-Adams, 1983; Lawson, 1987). In contrast to their Swedish counterpart, the 
British have always been unwilling to accept the trade union movement as a social 
partner (Elcock, 1992). When the middle-class reformers attempted to implement a 
contributory social insurance plan, they had three obstacles to overthrow: the sceptical 
reaction of participants about the administrative capacities to run a contributory 
programme; liberal and conservative politicians' antipathy to the German type policy 
and the workers' own organisations' (the Trade Unions and Friendly Societies) fear of 
the state competition. As a result of this political environment during the interwar 
period, Britain produced non-contributory pensions and an ad hoc mixture of two other 
insurance programmes, one run by the state for particular categories of workers and 
one heavily influenced by private-sector societies (Heclo, 19741. 
As opposed to Britain and Sweden, the United States' national social insurance 
programmes came imbued with an individualistic rationale, and were less adaptable 
through open political processes owing to the deep popular distrust of government 
power, the tradition of American individualism, a weaker trade union movement and no 
left-wing parties. The reformers, through the American Association for Labor 
Legislation (AALL), sought sickness, old age, and unemployment insurance but did 
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not find support from either business or labour, and their activities were frustrated 
throughout the first third of the twentieth century. 'Me power of the reform obstacles 
was only reduced by the exceptional circumstances created by the Depression and the 
arrival of the Roosevelt administration (Heidenheimer, Heclo and Teich-Adams, 1976, 
p. 221). Yet within the American situation (with a relatively strong state autonomy), 
European uniform national standards had no place and the conditions and benefits of 
unemployment insurance and public assistance were largely left to the vagaries of state 
discretion, with individually earned benefits and no support from general government 
revenues. 
All the differences demonstrated above, (although they should be regarded as 
examples), may imply that the distinct circumstances of policy making in the different 
countries would affect their policies of the same category (e. g. unemployment 
insurance). Without research of the interaction between the social policies and the 
different national features of economy, polity, tradition, etc., we can not understand 
properly the reasons of the operation, development and changes of social policy in 
these countries. The differences and complexities of the political contexts and, 
accordingly, governments' motives and their policy orientation, give rise to the 
question of whether one principle which is adopted to explain the policy making 
process of one country might be not relevant or less adequate to the cases of other two 
countries. The study of the policy choice in question will help us understand how the 
different features of the governments' policies reflect the different conditions under 
which they are operated and the different results they might give us. 
Based on the previous arguments, one may argue that any proposals in the social 
welfare field are subject to the limitations of time, place and conditions. Therefore, it is 
unrealistic to imagine that a policy with certain features can be adopted by every country 
and applicable forever as an eternal model, or hope that there should be an efficient and 
just system which is always available and through which the problems of social 
security of an individual can be dealt with and their needs satisfied. As the economic 
and political problems set constraints for the operations of the welfare systems in 
different countries, it might be wise to look retrospectively at the past circumstances in 
which social welfare policies were discussed and introduced in these countries and the 
distinct features of their policies which were decided by their unique politics and 
ideologies. Through a comparative analysis of the decision making process for the first 
unemployment insurance schemes of Britain, Sweden and the United States, I hope to 
discover that their choices for their unemployment programmes were limited and 
affected by factors, such as political feasibility. The awareness of various defects in 
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their systems today should not detract from the necessity of their initial introduction. 
The different methods they used to deal with problems and their experiences can be of 
use for other countries and the development of social security theory. 
Part Two The Research Method and Construction of the 
Thesis 
The method, with which this research is carried out, is descriptive and interpretative. 
All materials applied in the work will be the secondary sources obtained from libraries. 
Because the research is basically undertaken in Britain, for the information about the 
other two countries, I will have to rely mainly on the holdings of the subject in the 
University's library, which is limited in many respects. During the course of the 
research, I made a one-month journey to Sweden where I gained more resources on the 
Swedish welfare system and was able to interview and consult Swedish experts. 
However, some information was not available due to the fact that it was not originally 
written in English and had not been translated. 
Social scientists, especially those in social policy, always find themselves doing their 
research within a dynamic context of social problems, social actions and social 
changes, and the selection and composition of their research problems are influenced 
accordingly by these factors; the outcomes of these studies should lead to the provision 
of solutions to the contemporary problems (see Freedman and Sherwood, 1970). As 
the central aim of this study is to achieve a better understanding of policy developments 
in unemployment insurance programmes, it is important to define the research object 
with regard to the period, angle and major elements. With the examination of the 
relationship between alternative policy choices and their policy making context, my 
primary target is to discover some rules concerning what has (have) been selected in 
which circumstances, by whom, and what effects the chosen policy (policies) would 
bring to the social conditions of human beings. With these findings, I hope to learn 
what are the best way to reflect, influence and change our surroundings and what 
adequate protection society can offer the individuals. As Kristol (1977) argues, in the 
discussion of policy choice in social security, we should take into account questions 
such as 'what kind of civilisation, do we want to live in; what kind of social, political, 
and economic order do we want? What kind of life do we wantT (p. 62). 4 Related to 
4. Richardson also argued that in the economically advanced countries with fairly high standards of 
living, 'the greater the productivity per head and the higher the standards of living, the more will people 
be able to provide for their own needs and the less will they be dependent on social secuity', but on the 
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this aim, the historical and comparative analysis which this study adopts concentrates 
on the major questions such as: Why were unemployment insurance schemes initiated 
and why with those features? Why did the changes come about? 
Gilbert and Specht (1974) once described the different approaches to social welfare 
policy analysis as studies of the three TV, i. e. process, product, and performance. 
The first is focused upon the dynamics of policy formulation with regard to socio- 
political and technical-methodological variables; the second is the study of a set of 
policy choices which are the product of the planning process, and the last one is 
concerned with the description and evaluation of the programmatic outcomes of policy 
choices. Based on their arguments, it might be logical to argue that these three P's 
should be considered as three different sides of one objective or three inter-connected 
steps of one process, rather than disconnected completely from one another. On the 
contrary, a deeper understanding of each of these three P's can be drawn from the 
research in an interrelated and intersecting perspective. Decision making is a process 
and to study the different stages of the whole process will help us understand more 
comprehensively how the single steps and the final outcome are constrained by the 
whole structure. 
If a social security system can be considered as a net structure, the more comprehensive 
study of a policy might be done by understanding the interactions between the social 
security system and its surroundings, as argued already. A certain choice always arises 
from distinct conditions and, after being implemented, brings certain results which will 
cause certain reactions by those who are being influenced. All of these interactions, in 
turn, will become preconditions for the next policy making process. Authorities have to 
modify, improve or even change what has already been experienced according to the 
result of the operation and changing demands of people or different interest groups or 
their political rivals and the priority of the authority. The researcher of social policy 
could not do his work without analysing the surroundings of the changing conditions. 
There are many policy choices in the field of public provision programmes which have 
been considered by politicians. As far as unemployment insurance concerned, the 
range of policy choices includes at least the following: contributory or non- 
contributory, tripartite (employee, employer and the state) contributions or other 
alternatives, flat-rate or earnings-related benefits, central government controlled or 
condition that 'provided the national income is reasonably well distributed among the various sections 
of the population' and 'maintaining high employment' by increasingly successful economic measures 
(Richardson, 1980, p. 37-38). 
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locally administered, pay-as-you-go or funded schemes; etc. They are necessary 
elements which appear during the policy making process and determine the structure of 
the social security system. They cover choices which determine what benefits are to be 
offered to whom, how these benefits are to be delivered, and how they are to be 
financed. 
Since all the listed choices cannot be considered in the same depth during my study 
because of time-limitation, some of them must be given some priority. I shall focus on 
some of them, i. e. financing of the programme (contributory vs. non-contributory), 
payments of the benefits (flat rate or eamings-related) and regulations for entitlement of 
the benefits. While these elements will be given a relatively more detailed discussion, 
other choices will be also taken into account in varying degrees. However, instead of 
providing a mere description of the features of unemployment insurance of the three 
countries, I shall concentrate on the relationship between the characteristics of the 
schemes and their causes, with a hope that this aspect may lead to a more meaningful 
discussion about policy making process in this field. As Dye (1972) argues, policy 
analysis is intended to find out what governments do, why they do it and what 
difference it makes -- the description and explanation of the causes and consequences 
of government action. By examining the connections between the establishment of 
different welfare programmes for the unemployed in these three countries and the 
influence of political power and ideologies on the outcome of the decision making, I 
hope to be able to reveal the extent to which the differences in the designs of social 
security systems are largely determined by the political and social traditions and 
doctrines in each country. Further, I attempt to ask what lessons the decision making 
for the initial programmes in Britain, Sweden and the United States can offer to present 
policy makers in the three countries and, if possible, for other, especially developing, 
countries? 
In order to undertake the analytical work described above, I borrow Easton's systems 
theory as the starting point of my thesis. Easton (1965a) argues that the first important 
question is how a political system persists and changes over time. According to his 
thesis, one of the characteristics of political systems is their ability to respond and 
adopt to stress and therefore they are responsive and dynamic, and open to influence 
from a wider environment. One of the key elements of political systems is inputs in the 
form of demands and supports. They feed into those decision making process to 
produce outputs. These outputs are essentially the decisions and the policies of the 
authorities, and, within the systems framework, they will feedback into the system in 
the form of influence or pre-conditions for the future process. 
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Easton's framework theory is useful for our analysis of the policy process. It offers a 
way of simplifying the complex political phenomena, emphasises the independence of 
the various elements which constitute a whole process of political activity and, 
furthermore, demonstrates how the persistence and stability of political systems are 
maintained through change (Ham and Hill, 1984). However, we should accept his 
theoretical construction of the political system as an ideal type instead of what actually 
happens in practice. As Weber argued, '(a) kind of concept construction is peculiar to 
and, to a certain extent, indispensable to the cultural science' and the ideal typical 
concept will help to develop our skill in research because it offers a guidance to 
construct an hypothesis and gives unambiguous means of expression to a description of 
reality (Webber, 1949, pp. 89-90). The broadness and generality embodied in his 
discussion will be crystallised by focusing on two aspects of policy analysis: power 
structure and ideology (see next chapter). 
Therefore, the thesis is constructed in the following way. The next chapter is a literature 
review which involves both analysis of decision-making theory and, related to the 
factors mentioned in the decision-making process, discussion of various arguments 
concerning the key elements which determine the introduction and development of 
social policy. The second part can also function as the base for deciding the angle 
which this research is going to adopt and finding and selecting the essential materials 
involved in the case studies of the three countries. The following work will be included: 
1. Study of the theory of decision-making, as the theoretical foundation of the research; 
2. Examination of a few main approaches to social policy analysis involving a few 
important elements, which have played influential roles in development in the social 
policy area. 
Through this exploration, I shall be able to see how the policy choice has been 
influenced directly or indirectly by these factors. These theories will help shape and 
develop the research structure and put the ideas and selected materials of the three 
chosen countries into a certain framework. As a comparative study of three countries in 
the field under investigation will inevitably cover many materials, this framework will 
not only decide which materials are more relevant and appropriate for our purpose than 
others and therefore make this piece of research manageable within a limited period, but 
also provide an angle from which we can inspect the different experiences these three 
countries went through and discover the reasons behind them. After the three case 
studies chapters, a comparative analysis of unemployment insurance schemes in the 
three countries will be carried out. The final chapter is the conclusion. 
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Although the aims and theoretical significance of this study have been described 
previously, the verifiability of the theoretical analysis and historical description of 
events in this study has to rely on the read&s judgments about the contribution which 
this study might offer to the understanding of policy making in unemployment 
insurance schemes. This is because policy making is a world which is dependent on 
'our prior substantive judgments about the nature of that world, about what it contains 
and where we are in it' (McPherson and Raab, 1988, p. 66). 5 
Part Three Conclusion 
Due to the differences of the policy making contexts in different countries, even the 
same principle would be likely to be reflected in similar programmes in different ways. 
As the development of a welfare system is subject to the economic and political 
situations of a country, in order to make an adequate assessment of a public policy, we 
need to place it in the context in which it was raised, discussed and formalised. Instead 
of basing arguments on a purely ideological foundation and claiming that any 
implementation of the policies will necessarily have a detrimental effects on the 
economy, politics and people's lives, we should look at the contexts in which the 
operation and application of the policy choice are carried out. The discovery of the 
causes of the problems in the welfare area will lead to the recognition of effective 
methods to tackle the difficulties caused by the so-called 'welfare crisis'. A historical 
and comparative study adopted in this doctoral thesis enjoys two advantages in the 
sense of time and space. By looking at the origins of the unemployment insurance 
schemes in Britain, Sweden and the United States, we shall be able to examine the 
policy making in this field in a longitudinal and latitudinal dimension; the former 
implies the lessons we may learn from the past in order gain an additional weapon to 
deal with our problems at present, while the latter refers to the variables of the operation 
of the same policy world-wide. More meaningful is the inspiration that the other 
countries can derive for their efforts to establish or develop the welfare programme in 
the same field. 
5. Concerned with the development of a theory of morality and moral decision-making, Held (1989) and 
Anderson (1990) seek to discover the relationship between social principles and values and practice in 
the social policy field. In contrast to the idea which maintains that principles can be applied in a more 
or less pure form to any social situation, they argue that moral enquiry is a constant dialectic between 
principle and context; social principles can be tested and modified in accordance with the different 
contexts, which means that the different social situations require different approaches and lead to 
different policies arising from the same principles. The process of making the most informed decision 
involves flexibility in terms of operating these principles, and, therefore, it is more complicated than 
the scientific enquiry model (see Robinson, 1992, p. 137). 
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework and Research Questions 
In this chapter, I discuss the analytical approach that I intend to use in my research on the 
origins of unemployment insurance (UI) in three countries, Britain, Sweden and the 
United States. It is composed of three parts. Part One focuses on the discussion and 
criticism of systems theory, and is divided into five sections. In Section One, I introduce 
David Easton's systems theory and then discuss its advantages and disadvantages. In 
considering the shortcomings of the theory, in Section Two, I seek other important and 
useful factors and additional viewpoints for my investigation of the decision making 
process in the introduction of =employment insurance in the three countries. Two crucial 
variables, the political power structure and ideological positions, will be briefly 
discussed. Based on the suggestions in Section Two, I consider, in Section Three, the 
influence of the political parties and interest groups and the effects of ideologies in the 
decision-making process. As the roles played by the different political parties and interest 
groups are often constrained by their positions in the power structure, they make 
differing contributions to the outcomes of the decision making process. I review the 
various theories of power structure and the concept of 'non-decision' that is related to an 
understanding of the different influences from different parties in the power struggle. As 
far as the ideological element is concerned, I examine, in Section Four, the concept of 
'Dominant Ideology' and its importance in decision making. In Section Five, I present a 
brief summary of this part. 
In the first two sections of Part Two, I concentrate on the analysis of some important 
factors involved in decision-making in social policy. This discussion, which includes 
reference to my previous discussion, mainly concentrates on the following elements: 
Ideology, economic feasibility and political suitability. The complex influence of these 
three components in the specific decision-making environment will be considered and the 
theory of economic determination in social policy will be questioned. Following a 
summary of the previous discussion in this section, the importance of adopting a 
historical and comparative research method in this study, and a consideration of the 
disadvantages of the other aforementioned approaches and theories will be discusssed in 
Section three. Section Four is an outline of the research questions, while Section Five is 
a summary of this section. 
The last part of this chapter is the summary and conclusion. 
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Part one Theoretical Approaches to the Policy Making Process 
Section one Easton's Systems Theory -- Its Advantages and Disadvantages 
Political System and Its Two Main Elements 
According to Easton (1965a), the idea of system, as a natural phenomenon, signifies a set 
of interactions that are naturally interdependent, so that a change of one part will affect the 
action of another. Political life can be defined as 'an adaptive, self-regulating, and self- 
transforming system of behaviour' (1965a, p. 26,1965b, p. 17), through which 
commodities are allocated for a society by the authorities. The distribution of goods 
among the individuals and groups in society is influenced by their conflicting needs for 
scarce resources. The settlement of the conflict through the rearrangement of the 
resources renders a political system stable. If the system fails to adjust to changing 
situations by adopting the necessary measures to regulate its future behaviour, it will 
possibly be replaced by others, or its internal structure and processes will be transformed 
entirely. 
The operation of a political system is thus characteristically a dynamic process. The 
dynamic characteristic of a political system is connected with its function as described 
above. At the core of systems analysis in the political field, two factors, namely, 
demands and supports, and the decisions made by its members, can be regarded as inputs 
and outputs respectively. Easton represents a simple model of political system in the 
following way: 
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(Source: Easton, 1965a, p. 112) 
For Easton, demands can be defined as a statement of opinion that a certain decision, 
with regard to a particular subject matter, should, or should not, be made by those in 
power. They can originate from a people's dissatisfaction with their changing situation 
which could pose a threat to the system. By recognising the demands, politicians would 
direct themselves to the major problems and, as a consequence, make decisions according 
to the suggestions, proposals and concerns of those whose interests are involved 
(Easton, 1965b, pp. 38,48). 
The nature of the demands is closely related to the expectations, beliefs, interests and 
preference of those who present them, as Lasswell and Kaplan (1952) have argued that 
'(a) demand statement is one expressing a valuation by the maker of the statement' 
(p. 17). Here, demands could be regarded as a medium which connects the political and 
non-political sectors of the society. The different sources of demands will have distinct 
effects on the process and the outcome of decision-making and the political elites' 
ideologies bred within the political system itself should be given particular attention. 
As far as the term, supports, is concerned, they can be divided into overt support and 
covert support. Ile former consists of external actions by a person or a group to promote 
goals, ideas, institutions, actions or individuals. The latter, which can be more important 
than the former, refers to a person or a group who has a supportive frame of mind or 
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supportive attitudes to the ideas or objects of a person or organisation. The input of 
support into a system can be measured in terms of 'the intensity of individual feelings and 
behaviour together with the number of individuals involved. However this dimension 
can be misleading. Many members may feel incapable of implementing their ideas as they 
lack things such as organisations, skills, and resources. On the other hand, a few 
powerful members, such as active political elites, can make their expressions of support 
more forceful and have greater effect on the persistence or change of a system. Thus the 
power of the members should be considered as an intrinsic component when we estimate 
the effectiveness of the input of their support (Easton, 1965b, pp. 159,160,166-167). 
Supports, as the other major input of political systems, are important in the sense that, 
without support, firstly, demands could not be processed into outputs by authorities, 
secondly, some kind of stability in rules and structures used to convert demands into 
outputs can not be assured for a regime and, lastly, a minimal cohesion of the 
membership of a political community can hardly be maintained (ibid. p. 157). 
Advantages of Systems Approach 
A systems analysis encourages us to interpret political life as an open system (Easton, 
1965a, p. 34,1965b, p. 497). No system can succeed forever in escaping all the effects of 
internal or external changes. In order to allow a political system to survive, its members 
must be able to cope with the problems resulting from these changes or unresolved 
differences in society. They can do it by modifying its goals, structure, rules or 
behaviour. 
The concepts and method the theory offers reveal how the system itself manages to 
perform or persist through change and how it converts the inputs of demands and 
supports into output (Easton, 1965b, pp. 475-6). With demands and supports as two 
variables in our analysis, we can discover the motives behind the options taken by the 
policy maker in the whole process in order to deal with the challenge and maintain the 
power of support. 'For him, the ability to block a policy may not indicate pathology but 
be a vital and necessary safeguard for the well-being of himself, his colleagues and the 
organisation of which he is part. ' (Hall et aL, 1975, p. 24). The approach can therefore 
provide a valuable description and analysis of actual social conditions, social problems 
and the measures used to tackle them (Goldthorpe, 1962, pp. 18-21). 
We can argue that the decisions and actions taken to deal with the internal or external 
stress are constrained by the resources, traditions, available skills and political concerns 
the authorities possess. 'Mis may also be related to some groups' political incompetence 
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in the competitive interactions in politics, and, as a result, they can not even put their 
demands onto the decision-making agenda. This so-called non-decision matter has been 
analysed by Bachrach and Baratz (1970) and I shall discuss it in Section Three. In this 
context, we can ask: To what extent do the policies enacted by governments reflect their 
supporters' interests and demands? How successfully can the pressure groups play their 
roles by demonstrating their demands in decision-making? Are these demands necessary 
or a sufficient indicator for initiating change and ensuring the success of government 
policies? Under what circumstances are certain issues (or demands) given priority over 
others? The systems framework helps us to identify the central features of demands and 
supports in the policya-making process and the reasons why some demands are ignored or 
excluded. 
The Theory s Disadvantages 
The first shortcoming of the systems theory is associated with the broadness and even 
ambiguities in the way the theory was constructed and related questions were discussed. 
Easton (1965b) claims that we can apply the present mode to any study of the specific 
systems (p. 481). However, because the theory pays attention to broader theoretical 
objectives, it does not provide specific answers to questions such as the conditions for 
the operation and persistence of a particular type of system. To achieve a deeper and more 
relevant understanding of the system in question, a whole range of more specific 
questions concerning it need to be considered. This becomes especially important when 
students of politics find themselves bound to current policy needs and carry out their 
research within the dynamic context of social problems, social actions and social change 
in order to answer immediate problems. Concerning the question of the nature of the 
boundary that tells us 'when a person is acting as a member of a political system and 
when his interactions occur outside this area' (Easton, 1965a, p. 59), there is an absence, 
on a theoretical level, of manifest signs indicating clearly the features of this border 
across which the exchanges between a political system and its environment occur and 
continue. 
The second weakness of the systems framework refers to its failure to answer the 
question of the importance of ideological factors in determining the fate of the demands 
(ibid., p. 37). Human action, it claims, is controlled by the system for its functional 
requirements. This explanation of the development of human history is therefore 
apparently deterministic. In his article, Functionalism and SystemsTheory Walsh (1972) 
argues that, rather than being shaped by a social system, man constructs the world that he 
lives in and does not act according to a social role imposed by the society, for the purpose 
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of meeting the needs of that society (Walsh in Filmer, Phillipson, Silverman and Walsh 
(eds. ), 1972. Also see Haralambos and Heald (eds. ), 1985, p. 533). 6 As elected policy- 
makers are overwhelmingly from the more favoured classes, and are therefore more 
likely to be sympathetic to the desires of interest group leaders (Lindblom, 1968), it is 
important to know the policy-makers' ideology when they choose a particular demand as 
the basis for initiating their policies. 
The third weakness of this approach, which is connected with the above criticism, is its 
tendency to exaggerate the importance of value-consensus in maintaining social order. 
Although values shared by the various segments of the society may help their holders to 
obtain the same goal and therefore increase system stability, the value consensus is 
mainly a theoretical assumption, and hardly a matter of real existence. Abercrombie et al. 
(1990) argue that the existence of shared values or a common culture, as history 
suggests, does not appear to be empirically a necessary requirement of the existence or 
continuity of actual societies (pp. 5,232-3,245-6). Parsons (1951) argues that although 
each society imposes certain rules on its individual actors, these rules are never fully 
accepted and integrated within the personality structure of the actors without alienating 
elements. In fact every complex social system is filled with conflicts and adaptive patterns 
with respect to whatever value-system it may have (pp. 293-7). Secondly, the cohesion 
within society derives from a social competition for unequal rewards where there is no 
common commitment to core values (Mann, 1970, p. 424. Quoted in Mennell, 1974, 
p. 126). Moreover, it is dangerous to assume that value consensus increases social 
harmony without considering the conflicting interests of different groups in society and 
thinking of the content of value, i. e., whose values and ends these are. Value consensus 
'is merely a legislation of the position of the dominant group. ' (Gouldner, 1954, pp. 20- 
21; Haralambos and Heald, 1985, p. 533). 
Another weakness of the systems approach is its potential tendency to interpret what 
happens in society for its functional needs as characteristically universal. Easton (1965b) 
claims that whether research is about only one political system or cross-system is 'of 
significance only for the enrichment and enhancement of the reliability of a theory, not for 
its intrinsic nature' (P. 484). There is only one difference between international and 
6. Referring to the question, do the authorities merely react to external factors or do they themselves 
anticipate and then generate and champion certain issues, Griffith (1970) argues that they make up their 
own minds and put into effect their own policies. Changes in the framework of the law are in their 
hands and every piece of legislation put before Parliament by the Government is usually to give more 
power to the Government (Griffith in Hanson and Crick (eds. ), 1970, pp. 15,22-23). 
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national systems, namely that, in the former, the component units include the latter as 
subsystems, the latter respond and participate in the international system (ibid., p. 486). 
In the context of the welfare system, this argument indicates 'the cross-national 
similarities rather than differences; being industrialised or capitalist over-determines 
cultural variations or differences in power relations' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 13). It 
claims that the creation of the welfare state is necessary because industrial isation has 
destroyed the traditional institutions of social reproduction, such as the family, and 
solidarity, such as market dependence; it is also possible because the modem bureaucratic 
organisation, as an efficient form, can manage collective goods and promote the growth 
of the welfare state (Flora and Alber in Flora and Heidenheimar (eds. ), 1981). Its 
accounts of the development of social policy therefore have three shortcomings: the 
functional inevitability as origins; the general benefit as consequences; similarity in all 
advanced countries as patterns (George and Wilding, 1976, pp. 13,14). 7 
Section Two Power and Ideology -- Their Importance in Analyses of 
Decision Makino 0 
On the basis of my previous discussion of Easton's systems theory and its shortcomings, 
in this section, I attempt to explore some ideas of power structure and ideology contained 
in other models of the political system. They will be used as supplements to the previous 
discussion of systems framework, and are intended to make our analysis of politics 
referring to the two main factors of political system, demand and support, more specific 
and substantial. With all of them together, I hope that a more solid theoretical base to my 
empirical study can be established and a concrete and adequate analysis of the different 
relevant elements of the decision-mak-ing process can be undertaken. My discussion of 
these additional ideas in this section will be brief, as a more detailed analysis of them will 
be carried out in next section. 
As has been pointed out earlier, the functionalist theory tends to underestimate the 
importance and complexity of ideological factors in the political system. Since the 
complex is defined as an interactive process in which the conflicting demands of various 
parts of a society over value allocation, some problems, like the nature of the conflict of 
interests, the different power relationships within the system and the values and 
ideologies of the participants, will have to be included in our discussion. 
7. For more detailed discussions, see Part Two, Sections One, Two and Three. 
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Ideological Aspect 
Ideologies can be understood in a specific sense as distinctive kinds of beliefs of people 
which are produced by particular social structures, and in a general sense, as any set of 
beliefs regardless of its social causation. As belief systems, they are influential in shaping 
demands. They could be classified according to the content of the demands, which can 
range from economic beliefs to convictions about the role of freedom and beliefs about 
organisations, like the political system, of society. Lasswell and Kaplan (1952) argue that 
all groups might be thought of as interest groups organised for the satisfaction of their 
interests. Group consciousness is the degree to which there is identification with the 
group based on its demands, expectations and solidarity concerning valid interests; it 
initially increases when in conflict with other groups (pp. 38,40,45,46). 
In analysing political processes, neither a purely socio-economic approach nor an abstract 
functionalist perspective can be adequate to explain 'political forces that generate changes' 
(Banting, 1979, p. 1; Clasen, 1993, p. 27). To view a particular piece of legislation as 
'imperative' in solving a particular social problem does not indicate that the social system 
would collapse without such a development; rather, certain ends, such as political 
stability and economic progress, can be achieved by introducing such a policy. This kind 
of interpretation remains on a high level of generality and is itself not sufficient to 
consider the specific institutional forms in one country (Goldthorpe, 1962, pp. 22-28). In 
addition, it takes little account of the significance of articulate thought or belief in the 
process. For its followers, it is not the ideas and beliefs of individuals, but the objective 
'demands' of certain social situations that ultimately explain the courses of action (ibid., 
pp. 14-6). 
In order to assess the importance of the beliefs of the participants to the outcome of a 
decision-making process, we need to inquire to what extent the government's ideology 
constrains the orientation of its policy. Can ideologies from other organisations, such as 
the political parties or trade unions, have any essential influence on decisions? When 
circumstances are not favourable for the implementation of the ideas incorporated in the 
party's ideology, how can the party deal with the situation? 
As mentioned in the previous discussion, the demands of the different groups are treated 
in quite different ways. While the requirements of some groups can get particular 
attention from the decision-makers, other groups may even be unable to get their appeals 
heard, and, as a result, their voice is ignored and their needs fail to gain access to the 
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decision making process. As Lasswcll and Kaplan (1952) argue, the dominant opinion is 
not necessarily the majority one, 'the opinion of an influential minority may be that which 
is actually effective. ' (p. 40). Based on these arguments, we shall go on to consider in 
detail 'non-decisions' which will be discussed in the following section. 
The Effect of the Power Structure 
The functionalist analysis of the policy development might be modified in two specific 
points: one is that the 'necessity'of a policy must be related to certain ends of individuals 
and groups; the other is that the purposive action is directed towards various ends; the 
ends of individuals and groups rather than the 'needs' of society as a whole should be 
considered in an analysis (Goldthorpe, 1962, p. 28). Thus in the context of policy- 
making, we need to examine certain programmes to see which group(s) in the society will 
get most benefits and what the potential effect on the interests of other groups is. In order 
to do this, it is necessary for us to analyse how the different groups and parties contribute 
to the outcome of such a policy and why. This is related, initially, to the problem of 
power distribution. 
The pluralist, new-corporatist and the class models are the three that can be considered 
(see Korpi, 1983). Based on the experience of democratic political systems during the 
post-war period, the pluralist model suggests that, due to the ever-growing complexity of 
technology in industrial societies, the class structure of the early industrial society, with 
labour and capital as its two basic opposed classes, has been replaced with a multiplicity 
of smaller and more specialised interest groups. The degree of the interest conflicts 
between classes has therefore become less serious. All groups are given roughly equal 
opportunities to mobilise their power and exert influence on the policy making process, 
and the state is seen as neutral in terms of its relationsWp to each of them. This model has 
been attacked by various schools for its tendency to stress the equal influence of different 
powers in politics and to oversimplify the way in which interests are perceived and 
articulated (Hall el al., 1975). The most successful challenge has come from 
'corporatism' which maintains that there is an unequal distribution of power resources 
that makes society relatively stable. Those few, monopolist interest organisations, instead 
of seeking for access and influence, as claimed by the pluralists, have a close relationship 
with the state and are able to participate in policy-making and its implementation. 8 
8. According to Schinitter, corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation. I'lie &I 
constituent units are or-anised into a limited number of categories which are singular, compulsory, 00 
noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally differentiated. They are recognised or licensed (if 
not created) by the state and granted an organisational monoply within their respective categories. and 91 
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Korpi (1983) argues that both these explanations of the development of capitalist 
democracies are inadequate and must be questioned. The biggest flaw of the pluralist 
school is related to its assumptions that 'class divisions and inequalities in power are no 
longer significant' in changing society, while the neo-corporatist model fails to offer an 
adequate concept of the role of power in the process of structuring so-called neo- 
corporatist institutions. The latter ignores the fact that these institutions possibly reflect 
interest conflicts caused by changes in the distribution of power resources between 
classes and interest groups. Not only the definitions of social problems but also the 
alternative solutions are affected by the power distribution (Korpi, 1983, pp. 12-3). 
According to the class model, there are two types of power resources. The first one 
involves control of capital over the means of production and the second one is 'human 
capital, ' i. e., labour power, education and occupational skills. Ile use of human capital 
is dependent on the demand within the labour market and the directives of management in 
employment (ibid., p. 18). This model emphasises that the real power to determine 
decisions and regulate demands is in the hands of a small section of the society and elites 
who usually control economic resources. The strength and political position of working- 
class-based organisations in power resources can also be significantly effective. Through 
bargaining between the state, labour and capital, the settlements that involve various 
compromises will cause the creation of new social institutions or changes to the existing 
system (ibid., pp. 19,20). 
The class-mobilisation thesis, therefore, differing from systems or structuralist analyses, 
emphasises the social classes as the main agents of change and assumes that the balance 
of class power determines distributional outcomes. Under a 'social democratic' welfare 
state, for instance, power mobilisation depends not only on the levels of trade-union 
organisation, share of the votes and parliamentary and cabinet seats held by left or labour 
parties, but also on the working-class's capacity to forge a political alliance with, for 
example, the farmers (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 14,18). 'Me competition for influence 
among the different parties and pressure groups is sometimes considerable, compromise 
becomes necessary. According to Friedrich (1937), there are principled interests and 
expediency interests in all parties or groups. Although these two are not always present 
and equally effective, no parties or groups lack either of these elements completely. In 
order to hold together, a party will make concessions to a variety of perhaps incompatible 
interests. Therefore expediency interests are relatively more constant than principled 
obtain certain controls on the selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports (Schmitter, 
1979, p. 13. See Mendes, 1990, p. 23). 
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interests and principled interests are modified as they come into conflict with expediency 
interests (see Lasswell and Kaplan, 1952, pp. 42-3,44). 
Section Three: Power Structure and the Functions of Parties and Pressure 
Groups 
Following Section Two, the main tasks of this and the next sections are to search at a 
more specific level for the significance and implications of the political power structure 
and ideologies of society in the decision making process. 
Since different sections of a society obtain different positions in the power structure, the 
ideas of the more privileged group or party is likely to be more influential in this process, 
the others may have less or no impact at all. The relevance of the above three models in 
explaining the power distribution in Western societies may be limited to different political 
situations and particular periods; the assumption of the role of the working class in the 
class model may be better illustrated by the experience of the organised labour force 
which historically acted within Swedish trade unions in the 1930s and by that of Britain 
than that of the United States. In America, the working class movement has been 
insignificant, the merest groups that fight for their own specific aims. These accounts 
indicate that in order to understand precisely the roles of the various groups and parties in 
politics, we should first take into account their political positions and status and the 
relationships with others. 
The Different Relationships Between State and Pressure Groups and the 
Latter's Roles 
As a major source of demands, pressure groups can have a powerful impact on 
governments. Political parties have to collect, sift and condense demands for their 
political purposes. Ile attention one group's voice can gain from the government is 
closely connected to its strength in political contests. 
According to Peters (1978), the different relationships between the bureaucracy and 
pressure groups in different countries are classified within four categories and the 
influence from the pressure groups on policies varies from being seen as quite 
illegitimate, to being legally accepted, or even required. In the first relationship, the 
pressure groups are not only accepted by the political system but also legally involved in 
the process of policy making and implementation. Sweden can be regarded as an example 
of this type. In the second relationship, one interest group rather than all groups, as a 
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legitimate representative of a particular sector of the society, is accorded regular access to 
the decision making process. In the third relationship, a pressure group gains access to 
decision-making through its attachment to a particular party rather than through its ability 
to represent a sector of the society. While the former gets supports from the hegemonic 
party, the latter imposes its control over policy-making. This type of interaction can be 
found in the relationships between the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party in 
the United Kingdom and between the AFL-CIO and the Democratic party in the United 
States (La Palombara, 1965; Peters, 1978, pp. 152-3). These three legitimate patterns 
imply a certain stability and institutionalisation of influence. By contrast, in the last type, 
the illegitimate relationship, neither the system nor the individual administrators accept the 
inputs of the pressure groups as legitimate. The impacts of these groups on policies and 
the possibility of reaching the consensus among them are at best episodic. 
With respect to the relationships between the bureaucracy and pressure groups of various 
systems, Peters (1978) argues that the relationships play a crucial role in understanding 
the nature of the policy making process in advanced societies. Despite the conflict, these 
two parties can still be on good terms because 'they need each other' and '(t)his need of 
both parties for the resources of the other can provide a general answer to the finding of 
frequent co-operation between bureaucracies and pressure groups. ' (p. 142). Lindblom 
(1968) also argues that the reasons authorities pay attention to pressure group leaders are, 
firstly, they may influence their members' voting behaviour; secondly, as participants, 
they can make themselves heard in the decision making process and thirdly, they are able 
to exert their influence on the appropriate policy-makers through persuasion and help 
them to reach a decision concerning policy choices (Lindblom, 1968, pp. 63-64,66). 
'Non-decisions' 
The above discussion implies that, due to the different political systems, the different 
groups within a society play different roles in the decision making process. The only 
way, Dahl (1961) argues, employing a pluralist approach in the context of American 
politics, to analyse 'power' is to examine carefully a series of concrete decisions, to see 
who (individuals or groups) prevails in the decision-making and therefore who holds the 
most power. In this process, actual conflicts (of interests) between the actors will be 
definitely involved. While the proposals initiated by some participants will be finally 
adopted, the alternatives suggested by the others will be turned down (pp. 93,336. Also 
see Polsby, 1963; 1980, p. 113-121). 
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According to Bachrach and Baratz (1970), Dahl's theory ignores the fact that elites can 
prevent those unacceptable issues from being taken into account in the decision-making 
process. '[Plower may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision- 
making to relatively "safe" issues', while some groups and issues can not gain access to 
the decision-making process (p. 6. Also see Crenson, 1971, pp. 178,181). It is therefore 
a one-dimensional view of power (Lukes, 1974, pp. 13-4). 
Because of the'mobilisation of bias'of a political system, 'a set of predominant values, 
beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures ("rules of the game") operate systematically 
and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others' 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1970, p. 43). This results in some 'demands that are not 
articulated: the proposals which languish interminably in the queue or are emasculated 
beyond recognition. ' (Hall, Parker, Land and Webb, 1975, p. 151). This so-called non- 
decision-making refers to a confinement of the scope of decision-making, while decision- 
making is a choice among alternative modes of action. However, non-decision should not 
merely be regarded as a negative feature, as Parry and Morris (1982) argue that in many 
cases non-decisions can be regarded as decisions. It occurs firstly when there is a 
disagreement between parties and the political elite over the matter concerned and, 
secondly, when there is controversy among different groups about recognising 
something as an issue (Parry and Morris in McGrew and Wilson (eds. ), 1982, pp. 28-9). 
In Crenson's words, 'we must account for things that do not happen, ... Inaction is just 
as much as a fact, just as susceptible to empirical verifications, as is action. ' (Crenson, 
1971, p. 26). 
Lukes (1974) argues, the two-dimensional view of power of Bachrach and Baratz has a 
wider aspect than the one held by the pluralists. They take into account not only the 
interests, in the form of preference of policy, of those who are engaged in decision- 
making but also the interests, in the form of overt or covert grievances, of those who are 
not allowed access to the political system (p. 20). However, its advance is limited by its 
focus on the individual's decisions. 'Me power should also be examined in the context of 
an institution or a system. The bias of the system can be mobilised, recreated and 
reinforced by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and the 
practices of institutions (ibid., pp. 21-22,37-8). 
One difficulty Lukes' analysis, the three-dimensional view, has is how and where is the 
line to be drawn between structural determination, on the one hand, and an exercise of 
power, on the other. Lukes argues that sociological research must look at the complex 
interrelations between structural determinism and individual motivation as the origin of 
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social action. In one way, the behaviour of individuals is limited by the groups and 
organisations in which they act together, but on the other hand, they also have a certain 
relative autonomy. The problem here is which factors are the most crucial as components 
of a sociological environment and how they influence the decision-making process, and 
the different roles they play (ibid., pp. 50-52). 
Despite the differences between these three views of power, all of them stress the 
important role played by the observable conflict of interests of the participants in the 
exercise of power. Therefore, the exercise of power, decision-making and conflict of 
interests are regarded as key points for the observers of a political system, in Lukes, 
words, 'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's 
interests' (Lukes, 1974, p. 26,27). Thus the matter of 'conflict of interests' deserves 
careful attention from the researchers when they construct their arguments on the exercise 
of power in the process of policy-making. Therefore we should go further to consider 
'interest'-related issues, such as in which aspects and for what purpose, or in which 
given situations, the participants (parties and groups) of the political process seek for and 
fight for their own 'interests', or intend to make compromises with other groups when 
necessary. 
One of the elements which may make contribution to the fate of one groups'demands is 
its beliefs. The fact that some groups' demands and suggestions fail to access to the 
political process or are ignored willingly by the decision-makers may be mainly attributed 
to a relative political weakness of these group(s) or the incompatibility of their 
ideology(s) or value judgements with that of the people in power. We can ask, do the 
dominant or ruling classes, or the political party in power, always exert their successful 
control over the ideology or the policy preference of the other groups? What are the 
factors which explain their success or failure in that sense? In the following section, I 
shall discuss the concept of Dominant Ideology and its function in the power structure. 
Section Four Dominant Ideology 
Some Marxists, such as Miliband (1974) and Poulantzas (1978), argue that there is a- 
powerful, effective dominant ideology in contemporary capitalist societies and this 
dominant ideology has created an acceptance of capitalism by the working class. Based 
on their observation of the apparent stability of capitalist societies and the lack of a radical 
working-class consciousness, they claim that to reduce the destructive effects of the 
economic contradictions of capitalism, its superstructure, particularly its ideology, must 
have played a significant role. In all class-based societies, the dominant class controls the 
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construction of a set of coherent beliefs with their own dominant beliefs, and they are so 
powerful that they infect the consciousness of the working-class. By doing so, the 
dominant class incorporate the working class into a system which in effect is 
incompatible with its material interests. 
The thesis has been criticised by Abercrombie et al (1980,1990). They argue that there 
is a dominant ideology, but its precise content is not always carefully specified in the 
thesis. Dominant classes benefit from the effects of the dominant ideology, yet there is 
little study of the impact of the dominant ideology on the dominant classes. What has 
been important for the stability of capitalism is the coherence of the dominant class itself, 
and ideology has played a major role in securing this coherence but not for a society as 
whole, therefore the importance of ideology has been exaggerated by these theorists 
(Abercrombie et aL, 1980, pp. 1-3,29; 1990, p. 2). Whether the function of a dominant 
ideology is powerful or not is a historical matter and should be examined in relation to its 
historical circumstances. Ile reason for the relative stability of modem capitalist society 
should be attributed to its provision of a better stream of rewards for most people than 
other existing systems (ibid., 1980, p. 165; 1990, p. 24). 
The above arguments reflect the influence of materialistic thinking. They suggest that the 
coherence of society is an unintended consequence of an integrated dominant class, in a 
context where all other classes are constrained by their economic subordination. rMere is 
considerable historical evidence to suggest that societies are not in fact organised around 
common cultures which are able to embrace different classes. It is a dull compulsion of 
everyday economic realities that forces human beings to work and binds them to social 
order. If there is any cultural coherence in society, it is more likely to express itself 
through the cultural and ideological integration of the dominant classes rather than the 
ideological incorporation of the working class into society (ibid., 1980, p. 158; 1990, 
pp. 245-6,248-9). 
While it is essential to connect the stability of the system with its improved distributional 
system, this theory has a tendency to belittle the ideological influence on the whole 
process of this redistributional struggle and its result. Especially, when the organised 
working class became more aware of their interests, their struggle for their living 
standards was more likely to be under the influence of certain ideologies. As far as the 
dominant classes are concerned, we cannot consider the material benefits or higher living 
standards of the working class as solely the natural result of the market system and 
disregard the effort made by the ruling classes of society. 
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The ruling classes' actions related to social reforms originated from their understanding 
of the social problems and prediction of the possible negative effects on society as a 
whole or their own class interests. In particular, influenced by the on-going public 
debates and theories, some leading figures or liberal-minded politicians produced certain 
proposals in order to tackle these problems. The improvement of the living standards of 
the working class can be regarded as the consistent accumulation of these proposals, 
strategies or compromises. Ideological function is not only to direct the different parts of 
a society to realise their economic aims and then attain or enhance their solidarity but also 
to help them to understand and appreciate these results or make plans for a further 
improvement. 
In his work, Law and Public Opinion in England in the Nineteenth Centgry, Dicey 
(1914) argued that the development of legislation in England had a close connection with 
the support from the public or the citizens who were active in public life, and the 
dominant opinion originated or was influenced by certain intellectual figures and their 
schools. For Goldthorpe what Dicey excluded from his thesis but which were very 
important in explaining adequately the process were those factors, such as population 
growth, the development of industrial organisation, urbanisation and the important part 
played by the civil servants, the social investigators, the organisers of reformist pressure 
groups etc. The sociological approach adopted by him regards the growth of social policy 
as a complex process of social change in a society as a whole, not a product simply of the 
development of dominant thought and belief (Goldthorpe, 1962, pp. 8,9,11). 
I would like to suggest that it is true that the social developments mainly occurred first, a 
change of social and political thought from individualism to collectivism appeared later, 
yet the role played by the dominant idea in the society or within the parties for social 
reforms, as the mediator between the social changes and the emergence of a collectivist 
state, should not be underestimated. When a society is approaching an important 
transformation period, knowing how to interpret the situation and by whom can 
sometimes become crucial for its future development. In this respect, Dicey's theory can 
be useful. 
An historical account of the origins of certain types of ideology, like Abercrombie and his 
colleagues presented, would also help us to examine the changing relationships between 
the mode of production, the influence of an ideology and the changing class structure. 
Through this historical analysis, the impact of the dominant ideology on the development 
of a society will be properly understood with reference to not only the economic but also 
the cultural and political dimension. In this context, we should concentrate on how the 
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decision makers, or the elites, make a decision that embodies the influence of the 
dominant ideas of the society, and to what extent this decision reflects the interests and 
ideology of the subordinate groups. Although value consensus is not regarded as the 
essential basis of stability of social systems (see the previous discussion of the 
disadvantages of Easton's theory), it is still necessary to seek the possibility of 
appearance of commonly supported ideas or theories in society. 
Section Five Summary 
Easton's systems theory is useful in the sense that it holds a dynamic view of politics, 
and analyses what happens in this area against its environment. However, due to the 
general terms of its description of interactions between the various parties in politics, it is 
necessary for us to complete the theory with other factors for the sake of making a more 
accurate study as this research intends. Two elements have been chosen and given 
particular attention: the power structure and ideologies of the participants of the decision 
making process. The political influences of the pressure groups to much extent depend to 
a large extent on their political constitutions. Peter's discussion of four categories of the 
relationship between the pressure groups and the bureaucracy indicates that the 
contribution of a pressure group to the decision making process varies from one political 
culture to another. Its political role can be fully accepted by one system and thereby by 
law greatly influence the outcome of the decision making process, yet, this may be 
rejected legally in another system. While one of the pressure groups is allowed regular 
involvement in the decision making process by one political system, as representative of 
one part of the society, all these groups can participate in this negotiation, presenting their 
interests or putting their demands on the policy agenda in a different system. 
All these various arrangements reflect the different relationship between pressure groups 
and political parties. In order to make an accurate judgement about the influence one 
pressure group can exert on a political system, the power structure in this society should 
be taken into account. Because of an unequal distribution of power resources between the 
different groups in a society, the concepts of policy choices and 'non-decision' have been 
discussed. For Bachrach and Baratz (1970), power does not only refer to decision, the 
successful exercise of power by one privileged group, which may be hostile to an other 
group's interests, but also includes non-decision, the unsuccessful attempt of some 
groups to make demands in the decision making process. The concept of 'non-decision' 
is criticised by Parry and Morris (1982), as for them 'non-decisions' are in many cases 
decisions, and decision-making is a process of choosing one course of action from many 
possibilities. Whether or not we recognise the grievances of some groups as a political 
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issue, there are always controversial opinions among the different actors in politics. In 
spite of these criticisms, the concept of 'non-decisionprovides more than one dimension 
for the analysts of politics. Lukes (1974) especially discusses this matter in a sociological 
context. He argues that all these different explanations about power indicate the fact that 
the exercise of power involves the observable interest conflict of the different actors in 
political system. Based on his argument, we may argue that interest conflict should be 
analysed in its political, economic, ideological and cultural background. 
The interactions of the participants in politics are very much influenced by their value 
judgements. In order to assess the importance of the different ideologies held by these 
parties and groups, Abercrombie, Hill and Turner's theory of Dominant Ideology (1990) 
has been applied to this discussion. In response to some Marxists' argument about the 
significant role played by the dominant ideology of the dominant class on the stability of 
the capitalist societies and its effect on the working class, they argue that the function of 
the dominant ideology should be judged historically and its influence on the dominant 
class should also be considered. The coherence of the dominant class ensured by the 
dominant ideology has been important for the stability of the capitalist societies. It is the 
economic relations (interests) not the dominant ideology that has played a significant role 
for the acceptance by the working class of modem societies, because this system offers it 
with better living conditions. 
17heir arguments appear to be materialistic in that they attribute the social stability solely to 
the economic relations. Iley also attempt to disconnect ideology from politics, as for 
them, this stability is an unintended consequence of the dominant class. While they 
assess dominant ideology against its historical account and stress the economic solution 
of interest conflict, they however have failed to go further to examine the complex 
process of the improvement of the distributional system. This improvement should not be 
regarded as a natural outcome but as a result of the efforts from both sides of the capitalist 
society. The ruling class's effort is related to its understanding of the social problems, 
such as unemployment, caused by the market system and the anticipation of its negative 
effect on them, while the working class had become aware of the shortcomings of the 
system which had led them to fight for their interests with a mobilised force. The 
influence of the ideas of the intellectuals and leading figures on shaping the public 
opinions should not be ignored as Dicey's arguments (1905) imply, although the 
appearance of these philosophies was closely connected to the changing social systems as 
Goldthorpe (1962) claimed. 
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Part Two Analytical Elements of the Decision-Making System 
in Unemployment Insurance and the Related Research 
Questions 
In the previous discussions, the political system is regarded as a dynamic domain, with 
the main function of solving the interest conflict between different parties and groups. 
These parties and groups occupy various positions within the power structure and hold 
different ideologies in the struggle for their own interests. In this part, I apply these 
concepts in the context of social security systems. The aim is to identify the basic 
elements which are required in the analysis of social policy and in my empirical study of 
the initiation of unemployment insurance (Ul) schemes in Britain, Sweden and the United 
States. 
Part Two is composed of five sections: Section One questions the efficacy of studies in 
the field of social policy which are based on a single perspective. Section Two identifies 
analytical factors which may contribute to the decision making process in Ul. Following 
the arguments presented in the first two sections, Section Three reviews the advantages 
of adopting a comparative approach to research in social welfare systems, while Section 
Four presents research questions for my empirical study of Ul of these three countries. 
Finally, Section Five provides a summary of Part Two. 
Section One The Impracticality of the Single-Cause Perspective of 
Development of Welfare Policy for Unemployment 
Heidenhcimer et al. - (1990) argue that the study of social policy involves the analyses of 
three basic elements: 'how, why and to what effect' governments pursue particular 
courses of action or inaction (p. 3). Ginsburg (1992) refers to these three elements as 
origins, substance and the impact of policy (p. 2). For an adequate analysis of the process 
of social policy formulation, George and Wilding (1985) argue, it is useful to distinguish 
two stages: 1) Decisions with respect to whether legislative change will take place and 2) 
What the actual form and shape of legislation will be. In the first stage, according to 
George and Wilding, two different explanations can be applied to social policy 
formulation: one considers primarily the conflicting social and economic class interests 
and the other focuses on social values. In the second stage, various groups seek to 
influence the direction which legislation takes, in accordance with their economic interests 
and value systems. They caution, however, the separation of the analysis of policy 
origins and policy substance is problematic. As in practice, policy analysis is always 
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concerned with origins and substance and there is an overlap between these two stages 
(George and Wilding, 1985). 
As one of the schools that has explored the causes of social policy development, 
'technological determinism' argues that the technology of a modem industrial society 
makes the creation of a 'welfare state' both necessary and inevitable (Wilensky and 
Lebeaux, 1965, p. 230). Along with economic development in industrialised societies, 
members of different social classes are conscious of their economic vulnerability to 
various contingencies, such as industrial or occupational accidents, unemployment, and 
so on. Due to the loss of the functions of traditional forms of social and economic 
assistance, individuals, the affluent as well as the poor, increasingly rely upon 
government protection to combat income insecurity, 'regardless of the left-right 
complexion of the governing regime. ' (Heidenheimer et aL, 1983, p. 208). In his 
comparison of social security spending in sixty-four states in the period between 1966 
and 1975, Wilensky concludes that economic level 'overwhelms regime type as a 
predictor of social security effort' over the long term (Wilensky et aL, 1985, p. 9). This 
argument tends to support the convergence thesis -- industrialisation and economic 
growth determine the convergent welfare state reforms. 
The systems-structural approach, like the economic approach, also emphasises the role of 
industrialisation in shaping welfare states rather than their variations. It interprets social 
policy as a functional response to difficulties raised by capitalist production. As far as 
unemployment insurance is concerned, some have regarded its historical appearance as a 
result of the insecurity of wage employment and the incompleteness of private insurance 
markets and other traditional forms of income support for pre-industrial societies (see, for 
example, Harris, 1972, p. 148; Rose, 1972, p. 40; Garraty, 1978, p. 86; Beenstock and 
Brasse, 1986; Stiglitz, 1988, p. 344). 9 Unemployment compensation policies therefore 
perform an essential economic function (Axinn and Levin, 1975; Baldwin, 1990, p. 5). 
Atkinson (1991) argues, the approach which takes into account the close relation between 
social insurance and the functioning of the modem labour market 'helps us understand 
how the contingencies arise against which social insurance offers protection' (pp. 3-4). 
The functional approach, however, confronts the problem that governmental social policy 
emerged 50-100 years after decline of the pre-industrial community. It is therefore 
considered ahistorical. Functionalism has also been criticised for being deterministic, for 
9. According to Garraty (1978), in a free-enterprise capitalist system, labour is dependent on wage 
employment as workers are separated'from the ownership of the means of production'; unemployment is 
associated with such special form of the modem labour market situation (Garraty, 1978, p. 5). 
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excluding the possibility of radical change, and for stressing cross-national similarities 
rather than differences (Ginsburg, 1992, p. 15). Baldwin (1990) argues a degree of risk 
redistribution achieved in some welfare states, for example in Beveridge em in Britain, 
has exceeded the necessary point of preserving political stability and economic growth 
(pp. 6-7). In addition, the functionalist approach assumes the existence of concrete and 
objective 'social problems', ignoring the problematic nature of how 'social problems' 
come to be defined and interpreted as such (Carrier and Kendall, 1973, pp. 212,218). It 
implies that the creation of the welfare state is related to 'value consensus' and the efforts 
of social groups and institutions to meet the 'new demands' of the 'social system' or 
'sub-systems' (ibid., 1973, pp. 211,217; 1977, p. 272). 
The so-called 'crisis in the welfare state'caused by the economic recession in the mid 
1970 in industrialiscd countries (OECD, 1981), led more scholars in social welfare to 
undertake comparative research on the creation and differentiation of state social policy 
programmes. Referring to Tawney's argument in 1931 that the process of 
industrial i sation created both the desirability and possibility for the emergence of social 
services, George and Wilding (1976) argue that what we need to know are the motives 
and the specific ways that industrialisation has influenced the development of social 
services (pp. 85-6). 
Since the economic development of industralised societies does not correspond to the 
amount of government spending on income maintenance, economic development is not 
considered the most important factor in government interference in welfare policies. 
Rather 'economic conditions and relatively enduring configurations of political power 
combine to determine how welfare state boundaries are drawn. ' (Heidenheimer et al., 
1983, p. 208). Skocpol and Amenta (1986) claim that politics is an independent element 
in welfare state research and it 'outweighs economic variables in determining national 
social policies' (p. 136). 
In the political context of the welfare state, the institutional settings of various 
governments have had special significance. The institutional approach argues that, since 
the economy must be embedded in social communities in order to survive, it is 
impractical to divorce the economy from social and political institutions. The necessity 
and support for social policy have not been related only to market weakness, but also to 
the gradual development of full citizenship in which social lights are the last to be granted 
(Marshall, 1950). They have also been related to politicians' attempts to gain the broad 
support of the voters in a democracy by increasing public expenditure (Ashford, 1986). 
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The institutional approach focuses on the dynamic interaction between institutional 
settings, aspirations and the visions of policy makers during the process of defining, 
evaluating and implementing policies. An essential part of the institutional analysis has 
been to trace the emergence of new ideas and their permeation into the policy process. 
This does not imply that ideas alone will determine political and social change. Rather, 
institutional and policy adjustments are seen as influenced by 'how leaders [see] 
possibilities of successfully integrating these new requirements with old democratic 
structures (ibid., p. 318). Ile apparent difficulty with this approach has been that the 
historic development of welfare programmes does not support their explanation. Ile first 
major welfare-state initiatives occurred prior to democracy and were powerfully 
motivated by the desire to postpone the democratic development. Some countries, like the 
United States, where democracy developed early, experienced a slow emergence of the 
welfare state, when small property owners, as a dominant group, used their electoral 
powers to reduce taxes (Ginsburg, 1992, p. 15). 
The class-mobilisation thesis can be seen not only as a move away from traditional 
functionalism and institutional analyses, but also from loose pluralist explanations which 
see social policy development as a result of the effects of a variety of different factors 
(George and Wilding, 1976, p. 20). According to this thesis, social classes are the major 
agents of change and the balance of class power represents the decisive factor for 
distributional outcomes. Such an approach adopts a bottom-up perspective, claiming a 
connection between a strong and well-organised working class and generous social 
policy. The problem according to this thesis is to satisfy the conditions for power 
mobilisation. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that the power of one agent depends not only on its own 
strength, but also on the resources of contending forces, the historical durability of its 
mobilisation, and the patterns of power alliances. Accordingly, a more practical way to 
analyse the transformation of the modem state is from the perspective of class-coalitions, 
like, for example, the political alliance forged by the working-class movement with 
farmer organisations (pp. 16-8). In addition, it can be argued that the theory of working 
class mobilisation, through social democratic politics, ignores other factors, such as the 
effect of the deeply-rooted structures of economic development or ideological power, and 
the complexities of the different democratic regimes and welfare states (Stephens, 1979; 
Heidenheimer et aL, 1990). Despite these disadvantages, however, in the discussion of 
the reasons for the important decision making during the developments of welfare states, 
this approach avoids a narrow focus on the state and takes into account the interests of the 
relevant social actors (Ginsburg, 1992, p. 14). 
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Recognising the weaknesses in the former approach, the administrative approach argues 
that social policy is a functional means for social elites to cope with the threat of 
increasingly important but still largely disenfranchised classes, and administrators have 
played an ultimately important role in decision-making on redistributive issues (Shalev, 
1984; Baldwin, 1990). Such explanations tend to imply that the state, as an independent 
actor which captures a certain autonomy, can not only respond to the demands of 
particular groups but also perceive and solve problems. Thus, the design of a 'welfare 
state' has been a gradual process propelled by ambitious politicians and civil servants as 
much as by the potential of social unrest. 
The administrative school, however, has been unable to answer the question of why 
social policy, as a consequence of the administrators' efforts, should be controversial. It 
has also failed to explain how social policy can ever develop beyond the modest 
concessions which are necessary for maintaining the existing order (Baldwin, 1990, 
pp. 39-40). Nor does it sufficiently explain the various welfare systems in different 
countries. 
Each of theories described above may have made certain contributions to the discussion 
of decision-making process in social policy, but each is also subject to criticism. The 
various explanations are not mutually exclusive, but rather relate to different questions 
and to specific situations. 'It is the comparative historian's task to delve to a level of 
cause neither so basic that its elements are universally shared and differences left 
unaccounted for, nor so proximate that its applicability is limited. ... it is an intermediate 
level that the most fruitful comparative questions have been posed. ' (Baldwin, 1990, 
pp. 38-9). Through cross-national research, we observe different responses to similar 
problems (Anderson, 1978, p. 26). Such research, therefore, enables us to better 
comprehend the 'social construction of social policies' (Higgins, 1981, p. 172). This 
issue is discussed in Section Three. 
38 
Section Two Decision-Making Factors in the Establishment of 
Unemployment Insurance in the Three Sample Countries 
The preceding discussion indicates the complexity of government decisions related to the 
introduction and development of welfare programmes. The policy making process 
concerning these programmes involves a complex interaction among economic and social 
as well as political, ideological, institutional and even constitutional factors and 
differential interpretations of the problems by various groups or political parties. When 
the state makes decisions to provide relief and protection, these forces come into play. 
In The Possibility of Politics, Ringen (1989) points out four problematic areas of the 
welfare state upon which its critics focus: problems of legitimacy, governability, 
economic efficiency and activity. The first problem concerns the attitudes of the 
population to new or different government action; the second relates to questions like 
whether decision making represents a response to internal requirements of political 
consistency or to external pressures; the third focuses on the potential for economic 
distortions and 'disincentives'; and the last rests on the need to estimate the overall effect 
of policy on individual behaviour, their ideologies and relationships (Ringen, 1989, 
pp. 49,93,101-104). Taken as a whole, these factors determine the priority assigned to a 
given policy. 10 
Normally, the extent to which an issue is assumed to have legitimacy, political support, 
economic efficiency, financial feasibility and social efficiency, will determine its chances 
of being put on the agenda by policy makers. However, the assessment of these criteria is 
affected by the ideologies and interpretation of different political parties and groups. 
Thus, if a programme is regarded as compatible with the prevailing ideology of the party 
in power, it is likely to be given priority. 
With regard to ideological factors, George and Wilding (1976) identify four schools of 
social welfare policy: the anti-collectivist, Marxist, reluctant collectivist and Fabian. Each 
takes a different view of the nature of society, social problems and the function of the 
state (George and Wilding, 1976, pp. xi-xii). 11 As' a result, they provide different 
10. Ginsburg (1992) also suggests three approaches to understand why governments make decisions or 
non-decisions in the area of social policy. 'nie first concerns an institutionalised consensus or dominant 
ideology; the second relates to the function of social policy in responding to crises and in promoting 92 0 CP 
social inte-ration in modem society and the third stresses the subordination of social policy to economic 0 
policy (Ginsberg, 1992, pp. 11-3). 
11. Esping-Andcrsen (1990) suggests that classical political economists (liberals, conservatives or &I tDo 
Marxists) were concerned mainly with the relationship between capitalism and welfare, market (and 
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explanations for the attitudes of governments and parties toward social problems and the 
origins, aims and consequences of measures adopted to deal with these problems. Kelvin 
and Jarratt (1985) also argue that the response to unemployment has its roots in beliefs 
about the nature of man and of society (p. 5). To the extent that society is seen as serving 
the interests of the majority, poverty is seen as the result of individual failure and the 
response is compensatory programmes which may improve the individual's situation 
while attaching social stigma to the recipient. However, when economic hardship affects 
increasing numbers of individuals and society as a whole, it becomes a political issue that 
requires broad institutional change in order to improve the operation of the system 
(Fforde, 1990). 
It follows that ideological differences are reflected or embodied in governmental policies. 
Yet since various sectors of society occupy different positions within the power structure, 
a party or pressure group which holds a relatively favourable economic and political 
position is more likely than others to impose its beliefs on the formulation of policy. 
Carrier and Kendall (1973) suggest that in order to adequately answer questions such as 
'why things happened as they did' and 'why certain decisions were taken', political 
scientists should consider whose definitions of reality are considered legitimate, whose 
definitions of 'society and its social problems' are involved in the policy-making process 
and with what consequences (pp. 221-222; 1977, p. 287). 
In keeping with the above, our analysis will focus not only on the ideological motives 
underlying decision making process, but also on the power structure and political 
relationships among the parties involved. Solutions to social problems must be 
understood within the political context of a given country. Due to the variations in 
political situations in different countries, in relation to the traditions, policy legacy and 
power structure, we find as well variations in political responses to similar social 
problems. As Ashford (1986) points out, the adoption by the early liberal democracies of 
social policies was not merely a function of social need and social justice but also 'a 
function of how their political and administrative structures might best 
accommodate ... entirely new demands on the institutional structure of democratic 
governance. ' (p. vii). Different welfare systems in different countries were not 
property) and the state (democracy). Liberal political economists believed in the necessity of a maximum 
of free markets and a minimum of state interference as the precondition for liberty and prosperity. 
Conservative political economists saw an authoritarian welfare state as the best possible legal, political 
and social form to maintain capitalism without class struggle and as superior to the market in 
guarantying social welfare, harmony, loyalty and productivity. Marxist political economists claimed the 
market would increase conflict and intensify class divisions, since the liberal state was the protector of 
the propertied classes. 
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'determined by social policies alone, but by the historical, political and organisational. 
structure of the state. ' (ibid. p. 3). Thus it is important to understand who makes the 
decisions, how problems are defined, which solutions are considered, which aspects of 
each solution are assigned greater priority and how priorities are ultimately determined. 
In their analysis of the structure of power in society, proponents of the Weberian school 
of social conflict and Marxist class conflict argue that in advanced capitalist societies, 
individuals, groups and classes, which varying degrees of power and status, will be in 
conflict with one another when they pursue their own interests. For Mfiller and NeusUss, 
the welfare state emerged from a process of class conflict while capitalism developed as 
an essential institution for the survival of the system based on the capital mode of 
production (see Holloway and Picciotto (eds. ), 1978). 
It follows from conflict theory that solutions to the social problems of one group are 
likely to come at the expense of another. Since social problems are regarded as the 
product of conflict, and change is promoted by the forces inherent in the conflict 
situation, the resolution of the power conflict between the 'actors' or 'players' will be 
presented in the substance of policy. In the analysis of redistributive policies, such 
explanations of the development of the welfare state usually draw a battle line between 
two separate groups: the working and middle class, the poor and the rich. They seek to 
clarify the groups and classes that have been concerned with social policy, and conclude 
that a well-organised labour movement and the parties of the left are those that have been 
instrumental in pressing for the development of welfare provision. 
In contrast to the above, Ginsburg (1979) argues that welfare services do not merely 
provide benefits to the working class, but also create new opportunities for profitable 
accumulation among the capitalist classes. Due to the skeptical attitude of the labour 
movement toward the state apparatus, within which its interests are rarely represented, 
the labour movement has never, it is argued, contributed to state welfare measures. Also, 
due to the involvement of other interest groups in the political bargaining, such measures 
have in most cases failed to meet the needs of the working class (pp. 2,7-11,19,29). In 
his qualitative study of the introduction and expansion of unemployment and old-age 
pension insurance schemes in Britain and Sweden, Heclo (1974) insists that these 
measures were imposed by the elites (from above) rather than by 'organised labour' 
(from below). Compared to the influence of an administrative elite, factors such as party 
competition, interest groups, elections and so on. as policy inputs in pluralist theory, 
exerted only a secondary impact on policy in both countries. Change resulted from a 
process of institutional learning on the part of the administrative apparatus. 
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According to Baldwin (1990), the participants in the contest over welfare policy differ 
from social classes in general. Attitudes towards redistributive measures are related to the 
level of risk imposed on the group in question and the ability of that group to achieve 
self-reliance. Although the industrial proletariat tends to suffer from certain risks, such as 
unemployment, other vulnerable groups have also been present in every country where 
social insurance developed. Compared to the benefits accrued by the disadvantaged, 'the 
stake developed by the comfortably upholstered middle classes in such reform' is a 
'much more intriguing problem' (Baldwin, 1990, pp. 9,11-2). Baldwin concludes, 
therefore, that social policy reform is associated with an awareness of the 
interdependence of advantaged and disadvantaged segments of society. It is the 
combination of 'capital's struggle for profits and fair competition, and 'the working 
class's struggle for a decent standard of living which produced the welfare state (also see 
Ashford, 1986, p. 217). Similarly, Titmuss (1963) suggests that "(a)ll collectively 
provided services are deliberately designed to meet certain socially recognised 'needs'; 
they are magnifications first of society's will to survive as an organic whole and secondly 
of the expressed wish of all the people to assist the survival of some people" (p. 39). 
According to this argument, the power of society is distributed among individuals, 
pressure groups and the state, each of which present their own interests during 
negotiations and general elections. Thus, the welfare state is a neutral product of class 
consensus, designed in the 'national interest' for the 'public good'. 
Hall et al. (1975), therefore, stress that social policy is partly a history of conflict 
between interests; but it is also and even more clearly a history of conflicts being 
resolved. According to this approach, compromise has been characteristic of the 
outcomes of conflicts in welfare states (Rex, 1961, p. 129). Through its non- 
controversial policies, the state is able to serve the interests of all segments of society and 
6curtail sectional interests if and when they arise' (George and Wilding, 1976, p. 6). With 
welfare measures designed by the conscious bourgeoisie, the capitalist system has been 
made more efficient or more acceptable to the working class and, therefore, more stable 
(Ginsburg, 1979, pp. 19,29). 
The discussion thus far suggests that simple generalisations about the relation between 
class politics and policy-making are inadequate. Political factors underlying the 
establishment of unemployment insurance have had a differential impact in different 
countries. When we consider the importance of political factors in the process of 
decision-making, we must relate different features of the same type of legislation (UI) to 
variations in political power structures and the various roles played by different sectors of 
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society (not just the working class). The entire process of public welfare programmes 
involves an interaction between the ability of the elite to adequately respond to emerging 
problems from above and the ability of the working class to build alliances with other 
groups or classes from below in order to exert an influential role. 
In terms of the impact of ideology on the development of social policy as discussed 
above, we must also base our assessment on more relative terms. Referring to the 
question of dominant ideology, Turner (1990) argues that empirical, comparative, 
historical research is necessary. Dominant ideology can never be established merely by 
theoretical assertion or by relying on guidelines contained in the classical Marxist 
literature which was written in highly specific historical contexts (Abercrombie, Hill and 
Turner (eds. ), 1990, p. 252). Although it is important to consider prevailing public 
opinion at the time when social welfare programmes were introduced, it is also dangerous 
to draw cause-and-effect relationships between dominant theories and the outcomes of 
decision making in the social policy field. The pragmatism of those involved in the 
process must also be seen as an important element in policy choices. 
In reference to the previous discussion of ideological forces in social policy as identified 
by George and Wilding (1976), the reluctant collectivists, like the anti-collectivists, 
advocate principles of individualism, liberty and private enterprise. Yet their values reflect 
objective conditions and their theoretical stand can be regarded as pragmatic. While they 
believe that the capitalist system is the best economic arrangement, they also accept a 
certain level of governmental control for the purpose of improving the operation of the 
system (Harris, 1977, p. 16). The extent of the state intervention, they argue, is 
determined by the various economic and social aims and needs rather than by abstract 
theory. The concept of political and financial feasibilities are crucial because 
Iclonsideration of feasibility is also likely to influence the choice between several 
alternative solutions, and hence it can probably help us answer the question of why one 
remedy is introduced rather than another. ' (Hall et ah, 1975, p. 479). Beveridge, for 
example, was concerned about the effectiveness and costs of state provision (Gilmour, 
1983, p. 152). For the purposes of adequately assessing the influence of ideology in the 
policy making process in different countries, we must also locate it in the political context 
of each country as discussed above. 
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Section Three The Comparative Historical Analysis Method 
As suggested above, the development of welfare systems cannot be attributed to any 
single cause. Changes in the level of unemployment, economic development and policy 
doctrines as well as the awareness of unemployment as a social problem all have 
implications for welfare policy developments (Sinfield, 1991, p. 11; Clasen, 1993, p. 20). 
As the interactive relationship among these factors is complex, the conclusions to be 
drawn from welfare policy are never simple and 'important exceptions to any rule can be 
found' (Heidenheimer et aL, 1976, pp. 206,210-3). 
Emphasis on variation and divergence in welfare provision highlights the difficulty in 
reaching any one conclusion concerning the development of welfare states and challenges 
the notion of universal validity underlying any general explanation. This becomes 
particularly important when we compare different countries, since it is difficult to 
generalise from one country to another where historical development, benefit types and 
the administration and institutional framework of benefit arrangements are considerably 
different (Ashford, 1986; Baldwin, 1990; Heidenheimer et aL, 1990; Morris (ed. ), 1988; 
Castles, 1989; and Mishra, 1990. Also see Oyen, 1990, p. 6 and Clasen, 1993, p. 16). In 
the conclusion of his comparative study of social security provision, Kaim-Caudle (1973) 
argues that general explanations of welfare developments are likely to be misleading 
(Kaim-Caudle, 1973, p. 291). In particular, theoretical perceptions which can be applied 
or understood in only one national context are found to be limited (Higgins, 1981, p. 12). 
In keeping with the above, both the notion of 'historical inevitability' embodied in the 
various 'determinism' theories which have been discussed earlier and the 'definitive 
account' should be replaced by the notion of a range of 'plausible accounts, as it 'opens 
up the hopefully illuminating vision of the widest possible range of realities. ' (Carrier and 
Kendall, 1977, p. 290). By generating a range of plausible explanations, which highlight 
a variety of perspectives on welfare activities and a multitude of value-systems, and by 
adopting a comparative approach, which highlights cross-national differences and 
inconsistencies, we may improve our understanding of welfare development. 
In contrast to single-nation research, this undertaking enables not only the examination of 
social policy developments in one country against a broader background but also 
provides insights into the significance of factors that 'may be very difficult to evaluate by 
simply examining one society. ' (ibid., p. 279). By looking at the unique context of 
decision making in one country as well as elements shared by other countries in this 
process, we can reach a better understanding of the complex interaction of decision 
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making factors in the development of welfare programmes. As Kohn (1989a) argues, this 
type of study can enrich our knowledge and understanding of the domestic policy context 
and the responses to particular problems. It may shed light on the extent to which welfare 
policy developments are a function of economic, political and institutional elements. 
Thus, specific national characteristics and institutional features should be considered as 
an instructive preliminary step before translating 'nations' into 'variables'. In other 
words, the 'pivotal distinguishing characteristics of nations become variables in the 
analysis' (p. 23). 
As far as the initiation of social insumnce programmes in different countries is concerned, 
Flora and Alber (1981) argue that there is no evidence to show that the introduction of 
these progmmmes is necessarily associated with a certain level of economic development 
and political mobilisation of the working class. On the contrary, varieties are observed 
between countries with regard to this relationship. Welfare programmes in some 
countries may be introduced as a result of strong working class mobilisation at the early 
stages of industrial isation. But they can also originate from economic development in 
association with deteriorating socio-economic problems and weaker working-class power 
(Flora and Alber in Flora and Heidenheimar (eds. ), 1981, pp. 65-8. Also see 
Heidenheimer et al., 1976, pp. 208-9). 
In contrast to the convergence theory (see Wilcnskey et al., 1985, p. 387), Flora and 
Alber's study acknowledges the 'complex relations' between political and economic 
factors in different countries at different periods. The study, however, excludes a more 
detailed analysis of decisions (and non-decisions) which have been made in different 
political, economic and institutional contexts at different times (Clasen, 1993, p. 16). The 
labour movement is seen as an influential factor in the development of social policy. 
However, since the analysis focuses mainly on the Swedish experience, the thesis fails to 
take into account welfare programmes introduced by liberal and conservative parties, as 
well as ideologies and characteristics of different national labour movements (Shalev, 
1983; Espi ng-A ndersen, 1990; Clasen, 1993, p. 12). 
In his qualitative study (see the previous section), Heclo (1974) adopts a comparative- 
historical perspective which stresses the contribution of 'internal' elements ('political 
leaming') to policy decisions which is relevant for the examination of benefit changes 
(Clasen, 1993, p. 18). In their studies, Ashford (1978,1990), Scharpf (1987b) and 
Therborn (1987) emphasise the significance of national institutional frameworks for 
policy changes. Scharpf (1987b) argues that the ability of governments to translate their 
specific political preferences into effective public policy 'is institutionally constrained, 
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and the outcomes of effective public policy are crucially dependent upon changing 
economic circumstances' (p. 230). However, as policy choices in an earlier stage have 
shaped national institutions which affect assumptions and political resources for later 
policy changes, the examination of these choices becomes necessary. Variations in 
national social security traditions and institutional structures have influenced policy 
changes in unemployment compensation schemes. '[T]he existing political-institutional 
framework shapes and defines the agenda for considerations of reform as well as the 
state's capacities for political action' (Toft, 1991, p. 14). 
Institutional traditions have exerted a major influence on policy decisions. Benefit 
changes, therefore, are not attributed simply to the economic and political elements, but to 
'social policy legacies' as well which inform policy choices and policy outcomes (Clasen, 
1993, pp. 24-5). The term 'social Policy legacy' has been discussed in 'state-centred' 
models, in which the state is considered not only as an 'autonomous actor' but also as a 
'structure and set of policies (Skocpol and Amenta, 1986, p. 147). The theory maintains 
that previously enacted social policies have significant political consequences for future 
policy changes through processes of 'policy feedback'. These 'social policy legacies' 
influence conflicts between political actors (policy makers, officials, interest groups etc. ) 
and, therefore, can be used to explain welfare policy development (ibid., p. 149; 
Heidenheimer et aL, 1990, p. 230; Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 107). 12 The approach of 
'social policy legacies', especially using historical review and categorizations of welfare 
states into regimes and clusters, is important for an explanation of policy changes in 
unemployment compensation (Clasen, 1993, p. 13). 
Section Four Research Questions 
According to Carrier and Kendall (1977), there are at least three main tasks in the process 
of a comparative study which are to construct accurate accounts of: firstly the different 
welfare provisions and the way they have developed and are developing; secondly the 
different social, economic and political situations and the way they have changed and are 
changing and, lastly the relationship between past and present changes in welfare 
provision, and the past and present changes in other aspects of societies (p. 279). From 
chapter 3 to chapter 5,1 shall undertake empirical studies of the initial unemployment 
12. Esping-Andersen, for example, argues that the nature of class mobilisation, class-political coalitions 
and the historical legacy of regime institutionalization are three factors which are especial. ly important in 
identifying the origin of differences between the three clusters of welfare states (i. e. liberal, cooperative 
and social democratic). Yet, 'it will suffice to say that the explanation will be found in the interaction 
between political-power variables and nations' historical legacy' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 57). 
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insurance schemes of the three countries under investigation. Through a historical 
observation, the connection between the distinct outcomes of the decision making process 
for unemployment insurance and the different policy making environments in the three 
countries will be analysed. In order to answer these questions in this descriptive study, I 
will construct three empirical chapters in the following ways: 
Part One A Historical Review 
This part will focus on the social, economic and political elements which have brought 
the discussion of unemployment relief system into the agenda and led to the introduction 
of unemployment insurance schemes in these three countries. 
Section One A brief historical explanation of the different social structures, dominant 
ideologies and economic developments of the three countries. 
Section Two An account of the situations in the three countries in the period when 
unemployment became a crucial problem and public demand for the discussion of 
measures to reduce the distress and misery of the unemployed increased. An historical 
account of measures which had been taken to deal with the problem of unemployment 
and an assessment of their disadvantages will be provided. The economic position and 
level of unemployment of the countries in that period (1900s for Britain, 1920-30s for 
Sweden and the United States) and the policies of the governments in dealing with 
economic and social problems in these countries, and the consequences of operating these 
policies which might have an impact on the decision makers' choice for their 
unemployment insurance schemes, will all be explored. 
Part Two The First Unemployment Insurance Schemes 
In this part, the central question is: Why were unemployment insurance schemes with 
these particular features introduced? The important roles played by different political 
parties and pressure groups such as trade unions and their ideologies will be given 
particular attention. 
Section One The characteristics of unemployment insurance schemes: 
A. Contributory or non-contributory? 
B. Earnings-related or flat-rate contributions? 
C. Source of funds--financed by the insured persons, the employers or the state? or 
through some combinations of these sources? 
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D. Earnings-related or flat-rate benefits? 
E. Qualification conditions? 
Second Two Explanations of These Characteristics 
In terms of: 
1. Political factors which affect policy outcomes: 
A. What was the state of public opinion about unemployment protection at that time? 
B. What was the government's response to public opinion about unemployment 
protection? What measures did the government take to deal with discontent, particularly 
that of the unemployed? What were the policies of the parties in Opposition on the issue? 
C. What role did pressure groups play in initiating and changing policies? We need to 
ask: i) What were the pressure groups? ii). What policies did they pursue? Why and how 
did they press for those policies? iii). What was the result of their efforts? iv). What was 
the government's response? 
D. Did the government make compromises between the demands of different pressure 
groups or pay particular attention to the arguments of any one group? If so, why? 
2. Ideological factors which affect policy outcomes: 
A. What were the prevailing ideas about unemployment protection among policy-makers? 
Why were some ideas prevalent? 
B. What constraints did party ideology impose on policy making in this field? 
C. What were the ideologies of the other organisations, such as trade unions, employers 
organisations and pressure groups? What were the differences between their ideas and 
those of the policy-makers (i. e. the governments)? 
D. Did the outcome of the poficy-making reflect a compromise between the ideologies of 
different political parties and groups? 
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Section Five Summary 
There are different approaches that have been applied to explain the initiation and 
development of social policy. In one approach, the analysis with a single aim / single 
cause perspective, views the creation of the welfare state as inevitable and the only 
possible solution for dealing with the social problems. This perspective is misleading as it 
is inclined to understand social reality as a well-shaped structure in which the basic 
essentials are pre-determined, and also ignores the involvement of various factors in the 
policy making process and their distinctive significance. The 'technological determinism' 
or 'industrial logic' is commonly applied to this approach. These writers closely connect 
the appearance and expansion of welfare programmes with the economic growth of the 
country and argue that it is the latter which made the former imperative and available. 
Another approach seeks to explore the different elements and their complex relations in a 
specific historical context as multi-causes of the welfare policies. For the theorists of this 
approach, social policy originated from choices rather than one determinant or a 
necessary resolution. They question the relevance of the former approach. Heidenheimer 
et al. (1983) argue that economic development is a necessary, but not the most important, 
factor in deciding one country's welfare arrangements, as welfare policies can differ 
among countries which have reached similar economic levels. The influence of political 
factors should also be taken into account. George and Wilding (1976) also argue that the 
motives and the specific ways of creating social welfare systems by industrialisation 
should be explained. Carrier and Kendall (1977) argue that to connect generally the 
welfare development with industrialisation conceals the difference between correlation 
and causation and may elevate the 'classification of causes' to an absolute which cannot 
be safe. Issues, such as different interpretations of social problems by the different 
groups of a society and their significance should be included in analysis. Relatedly, the 
crucial role played by the elites in the evolution of social policy has been emphasised by 
Heclo. 
Based on the above discussion, some possible elements which may be involved in the 
decision making process of social policy have been analysed. Regin's four main aspects, 
public opinion, political situation, economic and financial concerns and people's 
assumption of the possible effects of the policies, can be regarded as basic factors in our 
analysis of the welfare state. In relation to my previous discussion in this chapter, two 
factors, the function of ideology and the power structure, have been given particular 
attention. As far as the ideological element is concerned, George and Wilding's 
description of four theories offers detailed arguments of each school's understanding of 
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society and state, their principle of freedom and justice and their attitudes to the public 
welfare policies. The characteristics of certain welfare policies will definitely bear the 
marks of the influence of any of them. However, it is unsound to overlook their 
pragmatic stand in the development of the welfare system. Their judgments and proposals 
for solving the social problems can be based on their concerns over the situations rather 
than abstract principles. 
In terms of political considerations in the analysis of social policy, the different 
explanations of the causes and effects of social policy have been presented. One 
approach, the conflict model represented by the Marxist school of class conflict and the 
Weberianism school of social conflict, believes that capitalist societies are composed of 
interest-in-conflict groups and classes, these groups and classes are in different positions 
in the power structure of the society and therefore have divergent impacts on social 
policy. Another approach, the consensus model, holds the pluralist perspective of the 
power structure of a society in which each segments of the society gains an equal power 
and has the capability to present its interests in negotiation, and the state is able to serve 
the interests of all groups of the society. Accordingly, for the former, the operation of 
welfare programmes can be more rewarding to one group (class) than others, while for 
the latter, the creation of the welfare state is designed to serve the national interests, 
meeting those publicly recognised 'needs'. According to the Marxists, as the capitalist 
class is economically privileged, the welfare policy is created in accordance with its 
interest. Although the working class played an influential role in social reform and gained 
benefits from producing a better distribution system, the welfare system is ultimately 
beneficial to the stability of the capitalist system. The political pressure by the working 
class in creating the social welfare system is not properly assessed in the consensus 
model. By contrast, the institutionalised conflict model of Hall et al (1975) and Heclo 
underlines the power of the working class organisation and regards social policy as a 
resolution and compromise of the different class interests. However, this approach is 
limited to some case studies and lacks a critical analysis of the influence of wider socio- 
economic and ideological forces. 
All the various accounts indicate that it is impossible to make general judgments about the 
cause of the introduction and development of social policy in different countries, because 
various elements and their complicated interaction will be necessarily engaged in the 
decision making process in this field. A more practical way to carry out such research 
may be available in a historical and comparative study. In this context, the term, 'social 
policy legacy', and its importance in explaining the complexity of the welfare policy 
developments, has been justified. The approach, which puts an excessive emphasis on 
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external and constraining social and non-social forces and regards them as the 
determinants of the development of 'welfare states, should be challenged by the 
alternative one which takes the internal forces into its decision making analysis. These 
internal forces', such as the 'class struggle', 'class conflict', the institutionalisation of 
such conflict, or alternatively, 'historical and economic forces' or 'political forces', are 
employed in this type of study. The critique of this approach is related to its 'over- 
socialised' concepts of welfare development. A different angle which will give a proper 
consideration of the important role of the elites in politics may be found necessary. The 
concept of 'history legacy' can serve the purpose of making a fairly balanced judgment of 
the relationship between the impersonal 'objective social facts' and an individuals' 
contribution to the welfare developments. 
Part Three Summary and Conclusion 
In the beginning of this chapter, I have discussed Easton's political system theory with 
the intention of borrowing it as a theoretical framework for my research in the decision 
making process in UI of the three countries chosen. The theory may be useful for this 
study as it defines a system or political system as a dynamic area, its components are 
dependent upon one another and the system is subject to the influences of its 
environment. Its shortcomings are however also apparent. Firstly, it provides a very 
general description of the ways that a system operates, reacts to pressures and produces 
solutions. As a result, there is a lack of a concrete and precise description of how this 
system carries out these functions and which groups play significant roles for the output 
of the decision making, how 'demands' and 'supports' as two main elements of its inputs 
are precisely defined and accepted by the political system. Secondly, the theory appears 
to underestimate the different significant effects of ideological factors on the political 
actors in the decision making process. Thus it fails to hold a sufficient power when it 
examines these two elements as inputs of the political system, but rather leads us to 
believe that decisions or actions as outputs of the system are a purely functional response 
to the changes in its environment for the sake of surviving. Lastly, referring to the former 
problem, it tends to indicate that the agreement over values can ensure the integration of 
the society, and therefore overvalues the importance of value consensus contained in a 
society for the decisions made by its members. 
Referring to the discussion of the merits and shortcomings contained in Easton's systems 
theory, two perspectives have been introduced as complements into the discussion of the 




ideologies of the participants of this process. The relevance and significance of these two 
elements for analysing the decision making process are related to their account of the 
complex relationship between the groups and parties in the power structure and the 
impact of their ideas on decision making. For the sake of the survival of a system, as 
Easton described, the actors in politics must assess 'demands' and 'supports' of the 
system in order to adopt proper measures for social problems. However, the crucial 
questions are: which groups' interpretation and understanding of one issue can be 
accepted as 'social problem'and therefore should be dealt with accordingly? Why is one 
group more influential than others in defining the social problem? If we suppose that a 
society is composed of the different groups and classes which have conflicting interests 
and divergent positions in the power structure, then one group is not only able to direct 
another group or groups to implement policies which conform mainly to its needs, but 
also prohibit the other's desires from getting access to the decision making process as it is 
described as 'non decision' by Lukes et al.. 
As far as the first factor is, concerned, three different schools provide us with various 
descriptions about the power distribution of a society. While the pluralist group argues 
that all groups in a modem democratic society are given a roughly equal opportunity to 
mobilise their power and exercise their political influence, the corporatist group insists 
that there is an unequal power distribution among the different parts of a society; a close 
relationship exists between the monopolist organisations and the state, the former act as 
mediators between state and their members. Both of these two schools have been 
challenged by Korpi's 'class model' (1983). It argues against both the assumptions that 
class division and unequal power distribution in society are not significant any more as 
claimed in the former school and the neglect in the latter school of the significance of 
power and the reflection of class conflict in neo-corporatist institutions. The 'class model' 
holds that as two main power resources in modem societies, 'capital' and 'labour' can 
exert their influences on the distribution system, interest conflicts and function of the 
social institutions, social institutions are resolution of interest conflicts which reflect 
power distribution. However, the real power is possessed by a minority who controls the 
means of production. Although the working class, as a mobilised force, is allowed to 
play a certain role in politics in the industrialised societies, it is the capitalist class, the 
owner of the means of production, which obtains a more privileged political position and 
gains more benefits from the state policies. 
The necessity of introducing the second factor, ideologies, into the analysis of decision 
making relies on the following thinking. As it is revealed that different groups and classes 
hold different positions in society, organisations and parties, as their representatives in 
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the negotiation, are expected to have various impacts on the outcome of the decision 
making process. While one group or party may dominant the process, some other groups 
or parties are found to play minor or subordinate roles, or even not be able to make their 
demands noticed by the decision makers. These groups, parties and classes carry out 
their actions and set up their political aims on the basis of their beliefs. It becomes 
important to understand how and to what extent they are influenced by theories in 
political contest and how their power possession affects the acceptance of their theories 
by the society. In this context, I have taken the concept 'dominant ideology' into account. 
Although its existence and significance for the stability of modem society is debatable, 
the concept implies the important distinctive role dominant ideology has played. In 
particular, the aspect emphasised by the theorists referred to in this chapter, namely that 
its influence on the ruling class should be assessed against the specific historical 
background, may be helpful for my investigation of the establishment of UI of the three 
countries chosen. While it is true that in the end the materialistic solution to the interest 
conflicts between the different parts of a society account for a lot, we need go further to 
ask why the proposals were designed in different ways and received different reactions, 
and who were those people who made such proposals. While those in a privileged 
position in the power structure will be likely to leave prominent marks on decisions, they 
are not only subject to the confrontation of their rivals but also constrained by the 
historical traditions they inherit. The term 'historical legacy' used by various experts in 
social policy indicates the influence of the policies set up in the past as well as cultural 
traditions on the present decision making process. 
The research on decision making in social policy or unemployment insurance 
programmes has concluded that it is inappropriate to attribute the welfare programmes to 
solely economic developments. The economic level of one country is important in 
explaining the cause of the introduction and expansion of its welfare programmes, but it 
is dangerous to concentrate on economic aspects. Some other factors, such as the political 
situations and ideological differences of the participants in decision making, should also 
be taken into account. It is proper to argue that it is the complex combination and 
interactions between these elements that have significant impacts on governmental 
intervention in the welfare system. This argument may be best clarified by a historical and 
comparative study of the introduction of one welfare programme, such as unemployment 
insurance, in various countries. To choose a historical angle makes us realise the 
importance of 'social policy legacies' when this country sets up its policy in this field, 
while a comparative study can offer a diversified explanation of the causes of the 
introduction and development of the welfare system with illustrations of unemployment 
insurance programmes. 
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In next three chapters, I shall undertake empirical studies of the original UI programmes 
of Britain, Sweden and the United States. Based on the discussion of decision making 
theories, I shall not only pay attention to the historical situations of these three countries 
in which unemployment appeared as a serious social problem (which prompted the 
collective action to deal with it), but also attempt to find out the roles played by the 
different parts involved in the public debate and decision making process. This design is 
based on the analysis of various theories related to decision making and its components. 
Before turning to the different features of Ul of these countries, I shall start my 
investigation with a historical review of the measures adopted in these countries to 
combat the hardship caused to the poor by unemployment. This arrangement will provide 
us with a general background of the development of policy making in this field, which is 
intended to indicate the different 'legacies' these three chosen countries had and what 
kind of 'learning process'they went through. After presenting the characteristics of their 
Ul schemes, I shall explore the reasons for these differences. This will be achieved by 
exposing the roles played by the political parties and groups, various actors, behind the 
'scenes'. Due to the variances of their political strength, they are expected to show 
distinctive capabilities and skills in politics. Equally important, their actions could also 
reflect their understanding of the economic and social circumstances then which was 
related to their ideas or beliefs of the state, individuals and society, and the influence of 
the national traditions. 
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Chapter Three 
The 1911 Unemployment Insurance Scheme of Britain 
In this chapter, I discuss the establishment of the British Unemployment Insurance 
scheme of 1911. In order to gain a thorough understanding of the characteristics of the 
schemes and the reasons behind them, I give, in Part One, a detailed account of the 
different measures which governments introduced to deal with the problem of 
unemployment. In Part Two, I explain the features of the 1911 scheme and analyse the 
political situation and the dominant ideology of the government which were reflected in 
the unemployment legislation. I also pay attention to the various roles played by the 
different parties and groups. In Part Three, a conclusion to my discussion is provided. 
Part One The Policy Context 
This part is composed of two sections. In Section One, I give a brief historical account of 
the social structure, dominant ideologies and economic development of Great Britain. In 
Section Two, I analyse the situation in Great Britain when unemployment became a 
crucial problem and public demand grew for the introduction of measures to reduce the 
distress and misery of the unemployed. 
Section One A Brief Introduction to Great Britain 
Situated in northwest Europe, the United Kingdom of Great Britain is a constitutional 
monarchy. There is no separation of the powers (that is of the legislature and executive). 
The British legislature and the executive mix freely together, ministers sitting and 
answering for their policy in both houses of Parliament -- the House of Commons and 
the House of Lords. The duty of the Parliament is to make the laws which govern the life 
of the community, to appropriate the necessary funds for the various services of state and 
to criticise and control the Government. The judiciary remains independent. Supreme 
bicameral legislative authority is given to Parliament, but the powers of the House of 
Lords, once equal to those of the House of Commons, have been cut drastically since the 
controversies early in the 20th century. . 
The unwritten constitution of the UK depends for its proper functions on the existence of 
two strong rival political parties. Earlier in history, the Conservatives or Tories, and the 
Whigs, later to develop into the Liberal Party, were rivals. At present the two major 
parties are the Conservative and Labour Parties. The Government is formed by the Party 
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which can command a majority in Parliament. The Party which gets the second largest 
number of seats forms the Opposition and has quite specific functions. Members of other 
minority parties and independents may choose to support the Government or Opposition. 
The government can be overturned by an adverse vote in the House of Commons. 
The cabinet is composed of a committee of ministers of the Government. The system has 
been developed since the eighteenth century. Its main duty is to formulate policy for 
submission to Parliament, and offer advice to the Crown. The Government in power in 
practice introduces most Public Bills into the House of Commons. After it is passed at its 
third reading in the Commons, it is sent to the House of Lords. As a result, it is either 
accepted or returned to the Commons with suggested amendments. The Lords can not 
prevent Bills passed by the Commons from becoming law. 
In the 18th-19th centuries Britain was among the first of the European countries to 
undergo an industrial revolution, which brought with it a leadership in the field of 
commerce and industry. As islanders, the British have taken naturally to the sea. 
Circumstances made them a nation of overseas travellers and established the British 
colonial system. By the late nineteenth century, the British Empire was bound together 
not only by industrial strength, but by her vast merchant marine and powerful navy. In 
this industrialised country at the beginning of the century, 1,042,435 people were 
employed in the mining industry. At least 5,000,000 people were dependent upon the 
textile-related industries for their livelihood. In the field of commerce, the total value of 
imports and exports of merchandise was 91,212,806,088 in 1910. 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain had a population of 45,469,564 in 1911, living in 
an area of 121,391 English sq. miles, and about one-sixth of the population were 
electors. The country occupied a unique position in the world economy. It also brought a 
train of social problems, which the state sickness-and unemployment-insurance system, 
first introduced by the Liberal Government in 1911, and a free health service and 
education system were introduced as a remedy. 
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Section Two Political Debates and Measures Taken by the Parties on 
Unemployment prior to the Introduction of the Ul Scheme 
In order to give a comprehensive account of the first British insurance scheme for the 
unemployed, it is necessary to analyse the background against which the scheme was 
discussed and established, and thus clarify the origins of the main ideas and principles 
that governed the introduction of the policy. Harris (1972) provides us with two main 
points which were accepted by a majority of social reformers and public administrators. 
They are: 
A. The loss of employment was accompanied by social destruction, 
economic waste and political danger no matter whether it arose from 
individual deficiencies or from a harmful social environment. Ilierefore 
it could be, to a certain extent, prevented and ought to be relieved; 
B. The remedies used at a local level and by voluntary effort had proved 
inadequate in resolving such an erratic and unpredictable problem for 
different industries, regions and types of workmen. Therefore, the 
organization and aims of the policy adopted should be set on a national 
rather than local level (p. 348). 
Starting with these two points, I set out my survey of the main factors which could have 
incited the Liberal Government to adopt a novel method of dealing with the problem of 
unemployment. I consider it from three aspects. Firstly, there was a shift in the dominant 
opinion about the relationship between the individuals and the state. In this way, I 
attempt to see how ideas concerning the position of the state in the individual's livelihood 
changed at that time and how the ideology of the government had an impact on decision- 
making. Secondly, there was a fresh understanding of the causes of poverty and 
unemployment, mainly as a result of empirical studies. These surveys proved that 
poverty was not just derived from the unfortunate person's personal moral inadequacy, 
but had economic and social causes over which the individual had no control. The 
principles of the 1834 Poor Law were seen to be inadequate in dealing with the problem. 
A different method for solving the problem was seen to be necessary. Thirdly, with the 
increasing unemployment during this period, the organised labour movement appealed 
for measures to protect the unemployed and their families from fluctuations in the labour 
market. Their pressure led the governments to introduce schemes in order to maintain the 
social stability and political alliance. The Liberal's scheme was thus only one point in a 
whole chain. From this discussion, we hope to discover the factors which played 
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important roles in changing people's opinion about the unemployed and to see how this 
change persuaded social reformers to attack the problem and rescue the unemployed from 
deprivation. 
The New Liberalism and the Traditional 'Political Economy' Dogmas 
The great Elizabethan consolidating statute of 1601 established the guidelines of poor 
relief, seeking to provide work for the unemployed, practical training for pauper 
children, and help for the aged, the sick and the infirm. The parish was designated as the 
centre for relief. When, in 1723, two or more parishes were permitted to unite in order to 
build workhouses, their declared purpose was simply that of putting the poor to work, 
and the measure led to a stringent workhouse test. Gilbert's Act of 1782 tempered some 
of the harshness of the workhouse test, yet the regular people were angered by the 
growth of machinery and enclosure and a dynamic and troubled time lasted through into 
the nineteenth century. Until the end of the nineteenth century, poverty was dealt with by 
the Poor Law (which was locally administered) and by private charity. 
The 1834 Poor Law 
The economic theories of the early Victorians were modified by their consciences and 
their concern for public safety. Tle philosophy of 'political economy', with Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo as its leading figures, continued to exert a decisive influence on 
political and economic thought throughout the nineteenth century, and its individualist 
ideology had enduring strength in Britain. By the mid-nineteenth century a synthesis of 
political economy and utilitarianism had emerged in that body of attitudes often called 
'victorianism'. Its social philosophy crystallised into four great creeds: work, thrift, 
respectability and, above all, self-help. 
'Self-help', the superior virtue, came from Adam Smith's belief that an open and 
competitive society with its enormous opportunities enabled individuals to pursue their 
self-interest. For them, human happiness relied mainly on economic growth, and, as the 
primary goal, the development of economy could be achieved by leaving all to pursue 
their own self-interest. Free and rational individuals should through their own efforts 
seek the maximisation of their desires. Logically, the role played by the state was 
regarded as negative (Fraser, 1973). 
The implications of this ideology for the Report of the Poor Law Commission of 1834 
were clear. The famous principle of 1834, 'less eligibility', was a good example: the 
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situation of the man in receipt of relief ought to be worse than that of the poorest 
independent worker in order to encourage a return to the state of independence. Because 
of the prevalence of this philosophy, collectivist political movements were slower to 
develop in Britain than in Continental Europe and as a result of this, the expansion of 
private and voluntary collective welfare was particularly rapid. 
According to Ashford (1986), the 1834 Act as a policy instrument was the primary point 
in debate about social policy in Britain. Firstly, compared with the law, the Elizabethan 
Poor Laws had a much broader notion of the state's responsibility for the disadvantaged 
and the poor; Secondly, the 1834 Act was in many respects not an effort to build a 
system that might be adjusted to future social problems, as the policy makers preferred a 
solution to Britain's industrial problem that would permit minimal disruption of rural 
harmony; Thirdly, the 1834 Act had devised a strict notion of social benefits, the crude 
means-test became the hallmark of the British welfare state (p. 69). 
However, while it set up the principle of 'less eligibility' for the elimination of poverty, 
the 1834 Act also represented the establishment of an important precedent. It created an 
administrative method of enormous importance for the future: inquiry was followed by 
report, by legislation and by inspection. The combination of central and local bodies, the 
Poor Law Commissioners and elected Guardians, to deal with social problems, was to 
provide the essential pattern for future social reforms. 
The creation of a national system of poor-law administration by the Poor Law 
Amendment Act not only set up the detailed aims and the means to avoid the variety and 
looseness of the prevailing system but also established a central body to ensure its 
operation. The combination of the central direction of policy with local control of 
administration by professional officials reflected the teaching of Bentham which aimed at 
efficiency and began the shaping of English government for modem purposes. The Act 
was a major landmark in social legislation as it indicated that the State was obliged to 
support its weakest members and because it attempted to use collectivist means to achieve 
the individualist ends: through State intervention in the form of rigorous procedures, 
able-bodied paupers were expected to recover their personal freedom and employment in 
the labour market. Therefore, men's welfare was conceived of only in the economic 
market and the cause of able-bodied pauperism was confidently identified as a moral one. 
The provision of deterrent workhouses marked the proper limit of state intervention. 
Furthermore, the collectivist innovation embodied in the Act was inhibited in practice by 
Parliament and by the prevailing mood of certain sectors of public opinion. The 1834 
Report took the view that the State should not interfere with 'the ordinary law of nature' 
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and believed that it was better that a man should suffer even though no fault of his own 
than that the laxity of the pre-1834 system should be maintained. 
ne Increasing Influence of Collectivism 
The individualist philosophy, advocating self-help, and condemning state intervention 
was neither absolute, nor so generally accepted. Social reform began after the passing of 
the Reform Act of 1832, and public health was appearing as the main issue in the 1840s. 
'ne Public Health Act of 1848 created the General Board of Health to deal with the 
deteriorating sanitary conditions. Although the Board existed as a fully independent and 
useful body for only six years, a group of people of all kinds, civil servants, doctors, 
inspectors, and public-spirited individuals, helped to provide a passing appearance of a 
new administrative state and push reform along. The administrative measures set up by 
the early Victorians marked the partial introduction of some of the features of the modem 
welfare state (Roberts, 1960). Ile reform process continued piecemeal and the reformers 
were alert to the dangers of centralisation and state intervention. However, there was 
already a simple machinery which could be used as a foundation for social reform in the 
future when social conditions got worse. In the 1870 Education Act, W. E. Gladstone's 
ministry underlined the limits of sporadic local and voluntary action. Benjamin Disraeli's 
social reform of 1874-80 in public health legislation marked a real change from negative, 
piecemeal interference towards a more constructive programme. 
There was a rise of collectivism between 1860 and 1900 (Pinker, 1971, pp. 85-92). AN. 
Dicey (1914) called the years between 1865 and 1900 the 'period of collectivism', in 
which the state action was made to improve conditions for the people as a whole, even 
with some loss of individual freedom. The British intellectuals have engaged in debate 
over the nature of utilitarian collectivism as a surrogate for the concept of state as revealed 
in law, institutions and administration in the rest of Europe (Fry, 1977, pp. 32-40). 13 
The Oxford philosophers, T. H. Green and D. G. Ritchie, who examined the relationship 
between the State and the individual from an organic point of view, were considered to 
be contributing largely to this shift. The younger Liberal politicians were influenced at the 
turn of the century by these new philosophical ideas, in opposition to the view of the 
13. In countries like Germany, where the concept of the state was more developed, the link between state 
and society was much more defined. However, in Britain there was no workable concept of the state. 
'(Waving no framework with which to construct a sense of direction and accomplishment from diverse 
serial initiatives, the use of collective authority for social purposes mystifies rather than clarifies. ' 
(Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991, p. 66). 
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political economists that centralised intervention was an unwanted imposition on the 
liberty of the individual freely to pursue his own welfare. 
The implication of this shift was a concept of social justice, in which the different 
elements in the social organism might better cohere with a measure of redistribution of 
resources (Ogus, 1982, p. 170). The material need, in their eyes, would become the basis 
for the moral improvement. Therefore, the redistribution of income was the prime social 
need. If the task of the reforms in the first years of the nineteenth century was that of 
making distinctions between the genuinely poor and the lazy, the aim of the social 
reforms in the succeeding years would be the treating of poverty in a more humane and 
effective way, making the poor more independent, more'moral' (Birch, 1974, p. 14). 
The Theoretical Discovery of the Poor Law's Failure 
Society's changing attitude to poverty and unemployment relied upon the new discovery 
of the causes of poverty and, particularly, unemployment. This significant discovery 
owed much to the research, based on empirical studies rather than on pure speculation, 
adopted by social scientists during the second half of the nineteenth century (Ogus, 1982, 
p. 160). The laissez: faire theory previously adumbrated by the political economists was 
regarded as much too abstract and not once in accordance with social reality, the cause of 
hardship was to be found in the inexorable law of economics, not the moral 
improvidence of individuals (Gilbert, 1966, p. 23). 14 
Charles Booth and B. Seebohm Rowntree 
Booth and Rowntree were the two outstanding figures among those who adopted the 
new empirical approach which revealed facts about poverty which were to have such a 
marked influence on the appreciation of the need to take some alleviating measures 
outside the Poor Law. Based on his survey, carried out from 1886 to 1903, of the living 
conditions of the people in London, Booth, the Liverpool ship-owner and manufacturer, 
found that over 30 percent of the population had an income below what he considered 
adequate for their support. More significantly, he invented a calculation of needs for the 
average family which was something between 18 and 21 shillings a week and used this 
as an objective criterion in defining poverty. 
14. In the early 1840s about 20 percent of able-bodied persons were the receivers of poor relief because of 
'insufficient wages', and the rate of pauperism tended to be highest in occupations where casual labour 
predon-dnated (Woodward, 1962). 
61 
In Booth's arguments and conclusions there was a powerful message. Along with the 
appearance of mass unemployment in the closing years of the nineteenth century, came 
the growth of socialist societies and more militant unions. Ile trade union movement, in 
contract to the individualistic and self-help associations of the mid-nineteenth century, 
had a rapidly increasing membership at the end of the century, and the larger unions of 
unskilled men would demand more from the state than legal protection; they believed in 
the principle of collective bargaining and expected more positive social reforms. On the 
other side, much larger industrial and commercial concentrations needed greater 
intervention and full protection from the state. The growth of a new collectivism in the 
two major forces of modem society made the intervention of the state more acceptable. 
Aroused consciences of the both sides of industry made the revived Liberal radicalism, in 
the early years of the new century, the leading force in constructive efforts to persuade 
the state to meet the challenge. Yet political responses before 1906 were limited and still 
mainly local. The thought and work in the nineteenth century of Bentham, Mill and 
Green had prepared the ground for the twentieth century's trend. However, it needed 
more revelation and example for society to fully accept them, and look for national rather 
than local solutions. In this sense, Booth played an outstanding role at the turn of 
century. He pushed towards a solution of the late Victorian dilemma: between the belief 
that the widespread relief of poverty undermined personal responsibility and fostered 
immorality, and the belief that poverty was dangerous to the political and economic 
foundations of the state. Although Booth was an individualist, he argued that the 
individualistic community was obliged to take the responsibility, for its own sake, of the 
lives of those who for whatever reasons failed to live independently at an acceptable 
standard. He maintained that help such as a pension of five shillings a week at sixty-five 
as he advocated, would stimulate rather than weaken the play of individualism. 
His importance for the twentieth century, as a pioneer of dispassionate social 
investigation, relies on his contributions to the understanding of the causes of poverty. 
He related poverty to its environment and unden-nined the view which connected it to 
personal or moral failing. His interpretation of poverty was to have far reaching effects 
on its treatment in the twentieth century; the belief that the level of subsistence of the poor 
was most threatened by the competition of the very poor. His hope of blending the 
individualistic virtues of the nineteenth century with the collectivism of the twentieth 
century helped to shape the Liberal attitude to reform in 1906. 
Rowntree carried out a similar survey in York as early as in 1899 and its result was 
published in 1901. His investigation only focused on working-class households. As a 
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socially concerned businessman, his concern with poverty arose from a dissatisfaction 
with the condition of the poor and the intolerable disparity in control of resources which 
caused those conditions. With the aim of understanding the nature of poverty, Rowntree 
divided the families in poverty into two groups: a). Families whose total earnings were 
insufficient to obtain the minimum necessities for the maintenance of merely physical 
efficiency; b). Families whose total earnings would be sufficient for the maintenance of 
merely physical efficiency were it not that some portion of it was absorbed by other 
expenditure, either useful or wasteful. These two groups were described by him as 
'primary' and 'secondary' poverty respectively (Rowntree, 1902, P. M. While the 
'primary' poverty was caused by low incomes, the 'secondary' poverty was related to 
the conditions under which the families were living (Rowntree, 1902, p. 144;. Viet- 
Wilson, 1986, p. 76). His distinction between primary and secondary poverty was 
designed to prove that deprivation was in part caused by low income not by 
improvidence. According to him, 27.84 per cent of the whole domestic population of 
York were living in poverty, a large majority of it (17.93 per cent) were falling under the 
'secondary' head (Rowntree,, 1902, pp. 111,117). 
In his study, Rowntree presented the 'scientific' description of poverty. A research 
chemist by training and practice and a pioneer of social research into poverty, he had no 
intention of changing the definition of poverty as a deprived life-style, but only of 
discovering its extent and nature. He meant to use persuasive methods in nutritional 
science to provide a more plausible explanation, because scientifically-proven minimum 
subsistence expenditures were irreducible. His paradigm of poverty confirmed Booth's 
findings about the urban poverty which were derived from complex economic and social 
factors and had implications that state action was required to raise incomes. Thus his 
views on policy to combat deprivation were progressive and redistributive (Veit-Wilson, 
1986, pp. 95,69-71). 15 
From their social surveys, Booth and Rowntree showed that personal character 
deficiencies were not the primary cause of poverty. They confirmed that there were 
various strata among the working class. There were, first, the enfranchised skilled 
artisans and trade unionists; Second, the respectable poor, or the 'deserving poor', 
whose predicament lay in forces beyond their control, who made efforts to be 
15. Winston Churchill wrote about Rowntree's report on poverty: 'I have been reading a book which 
fairly made my hair stand on end. Consider the peculiar case of these poor. Although the British Empire 
is so magnificent, they would have been happier if they had been bom cannibal islanders in the South 
seas... 7bey would have been healthier if they had been the subjects of Hardicanute. ' (Quoted in 50th 
Annivcrsaoý Of the Beveridge RcpQrt 1942-1992, p. 3). 
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independent of the Poor Law; Last, 'the residuum of casual workers, loafers and 
unemployables'. It was the respectable poor who were liable to 'be infected by contact 
with the residuum during periods of social distress, and as a result moral and physical 
degeneration would set in. ' (Hay, 1975, pA. It was therefore argued that this group 
should be provided with better treatment than was available under the Poor Law. Under 
the circumstances it was legitimate to introduce social insurance, which could benefit the 
respectable and incorporate them into society and strengthen their resistance to the 
blandishments of socialism, while, at the same time, the deterrent effect of the Poor Law 
could be retained and to do this would be in the interest of society generally. 
The Impact of the Boer War and the Measures Adopted by the Different 
Paties 
The growth of the British economy, compared with Germany and the United States, 
became relatively slow in the late nineteenth century. From the 1890s onwards a deep 
concern in Britain was reinforced by revelations about the health of army recruits during 
the Boer war. A high rate of rejection during medical examination of a good cross-section 
of the nation, by the conclusion of the Boer War in 1902, gave 'the shock to 
complacency' (Hay, 1975, p. 20) and highlighted the poor health of army recruits 
disclosing 'a senseless, heartless waste of humane resources' (Birch, 1974, p. 22). The 
Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical Deterioration of 1904 supported 
Rowntree's conclusions to his study of York --'a low standard of health prevails among 
the working classes. It therefore becomes obvious that the widespread existence of 
poverty in an industrial country like our own must seriously retard its development. '
(Rowntree, 1902, p. 303). 
The Tariff Reform 
The feeling that imperial greatness and individual degradation went poorly together was 
spreading and the belief that social reform and national welfare could improve the 
nation's strength in a competitive modem world was a growing consciousness among 
Conservative reformers. In contrast to the Liberal's policy which advocated free 
international trade and low levels of government expenditure and taxation, the 
Conservatives argued for a more stable and potential economic order. In 1903, Joseph 
Chamberlain directed the campaign for the introduction of a new system of tariffs. It 
included imposing import duties to protect the domestic economy, securing additional 
government revenue, promoting imperial welfare and solidarity, reducing certain food 
taxes, and financing measures of social reform. For most Tories, trade protection in the 
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form of Preference for Empire, would secure elastic revenue and therefore public money, 
that the accomplishment of social reform schemes needed, would be assured. 'llierefore, 
the system offered to solve many conservative problems and expressed the important 
conservative aims of controlling the party and increasing the power of the Empire. 
The tariff reform was the Tories' response to the challenge of the collectivism and 
materialism of the emergent radical Left who saw an individual himself often as the 
victim of unjust economic arrangements and had inclinations towards economic hardship. 
Ffords (1990) says that tariff reform, as one of the modem political methods, presented a 
form of surrogate collectivism and shared many of the features of its enemy. One of them 
was the willingness of political leaders to present themselves as great benefactors of the 
people by promising to increase popular standards of welfare by means of the 
manipulation of state levels. Joseph Chamberlain saw the task of good government as 
that of developing national and imperial resources of all kinds and intended to develop a 
policy of national and imperial greatness, through which the conditions of the poor, for 
too long a stain on that greatness, would be improved. It therefore represented an 
important challenge to the Free Trade radicalism of the revived Liberalism. ne election 
of 1905 had increased the proportion of Tariff Reformers in the Conservative Party and 
they insisted that if the country were to return to Protection, unemployment would fall as 
foreign competition declined. 
The 1905 Act 
The early months of 1904 were marked by an abnormally high level of unemployment 
averaging some 5.7 per cent and it continued to rise to 7 per cent by the end of that year. 
The delegates at the annual TUC (Trade Union Congress) Conference in September 
exhibited a lively concern about the worsening situation. Although there were still those 
who argued that unemployment could be offset by persuading everyone to join a trade- 
union, this view scarcely accorded with the more radical sentiments of the majority of 
delegates. The organisations, the SDF, TUC, ILP (Independent Labour Party) and the 
Liberal opposition pressed the government to take immediate parliamentary action and 
ask for more permanent measures for solving the problem of the unemployed. 
Forced by a political coalition, which was created both in the House of Commons and 
outside, e. g. organised labour, the Marxist Social Democratic Federation, etc., Walter 
Long, the President of the Local Government Board, proposed to co-ordinate and extend 
their activities in the winter of 1904-5, in order to provide for the respectable able-bodied 
and avert the request for a national measure to deal with unemployment (Harris, 1972, 
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p. 153). He generated positive legislative proposals on 24 January 1905 which were 
enacted by the Conservative Cabinet as its Unemployment Workmees Act. According to 
his proposal, the unemployed would be paid with the money raised from the rates. 
Long pointed out that the introduction of the Unemployment Workmen Act of 1905 was 
attributed to popular pressure imposed on the local authorities and by the agitation of 
many local authorities who had called his attention to the plight of the unemployed 
(Brown, 1971a; 1971b, pp. 44,45). In 1905, the Labour Party made a general 
commitment to two principles on unemployment: that each man had an inherent right to 
work, and that the state was financially and morally responsible for the unemployed 
(Brown, 1971b, P. 72). Sydney Buxton, a radical Liberal, Churchill's successor at the 
Board of Trade, reported to Sir Hendry Campbell-Bannerman, the leader of the Liberal 
Party, that Long's proposals were a great concession to the campaigns for the 
equalisation of rates and for the assumption of the state respons ibility towards the 
unemployed (Harris, 1972, p. 158). 
The Act created destitution committees in large towns and gave local authorities 
permission to levy a small rate to provide public relief works for the temporarily 
unemployed people. But it failed to reach the areas of poverty exposed by Booth and 
remedy the weaknesses of the Poor Law (Birch, 1974.23). The Cabinet refused to 
finance the public works out of the rates, and believed that distress committees could 
organise a more effective use of voluntary contributions raised in the period of distress 
by the Lord Mayor's Fund and similar appeals. This revealed the Government's intention 
to deal with the acknowledged problem with a limited commitment on public funds 
(Hennock, 1987, p. 154). In practice, the Act was a failure. Beveridge found that the 
majority of those relieved 'were normally on the verge of distress'; its idea of providing 
relief work for temporarily unemployed artisans was discredited (Hay, 1975, p. 49). 
The Labour Party's Right to Work Bill of 1907 
During 1903 - 1905, the Liberal leaders had come under heavy fire from labour and 
socialist writers for failing to produce an unemployment policy. Although the Liberal 
Party had established an unemployment committee late in 1904, this did not produce any 
generally accepted policy, nor did it act as a stimulant to the Liberal rank and file. The 
Liberal Party concerned itself with the reformats proposals in a broad range, for example, 
old age pensions, employers' liability, and national insurance, but what the party was 
mainly preoccupied with was land programme. Liberals' resistance to social reform was 
more due to their difficulties in conceiving'how the state could play a constructive role in 
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solving problems. ' The articulated 'growth theory' of social justice was unavailable 
'even though we could see its implicit reflection in the imperialist response of British 
reformers to the Boer War' (Ashford, 1986, p. 101). They became interested in the 
problem of unemployment only when Long put out his proposal. When unemployment 
got worse in 1905, the Conservative government had at last introduced legislation, and 
the Liberal leaders, mainly for political reasons, only reluctantly began to take a more 
active interest. 
Unemployment did not play a very important part in the election campaign of 1905 and 
the Liberals just gave rather vague and imprecise expressions of sympathy for its victims. 
Gilbert's answer to the question of why social reform was never a major election issue is 
that the two major parties (the Conservatives, and the Liberals) were aware that they 
could get involved in an auction on social reform and made a tacit bargain not to compete 
(Gilbert, 1966, p. 449). 
However, there was a change in spirit and emphasis and it can be forcefully illustrated by 
the Liberal success in 1906 election. The enormous Liberal majority that resulted from 
the general election, and the return of fifty-four labour representatives (twenty-nine of 
them belonged to the Labour Party), signaled the moment for bolder and more far- 
reaching labour legislation than anything contemplated in the previous Parliament 
(Hennock, 1987, p. 84). Lloyd George acclaimed their victory in the election which gave 
them a majority of 346 as a constitutional revolution, and for the Conservative leader, 
A. J. Balfour, their defeat was a sign of a change with the looming force of socialism 
evident on the Continent. He realised that the influence of the new group of 29 
Independent Labour MPs was to heighten the awareness of social problems and the sense 
of urgency. According to Bruce, the result of the election was hardly even a 
constitutional revolution. It was an expression of reaction against nearly 20 years of 
Conservative rule. Social reform was not an election issue, yet its ground had already 
been prepared by the trend to collectivism and growing public consciousness which was 
stimulated by the recent legislation, the Unemployed Workmen Act (Bruce, 1968, 
pp. 163-4). 
The reforming edge of the new Liberal Government was blunted by the Conservatives 
who had a huge majority in the House of Lords. The Liberal's piecemeal reforms had 
done little to improve the material condition of the people and the worsening 
unemployment. By the winter of 1906-7, the Liberal leaders felt the need to accelerate the 
Government's progress towards social reform in order to oppose the Conservatives and 
secure a full six-year term of office (Harris, 1972, pp. 264-72). In 1906 Lloyd George 
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enunciated the principle of social justice which was to form the inspiration for the coming 
reforms: 
'the law which protects those men in the enjoyment of their great 
possessions should, first of all, see that those whose labour alone 
produces that wealth are amply protected with their families from actual 
need, where they are unable to purchase necessaries owing to 
16 circumstances over which they have no control'. 
Under pressure by and on behalf of the unemployed, the different parties worked out 
different policies to deal with the problem of the men out of work. Keir Hardie, from the 
Independent Labour Party (ILP), affirmed that the Labour Party in the Commons would 
take up vigorously the issues of unemployment and old age pensions which had been 
ignored by the Government. The Labour Party produced their own Unemployed 
Workmen's Bill introduced by Ramsay MacDonald on 9 July 1907. It was the product of 
close liaison between the Labour MPs and the trade unions. 
The aim of the Bill was to use funds paid for out of general taxation to provide for the 
temporarily unemployed through no fault of their own, in order to remove their distress 
and to protect them from the stigma of the Poor Law. The Labour Party based its scheme 
on the following thinking: if work and maintenance were provided for the registered 
unemployed by the municipal authority, financial difficulties would appear, as by 1908 
the voluntary relief fund had become inadequate and the local rate payers felt unable to 
bear the financial burden; the policy based on a national scale but administered at a local 
level was presumably more acceptable, therefore 'where to get the money to finance 
public work on a necessary scale' was a serious problem which had to be considered by 
the politicians. Even more than aged pauperism, unemployment tended to be the greatest 
burden in the localities which were least able to pay for its relief. '[I]t was constructed on 
the same basic principles that had been accepted for old age pensions in 1908, that of 
taking a deserving group of the needy out of the Poor Law and making provision for 
them by grants out of general taxation. ' (Hennock, 1987, pp. 155-6). 
The Bill failed to make progress after its first introduction and was defeated on the 
second Reading by 267 to 8 on 16 July 1908. Asquith, then acting Prime Minister, and 
other ministers refused to accept the Bill and decided to postpone any action until the 
appearance of the Report of a Royal Commission. However, its significance should not 
16. Slings and Arrows, 1929, p. 5. Quoted in Ogus, 1982, p. 18. 
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be underestimated: it forced the state to assume responsibilities to readjust the economic 
system which results in poverty and made the Government to believe that they must 
produce an alternative scheme. 17 
The Challenge of the Popular Movements and the Change of the Attitude 
of the Liberal to the Problem of Unemployment 
The Labour Party' 1907 Bill was related to their dissatisfaction with the Government's 
failure to work out a programme to tackle unemployment. The Labour Party understood 
the importance of its commitment to fight for the unemployed and began its public 
campaign in July. Ramsay MacDonald outlined the defects of the Unemployment 
Workmen's Act of 1905 and its poor administration under the Liberals in a pamphlet 
published in July and Arthur Henderson blamed the Government for its reluctance to 
adopt the Labour Party's Bill if it could not have one of its own in Parliament. The 
Labour Party was not alone in its efforts to publicise its Bill. They were joined by trade 
unionists who would 'stand by the Unemployed and the Labour Party's Bill! 18 
The Government remained unmoved by these demonstrations of dissatisfaction. The 
Government's perspective might be represented by that of Bums, who was President of 
the Local Government Board, but expressed little concern with the rising volume of 
discontent about his administration of the Unemployed Workmen's Act. Bums' 
unwillingness to amend the 1905 Act in 1907 was based on his view that'it is to extend 
the virtues of pauperised dependency and to inflict ... a serious blow on the morale of 
labours'. 19 
Yet, the Labour Party's campaign for the unemployed was so successful that the 
Government dared not ignore the problem much longer. The original introduction of the 
Right to Work Bill was seen as a sort of goad to provoke the government into producing 
a positive unemployment policy. Ile Liberal Government would be compelled to bear in 
mind when considering how to replace the 1905 legislation, in particular, when the 
Unemployed Workmen's Act expired in 1908 (Brown, 1971b, p. 84). 'The early 
presentation of practical legislative proposals is required, ' said Asquith when he wrote to 
the Liberal candidate at a by-election in Newcastle concerned at the worsening 
17. Socialist Review, 6 (Apr 1911) 87-8 
18. LP. The Labour Party and Unemployment (1908). 
19. BM, Bums Papers, Add MSS 46324. Diary, 12 May 1906. See Brown, 1971, p. 8. 
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unemployment. He told the King that the 'right to work' principle was 'obviously 
inadmissible', but felt that something should be done for the sake of appearances. 20 
The continuance of labour pressure, the level of public interest, the violence of 
unemployed agitation, and hence the large anti-government vote on 30 January 1908 
obviously alarmed many Liberals. Faced with political and economic necessity and the 
pressure of social reformers, the changes of the Liberal Government in 1908 brought two 
men into prominence: Winston Churchill, President of the Board of Trade and Lloyd 
George, the successor of Asquith at the Exchequer. This was regarded as a further 
indication of the Government's embarrassment over the Right to Work Bill. 
The development of a new, long-term unemployment policy, implied by these ministerial 
changes, became more and more urgent as the depression deepened. By June 1908 the 
unemployment index had risen to 7.9 per cent, the figure was double the average for the 
previous ten years, and violence broke out in several cities. By August 8.5 per cent were 
out of work, the figures had reached the highest level since 1893, and as the winter 
approached the unemployed became increasing more militant. The radicals in the labour 
movement demanded industrial action and the number of strikes multiplied. The signs of 
violence alarmed many who perceived behind them the influence of socialist agitators. 
The rise in the numbers out of work and the spread of violence urged the cabinet to deal 
with the unemployment situation. On 14 October. a small committee consisting of Lewis 
Harcourt, Winston Churchill, Lloyd George, Reginald McKenna, Herbert Gladstone, 
Sidney Buxton and John Bums was established to draw up a list of proposals for 
immediate implementation. When he discussed the introduction of the Liberal's pension 
policy, Fraser (1984) argues that there was always a strong element of political 
motivation in Liberal social policy. The Liberals' two years in office had produced 
disappointing results and the threat to Liberal superiority of a growing Labour Party was 
becoming manifest. Political expediency therefore chimed with social concern to make 
1908 an appropriate moment to introduce pensions. Winston Churchill and Lloyd George 
were deeply concerned about social problems, as Lloyd George said: '[it] is time we did 
something that appealed straight to the people -- it will, I think, help to stop this electoral 
rot and that is most necessary. '(Quoted in Fraser, 1984, p. 142). 
20. BL, Asquith Papers, 5, fl 4. H. H. Asquith to the King, 11 Mar 1908. Hennock, 1987, pp. 154, 
155. 
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The RepQrts of the RQyal Commission on the Poor Law 1905-9 
Social research and the growing social concern with poverty made it clear that the poor 
relief provided by Poor Law in the early years of the twentieth century was far from 
being satisfactory. The Poor Law was under intense strain and failed to achieve its 
primary aim of reducing the number of those requiring it through the disbursement of 
public assistance. It offered no facility upon which to build an institution for the care of 
the unemployed. It tainted everything it touched (Gilbert, 1966, p. 27). According to this 
view, the conclusion was clear: the Poor Law system could not be retained (Bruce, 1961, 
p. 163). 
The obvious failure of Poor Law to provide a humane and constructive solution to the 
many problems of poverty, especially among the unemployed, forced serious social 
thinkers and different political groups to search for alternatives to it and for 
improvements to the system. This eventually led to legislation introducing labour 
exchanges and unemployment insurance. However, first came a Royal Commission on 
the Poor Law, appointed by the Conservative Government late in 1905, to investigate the 
entire operation of the Poor Law and the different measures for combating the 
unemployment problem. The need for revising or reaffirming the principles of 1834 had 
become more urgent when the penalty of disfranchisement was a potentially meaningful 
deterrent to the receipt of poor relief and guardians were increasingly faced with the 
conflicting claims of democracy and deterrence (Harris, 1972, p. 245). 
Against this background, the Conservative Government set up the Poor Law 
Commission. The Commission was composed of a cross-section of those concerned 
with the poverty problem: The permanent heads of the Local Government Boards of 
England, Scotland and Ireland, which supervised poor relief, and representatives of trade 
unions, religious bodies, charitable organisations, and the Fabian Society. The 
Commission produced two reports. In the Majority Report, it recommended the 
modification rather than suppression of the Poor Law and the removal from its 
jurisdiction of certain categories of unfortunates. A minority of its members, including 
Beatrice Webb and George Lansbury and Francis Chandler, were not satisfied with the 
terms of reference and decided to make an inquiry into the causes of poverty. They 
produced a Minority Report. 
There were differences between the Minority and Majority Reports of the Commission 
1905-9. While the Majority Report attempted to modify the principles of 'less eligibility' 
of 1834 and sought to give most power to stringently controlled voluntary agencies, the 
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Minority wished the state to assume the major role, favouring its fundamental 
interference with the labour market. The Majority were positively in favour of 
unemployment insurance which would include unskilled and casual as well as organized 
workmen. They advocated voluntary rather than compulsory labour exchange scheme 
because they were more sceptical than the Webbs about the political feasibility of 
reforming the habitually and willfully unemployed . 
21 The Minority's policy for the 
unemployed centered on the compulsory organisation of the labour market, education and 
discipline for the unemployed, and penal repression for the willfully idle. '111ey did not 
promote insurance. The Majority advocated moral discrimination in the treatment of 
poverty, the deserving poor being looked after by the voluntary agencies and the less 
deserving poor being treated in a harsher way by recognised Poor Law Authorities, to be 
renamed Public Assistance Committees. The Minority, influenced by the Fabian ideas, 
connected poverty with the shortcomings of society itself rather than the individual faults 
of poor people, and believed in the abolition of destitution by sound and enlightened 
social policy. 22 They insisted on the destruction of the Poor Law, transferring its work to 
local specialist committees. 
In spite of these differences, both reports are of vast importance --'they crystallise past, 
present and future attitudes to the whole question of poverty' (Birch, 1974, p. 24). The 
Liberal leaders, including Asquith, Haldane, Churchill and Balfour, were not publicly 
committed to the idea of Poor Law reform until they received the Reports from the Royal 
Commission. Churchill came briefly under the influence of the Webbs in 1908, and his 
decision to take William Beveridge to the Board of Trade was due in part to the Webb's 
advice. For both sides, the Poor Law's existing form of service need to be changed and 
suggested the transfer of some of its functions to local authorities. 
There were a number of common characteristics in the Reports of the Royal Commission: 
1). There was formal recognition of the fact that the poor were not a single group for 
whom a general system of relief was appropriate: poverty was rather the consequence of 
a number of social risks which were to be sharply differentiated; 2). In so far as 
individual liberty was an insufficient guarantee of individual welfare, collectivist 
21. Cd. 4499/1909, Majority Report, Part VI, Paras. 636-50,653-8. Quoted in Harris, 1972, p-260. 
22. In an article in The Crusade , January 1911, Sidney Webb argued, in contrast to Beveridge, for the 
minority commissioners, that unemployment is to a large extent preventable under competitive industrial 
conditions and is mainly due to defects of industrial organization which it is fully in the power of the 
state to remedy, if and when it chooses. And based on this new information, 'we are now as a nation 
morally responsible for the continued existence of the great army of but-of-works' in our m Ust in a far 
more direct and unmistakable sense than ever before '(Webb's italics). Quoted in Beatrice Webb, Our 
Partnership, ed. M. Cole and B. Drake, Longmans, 1948. See Birch, 1974, p. 103. 
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solutions were inevitable; 3). Attention was clearly focused on prevention and the social 
provision of benefits in kind rather than on financial relief. In this respect, social welfare 
measures involving financial benefits, including social insurance, were complementary to 
the main thrust of state intervention; 4). National rather than local administration was 
essential. 23 
The Liberal's 1909 Bill on UnemWoyment Insurance and Labour Exchan= 
By 1909 the Government had developed some positive measures of its own. This was, 
in part, due to the embarrassment it had suffered in 1908 through its failure to produce 
any realistic counter-proposals. Lloyd George and Winston Churchill were both aware of 
poverty and the challenge of the Labour Party. But they were also aware of the 
difficulties associated with rapid and radical change. 24 They had to find their own 
resolution of the choice between a desirable and a possible basis for the modem state. 
The result was a policy which consisted of three components: a national system of labour 
exchanges, state-subsided unemployment insurance and national resource development. 
An outline of this policy was submitted to the Cabinet by Churchill early in December 
1908. Draft Bills were submitted to the Cabinet on Labour Exchanges in January 1909 
and on Unemployment Insurance in April 1909. 
The Liberal proposals posed an obvious challenge to the Labour Party, which had really 
done little more than state a principle and outline machinery by which it might be 
achieved. By 1909, the energies of the labour alliance, channeled for the past two years 
into the struggle for the Right to Work Bill, had begun to diversify. Ile time and energy 
which the labour movement had devoted to propagating their own ideas were 
increasingly absorbed by these new proposals. 
23. Discussions on the two Reports, See Ogus, 1982, p. 182; Harris, 1972, pp. 260-1; Birch, 1974, 
pp. 23-6. 
24. In Cardiff on II Oct. 1906, Lloyd George said: 
"... If at the end of an average term of office it were found that a Liberal Parliament had done nothing to 
cope seriously with the social condition of the people, to remove the national degradation of slums and 
widespread poverty and destitution in a land glittering with wealth; that they had shrunk from attacking 
boldly the causes of this wretchedness, notably the drink and this vicious land system; that they had not 
arrested the waste of our national resources in armaments, nor provided an honourable sustenance for 
deserving old age; that they had tamely allowed the House of Lords to extract all the virtue out of their 
Bills, so that the Liberal statute book remained simply a bundle of sapless legislative faggots fit only for 
the fire; then would a real cry arise in this land for a new party, and many of us here in this room would 
join that cry. .. " (Quoted in Birch, 1974, p. 98). For Birth, this passage illustrates the importance of 
political considerations in shaping the social policy of the last Liberal Government in Britain. The 
Independent Labour Party was becoming 'a great and sweeping force' in Britain and was threatening 
Liberalism (ibid. ) 
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These two measures were introduced with the purpose of facilitating the mobility and 
stability of labour in response to the demands of the market, achieving a more efficient 
organisation of the labour market and financing 'healthy and productive' employment. 25 
The most potent argument for introducing the labour exchange system was the fact, 
stressed by Churchill, that it was a necessary preliminary to any insurance plan (Brown, 
1971b, pp. 125-6). Churchill believed that unemployment insurance could not relieve 
much of the burden of destitution. Through labour exchanges, a national distribution of 
available work would be made possible. He was assisted by two outstanding public 
servants. One was Sir Hubert LIewellyn Smith, Permanent Secretary to the Board of 
Trade, and the other was William Beveridge. The former devised the pilot scheme of 
unemployment insurance which Churchill developed after 1908 and the latter supplied 
Churchill with the framework of labour exchanges. 
With the Labour Exchange, Unemployment Insurance and the National Development 
Act, the aim of the Liberals' policy for the unemployed was to streamline the normal 
market for labour, reduce unemployment and relieve distress among the unemployed. 
The Development Act of 1909 in fact undertook little job creation. 'Me inaction reflected 
the influence of Ricardian doctrine: that there could be no overall deficiency in the 
demand for labour. Where contraction produced unemployment in some area there would 
be expansion elsewhere ai the same time. The unemployed lost their jobs because of their 
undesirable personal characteristics. Thereby the constraint of the provision of relief 
work could find expression in the Liberal's strong resistance to public sector activity 
which was thought of as dangerous to the vigour of the. private sector and protecting a 
negative view of the unemployed. 
On 4 May 1911, the National Insurance Bill was introduced into the House of Commons 
by Lloyd George. The Bill was composed of two parts. Part One, Health Insurance, was 
'derived much more directly from the concern for national efficiency at the turn of the 
twentieth century' (Hay, 1975, p. 54). The scheme was complementary to the 
unemployment insurance, which could not have worked had those who had lost their 
jobs due to illness or invalidity been protected by it. It was not meant to tackle the causes 
of ill-health, but gave provisions for sanatoria and for expenditure on medical research. 
Although it was called by Lloyd George 'an ambulance wagon, it set the pattern for the 
social legislation of the next generation (Fraser, 1973, pp. 156-7; Hay, 1975, p. 54). Part 
Two contained the Unemployment Insurance scheme, which was to be compulsory, 
25. Lloyd George, Hansard, 5th Series, Vol. 4, cols. 489-98. See Harris, 1972, pp. 277-278. 
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state-subsidised, flat-rate in contribution and benefit and organised on a trade basis. The 
primary purpose of the scheme was to protect workmen against trade fluctuations, which 
were, to a certain extent, predictable by the State but entirely outside the control of the 
individual workmen. 26 
The principles of the Bill were attacked by some groups and individuals, for instance, 
Left-wing MPs, representatives of organised charity and the National Committee for the 
Prevention of Destitution, organised by the Webbs and the Fabian society. Their 
objections, however, had little influence on the Board of Trade's thinking about 
unemployment insurance. During the summer of 1911, the Board of Trade introduced a 
number of amendments and refinements of the individual Clauses for the Bill. They 
accepted the demands of a deputation from the Parliamentary Labour Party that the 
insured workmen should insist upon the standard rate of benefit and not merely'current' 
wages, 'provided that it be made clear that ... where the workman through incompetence 
is incapable of earning that rate, the individual test shall prevail. o27 The equal rate of 
benefit to apply to all insured trades, was 7s. week for up to fifteen weeks of 
unemployment. 28 
Although there was a small handful of dissident backbenchers who complained that the 
scheme would positively encourage unemployment or that its actuarial basis was 
conjectural and unsound, 29 the Bill was welcomed by people ranging from the Unionists 
to the Labour Representation Committee (Harris, 1972, p. 29). From the end of 1909, the 
TUC and the labour movement had shown a keen interest in the scheme and the TUC 
decided to defend any insurance system for the purpose of integrating the unions. 
James O'Grady, Labour MP for East Leeds, confessed in 1911 that the 1911 Act 
contained all Labour's proposals of the past twenty years, and although it failed to realise 
many of Labour's hopes, the Labour Leader, George Lansbury, could still describe it as 
'the most socialistic measure on the statute book'. 30 For the insurance schemes, the claim 
was made that the proposed Exchequer contribution would be the equivalent of the 
Party's own demand for state maintenance. 31 According to Gilbert (1965), the relatively 
easy passage of the Bill through Parliament was largely due to the fact, that there were no 
professional or profit-making groups whose livelihood was threatened by a state- 
26. The Times, 5 May 1911 
27. LAB 21 483/LE. W 9169, H. Llewellyn Smith to J. Ramsay MacDonald, 13 Oct. 1911. 
28. National Insurance Bill, 21 Nov. 1911, Seventh Schedule, p. 121. 
29. Hansard, 5th series, Vol. 25, col. 651. 
30. LL, 12 Sept 1912. 
3 1. LP, Ann Rep, 1909,93 
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controlled system of unemployment insurance (pp. 127-48). Under the careful 
management of Board of Trade officials and with the unexpectedly easy consent of the 
Grand Committee, the Bill was ggiven its third reading in the House of Commons and 
was given the royal assent early in December 1911. 
Part Two The 1911 Unemployment Insurance Scheme and the 
Decision Making Environment of Britain 
In this part, I examine, in Section One, what were the major features of the 1911 
Unemployment Insurance scheme and, in Section Two, the important roles played by the 
different sections of society and their ideologies. From this account, I attempt to see how 
the policy was influenced by the Liberals' determination to solve the problem of 
unemployment and by their consideration of what was politically and financially 
possible. Part of the answer can be derived by considering factors which influenced the 
Liberals' attitude toward the social problems discussed in Part One. 
Section One The 1911 Unemployment Insurance Scheme, 
According to Ogus (1982), the notion of social insurance represented a satisfactory 
compromise between the two polar views of welfare as individualist and collectivist. 
While the former based their judgment on encouraging an individual's effort for the 
greatest happiness through the exploitation of the free market, the latter insisted on the 
redistribution of resources from the richer to the poorer or from those less susceptible to 
the particular hazards covered to those more at risk (p. 18). Social insurance also gave rise 
to a new form of relationship between the individual and the state, since the right to 
benefit existed independently of any particular government (p. 183). Winston Churchill 
regarded it as 'the future of democratic politics' (Birch, 1974, p. 31). It required a new 
form of administration and led to further economic intervention; it also brought about 
new relationships between the worker and his employer, and between the citizen and the 
state. For the former, the new relationship went beyond the simple cash wage, for the 
latter, the worker could rely on membership of the community for welfare if his 
insurance foundation was insufficient 
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Contributory 
According to the scheme, the payment of unemployment benefit would be based on past 
performance in employment, and on financial contributions from the individual himself. 
In legal terms, it could be regarded as a contractual right. In moral, and cultural terms, it 
incorporated the traditional puritan, capitalist virtues of thrift and foresight. Meanwhile, 
in certain other respects, the scheme marked a significant advance towards collectivist 
values. Contributions Paid by both employer and employee for some future contingency 
had an impact on the employment relationship since this embraced the long-term 
consequences of loss of employment. 
For Lloyd George, insurance, with contributions from employers, employees and the 
State, was the obvious method of financing the scheme because the cost of the non- 
contributory old age pension scheme had made it obvious that any comprehensive 
scheme could not be financed by general taxation. According to Beveridge, the 
contribution from the State was justified because the unemployed were supported by the 
community in any case and because it disarmed 'trade union jealousy' and the complaint 
from the regular and efficient that they were supporting the irregular and inefficient 
(Harris, 1972). According to the report of an actuary, who examined the Bill on behalf of 
the Labour Party, it would be 'advantageous for trade unions to join the scheme because 
the administrative costs would be borne by the state, and they would save because the 
contributions were small compared to the benefits' (Brown, 1971b, pp. 156-8). 32 
Beveridge defended the practice of extracting contributions from employers on the 
grounds that the provision of social insurance should be reflected in the cost of 
production, and because it was desirable in the interests of administration and labour 
relations that employers should participate (Ogus, 1982, p. 22). With contributions being 
made solely by employees, it ignored the interests and responsibilities of industrialists. In 
1908 Churchill said, 'unemployment is primarily a question for employers .... their 
responsibility is undoubted, their cooperation indispensable'. 33 
The contributory principle could be interpreted as a means of both broadening the basis 
of taxation, the Treasury ideal, and getting the political support of the working class, in 
Winston Churchill's words, 'to increase the stability of our institutions by giving the 
32. Some, such as George Lansbury, the Labour leader, Will Thorne, a Labour M. P., a member of the 
Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress and the Labour M. P. William Tyson Wilson, 
argued that workers would actually bear the cost since the state could use tax to finance its contribution 
and the employers could make up their cost by increasing prices (Justice, 27 May 1911). 
33. Quoted in Harris, 1972, pp. 303-304. 
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mass of industrial workers a direct interest in maintaining them. '34 The financial basis of 
the Liberal Govemment's insurance scheme was unsound. The risks of misfortune were 
not assessed on an actuarial basis and the premium was fixed as the result of political 
decisions. The Government could take large sums from normal taxation in order to 
increase benefit levels, and the more fortunate members of the working class would have 
to support the less fortunate. Tle Liberal Government wanted to use the scheme to meet 
sudden and unforeseen emergencies, but the scheme could not cope with mass 
unemployment and when money was devalued, the state had to take drastic action to 
ensure a subsistence-level income for all regardless of contribution conditions. 
Compulsory 
In the initial debate, support for the alternative approach of voluntary insurance 
administered by the trade unions and subsidized by the Exchequer was widespread. Yet, 
the voluntary insurance scheme had a number of shortcomings: the benefit only covered 
the privileged elite of skilled and highly paid workmen, the nature and amount of benefit 
varied and it would hardly have any effect on national trade cycles. Asquith recognised 
that sole reliance on voluntary action was invariably accompanied by a lack of security, 
partial protection and less than universal coverage, as it provided security for some by 
means which others could not emulate; when universal provision became crucial, the 
priority of compulsion would be reestablished (Hennock, 1987, pp. 8-9). 
The inference drawn from the failure of the only foreign experience, that of St Gallen in 
Switzerland, was that a compulsory and comprehensive scheme was doomed, primarily 
because of actuarial difficulties: it was impossible to calculate the risk of unemployment, 
particularly in certain industries. Voluntary unemployment insurance plans existed in 
many European cities by the first decade of the twentieth century. But only the St. Gallen 
program in north-east Switzerland was a compulsory one. Because unemployment was 
higher than expected, better-paid workers resented having to contribute to the benefits of 
many more contributors from the lowest income group, and also because St. Gallen just 
demanded contributions towards insurance from the worker, but not from the employer, 
workers quickly fell behind in their payments to the insurance fund, and the scheme was 
bankrupt two years after its establishment in 1895 (Sinfield, 1983; Gilbert, 1966). It was 
possible for the designers of the British unemployment insurance scheme to draw 
inferences from its failure. 
34. Beveridge ISS., Parcel 2, Folder C (ii), 279, item 28. Quoted in Harris, 1972, p. 366. 
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Llewellyn Smith thus concentrated on a compromise plan: compulsory insurance for all 
workers in certain industries including ship building, engineering and construction with 
contributions of 2 1/2d 0 p) each from the worker and his employer, the state adding 
per cent of the total thus contributed. These industries had in common that they were 
liable to cyclical or seasonal unemployment rather than chronic unemployment or 
underemployment. Protection in the form of insurance was therefore not only desirable 
but also manageable. Although some unions pressed for the inclusion of other industries 
on the grounds that this would promote decasualisation and make the measure more 
defensible, their arguments were defeated because of the extra cost which worried Lloyd 
George. 'Thus when the question of the Bill's scope was raised by Labour members in 
Parliament it was pointed out by government spokesmen that it already embraced a third 
of the adult male working population, 'the rest either being in unions which paid 
unemployment donations, or employed in trades which were not prone to fluctuations in 
the labour market.... In addition, it was argued that the scheme was experimental and 
before it could be safely extended, more actuarial information had to be acquired. P35 
Flat-rate Contributions and Flat-rate Benefits: 
The principle, flat-rate contributions, was easy to reconcile with a liberal individualist 
philosophy: contributions which varied according to capacity to pay would have involved 
a substantial redistribution from richer to poorer workers (White Paper 1944). It also 
conveniently reflected the notion of social solidarity: 'in their capacity as possible 
recipients of benefits the poorer man and the richer man are treated alike'. 36 The Liberal 
Government intended to achieve a political consensus at a time of rising conflict in the 
political and industrial world. The success of the British scheme was judged by its ability 
to protect the befter-paid and better organized workers from having to subsidize their 
lower-paid and higher risk colleagues (Sinfield, 1983). However, contributions had to be 
fixed at a level which the lowest paid workers could afford. 37 As a consequence, unless 
the contributions from the employer and the Exchequer were to be at a disproportionately 
higher level to meet the increasing need . of living expenses, this would inevitably 
constrain the level at which benefits could be paid. 38 
35. c/o Mrs. J. Clay, Buxton Papers, Unemployment Insurance Memorandum, 16 Mar 1911. See Brown, 
1971, p. 146. 
36. Beveridge, 1942, Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmd. 6404, para. 273. 
37. Above, para. 283- 286 
38. This was perhaps the main reason for the failure of the National Insurance system in the 1950s and 
for the replacement of flat-rate by earnings-related contributions. The unemployment insurance scheme 
provided a level of benefit which was not enough for a would not be sufficient for the unemployed during 
the period of the postwar depression. 
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As far as the original arrangement for the payment of benefit is concerned, criticism was 
made of the difference in the proposed level of benefits by some workers. Building trade 
workers, in particular, resented this because they would get a lower rate according to the 
schedule (6s (30p) per week for building workers, 7s (35p) for engineers). They argued 
that benefits should be consistent with contributions which were flat-rate. William 
Matkin, the secretary of the Union of Amalgamated Carpenters and Joiners, urged the 
building unions to press for equality. And it was also regarded by the Joint Board as 
inconsistent if benefits were unequal when the contributions were the same. After one 
year's internal negotiation, the request was finally accepted by Buxton on behalf of the 
government, and the Bill was amended in ways favoured by the Labour Party, for 
instance, benefit was made uniform, contributions from young apprenticed workers were 
reduced, and the scheme now covered those in the scheduled trades who were aged more 
than sixteen, not eighteen as originally intended. The net result of these changes was an 
increase in the state contribution of 9100,000 (Brown, 1971b, p. 159). 
The principle of flat-rate benefit, paid on the basis of assumed need rather than in relation 
to the individual's earning loss, was the main feature which distinguished the continental 
system of social insurance from its British counterpart. And this was consistent with the 
view at that time that social insurance was to provide nothing more than a 'life-belt' for 
survival during periods of temporary interruption of work. Ilie British policy was both 
to preserve work incentives and to encourage voluntary provision above the minimum. 
Section Two The Different Roles Played by the Different Groups and 
the Parties 
Fforde (1990) argues, in terms of a wider study of the major forces of the modem British 
politics, the period (1886-1914) can be regarded as the watershed years. All different 
forces appeared to an increasing degree on the political stage and all different ideas were 
put in the lines of inquiry (pp. 6-7). 39 According to Harris (1972), the demand for a 
'national policy' came from three sources. They were: radical groups within the Liberal 
Party, the organized labour movement and the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and 
Relief of Distress. As far as the new Liberal ideas on unemployment were concerned, 
Harris argues that they can be understood in the context of 'a much wider, revolution in 
39. They include: 'Central government expansion and democratic advance, materialistic perspectives and 
state growth, welfare legislation for restructuring society, populist politicians and political patronage, 
trade unionist pressure and parliamentary Labour' (Fforde, 1990, pp. 6-7), 
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the Liberal attitude to social administration' during the 1900s -- a consciousness of the 
need to relinquish the 1834 principles (p. 212). 
The significance of these different factors which were reflected in the social reforms 
should be considered organically. The interplay between them was a significant motive 
which pushed the Liberals into finding a practical answer to the problem of the 
inadequacy of the existing system and determined the Liberal governmenfs strategy for 
dealing with social problems and the challenges they faced. 
The Liberal Government 
In the early twentieth century, social reform in general and unemployment insurance in 
particular, depended upon, to a considerable xtent, the attitude of influential elites within 
the Liberal Party to social problems, especially unemployment. Harris (1972) argues that 
there were three explanations for the Liberal Party's change of attitude towards social 
reform. The first was external political pressure, the second was a shift in the internal 
distribution of power within the Government and the third was the gradual redefinition of 
the social questions at stake. 
The introduction of his Health Insurance scheme to the House of Commons in 1911, 
Lloyd George said, was closely related to public opinion which had been profoundly 
influenced by the thought and teaching of the last 20 years. He said that he had the good 
fortune to be 'carried forward on a side of social pity that was only waiting for a chance 
of expression'. 40 The recovery of some of the paternalism since the late nineteenth 
century, in regard of creating statutory policies in the fields of industry, public health and 
education, can be related to the political philosophy led by T. H. Green and John Stuart 
Mill. 41 Therefore, in the late-Victorian and Edwardian period, the Liberal Party was not 
totally bound up with the Victorian laissezýfaire but also influenced by the collective 
thinking. 42 This change also had pragmatic origins, which was about 'the real or 
40. Lloyd George (1911), The People's Insurance, p. 152. Quoted in Bruce, 1968, p. 162. 
41. Green argued that individuals and institutions were a part of the community and the aim of collective 
well-being was more important than the pursuit of private interests. Developing Benthamite ideas, Mill 
also maintained that the organized community could promote the interests of its members while still 
preserving much of the liberty of the individual (Birch, 1974, p. 16). 
42. In his 1885 speech in Glasgow, 'The Campaign for the Unauthorized Programme', Joseph 
Chamberlian showed his impatience with the 'laissez-faire' tradition of the Liberal Party and his 
awareness of the power of the new electorate and suggested the development of collectivist policies. He 
said, "[plolitics is the science of human happiness, and the business of a statesman and of politicians is 
to find out how they can raise the general condition of the people; how they can increase the happiness of 
those who are less fortunate among them. .... there is some reason to doubt the perfection of our system 
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apparent constraints of democratic politics and the new definition imposed on urban and 
rural problems by empirical research. ' (Harris, 1972, p. 212). 
The Government had turned its attention to social problems in 1907. 'Me first evidence of 
this new trend was Herbert Asquith's promise to introduce Old Age Pensions in 
February 1907. Churchill had been considering the possibility of introducing labour 
exchanges and social insurance on the German model some time before he renewed his 
connection with the Webbs in February 1908. The reconstruction of the Cabinet in 1908 
resulting from Campbell-Bannerman's retirement provided an opportunity for Churchill 
and Lloyd George to put into practice their idea of transforming the Liberals into the 
'party of the nation'. In this context of new ideas and new policy-makers, a national 
policy on unemployment was developed. 
The form of the Unemployment Insurance and Labour Exchanges, from Gilbert's point 
of view, owed little to extra-parliamentary discussion. They were almost entirely the 
result of the energy and enterprise of men in the Liberal Government, e. g., Herbert 
Asquith and Lloyd George, who saw in social reform the way to glory for themselves 
and the Party (Gilbert, 1966, pp. 234,249). Aroused by the reports of Charles Booth and 
Seebohm Rowntree and the findings of the Physical Deterioration Committee after the 
Boer War, Lloyd George said in 1908, '(i)n so far as poverty is due to circumstances 
over which the man has no control, then the State should step in to the very utmost limit 
of its resources. 43 The Budget introduced by Lloyd George in 1909, which proposed 
heavier and more varied taxation than ever before for supporting social reform, were one 
of a few issues which were of considerable significance for the growth of the welfare 
state before the National Health Insurance Act in 1911 (Birch, 1974, p. 30). 
Hennock (1987) argues, British unemployment insurance and health insurance, 
established as a substitute for the Poor Law to protect the families of the poor from want, 
were derived from two related considerations of the politicians. One was the intention to 
preserve the economic and military resources of the nation in order to cope with 
international rivalry, the other was the need to restrain the citizen-voter from falling into 
the class of paupers. Within the Liberal Party, the argument that industrial prosperity and 
imperial strength could be maintained only by a healthy and relatively content working 
when in this, the richest country in the world, one in thirty of the population at every moment are unable 
to obtain the means of subsistence without recourse to the parish, and one in len at the same time are on 
the verge of starvation. " Quoted by J. L. Garvin, Life of Joseph Chamberlain, Vol. ii, Macmillan, 1933, 
p. 67. See Birch, 1974, pp. 91-2 
43. Uoyd George, Better Times, 1911, p. 52. Quoted in Bruce, 1968, p. 163 
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force'rendered social reform much more palatable to commercial interests'(Ogus, 1982, 
p. 69). In his work, Gilbert also linked social reform with the campaign for national 
efficiency (Gilbert, 1966, p. 77). The term 'national efficiency' certainly helped to give 
the Liberal reforms the status of a respectable political issue (Harris, 1972, p. 218), yet, 
the Liberal's support for particular measures cannot be attributed solely to considerations 
of efficiency (Hay, 1975, p. 30). 
Harris (1972) points out that'in tracing the evolution of a national unemployment policy 
it is difficult to point to the decisive influence of any single set of reforming ideas or to 
discover any logical sequence of institutional change' (p. 62). It is incorrect to ascribe the 
liberal reforms to an advance of 'collectivism', since the action taken by the state was 
derived less from ideology than from the practical failure of unemployment relief based 
on voluntary provision at a local level. On these grounds, Harris (1975) concludes that 
the motivation and aims of the Liberals were primarily pragmatic, 'evoked partly by the 
fear of being politically outmaneuvered and partly by the practical inadequacy of existing 
forms of unemployment relief. ' (pp. 362-3 ). 
When the Liberals tried to crystallise their ideas in the practicable legislation, the factors 
listed above (such as the economic situation of Britain, the incapacity of Poor Law to 
solve the problem of unemployment and the reshuffle of the Liberal Government) 
influenced the decision makers, the influence of the traditional Liberal ideology was still 
noticeable. Although they were glad to accept some ideas from people who produced the 
Minority Report, such as the Webbs, both Churchill and Lloyd George were keen to give 
any measure of social reform a distinctly 'Liberal' identity. The formulation of the 
Government's 1911 unemployment insurance scheme was rooted in liberal doctrine. In 
striking a compromise between the traditional liberalism and the new collectivism in the 
development of the welfare state, the continuation of the profit motive was ensured, the 
natural interplay of economic forces was modified for the purpose of preserving political 
and social stability, and the ills of an industrial society which had developed with little 
concern for the welfare of the ordinary man was attempted to be rectified (Slack, 1968; 
Birch, 1974, p. 5). The Liberal unemployment policy was intended to preserve and 
enhance the free market and to promote labour mobility and working-class independence 
by imposing a new discipline on industry by central government (Harris, 1972). 
The Liberals still emphasised 'individual thriff and while they were in favour of State 
intervention, they asserted that unemployment benefits should be treated as a floor upon 
which private plans might build. Therefore, the redistribution of wealth was limited; the 
provision of subsistence did not create full economic equality, but enabled individuals to 
83 
do as much for themselves as possible. They were influenced by a view which 'stressed 
the organic relationship between the state and individuals, in opposition to the unwanted 
imposition on the liberty of the individual freely to pursue his own welfare' (Ogus, 
1982). 
The unemployment scheme insured only against the universal, impersonal, economic 
forces that affected employment (Gilbert, 1966, p. 281). Sir Hubert LIewellyn Smith, 
Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade, felt that the scheme ought to encourage 
regular employment and ought not to discourage self-insurance. It would have to be tried 
out first in the trades that lent themselves most readily to insurance; and the Treasury, in 
order to give stability and to justify a certain amount of state supervision, should 
contribute to the insurance fund. He argued that the frequency of claims would be 
determined by the economic circumstances of the individual's particular trade, and by the 
general conditions of the business world. The workers within a given insured trade, who 
lost employment through their own misconduct, would be ineligible for unemployment 
insurance. If scheme was to be made voluntary, the improvident and unemployable 
would be the only ones who would insure against unemployment, therefore it had to be 
compulsory. 44 
The Conservative Party's Strategy to Deal With Their rivals' Policies 
In general terms, in the years between 1886 and the Great War, the Conservatives were 
aroused by fear of the reintroduction of state patronage along with the democratic 
processes. 'A belief in political freedom; a stress on economic liberty; and a firm faith in 
social duty founded in Christian concepts were thus key features of the Conservative 
mentality. ' (Fford, 1990, p. 28). They regarded the protection of private property as a 
primary purpose of the state, considering this very important to economic advance. The 
Party was also influenced by the Christian tradition, wanted an integrated society with 
shared values and benefits practising the ideals of duty, aid, responsibility and concern. 
After Boer War in 1902, in particular, since 1906, among the Conservative reformers, 
the idea was growing, that social reform could save the strength of the nation in a 
competitive modem world; the responsibility of the government for the material condition 
of the people was greater. 
The Conservatives expressed their sympathy for grievances or harsh conditions but did 
not propose any corrective interventionist action. This tactic was indicative of their 
44. L. Smith, "Economic Security", Economic Journal, Dec. 1910, p. 518. 
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principled opportunism. It 'involved projecting an image of concern' (ibid., p. 37). They 
charged the National Insurance Act, the Liberal's prominent collectivist measure, with 
voluntarism, obstructionism and opportunism. A USRC (the Unionist Social Reform 
Committee) was established in February 1911 by the Tories to combat and obstruct the 
provisions of the Bill which the Right did not like. Like the tariff refonn, the USRC was 
the Conservative's response to the challenge of collectivism and democratisation and 
attempt to maintain the economic and social order which was under attack. The Unionist 
Social Reform Committee argued against state aid and supervision and also objected to 
adopting measures such as insurance against unemployment because it was believed to 
hurt some interests of its best and most powerful adherents. Yet, it overcame the frequent 
reluctance of the Conservatives to adopt the methods of their opponents and employed 
modem styles of organisation and statist arguments. 
The Influence of the Labour Party and the Function of the Trade Unions 
as a Pressure Group 
According to a German document, produced by the Ministry of the Interior, the Liberal 
Government showed a consideration for working-class institutions and their pressure; it 
was eager to provide, by German standards, a substantial state contribution for the 
purpose of getting support from the working class and the Labour Party, which would 
support its majority in parliament. The document even suggested, the principles of the 
flat-rate contributions and benefits reflected the strong influence of socialist-communist 
ideas (see Hennock, 1987). Hay (1975) also argues that British politicians introduced 
social reform in the early twentieth century in order to prevent workers turning to extreme 
socialist or syndicalist solutions (p. 25). 
In some other scholars' points of view, the working-class, in contrast to their German 
counterparts, did not want reform. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the 
major parties were not forced into social reform by massive popular demand or fear of 
revolution but were able to introduce specific policies to gain a tactical advantage over 
other parties. The rival parties of the Left fought to establish the orientations of politics. ' 
(Fforde, 1990, p. 106. Also see Gilbert, 1966, p. 25-26). Pelling (1969) argues that the 
working class at the beginning of this century was apparently hostile to state institutions 
and the extension of the power of the government. The notion of the supremacy of state 
responsibility and the idea of a bureaucracy ready to impose it on the population at large 
was alien to the British liberal and democratic traditions. Moreover, the trade union 
movement gave the Labour Party their support not for social reform but for its own 
power and status. 
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The British trade union movement accepted the structure of the capitalist society and 
merely sought to achieve the best interests for its members from it. Due to the tradition of 
self-help and political freedom, an incredible adaptability of the governing class 
throughout history and the Fabians' influence, which favoured the gradual introduction 
and spread of Socialism, British collectivism was not likely to adopt the radical form of 
socialism or a highly Conservative protectionism in Bismarkian fashion (Cole, 1955, 
Birch, 1974, pp. 5,17; Ogus, 1982, p. 169). 
Hay (1972) argues that the above opinions can be grouped into three categories. First, 
the working class'as a whole'did not want reform; second, the organised working class 
did but the unorganised did not; and, third, while there was a demand for social reform, 
it was limited in scope and quite within the power of traditional parties to provide it. He 
concludes that it is impossible to say that the social reforms of the period from 1906 to 
1911 were simply the inevitable result of working-class pressure, although such 
pressures should not regarded as being unimportant. Rather, their influence has to be 
examined in each case. In terms of the causes for the ruling classes changing their 
attitudes to social reform in early twentieth century Britain, working-class attitudes and 
pressures were only one element (pp. 27,29). 
In my view, working class demands for improvement with their potential as a political 
force which could threaten social order could not be ignored by the Government. The 
British welfare state was closely attuned to the response from those in government as 
well as sensible and moderate democratic pressures from below. 
From the second half of the nineteenth century, the trade union movement was 
experiencing a transition from its individualistic and self-help associations to a union 
which had rapidly growing numbers and a more forcible voice for greater protection from 
more positive social reform. 71rough extensions of the franchise and the protection of 
the vote through the ballot, the trade unions became a solid base which gave the Labour 
Party organisational, financial and cultural support after 1900. The distinct trade union 
culture gave a new dimension to the nation's political structures and the consequences are 
historic. After the general election of 1906 British politics witnessed a significant change. 
In the changed domestic power balance, the Labour Party became an important 
parliamentary force and trade unions flexed their political muscle. 
The Labour Party was at its peak in 1910 with a 7% force and becoming an established 
strength in the House of Commons (by the 1910 Act it had forty MPs). Its radical 
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manifestos, the continued growth in trade union membership (which more than doubled 
between 1900 and 1914) and the sharp rise in industrial unrest of the organised labour, 
all provoked alarm on the Conservative side of politics. Both the Labour Party and the 
Trade Union Congress had produced extensive social reform programmes of their own 
by the early 1900s. These Left reformers held up the prediction of a new future combined 
with collectivism in Great Britain; they aimed for the possible change of socio-economic 
structures, the achievement of prosperity with the active power of the state and 
advancement of civilisation by government intervention. Collectivisation was also 
sanctioned by the popular will. Their support for left-wing measures was stimulated by a 
demand for immediate improvement in individual material well-being through 
governmental intervention. 'Me popular faith in the state to cure society's ills was created 
by the achievements of the Victorian system. 45 
Inside the Government, there were a few political figures who were fully aware of the 
problem of the electoral threat from Labour and were active in the campaign for changing 
the living conditions of the people. Lloyd George, who was bom in poverty, saw the 
moral and emotional challenge of socialism and the need to meet it. Churchill also 
showed his capacity to catch the mood of times by saying that'I do not want to impair 
the vigour of competition, but we can do much to mitigate the consequences of failure. 46 
They were concerned with the economic improvement of the working class for the sake 
of national efficiency and a solution to social problems, whether or not the working class 
itself demanded social reform strongly. Like Gladstone who won the battle for political 
and economic freedom in the nineteenth century, Churchill and Lloyd George fought for 
social freedom in which a decent standard of life for the majority of the people in the 
twentieth century played an important part. The initiatives of New Liberalism between 
1906 and 1911 such as the Agricultural Holdings Act in 1906 (which increased the rights 
of tenant farmers), state funded Old Age Pensions in 1908, the Labour Exchange in 
1909, the Trades Boards Act in 1909 and the National Insurance Act of 1911, were 
accompanied with developments in the Labour movement. 
As a pressure group for the unemployed, the Social Democratic Federation was the first 
to be interested in the problem of the unemployment which occurred after the Boer War 
and took frequent initiatives to draw successfully attention to the unemployed. Yet 
45. The prestige of politics in the Victorian low government was related to its 'Miscal rectitude, 
bureaucratic efficiency, public spirit, political high-mindedness, uncorrupt statesmen, the whole apparatus 
of the Italian dream of buon governo'. These elements engendered the public receptivity to the 
enlargement of the government and their trust in it to carry out great tasks, and '(Ohe Left invoked the 
legitimacy of state institutions as arguments for their transformation. ' (Fforde, 1990, p. 161). 
46. Churchill, Randolph. Winston S. Churchill, vols. i and ii, Heinemann, 1967. See Birch, 1974, p. 27. 
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because of the weakness of the organisation, and internal disputes on 'the question of 
whether or not short-term palliatives should be ignored for the sake of achieving 
socialism', the SDF was prevented from undertaking any sustained national campaign 
and its efforts were hampered (Brown, 1971b, pp. 164-169). Eventually, the much larger 
labour organisations -- the TUC, the ILP and the LRC -- took over the SDFs position in 
conducting propaganda and agitation on the question. The initiative passed finally into the 
hands of the new Labour Party and the change of role was complete once the LRC 
established a firm foothold in Parliament in 1906. The Labour Party's emphasis on 
unemployment put John Bums, the Labour MP, into the cabinet but he was soon 
eclipsed because of his refusal to produce any substantial unemployment policy in the 
face of the pressure from both within and outside the Party. The Labour Party was also 
successful in making unemployment a living political issue in 1908 when the Liberal 
Government, based on 'a tacit recognition of the success of the Labour propaganda 
campaign of 1907-8', held the first discussion on the new legislation. 
As a result, the Liberals were compelled to give the matter some thought. Harold 
Spender, the radical journalist, who had accompanied Lloyd George to Germany, wrote 
an article in 1909, which was seen as an unofficial announcement of the social reforms of 
the Liberal Government. In the article, he said: 
'It is not enough for the social thinker in this country to meet the 
socialist with a negative. The English progressive will be wise if, in this 
at any rate, he talks a leaf from the book of Bismarck who dealt the 
heaviest blow against German socialism not by his laws of 
oppression ... but by that great system of state 
insurance which now 
safeguards the German workman at almost every point of his industrial 
career. o47 
So the introduction of the government programme in 1910-1911 'did represent the 
triumphant culmination of the Labour campaign' (Brown, 1971b, pp. 170,73), even if the 
Government's action was based on the consideration of political expediency. 
The parliamentary Labour Party, joined by the SDP and the Fabian Society, opposed the 
contributory principle of the 1911 scheme, but MacDonald's opinion determined the 
official party attitude. He argued, in a Labour Leader article, that low-paid workers 
would come to regard themselves as the objects of state charity and fail to join with their 
47. Quoted in Gilbert, 1966, p. 257. 
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fellows in order to improve their conditions, if they were continually asking for 
government doles and low or non-contributory insurance schemes, because this would 
perpetuate 'low wages'. 48 And as a result, at least half the parliamentary party were even 
against the abolition of contributions from lower-paid workers. 
Part Three Conclusion 
In order to understand Britain's decision-making process and the legislative debate on 
unemployment insurance, it is necessary first of all to review the conceptual development 
of the relationship between the free market operation and State intervention following the 
1834 Poor Law Amendment Act and regard some administrative devices used to deal 
with social problems before the Liberal reforms in the first decade of the 20th century. 
The establishment of the Liberal measures, like the Old Age Pensions Act of 1908 and 
the National Health Insurance Act of 1911 in which the second part was the 
Unemployment Insurance, demonstrated the way in which the Poor Law was being 
supplemented and by-passed in the provision of social welfare. 
After the 1834 changes in the Poor Law, concerns with social conditions developed as it 
became clear that economic advance was accompanied by a very unequal distribution of 
prosperity. The strict 'Workhouse Test' which allowed no variation in the treatment of 
the poor became unsuitable for the circumstances of the applicant and many of those 
compelled to rely on public relief were incapable of supporting themselves. Some degree 
of intervention by the State was regarded as unavoidable, to deal with social problems 
created by the industrial revolution which were seen as threats to the established order. 
Political economists, like Ricardo, and governments argued for state intervention in the 
free market although this was to be minimal, residual and a last resort to ensure the fairest 
and fullest operation of the free market economy. They still believed in the total efficacy 
of the free market and self-help and thought that there should be as few obstacles as 
possible for the competition which made possible Britain's industrial supremacy. 
Expenditure on health and welfare schemes was still mainly left to local and individual 
initiatives. 
In the last quarter of the 19th century, supporters of laissez: faire were astonished by 
economic and social crises; they began to question the validity of the ethic which held that 
the losers in the competition were responsible for their own failings and could only be 
assisted by appealing to the charitable impulse of society, and the government need do 
48. LL, 9 June 1911. 
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nothing more than ensure the availability of conditions of perfect competition. By the 
beginning of the 1870s, the principles of individual self-reliance and local self- 
government had been breached in the public health area. The case of poverty and 
unemployment during a period of grave economic uncertainty in the 1880s implied the 
necessity of state intervention as Alfred Marshall and D. G. Ritchie, the Oxford 
philosopher, argued. The thinking of political leaders also showed the same tendency. 
Ile consequence was the extension of the state responsibilities to an extent that would 
have been inconceivable in the mid-nineteenth century. Policies by the Conservative party 
in the 1880s and 1890s included Radical Programme of 1885 promised redistributive 
taxation to pay for the welfare reforms, land reform, free elementary education and 
compulsory compensation for industrial accidents for employees (Workmen's 
Compensation Act, 1897). Collective responsibility in other areas, such as old age, 
housing and unemployment, as a substitute for private means and market forces, began 
to be accepted as the legitimate concern of the state, and this acceptance surely damaged 
the don-dnance of laissez-faire.. 
This trend was encouraged by the discovery of poverty from first-hand surveys carried 
out between 1870 and 1901 by the Charity Organisation Society, Charles Booth and 
Seebohm Rowntree. These surveys revealed the fact that large numbers of people were 
living in poverty, that the old poor law and private benefaction were inefficient and 
inadequate. It was recognised that the economic pressures in general and unemployment 
in particular did not primarily result from personal moral failings as much as from 
external economic hazards in the operation of market forces. It was the result of 
industrialisation, and personal misfortune which was beyond the control of the 
individuals should be compensated for more collective I egislation. 
11iis discovery promoted a reappraisal of the role of the state in the administration of 
welfare. Tle changing attitude to poverty led the different groups in society to seek 
different remedies to the problem from the traditional Poor Law. This was thought to be 
necessary in particular when there was universal concern over Britain's inability to meet 
the challenge from overseas industrial competitors and the decline in the rate of growth at 
the end of the 19th century, indicated that the concept of laissez: faire was no automatic 
guarantee of economic prosperity. The recovery of national efficiency and the 
maintenance of the political stability of the country were considered as important issues. 
The teaching of utilitarianism and other theories, the findings of the empirical studies of 
poverty and public awareness of the declining economy stimulated a general 
reassessment of the relationship between the state and the individual by adopting a 
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different approach from that of traditional individualism. The growing appeal of the 
parties in favour of social reform both reflected and encouraged a shift in the dominant 
ideology. However, the intentions of the interventionists cannot be explained solely in 
terms of the economic crises and the discovery of the poverty; politicians also recognised 
the need to satisfy a mass electorate and deal with the challenge of socialism. Many 
changes in the functions of the state were initiated by politicians as responses to strife, 
crisis and tension in the Edwardian era. There were dramatic developments in labour 
relations during the period. The different groups and the different political parties 
participated in the debates and worked out the various programmes, their interpretation of 
the problem and their schemes to solve it were influenced by their parties' and groups' 
ideologies. 
The Tories assumed that the protection of, private property and the maintenance of the 
existing system were the state's primary purposes, they also realised the importance and 
necessity of the state's obligation to improve the living conditions of the people. This 
originated from their unprincipled opportunism. Although the Conservative Party resisted 
state intervention, the Tory's Unemployed Workmen's Act of 1905 provided temporary 
work for qualified applicants through Distress Committees in all large centres. After their 
defeat in the general election of 1906, political considerations forced them to make some 
changes to their traditional ideology and their favoured system which had been shown to 
be unsuitable and was under attack. 
The Labour Party's success refers to the fact that they made unemployment policy a 
living political issue through their campaign, particularly after 1907-08. The trade unions 
emerged as a powerful force at the beginning of the century in the face of continued 
economic stress and exerted their considerable pressure on politicians for reform. As the 
group who were most likely to suffer from deprivation and poverty caused by 
joblessness, they needed protection from the state the most. Their agitation about their 
situation which led to the increasing industrial unrest of the organised labour market 
became a serious public concern, and made the political parties realise that it was a 
potential threat to the system and that some measures of collectivisation for the sake of 
the well-being of the working class had to be provided. Like the 'national efficiency' 
crisis after the Boer War which persuaded the government to enact measures of greater 
care for children, the economic crisis and damaging industrial unrest paved the way for 
much of the far-reaching industrial legislation. The improvement of the living conditions 
of the working class seemed to become a urgent issue. So social reform also became a 
key issue in the political competition between the different parties. There was a strong 
political motivation behind their social policies. They attempted to establish a more 
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suitable or proper system than the Poor Law to provide the poor with state assistance; 
this was particularly crucial when the British public and politicians became conscious of 
economic challenge from other countries and the socialist influence which might threat 
the order of its present system. 
In this context, the Liberal government's awareness of the urgency of the issues 
encouraged it to search for measures to deal with the problems. The programmes of the 
Liberal Government between 1906 and 1911 were introduced as politicians' pragmatic 
reactions to economic and social pressures. They were influenced very much by the 
understanding of social problems by elite figures within the Liberal Party. Their attitudes 
reflected the long tradition of collectivism among progressive politicians, which 
originated in the intellectual and political disputes over the efficacy of the free play of 
market forces in the 1880s and 1890s and the continued increase of state functions after 
the 1890s. To secure minimum standards of welfare for all citizens would give the 
Liberals political advantages over the Conservatives in the battle for the working-class 
vote, and it would gain them support from the growing labour movement and the 
powerful Labour contingent in the Commons. In so doing, it would reinforce the ability 
of the state to meet the challenge of socialism. The result of the Liberals in the 1906 
election was a revelation of such popular opinion. 
The final form of the 1911 unemployment insurance scheme was basically decided by a 
few important figures in the Government. They showed active concern with social 
problems. The internal distribution of power within the Government in 1908 gave the 
progressive politicians an opportunity to fight for the realisation of their political ambition 
through social reform. Under the leadership of H. H. Asquith, the important figures, 
such as David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, made the greatest contributions to 
social reform fuelled by passion and ambition. In the process of introducing 
unemployment legislation, they showed their political concern with the problem and were 
eager to respond to working class demands. For Lloyd George, the task of the 'New 
Liberals' was to remove the immediate economic causes of discontent in poverty, 
insecurity and bad conditions. 49 For Winston Churchill, 'Socialism attacks Capital, 
Liberalism attacks monopoly'. 50 William Beveridge's Unemployment. A Problem of 
Industry in 1909, argued that unemployment was a necessary accompaniment to 
industrial organisation; it effectively destroyed the individualist case and turned attention 
to the best methods of minimising unemployment and providing effective help for those 
already unemployed. His Labour Exchanges Act of 1909 was voluntary and the State 
49. Lloyd George, Better Times, p. 68. See Bruce, 1968, p. 171 
50. Speech at Dundee, May 1908, Liberalism and the Social Problem, See Bruce, 1968, p. 155. 
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merely took over sonic sLxt), local authority or private exchanges; it was however the first 
stateschenic. 
Although Winston Churchill and Uoyd George took some advice from the N%Icbbs, tile), 
intended giving their measures of social reform a 'Liberal' identity. The characteristics of 
the British Unemployment Insurance of 1911 reflected fundamental ideologies of those 
important figures within the Liberal Party. Their consciousness and understanding of the 
economic and political situations of the country during that period had been reinforced by 
tile public debate. intellectual research and political moverricrit; hoA-cver, it was their 
basic conception and beliefs about the functions of the state and market system which 
played a crucial role in the outcome of decision making in that field. Their final proposal 
was designexl to meet tile increasing demands from the Labour Parly and trade union 
movement, but at thesame time, to avoid a radical offence to tile Tories and therefore 
severe attack from tile Party. Tlicir determination to solve the problems of tile working 
class in particular and their u. %e of pragmatic strategy in the process of decision making 
ensured their acceptance of certain conilromi. y--s which led to the modest scheme and also 
provideil a basis for the p1mage of their proposal into legislation. 
Much of their legislation was piecemeal and exivrimental rather than constituting an 
entire system of welfare. I'he reforms provided a basis for future initiatives; their 
innovations, like pensions and insurance, were integral to tile establishment of the 
welfare. state. As a contribution tosocial policy. unemployment insurance, like Labour 
Exchanges and lwalth insurance. formed the basis for a new commitment to diminish the 
hardship of industrial society. At tile same time they also avoided a radical change from 
the old tradition, mixing individualism and collectivism in an acceptable scheme. 711C 
Liberal Government hoped to gain the support of tile working class through various 
-social reforms while preserving andstrengthening the free play of tile market. Ile), did 
not even dismantle tile Poor Law which so many of its recipients hated. 711c old system 
was allowed to operate alongside tile new one. I'he Government relied a great deal on 
local authoritit-N. although Uqyd George and Winston Churchill intended to increase the 
central direction of public life. This %%, as a very controvcr-sial issue among the Party. 71cy 
were either suspicious of the direction of such policies, like its Prime Minister 11.1i. 
Asquith. or in favour of more powerful local authorities, like tile individualist wing. 
'111C Libe'rals faikA to r4ovide more compulsory and unive rs I provisions which were 
needed. For example Sickness Insurance was only available to the insured and not to 
their families. whilL- tile Unemployment Insurance applied only to cerlain trades. It was 
compulsory for some 2 1/4 million workers but not universal, relating to trades which 
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were regarded as more vulnerable to seasonal or other fluctuations. Ile piecemeal and 
experimental scheme was meant to aid the skilled man and was not intended for the 
casual labourer. However. it rejected the individualist tradition which distinguished 
worthy applicants from unworthy and recognised the complexity and diversity of 
unemployment. While the Liberals accepted collectivism and state intervention, they did 
not give up their basic belief in 'individual thrift' and the profit motive. The 
Unemployment Insurance scheme was intended to ensure the efficient operation of free 
market competition and provide a base for private insurance. Although there was a 
contradictory reaction to the Uberal Bill within the I-abour Party (and joined by the SDP 
and the Fabian Society, they campaigned against the Bill's contributory principle) the 
Party formed an alliance in supporting the measure and the attitude of their leader, 
MacDonald, was decisive in this matter. 
Willi [fie attack on uneml)loyment. he British Government entered for the firsi time into 
the life of the ordinary. adult, rnale, able-bodied workman. Yet, the measures adopted in 
1909 and 1911 tosolve the problems of unemployment never had the chance to prove 
them. 1, elves undty the economic conditions for which they were designed. Unemployment 
Insurance was disrupted by the upheaval of the first World War. Later, the great 
depre. ssion of the twenties and thirties; destroyed for a time the unemployment plan as a 
. scheme of insurance and forced the Government to provide direct, tax-supported 
unemployment relief coupled with a means test, the famous'dolc'. With this experience 
W iind him, 13everidge insisted in A&iumption C of his report of 1942 that on), plan for 
unemployment insuranceshould be coupled with a consistent government commitment o 
the maintenance of full employment (Gilbert, 1966, pp. 287-288). 
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Chapter Four 
The 1934 Unemployment Insurance Scheme of Sweden 
In this chapter, I discuss the introduction of the Swedish unemployment insurance 
scheme in 1934. In Part One, I give an historical review of the earlier period when the 
Swedes undertook a debate on the nature of unemployment and introduced various relief 
measures to deal with the problem. In Part Two, I discuss the main features of the 1934 
scheme. In order to explain how the scheme came about, I pay particular attention to the 
different roles exerted by different groups within the society, to the ideologies of these 
groups and to other elements which exerted an influence on the characteristics of the 
scheme. The main conclusions are drawn in Part Three. 
Part One The Policy Context 
This part focuses on the social, economic and political factors which brought the 
discussion of unemployment relief onto the agenda and led to the introduction of 
unemployment insurance in Sweden. It is composed of two sections. Section One is a 
general introduction to the country and Section Two is a detailed discussion of some 
historical factors which changed the country's attitude towards unemployment as a social 
problem and the measures they had already taken to deal with unemployment before the 
establishment of the 1934 Unemployment Insurance scheme. 
Section One A Brief Introduction to Sweden 
Sweden is the fourth largest country in Europe, occupying an area of 173,349 English 
square miles. About 50 % of the land surface is forested and less than 10% is farmland. 
According to estimates for the end of 1932, it had 6,190,364 inhabitants. For many 
centuries, Sweden was ethnically very homogeneous and was perhaps the most unified 
people in the world before the Second World War. 
As one of the oldest kingdoms in the world combined with ancient democratic traditions, 
Sweden has been a constitutional monarchy since the early 19th century. The parliament, 
composed of two chambers both elected by the people, was established in 1865.7he 
First Chamber was elected by the members of the 'Landstings' (provincial 
representatives) and city councils, and electors of six towns not represented in the 
'Landstings'. It was dominated by the upper class. The candidates were required to be 
wealthy. All the members of the First Chamber were elected for the term of eight years. 
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The Second Chamber was elected for four years by general election, but only a small part 
of the male population was eligible to vote and an even smaller proportion eligible to 
stand. The proportional representation method ensured that the conservative agrarian 
interests and the rising middle classes could exert some influence. The Social Democratic 
Party (SAP) and the Liberal Party, formed in 1889 and 1902 respectively, were aligned 
to fight for the suffrage and parliamentarianism for their first few decades. In 1917, 
Sweden adopted parliamentary government and introduced universal adult suffrage in 
1921. At the 1921 election, five parties -- the Communists, Social Democrats, the 
Agrarians (changed to the Centre Party in 1957), Liberals and Moderates (Conservatives, 
inaugurated in 1904) -- captured seats in the Parliament, when universal suffrage was 
applied for the first time. The political power of the King had begun to shift to parliament 
and the government. Since then executive power has rested with the Cabinet (Regering) 
which is responsible to parliament (Riksdag). 
The Swedish Parliament is the country's highest decision-making body and the prime 
representative of the Swedish people. It enacts laws, decides the amount and use of 
taxation and examines the Government's actions. The number of the Parliamentary seats 
allocated to the parties are in proportion to the number of votes they receive. A party must 
attract at least 40% of the votes in the whole country, or 12% in a single constituency, in 
order to gain representation in Parliament. Before 1973 the King acted with the advice of 
a council of state, the head of which isthe Prime Minister. All the members of the 
Council of State are responsible for the acts of the Government. In accordance with 
tradition, the work of the Swedish Riskdag is, to a great extent, carried on in a non- 
partisan atmosphere. This is largely the result of the thorough attention given to all 
questions by numerous standing committees elected on the basis of proportional 
representation. 
Until the tum of the century, every second Swede was living off the soil. Traditionally, 
fan-ners had good access to political channels and had been entitled to free ownership of 
land and forest. The country has always had a class of freehold farmers who were able in 
one way or another to influence the nation's government. Over the past century, assisted 
by a prolonged period of peace, Sweden has developed from a poor farming society into 
a technologically advanced welfare state characterised by a high degree of social equality 
and a high level of prosperity. 
In the 1880s, industrialisation and urbanisation in Sweden inspired the first mass- 
political splits between rural conservatism and urban radicalism. However, while 
Swedish peasants joined by the industrial bourgeoisie, the civil service, the nobility and 
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the military, were the grass-roots of conservatism, the small farmers and rural craftsmen 
in the countryside also supported the liberal parties which were formulated amongst the 
free tradesmen and craftsmen of the cities. There was a growing gap in the second half of 
the 19th century between the richer peasants, who were the proprietors of more than half 
the lands and were to form a politically influential middle-class, and those rural proletariat 
of the landless persons. With the growth of industrialisation, the farmers found it 
difficult to make themselves. heard in politics; in 1910 their representatives split from 
other parties and, in 1922 , they formulated their own party under the name of the 
Agrarian Party. 
The serious rural problems were eased by massive emigration and the process of 
industrialisation. Between 1865 and 1930, there was a large-scale emigration mainly to 
the USA. In 1930, the majority of the 1,300,000 Swedes who emigrated to North 
America went to the United States. By 1870 Sweden had 80,000 industrial workers (15 
per cent of the population), by 1900 this had increased to 300,000 (Davidson, 1989, 
p. 49). In 1934, the population of Sweden was about equally divided between the pursuit 
of agriculture and commerce and industries. 
When industrialisation took off in Europe during the 19th century, Sweden was able to 
supply the resources necessary for factory building, engineering equipment and housing. 
The mining and metallurgical industries and the timber and wood-work industries made 
rapid progress and in the 1930's became leading and important businesses. During the 
20th century, based on Swedish inventions and adaptations and making use of advanced 
technology, many new industries have emerged; the engineering sector and science-based 
industries are representatives. 
Section Two Political Debates and Measures Taken by the Parties on 
Unemployment prior to the Introduction of the UI Scheme 
As an advanced welfare state, Sweden or the so-called Swedish model has been an often- 
chosen research object for comparative social policy studies (Himmelstrand, 1978; 
Stephens, 1979; Scase, 1977; Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andesen 1985; Olofsson, 
unpublished book). According to Koblik (1975), however, it is not wholly true to 
assume that Sweden has always played a leading role in social reform or that there was a 
long historical background for welfare programmes. Only since the 1930s has the idea 
that it is government's responsibility to solve social problems replaced the liberal non- 
interference policy of the nineteenth century and, since then, significant progressive 
legislations through social reforms been introduced (Koblik, 1975, pp. 332-3). 
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What follows is an historical review of the social, economic and political context in 
which the public debates on Unemployment Insurance took place in Sweden. The 
ideological influence of the dominant elites, the measures adopted by the different parties 
and the roles played by the trade unions and the labour movement will be given particular 
attention. I take account of the development of the ideas which accompanied the process 
of industrialisation, concerning the most appropriate means of solving their 
unemployment problem and arguments about the importance of the power structure and 
its role in the establishment of Unemployment Insurance. 
Industralisation, Social Problems and the Recognition of State 
Responsibility 
The industrial revolution occurred relatively late in Sweden. 51 'Me country was identified 
with poverty, unemployment and famine in the late 19th and early 20th century and a 
restrictive poor relief system, combined with 'Christian charity', was its social welfare. 
While majority of the population was struck continuously by economic hardship, a 
relatively small upper classes and nascent middle class were enjoying wealth of the 
country. When there was discussion of social legislation in Britain and Germany in the 
1880s, the political preconditions for reform did not exist in Sweden then. Ile masses of 
the population were excluded from the undemocratic political process and the lower 
classes turned to the mass movements fighting for political and social rights (Davidson, 
1989, pp. 51,60). The relatively late development of the economy and democracy, 
however, did not constitute a barrier to public concern. Intellectual and the political 
discussion of unemployment insurance in Sweden started at the same time as in Britain. 
From the beginning of the twentieth century, the government has embarked on a wide 
research programme of welfare schemes taking into account both the economic 
development of the country and the experiences of other European countries (Wilson, 
1979). 
The Poor Relief System and the Promotion of Unemployment Insurance in the Late 
1800's and the Early 1900's 
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, classical economic theory had the most 
powerful influence on policy makers in Sweden as in Britain. Thus unemployment was 
viewed as an accidental phenomenon resulting from minor fractions in economic relations 
and occasional bad harvests. 7he heart of the analysis of unemployment lay in political 
51. Sweden was in its transition from an agricultural society to an industrial state between 1850 and 
1920. - 
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economy and Say's Law (first presented in 1803), which suggested that production 
generated its own demand and the only possible cause of extensive unemployment in 
society was that wages were set at too high a level. 
As the only form of public welfare in Sweden for centuries, poor relief originated in the 
Middle Ages with a aim to control the lower classes, maintain people's will to support 
themselves and calm social and political unrest and maintain public order (Davidson, 
1989, p. 57). The 1918 new Poor Relief Act embodied a more generous attitude towards 
the poor, however, self-support was taken by the authorities as obligatory principle. In 
addition, a person accepting poor relief lost his right to vote (Forsberg, 1986, p. 19). 52 
This arrangement was based on the belief that poverty and dependence were the result of 
individual shortcomings such as laziness. Therefore, humanitarian relief of distress based 
on the idea of Christian love should be voluntary and limited, in order to maintain an 
individual's incentive to self-help: only through industry and thrift that one could get 
rich. According to Ebba Pauli of the Central Association for Social Work in 1906, people 
should be educated to adapt to society rather than to change society (Koblik(ed. ), 1975, 
pp. 336-8). 
However some people were considering alternative method to deal with poverty. They 
became aware in the 1880s of the fact that the traditional means to ensure the security for 
industrial workers were disappearing with the transformation from an agricultural to an 
industrial society in Sweden; the existing poor relief system was inadequate and they 
believed that the introduction of alternative measures such as social insurance was 
necessary. In early 1884, the first comprehensive social insurance bill written by Adolf 
Hedin was introduced in the Second Chamber of the Swedish Parliament. 'Me bill was 
the first step in the development of social policy in Sweden. As a leading liberal figure, 
Hedin in the bill called for investigation of the Bismarckian social insurance approach of 
Germany, which provided compulsory state insurance for sickness, industrial accidents, 
old age and invalidity. Although the bill was unanimously adopted by Parliament, the 
paternalism in the Bismarckian scheme was almost immediately attacked openly by Hans 
Forssell, a leading Swedish Conservative Senator and Manchester liberal (1843-1901). 
He opposed any state intervention in the relationship between employers and employees 
(Olsson, 1990, pp. 43-4). It was also attacked by the parliamentary farmers' group in the 
Second Chamber, as they feared the possibility of being taxed to support a scheme which 
would solely benefit industry (Heclo, 1974, p. 181). 
52.7be rule last till 1945. 
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When economic conditions deteriorated and unemployment increased, a careful study of 
unemployment insurance was undertaken by a committee in 1895. It was set up by the 
small circle of liberal reformers in the country and its work was limited to the work relief 
system in Stockholm and other major cities. It drew heavily on the experiences of Bern 
and St. Gallen but the voluntary nature of the municipal insurance scheme was quickly 
disapproved by large employers. Outside Parliament, there was also a growing interest in 
the reality of trade cycles, which led to rising unemployment, of the mass popular 
movements since the last decade of the 19th century. Gustav Cassel's Socialpolitik 
(social policy) of the National Association of Social Work (the CSA), was probably the 
most influential in the early Swedish social policy discourse (Olsson, 1990, p. 61). 
Founded in 1903, the CSA was strongly influenced by the idea of voluntarism, 
preventive self-help, and individual responsibility in social welfare. Cassel (1902) was 
critical of both dogmatic liberalism and socialism. He emphasises individual 
responsibility in contrast to reliance on the state. In his conception of social policy, 
voluntary organisations like cooperatives and trade unions play a central role. Both 
would make competition more social and efficient: consumer cooperatives would 
organize the demand side, while the unions would make supply more uniform. 
However, when the associations cannot make further progress, it is time for state 
intervention (ibid., p. 63). 
The new tenets, similar to those of Marshall and his followers in Britain, indicated a 
different perspective of explaining the occurrence of the short-term fluctuations in 
employment -- not just poor seasons and harvests but also poor markets for industrial 
goods that could prevent workers from securing an adequate income for themselves and 
their families. Government could use short-term palliative measures to clear away the 
obstacles for the market, and '[t]he most politically explosive of these palliatives was 
unemployment insurance. ' (Heclo, 1974, pp. 66-67). They argued that the best social 
policy was a policy which could provide favourable conditions for business. The 
precondition for state intervention was that its action would not be harmful to the 
operation of the market system in the country. 'Mis Liberal orientation gave birth to a 
series of legislated, voluntary social insurance schemes, with some modicum of public 
subsidy. For example, in 1891, voluntary private sickness insurance; in 1901, voluntary, 
private accident insurance (Davidson, 19891. 
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The Liberal Wavrinsky's Proggsal of Unemployment Insurance and the Acceptance of 
the Insurance Principle in the Early 1900's 
Swedish reformers had been stimulated by the German idea of social insurance from the 
end of the 19th century. A broad-based political consensus resulted from a free political 
climate of this country. As there were still intense social division and economic conflict, 
various groups (agrarian interests which were well represented in the political 
institutions, national administrators, intellectuals, businessmen, unions, etc. ) participated 
in the dispute over the merits and shortcomings of social insurance (Heidenheimer et al., 
1976, p. 216). However the debates in this field were very weak and did not lead to a 
positive outcome. 
A handful of liberal reformers and civil servants played an initiating role on 
unemployment insurance in reaction to the emerging cycle of unemployment. Ile pattern 
illustrated in Hedin's motion in 1884 was typical until early in the 20th century. In 1900 
when he introduced his motion on unemployment insurance for the first time in the 
parliamentary Second Chamber, Eduard Wavrinsky argued that it had become necessary 
for society to intervene in workers' lives because traditional patriarchal relations between 
employer and worker were vulnerable to the changes in society (Heclo, 1974, p. 71). 
However his 1900 and 1901 motions were narrowly defeated in the Second Chamber. In 
1906, unemployment insurance became a public issue in Swedish society. The first 
forceful collective pressure for unemployment insurance came from liberal poor law 
reformers of the Central Association for Social Work under the leadership of the noted 
reformer G. H. Von Koch. Ile Liberals favoured unemployment insurance because they 
regarded it as a means of promoting the 'self-help' principle of liberal reformers of the 
poor law. For the Liberals, it could also be used as a politically expedient means of 
defeating the Conservative government (ibid., p. 72). 
From the autumn of 1907, the first major international economic crisis of the century 
began to be felt in Sweden; unemployment rose and remained at unusually high levels for 
the following three years. Only now did political parties become involved in the 
unemployment insurance issue, and under the same economic stimulus the Swedish 
legislature began its first extensive discussion of unemployment. Board of Trade 
administrators had undertaken the first Swedish investigation of unemployment insurance 
in 1907. Grunner Huss, one of the economists at the Board, emphasised the social 
responsibility for unemployment in his report in 1907: 
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Those who have worked diligently and willingly, but because of 
insufficient demand for their working power are subjected to need, 
ought to be provided security another way than through general poor 
law relief or private charity ... It is unjustifiable that inability for self- 
support, the cause of which lies not in the individual himself but in 
social relationships, should result in the reduction of citizen rights 
which poor relief entailS. 53 
His views were probably influenced by those of his teacher, the famous neoclassical 
economist Gustav Cassel. He and his university friends, G6sta Bagge and Otto Mae, 
who were also students of Cassel, dominated the development of unemployment policy 
for the next generation. 
In 1908,1909, and 1910 Eduard Wavrinsky, a Liberal member sitting for Stockholm, 
the director of a large private insurance company, reintroduced his motion on 
unemployment insurance. The Social Democratic Party supported the amended motion, 
in which Wavrinsky recommended the Ghent-type insurance, 54 as it was an aid to 
unionisation. However, their efforts were effectively thwarted by the conservative Upper 
Chamber. Ile Conservative government rejected the unemployment insurance proposal 
in the Lower Chamber in 1908 and in the Upper Chamber in 1909 and 1910. They 
emphasise that the scheme would lend support to workers' wage demands by supporting 
strikers and deterring potential strike-breakers and unemployment insurance should be 
left to the unions. 55 
Although the investigation that Wavrinsky had requested was not carried out, because of 
these party clashes, there was a shift in understanding of the causes of unemployment 
away from personal fault. The 1911 election campaign was the first time in which 
unemployment insurance was mentioned in a Swedish party election programme by the 
Liberals. The 1911 general election results gave the Liberals a chance to form their 
second government and the party's leader, Karl Staaf, undertook the prime ministership 
53. Promemoria angaende Arbetsloshelsforsakring. 
54. This type of unemployment insurance used public funds as subsidy to the existing union 
unemployment insurance plans. Discouraged by the experience of St. Gallen in the Swiss cantons, where 
the world's first compulsory unemployment insurance scheme had been experimented with in 1894 but 
had ended after the second year by a referendum because the fund had a deficit of 5,550 frances and the 
opposition of the better-off workers (related to the higher level of unemployment and a larger proportion 
of contributors of the lowest income class than expected), the union movement in Belgium intended to 
have a new variant of any obligatory unemployment insurance. In August 1901, the Ghent commune 
made the first grants to unions and to a'thrift fund' for the unorganized workers (Heclo, 1974, pp. 70-1). 
55. F6rsta Kammar tillffilliga utskott, no. 1, Utlfitande no. 24,1910, p. 7. Quoted in Heclo, 1974, p. 74. 
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with a personal desire to carry forward reform work. The discussion in the Riksdag in 
1912 on general pension insurance stressed the importance and urgency of increased 
security as an earned right rather than a measure granted only upon proof of need. 
Insurance benefit would not just be available in old age but also cover other situations, 
e. g. illness, accident, involuntary unemployment and so on, and it should have the 
character of a general national insurance. 
Although there was a big disagreement between the proponents of poor relief and social 
insurance in the debates in parliamentary committees and in the Riksdag (Koblik (ed. ), 
1975, pp. 339-340), political parties and groups reached a consensus through their 
representatives in the cooperative investigation. The pension proposals reflected their 
common aim of improving the existing poor relief system and the pension bill gained the 
support of all parties in each chamber. In 1913, Sweden became the first country in the 
world to have adopted a contributory, universal and flat-rate Old Age Pension. It was 
viewed as a reflection of 'a pre-industrial tradition of royal concern' bestowing uniform 
protection upon all citizens. It became a model for other social insurance schemes in 
Sweden in subsequent years (Heidenheimar et al, 1983, p. 216). However, the benefits 
were too low, the income test was too strict and special supplements of the poor relief 
type had to be introduced by the municipalities. 
The Liberal cabinet agreed to establish the administration of unemployment insurance 
soon after taking office in 1911. Ilie new Liberal Minister of Civil Affairs appointed Otto 
Mae, a Social Democrat, who wrote about the advantages of social insurance inTiden, 
the theoretical monthly of the Social Democratic Party in 1909, to investigate the problem 
of unemployment anticipating that his report would form the basis for a government bill 
which would be brought before the 1914 Parliament. JRrte and his colleagues drew up an 
unemployment insurance plan along the lines of the Ghent system. However, the 
administratiorfs plan became the political victim when the Liberal government fell in the 
spring of 1914 over the entirely unrelated question of defence and the new Conservative 
government was preoccupied with the same problem. The impetus behind Sweden's first 
efforts at unemployment insurance was lost. Jdrte's 1915 report on the issue to the new 
government was quietly forgotten amid the urgency of avoiding participation in the first 
World War. 
The Public Work of Unemployment Relief of the Conservative Govemment 
With the expectation that the European War would result in the inevitable decline of 
world trade and thus massive unemployment, the Conservative government established 
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an Unemployment Commission (AKStatens arbetsIdshetskommission) on August 10, 
1914, to propose measures against the expected unemployment. The principal aim of the 
Commission was to relieve unemployment through public works. It was carried out on 
the following general principles: 'the work must benefit the State, a commune, or other 
public body, and must be justified for economic or cultural reasons but must not be such 
that it would be carried out normally by ordinary means; wages must form a 
comparatively large proportion of the cost; and it must be possible to start, stop, extend, 
or restrict the operation in accord with the fluctuations of private employment. ' (Childs, 
1936, pp. 150-1). 
In the Spring of 1916, the Commission began its first national work relief programme 
and expanded this activity during the following two years with payments below the 
normal market wage rate. Liberal economic doctrine still dominated within the 
Commission. The administrators believed in the moral and economic advantages of relief 
work for the unemployed more than other approaches, such as cash support, and 50- 
70% of the unemployment relief was given in the form of work or assistance. Their 
powers increased successively, especially during 1920-22, in which they were equivalent 
to those in regular government departments (Lindeberg, 1968, pp. 320-1). During the 
three years after 1921, the Commission created state relief organisations to arrange public 
relief work for the unemployed and gradually undertook most administrative work to set 
the work, conditions and wage rates independently. 
The New Pattern of Power structure and the Increasing Influence of the 
Social Democratic Party 
The New Political Power Structure of the 1920's and the Incompetence of the Social 
Democratic Pajjy 
The 1920s was a period of political instability and minority governments in which very 
little social reform was undertaken in Sweden (Castles, 1978; Olsson in Flora (ed. ), 
1986; Davidson, 1989, p. 91). Although democratic reform was accomplished with the 
achievement of universal suffrage, through the collaboration of Liberals and Social 
Democrats from 1917 to 1920, this only resulted in short-lived caretaker and minority 
governments in the 1920s. The Social Democratic Party established the first socialist 
government in Swedish history in 1920 for a period of six months. After the Social 
Democrats resigned in September, there were nine separate governments in the next 
twelve years, in all of which factionalism was prevalent. 'Me interests of different groups 
offset one another, and short-term alliances depended on political convenience; there was 
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no rational pursuit of political ends or consistent ideological politics but merely a game of 
tactics. The Rik-sdag could not initiate any political programmes due to the lack of 
majority support. 
With the economic dislocations following the First World War, a big depression began in 
Sweden in the autumn of 1920; the country suffered from economic recession and high 
unemployment. In the early 20s unemployment was over 20 per cent. lbroughout the 
1920s, even during the boom years from the mid to late 1920s, the unemployment figure 
decreased very little and hovered around 10%. It did not again fall below 10 percent until 
late in the 1930s (Landgren, 1957, p. 15; Lindeberg, 1968, p. 320; Heclo, 1974, p. 94; 
Mendes, 1990, p. 37). What measures should be taken against the unemployment crisis, 
in order to achieve a balance between the self-regulating effects of the free market and the 
regulatory function of the state for the economy, became a major concern for the political 
parties. 
Measures of combating unemployment in the debate among the parties included higher 
relief-work wages, more state-township jobs and the introduction of unemployment 
insurance for industrial workers. Central issues were whether the payments of work 
projects for the unemployed should be below market rate or normal terms. The Social 
Democratic Party favoured the second alternative, while the Liberals believed in the 
former's efficacy for reducing unemployment, arguing that harmony in the economic 
system was inherent to market forces and to private ownership, the prospect of profits 
and wage differentiation. With regard to unemployment insurance, both the Social 
Democratic Party and union organisation argued for its introduction with state subsidies. 
It was acknowledged that help to the unemployed constituted support for the workers 
(Lindeberg, 1968, p. 328). Their demand, however, turned out to be fruitless. 
Under the heavy strain from persistently high unemployment, proposed unemployment 
insurance policies had been looked upon as a limited technique for improving labour 
market organisation in Sweden during the interwar period. Apart from this, there were 
several reasons for the SDP's failure over unemployment policy in 1920s. 
Firstly, in the 1920s, they could not act as a dominant party to put their proposals into 
practice. Its unity with the Liberals came to an end after the accomplishment of the 
suffrage reforms (Davidson, 1989, p. 91), and the political cooperation between these 
two Parties was replaced by a new political power structure in Sweden. While the 
Liberals, the Conservatives and the Agrarian party were allied on one side, the Social 
Democrats stood on the other. Although the Social Democrats headed several short-lived 
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coalition governments, they were too weak to implement employment policies. They 
were facing a united opposition from employers, the Conservative and the Liberal 
parties, who held liberal economic ideas. This collaboration was particularly evident 
when the Branting government of the SAP fell in 1923; in 1926, a Social Democratic 
government was also forced to resign on the unemployment issue (Lindeberg, 1968, 
p. 322). The political cleavage in this area ruled out any major welfare reform for over a 
decade (Olsson, 1990, p. 109). 
Secondly, as far as organised labour is concerned, it had lost both members and support 
in the 1920s after the defeat of the 1909 general strike. The shattering event was to have 
consequences for many years and'it was a long time before a working relationship could 
be established between the two sides with the government as friendly mediator. ' (Childs, 
1980, p. 7). The most influential groups within the labour movement were reformist, but 
were unable to resist the combined strong opposition of administrators, bourgeois parties 
and employers' representatives. 
As one of the interest groups who initiated the unemployment policy in Sweden during 
the depression following the First World War (Lindeberg, 1968, p. 319), the Swedish 
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) maintained that it was the legal duty of society to 
help the unemployed. They took unemployment insurance as their major demand and 
argued that public work should be kept for the non-members. 'Ibis was different from the 
political preference of the SAP leaders who maintained their commitment to full 
employment policy. As early as 1913, the leader Hjalmar Branting and activist Gustav 
M611er introduced a proposal to parliament, which 'would now be called Keynesian 
(approach) ... to ensure full employment through expansion of the public sector and the 
use of the fiscal policy' (Ginsburg, 1983, p. 111). Although the proposal was ignored by 
parliament, its idea remained as a central part of Social Democratic doctrine. When 
political administrators accepted this new intellectual perspective, 'unemployment 
insurance recede[d] into the political background as a tool of economic adaptation rather 
than general provision' (Heclo, 1974, p. 92). 
Thirdly, throughout the 1920s, the SAP felt unable to deal with a difficult matter -- 
ideology. While the non-socialists were carrying on their successful defence of liberal 
doctrine, the Social Democrats, retaining their faith in Marxism, failed to take any major 
initiatives in any case and to formulate a practical programme to deal with unemployment 
(Heclo, 1974, p. 92, Davidson, 1989, pp. 91-2). 
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Based on classical Marxist analysis, the SAP insisted that the interests between capital 
and labour were incompatible and unemployment and capitalist crisis thus would be 
inevitable. This belief prevented the party from producing practical programmes and 
taking effective political action to counter the Liberal assertion of 'harmony'. They 
criticised the classical economic principles contained in the relief programmes proposed 
by the Conservative govemment in the early 20s ( Mendes, 1990, p. 38), however they 
had no answer back to the dominant explanations of the non-socialist parties that 'too 
high wages' were responsible for unemployment (Davidson, 1989, p. 94). 
Some Social Democrats accepted such claim that any work projects for the unemployed 
should offer lower wages than the private sector (Ginsburg, 1983, p. 111). In March 
1921, the SAP's parliamentary group agreed to LO's suggestion of state funding for 
trade union unemployment insurance funds, yet the SAP believed in the classical 
solutions, cutting wages to increase employment (Mendes, 1990, p. 39). They found it 
difficult to find a balance between carrying out short-term social reforms, e. g. securing a 
fairer sharing of the national product in order to improve the living standard of workers, 
and at the same time, following the Marxist theory of conflict which the ushered in the 
final crisis of capitalist system and establishment of socialist society. 
Last, the SAP could not get support from the powerful rural population -- the decisive 
factor for political development in the period; instead, their support was limited to 
industrial workers. During that period, the interest conflicts between industry and 
agriculture were acute. Especially by the end of the decade, agriculture's lag in income 
and profitability behind industry was greatly increased due to the effect of the 
intemational crisis. 
Because of these difficulties, and due to their parliamentary weakness, the Social 
Democrats did not formulate any definite course of action during the 1920s. The Party 
argued for the introduction of state subsidies to encourage union unemployment 
insurance. But their proposal for a Ghent-type unemployment insurance plan was 
dropped in 1924. Ilis result was related to the united opposition of Conservative, 
Liberal and Agrarian parties, economists and employers' groups and the Unemployment 
Commission. The bourgeois majority insisted that mass unemployment could be avoided 
only by using traditional economic measures: economy, retrenchment, and lower 
production costs -- particularly wages (Heclo, 1974, p. 96). In the investigation 
established by the Social Democratic government in 1926, the Liberal, Conservative and 
Agrarian Parties' representatives led by economist Eli Heckscher argued unemployment 
insurance policy would lead to 'false' wage levels above the equilibrium point and 
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therefore actually increase unemployment. Poor relief was a valid form of aid applicable 
to the unemployed and relief work at below market wages was beneficial. The labour 
members of the investigation could not dispute the majority's analysis of the problem and 
merely argued for the need to adopt unemployment insurance and strengthened labour 
exchanges to deal with the problem. 
In 1928, Swedish policy makers and civil servants turned their attention to the rapid 
expansion of British unemployment insurance; they argued that any unemployment 
insurance programme has a tendency to extend to relief and was dangerous for the 
national economy. Tle conclusion was that'no action should be taken on the question. ' 
(Heclo, 1974, p. 97). Thus '(Ohe deadlock on unemployment insurance was due not 
simply to a clash of political or economic interests but to a pervasive economic doctrine 
that no amount of expert investigations and compromises could circumvent. Attention 
and conflict focussed on unemployment insurance because no one could think of 
anything better to do than alleviate the symptoms of mass unemployment' (ibid., pp. 97- 
8). An alternative mode of thought began to appear in the trade unions and in the left-led 
municipalities, and it soon came to attract a new generation of welfare intellectuals 
(Olsson 1990, p. 74). 
The New Policy Resl2gctive and the New Strategy of the New SAP Generation 
As described, their ideological commitments prohibited the Social Democratic party from 
taking its own practical programmes to encounter the Liberal belief of 'harmony'. In the 
meantime, the predominance of traditional economic doctrines in Sweden was challenged 
by the younger generation in the party who decided to adopt pragmatic actions to combat 
the consistently high unemployment rather than adhere to Marxist dogma. 
After the death in 1925 of Branting, the architect of Sweden's first Social Democratic 
government, Ernst Wigforss and Per Albin Hansson, were regarded as the two most 
important political figures. While the former was the party's leading expert in economic 
policy, the latter was the successor of Branting as the leader of the SAP in 1925. As one 
of the members of the Committee on Unemployment 56 who played an active role in 
working on the first report, Wigforss was critical of the chapter dealing with the causes 
of unemployment. In the sixth version of the chapter written by him, Wigforss pointed 
out that, first, it was the market which set wages and the unemployed could not get a job 
with a wage below the market one; second, to be able to assess the effects of a wage 
reduction, it is not enough to study the labour market; studies of other markets and the 
56. It was appointed in April 1927 by the government. 
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interrelations between the different parts of the economy are also necessary. Wigforss 
claimed that to increase purchasing power of a society by means of a high wages policy, 
rather than through the socialization of business, would 'pump up purchasing power' 
and stimulate the economy, and therefore lead to the elimination of unemployment 
(Koblik, 1975, p. 285; Wadensjb, 1989, p. 8; 1991, p. 111; Davidson, 1989, 
p. 96). Wigforss' attack on the traditional approach to the problem of joblessness had 
major implications for the forms of the would-be Swedish model of the welfare state and 
made him a pioneer in framing practical policies using Keynesian economics (Heclo, 
1974, p. 99). 
The policy worked out by Hansson, Wigforss and Mbller in 1930 was to replace the 
relief programme with an extensive public work programme paying normal wages. The 
policy was accepted by the party executive and the party congress, and marked the 
party's, and in the long run Swedish society's, new conception of what ought to be 
done. Adopting the Marxist approach, argued Wigforss at the 1932 Congress, prevented 
the party from adopting active policies. In order to meet the crisis caused by the Great 
Depression, the new unemployment policy rather than socialisation of the means of 
production was required. The Party's acceptance of the planned economic theory marked 
its departure from its ideological confusion and inaction of the 1920s (Davidson, 1989, 
p. 98). 
In Sweden, as in the United States, the depression was the main issue in the early 1930s. 
The different political parties developed their own proposals for the 1932 election. The 
bourgeois parties produced their manifestos on the basis of their traditional economic 
principles, 'doctrine of harmony, when economic conditions were getting worse. They 
believed that the economy would recover from the depression and rejected unemployment 
insurance. For them, interference with wage rates would lead to high prices and 
ultimately to economic crisis; therefore it was necessary for the state to keep its 
expenditure to a minimum and reduce the level of wages for relief work. Their ideology 
in 1932 was like that of the Social Democrats' in the 1920s, full of confusion and doubt. 
The Social Democrats, in contrast, campaigned for the election with convincing 
programmes. Through their new unemployment policy, which involved expanding 
public expenditure and providing for employment at normal wages, in order to increase 
purchasing power and hence demand, it was claimed that the economic problems would 
be solved. 
Two reasons pushed the Social Democratic Party towards a new employment policy. One 
was the increasing pressure of LO -- the Federation of the Trade Unions: the coverage of 
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unemployment funds was raised from 38 to 55 per cent of the labour force by the end of 
the 1920s. The other was the new generation of party cadres that emerged in the mid 
1920s, i. e. Ernst Wigforss, Per Albin Hansson and Gustov M61ler, who generally 
preferred more interventionist employment policies. For them, governments influence 
employment by active political decisions, e. g. by increasing public spending (Olofsson, 
unpublished book, pp. 98-9). 
The SDP began to admit the necessity of state intervention to obviate crises and 
unemployment through the new unemployment policy rather than through socialisation of 
the means of production. The new economic policies of Sweden in 1933 reflected the 
influence of Keynes' ideas as set out in his pamphlets in the 1920s (Landgren, 1957). 
This ushered in an era when unemployment was transformed from a social policy 
question to an economic problem (Mendes, 1990, p. 40). The policy itself was mainly 
composed of the scrapping of 'reserve labour, the abolition of the Unemployment 
Commission, the provision of relief work on a very large scale at normal wages, 
stimulating the economy and introducing state unemployment insurance (Davidson, 
1989, p. 100). The party won the second chamber election but did not have an absolute 
majority and their plans were rejected by the bourgeois parties who intended to resume 
power. 
ne Crisis Ageement of the Social Democratic PaM and Agrarian Party 
As a result of the 1932 election, the Social Democrats, under the leadership of Per Albin 
Hansson, formed their minority government. Considering the political difficulty of 
fulfilling their programme in the Riksdag and the urgency of solving these problems, 
they decided to cooperate with the Agrarian Party. They gave their priority to developing 
a new economic and unemployment policy and were willing to secure the support of rural 
voters through the regulation of agriculture. The two parties had to accept each other's 
programmes in certain critical areas, and each party had to make changes to their original 
proposals. One of the compromises was the exclusion of unemployment insurance from 
the agreement (Davidson, 1989, p. 100; Koblik (ed. ), 1975, pp. 256,269). The main 
reason for this seems to be that it only benefited industrial and not agricultural workers 
The significance of the 1933 'crisis agreement' marks the beginning of the cooperation 
between the Social Democrats and the Agrarian Party which had been a prominent topic 
since the reform of 1909 which enfranchised petite freeholders and rural workers. 
Instead pursuing their aim of 1911 which was to establish a workers and fan-ners' party, 
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the Social Democrats intended to follow the policies which would be beneficial almost 
exclusively to industrial workers, and as a result, aroused resentments among agrarians. 
Following World War L the farmers reemerged as an independent political force. From 
the beginning, it was hostile to socialism, based on the presumption that it intended to 
bring the profit motive to trade and industry and exploit the interests of the agricultural 
population. In the 1928 election for the second Chamber the Social Democrats lost fifteen 
seats, the greatest defeat until then, which resulted in victory for the Conservatives. One 
reason for this outcome was the latter's exploitation of the electorate's fear of 
socialisation which had been indicated in the Social Democrats' inheritance tax policy. 
The other reason was the support of the majority of farm workers for the bourgeois 
parties (Korblik (ed. ), 1975, p. 264). While the party weakened its grip on the rural 
population by their policies on unemployment, the relationship between the Agrarian 
Party and the Right was on good terms. The Agrarian and the Right parties sought 
agreement over the unemployment question: they aimed to keep relief work to a minimum 
with a mobile labour market, and believed the level of the wages for relief work should 
be lower than that of the open market. 
This situation had political consequences for the Social Democratic Party as Gunnar 
Myrdal, a young Social Democratic economist, and Rickard Lindstrom, the chairman of 
the Social Democratic Youth League analysed. Their views exerted a clear influence on 
Social Democratic ideology and tactics in the following years: some trade union methods 
were criticised by the party leaders and the party's agricultural and rural social 
programmes were extended. In 1932, the Social Democrats presented their new 
economic policy to the Riksdag. 'Iliis was based on stimulating employment and buying 
power through state loans on the open market. This reflected the Party's recognition that 
there was a relationship between the agricultural crisis started at the end of 1930 and 
industrial unemployment. For Wigforss, the new policy demonstrated a fresh 
cooperation between workers and fanners. 
The agreement gave a psychological advantage for the SAP over other parties in the 
continuing battle for farmer voters and provided a foundation for it to assume a position 
of power in a predominantly agricultural country. The dominant political forces of the 
government after 1932 were in favour of state intervention and public social policy, and 
their policy won the support from the Agrarian Party. Despite dissimilarities between 
them, they formed an alliance in favour of the general principle of state control in social 
security, health services, services for the elderly and education; with this base, it had 
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more opportunities to put their new economic policies into practice (Koblik (ed. ), 1975, 
258; Marklund, 1992, p. 3). 
The Disadvantage of the Relief Programme and the Adoption of the Uneml2lument 
Insurance Scheme 
The relief system which provided public work for the unemployed at below-market 
wages became incapable of coping with the unemployment problem when it got more 
serious after 1931. The number of registered unemployed between 1931-33 increased 
rapidly: Feb. 1931: 41,595; Feb. 1932: 108,032; Jan. 1933: 189,225. Only 22 per cent 
of them were provided with relief (Childs, 1936, p. 152). 
When the Social Democratic Party came to power in 1932, their first measure was to 
expand the economy and to stimulate employment through the use of public 
expenditures. The practical policies were designed by Wigforss, who had become 
Finance Minister. During this period, Sweden broke with traditional economic ideas and 
adopted the use of the government budget as an instrument for economic stabilization 
(Ginsburg, 1983, p. 112). Frans Severin, the successor to Wigforss as one of the 
members of the Committee on Unemployment after September 1932, argued in his 
comments on the first report that the reduction of wages was not an appropriate measure 
for combating cyclical unemployment and insisted on more public works. Erik Lindahl, 
who was asked by the Committee to comment on Gunnar Myrdal's supplement to the 
Committee's second report in 1934, pointed out that public works could not only be used 
to diminish cyclical unemployment, but could also be used against non-cyclical 
unemployment, and could be financed by deficit spending (Wadensjb, 1989, pp. 4,15- 
17). 
The Social Democratic Party worked out their detailed plan to put the unemployed back to 
work through subsidies to private industry. This plan caused protest from the 
Conservatives, in part because that the Government planned to raise a large sum of 
money through new taxes policies in order to put their programme into operation. 'ne 
strong opposition of the Conservatives made the Social Democrats seek support from the 
Farmer's party in order to get their proposal accepted in the Riksdag. This was achieved 
in the end by their making some concessions. One was to set the payments for the 
unemployed on reserve work at the usual wage of the unskilled labour in the locality 
rather than at the trade-union rate. 
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The Government could not carry out its large-scale relief programme, because when 
Swedish industry made its remarkable recovery in the middle of 1934, the 
Unemployment Commission curtailed those reserve work projects that had been started 
before the new programme was passed. The system was, however, accepted as a means 
of solving the problem of unemployment, and behind the system lay the principle of state 
responsibility. Yet the system exhibited some disadvantages. Apart from the difficulty of 
administration, most works were just provided for unskilled manual labourers, and were, 
therefore, inadequate for the skilled labourer, who might loose the opportunity of selling 
his skills in the market if he accepted work on a project. 
Amid the slowly growing policy consensus and improving employment situation after the 
Social Democrats arrived in office, the political controversy surrounding unemployment 
insurance gradually diminished (Heclo, 1974). In January 1933, a five-man committee 
led by the new social minister, M61ler, presented its unemployment insurance proposal 
which largely repeated the 1928 Lindquist Commission's proposal for voluntary 
unemployment insurance, but also paid attention to the shortcomings of this type of 
scheme on the grounds that it excluded many of the most needy. They also urged a 
proportionately larger amount of state contributions for high-risk groups (those with the 
lowest pay and highest unemployment rates), with the aim of encouraging them to 
establish their funds. The cabinet accepted the committee's proposal which was 
introduced in the Spring of 1933. 
Because the Conservative and Agrarian Parties opposed the proposal forcefully, the 
Government realised that the support of the Liberal Party would be crucial. They made a 
number of changes to the proposal, which included a decrease in the employer's 
contribution, an extension of the contribution period for qualification, and the provision 
of work for the unemployed at 'reasonable' rather than market wages, in return for the 
Liberals' support. Nevertheless, the Government's attempt proved to be in vain. Ten out 
of the eighteen Liberals in the First Chamber voted against the scheme, and as usual, it 
could not pass in the Riksdag. 57 The proposal was reintroduced in 1934. In spite of the 
opposition of the Conservative and Agrarian parties, it passed the two chambers with the 
support of the Liberals and Social Democrats. 
57. Olle Nyman, Svensk Parliamentarism, 1932-1936, pp. 138 ff. F6rsta Kammar debate, June 20, 
1933. Quoted in Heclo, 1974, p. 104. 
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Part Two The 1934 Unemployment Insurance Scheme and the 
Decision Making Environment of Sweden 
In Section One of this part, I describe the features contained in the 1934 UI scheme, 
while in Section Two, I discuss the relationship between this outcome and the political 
context of Sweden. The central question are: What were particular features introduced in 
to the Swedish unemployment insurance scheme and why? The important role played by 
different groups and their ideologies will be given particular attention. 
Section One The Unemployment Insurance Scheme 
In Sweden, voluntary unemployment insurance was organised around associations that 
were administered by the respective labour unions. This voluntary state-subsidized 
unemployment insurance was put into operation on 1st January 1935. The following are 
the features of the Swedish Unemployment Insurance with regards to its coverage, 
financial arrangement, legal benefits and conditions for receiving insurance. 
Coverage 
The particular nature of a 'voluntary' scheme in Sweden was brought out well in the 
coverage. Although social class and selectivity were rejected as alternative criteria for 
social welfare provision, they were not altogether absent from the pre-World War II 
system of social security in Sweden. In addition to the universal insurance schemes 
(pensions and occupational injury insurance), another type of insurance characteristic of 
the pre-war Swedish welfare system was state-supported voluntary protection. Both 
Unemployment Insurance and Sickness Insurance had long-established links with 
popular mass movements, i. e. the free church, the temperance movement, and the 
socialist trade unions. Voluntary mutual aid societies, which played an important role in 
determining the provision of supplementary welfare for the purpose of solidarity, 
benefited from the state subsidies later on (Davidson, 1989, pp. 59-60). Ul in Sweden is 
in principle voluntary for individual employees. Yet, for most labour unions, 
membership of the UI fund is obligatory for union members. On the other hand, union 
membership is not compulsory for members of Ul funds. Anyone who works in a field 
covered by a UI fund has the right to become a member (Bj6rklund, Haveman, Hollister 
and Holmlund, 1991, p. 111). Since most Swedish workers belong to unions, coverage 
is extensive (Ginsburg, 1983). Therefore in practice, it is compulsory. Together with its 
complement, labour market cash assistance, unemployment insurance has a universal 
coverage (Edbalk and Elm6r in Soderstrom (ed. ), 1983, pp. 62-3). 
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The 1934 UI scheme was the most important example of society's efforts to provide 
social protection for individuals. Another important factor was that the more peaceful 
labour market created a better environment for accepting the Ghent system. Furthermore, 
local politicians were also strong advocates of a state-subsidised unemployment relief 
system, as the unemployment situation after the 1920s put severe strains on the local 
social welfare schemes and local government made efforts to lighten the burden on the 
schemes. The Ghent system was the most commonly accepted system of unemployment 
insurance when the Swedish set up its UI scheme, and the idea of compulsory 
unemployment insurance was becoming unpopular (Edebalk, 1975, pp. 316-7). 
The union-based scheme reflects a strengthening of the unions, but excludes certain 
marginal sectors of labour and therefore is limited in coverage. Those who were most in 
need might be excluded from the protection offered by the scheme. Severe 
unemployment together with stringent terms of insurance would lead to a socio-politically 
unsatisfactory unemployment insurance. It was approved by those who insisted on the 
self-help principle as the appropriate method of solving social problems. It was opposed 
by employers and Conservatives from fear that it would strengthen the unions (Olofsson, 
unpublished book, pp. 110-11). Skilled workers supported this type of scheme while 
unskilled workers appealed for the provision of either public works or financial support 
from the State in periods of depression. 
Contributions 
Contributions to the funds were shared by employees, employers and the state. The 
funds had to be approved and registered by the state in order to get grants from the state. 
The government subsidy varied between funds especially, according to rate of 
unemployment. In the early stages of the development of unemployment insurance, an 
employee's contribution played an important role. Employers' contributions were paid as 
a percentage of the total pay-roll. No form of merit rating as in the American 
Unemployment Insurance system exists in the Swedish system (Edebalk and Elm6r in 
Soderstrom (ed. ), 1983, pp. 62-3). 
Benerit 
The industrial trade unions and the trade union council (LO) demanded extensive state 
welfare programmes equal to what private and publicly employed white-collar groups 
already had in agreements with their employers. However, the LO as well as the Social 
Democrats were opposed to contractual (occupational) welfare based on agreements with 
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individual employers. They accepted the idea that the social insurance system should be 
based on compensation according to the loss-of-income principle and earnings-related 
benefits (related to previous and present income) instead of flat-rate cash payments. They 
also emphasised work and employment rather than cash transfers. Policies should enable 
individuals to support themselves. 
The design was chosen to attract Liberal votes for the bill and had a number of 
advantages: 1) It would reduce the criticism against the voluntary system which was 
assumed to reach only a very small proportion and be biased in favour of the groups with 
little risk of unemployment; 2) It would include the large group of forest and agricultural 
workers; 3) The subsidy rules provided a compromise between the demands from 
opponents of insurance for a means test and the demands from supporters for the right to 
obtain compensation. Within the relief funds, the members earned the right to 
compensation through membership dues, but the government provided subsidies to the 
relief funds according to need (Edbalk, 1975, pp. 315-6). 
However, in order to qualify for government contributions, the funds of the mutual 
societies had to be certified and more stringent rules had to be followed than before. This 
meant that to a large extent, Parliament decided the system of regulation. Relief funds had 
to fulfill certain statutory conditions, otherwise, they had to rely entirely on their 
members' contributions (Sj6berg, 1985, p. 61). 'The unemployment funds themselves 
retained primarily overseeing and administrative functions'. As a result, most of the 
societies choose to stay outside the state-supported system in the 1930s (Bj6rklund, 
Haveman, Hollister and Holmlund, 1991, p. 112). This reflects the Swedish policy of 
providing the unemployed not with relief payments but with work. Thus great efforts 
were made to counteract unemployment and to provide the unemployed with occupational 
training or jobs (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 1984, p. 40). 
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Section Two The Influence of the Different Groups on the Introduction 
of the 1934 Act 
According to Heckscher (1984), after the establishment of political democracy in 1919, 
Swedish politics experienced a change from ideological dominance to increasing 
pragmatism in the inter-war period. This change reflects the replacement of the influence 
of Germany and France on political thinking in Sweden by the British and American 
approach. The development of the Swedish welfare state originated from a series of 
political compromises between the different parties and through the piecemeal solutions 
to practical problems rather than the SAP's ideological blueprint for the modem welfare 
state in the 1930s (pp. 204-4). Rather believes that the rise and general development of 
the Swedish Welfare State must be explained as the outcome of class conflicts and 
compromise between organised class interests, Rothstein (1985) emphasises the roles 
played by particular individuals. He argues that in administrative matters, the thought and 
strategies of people like Gustav M61ler must be considered as important; he was the 
foremost spokesman on social affairs for a Social Democratic party that holds the record 
of durability in governmental power among Western democracies: 1932 to 1976 (p. 152). 
Wilson (1979) also argues that the civil service played an independent role in shaping 
social policy through the committee process for over a century and a half. 
In order to understand the roles played by the political factors in the development of 
social policy in Sweden, it is necessary for us to understand the country's power 
distribution in the context of the establishment of a democratic political system. The 
democratic system enables the different parts of the society to express their different 
political opinions through different channels and to participate in consultative committee 
process. This was not always efficient and smooth, and the 'institutionalised 
compromise' did 'little to satisfy. ambition or to relieve the psychological tensions 
engendered' by conflict (Rustow, 1955). Yet the agenda was mainly influenced by 
organised interest groups, especially the labour movement, and the substance of 
decisions frequently embodied compromises (Heckscher, 1984, p. 194; Davidson, 1989, 
pp. 135-6; Wilson, 1979, pp. 17-8). Thus although there were intensive social divisions 
and economic conflict at the turn of the centuries, people from the different groups 
actively involved in the policy-making process for social insurance gradually came to an 
agreement by official investigations, commissions and renegotiations (Heidenheimar et 
al., 1983, p. 216). The delicate system of checks and balances with which the Swedish 
government operates should not be underestimated. 
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The Influence of the Trade Union as an Interest Group 
Olofsson argues that historically the emergence and growth of the 'welfare state' were 
related to the problems of the working class and the growing strength of labour 
movement. By forming their- own organisations, the trade unions, the workers can 
protect their interests; society itself also recognized that it should eliminate the hardship 
caused by market processes for the workers (Olofsson, unpublished book, pp. 11-13, 
18,93-4. Also see Korpi, 1983,1986 and Esping-Andersen, 1986,1990). 
Due to a particularly close link between the Trade Unions Federation (LO) and the Social 
Democratic Party (SAP), the latter got a significant support from the former, while the 
former achieved their aims through exerting influence on the latter. In this way, the trade 
union movement acted as an influential force in the social ýemocratic movement's 
adoption of the new political ideas (Meidner, 1980, pp. 344-5,347). It pressed the 
government to construct social insurance reforms, - relating to industrial accidents, 
sickness and old age, in order to protect the material interests of different segments of the 
labour force (Olofsson, unpublished book, p. 14). It is therefore wrong to view the early 
development of Swedish employment policy as a purely govemment initiative. Although 
political parties, cooperatives and employers' organisations, and so on, all played an 
essential part in the creation of the welfare state and the political parties retained relatively 
well-defined ideologies, the labour unions exercised a considerable influence and this 
was a key to the Social Democrats' success. 
The Centrally Organised Labour Force 
In Sweden, manual workers and salaried employees were both highly organised into one 
centralised union confederation, the LO and TCO. 58 The LO and TCO were formed in 
order to set up a new balance of power and each of them had the protection of their own 
interests as their first aim IHeckscher, 1984, p, 199). The Labour movement became a 
considerable force before the end of the 19th century and started to influence society after 
1900. As a strategic response, employers and other business interests also became highly 
organised; the Employers' Confederation (SAF) was constituted in September 1902 in 
order to counter the tactics of the unions (Johnston, 1962, pp. 69,70). 
According to the so-called December Compromise of 1906 between LO and SAF, 
employers reserved to themselves alone the right to intervene in labour issues, while the 
58. TCO was created in 1944 based on the white-collar federations which were formed since the early 
1930s. 
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trade union movement was given legitimacy to recruit and strengthen its organization. 
This agreement thus indicated the power balance which existed between labour and 
management organisations and established the form of collective agreement at national 
level which was to be used for next several decades. However, the failure of a general 
strike in 1909 had a catastrophic effect upon the Swedish labour movement as the LO lost 
half of its members in the next two years, and it took them many years to regain its 
former strength and membership. In 1928, the Prohibitionist-Liberal Government passed 
labour market regulations and the right to strike was restricted. After the passage of 1928 
regulations and up to the late 1930s, Sweden experienced a period of organised 
capitalism. The Swedish trade union became one of the best-organised labour movements 
in the world (Davidson, 1989, pp. 94,188). 
The labour movement's task was to carry out and further develop the welfare system for 
its members, its ideology was to maintain the market economy and reduce its negative 
effects through social and fiscal policies. In response to a fundamental change in the 
economy and prevalent unemployment after the First World War and especially in the 
1920s, the increasingly powerful labour unions and the Social Democratic Party 
maintained the doctrine of solidarity to meet this challenge. The solidarity doctrine 
subsequently spread from the working classes to society as a whole. 
A Close Relationship Between the SAP and the LO and Compromise Principle 
A distinctive characteristic of the Swedish labour movement as an interest group was its 
extremely close ties with SAP. The party and the trade union movement have been 
historically and ideologically linked with each other since the end of the last century and 
the LO exerted a significant influence within the SAP. When the Social Democratic Party 
was established in 1889, trade unionists constituted the overwhelming majority of its 
membership. In turn, the party offered organisational and financial and ideological 
support for the formation of unions. The cooperative ties between these two parts 
influenced the government intervention in the labour market; the party fulfilled many of 
the functions as a co-ordinating central body for the unions, and at the same time drove 
the unions into political activity in order to gain numerical and financial strength 
(Johnston 1962, pp. 24,28-9). Its idea that the state and the self-governing local 
authorities had key responsibilities for solving social problems was consistent with the 
traditional paternalism of the Scandinavian countries. 
The success of labour market policy in Sweden to a large extent resulted from a united, 
centralised trade union movement in collaboration with the governing Social Democrats 
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(Rothstein, 1985, p. 155, Mendes, 1990, p. 21). Through this link, the SAP reserved the 
right to intervene in the labour market and the trade union movement could take on an 
increasingly important role. In spite of the political limitations for the trade union 
movement contained in the 1906 Compromise, 'trade union-political party collaboration 
opened the way for changes in living conditions in Sweden outside the labour market as 
such. This became clear after universal and equal suffrage had been achieved in 1921 and 
the Social Democratic Party assumed governmental power in the early 1930s. ' (Larsson 
et aL, 1979, p. 11). The predominance of social democratic governments since 1932 
meant that LO has been able to seek particular material benefits through legislation rather 
than bargaining table (Johnston 1962, pp. 28-9). There has been a distribution of 
functions between the two pillars of the working class movement: while the trade unions 
have sought to increase the prosperity of their members through wage bargaining, the 
party has tried to improve the situation of the whole population through welfare state 
action (Olsson, 1990). 
The LO held a flexible attitude when it attempted to discover the ground for its policies, 
the high proportion of the trade unionists in the SAP also gave the Party a reformist 
feature (Johnston 1962, p. 24). Cooperation and negotiation between labour groups and 
other organisations within the society instead of open confrontation, were more and more 
accepted by labour unions and employers' organisations as well. This may be due to the 
fact that the LO experienced a change from its original belief in Marxian doctrine to a 
pragmatic principle in the course of strikes for the material benefits of the workers. This 
attitude was important for the development of social reform to bring a positive result. 
With other social groups and political parties, the labour movement made important 
contributions to the transformation of Sweden into a welfare state. 
The Strong Self-help Tradition of the Trade Unions 
Due to the late industrialisation in Sweden, the trade union movement itself had its 
origins in artisans' associations, led by craftsmen with predominantly liberal ideologies. 
It built up its cooperation with the dynamic liberalism of the nineteenth century which 
advocated social reforms for the purpose of dealing with social Problems, and its 
growing political strength was regarded as important by the Liberal politicians (Johnston 
1962, p. 34). Traditionally, labour unions and employers' associations solved their 
problems by negotiation and attempted to restrict state intervention to a minimal level. 
In the late 19th century, as the Poor Law could not protect workers against recurrent 
unemployment, members of the voluntary societies began to flourish. The first 
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unemployment benefits society for workers was established within a trade union in 1884 
(Mendes, 1990) and the first UI fund started within the typographers' union in 1892. 
This kind of self-help management as new institutional form of reciprocity was 
encouraged when the Confederation of Trade Unions (LO) was formed in 1898; various 
self-help institutions were developed on a large scale by the late 19th century, and, with 
this basis, insurance against unemployment got developed in Sweden as in Britain 
(Edebalk, 1976; Olofsson, unpublished book, pp. 108-9). 
Due to the situation that, prior to 1910, there was no current unemployment statistics and 
state employment exchanges were poorly organised, the unions were the only possible 
providers of these services. Compared with an individual insurer, the unions knew their 
labour market better and often had their own employment agencies. In addition, 
unemployment insurance was related to the unions' wage policy. With unemployment 
insurance they could consolidate their membership (even during recession period) and 
strengthen their negotiating power for better wages. Trade union also enjoyed the 
advantages of large cash reserves, high wage level promised by collective agreement and 
high pre-capita wealth which made both employee and employers prepared to meet the 
emergency and sustain consumer purchasing power (Childs, 1936, p. 158). 
According to Forsberg (1986), voluntary sickness and unemployment insurance 
organisations, mainly covered employees in the economically stronger industries (pp. 29, 
44). Through the new unemployment benefit societies of the trade unions, the better-off 
workers subscribed to the collective savings funds to cope with the problem. They were 
in favour of the principle of 'solidarity' and hostile to the idea of charity, arguing that it 
was degrading for recipients. These organised groups in Sweden were more powerful 
than in most other industrialised countries (Edbalk and Elm6r in Soderstrorn (ed. ), 1983, 
pp. 62-3; B16rklund et aL, 1991). Although the State Unemployment Commission of 
1914 provided relief work at minimal rates for some of the unemployed, no state system 
of provision for the unemployed was established until 1934. As a different scheme from 
the one adopted in Britain, the Swedish Ul scheme was constructed on the basis of 
membership, which originated within the workers' movement, and the popularly 
supported principle of group solidarity, rather than from any bureaucratic tradition 
(Forsberg, 1986, p. 44; Davidson, 1989, p. 58). 
The weakness of this kind of voluntary and unsupported action was that arrangements 
were essentially directed towards the employees in a single occupation or in an individual 
enterprise, coverage was thus restricted. ITIhe basis of support for the lower classes 
continued to be the Poor Law. ' (Davidson, 1989, p. 58). By 1908 a series of 
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decentralised and uncoordinated funds covered only four per cent of the labour force. 
After the 1908-09 recession and the failure of the strikes in 1909, the memberships 
rapidly declined. In addition, the growth of these societies was opposed by the right- 
wing parties and the employers' organizations, with a concern that more workers would 
join unions. The contributions and therefore benefits from their own unemployment 
insurance scheme were low (Edebalk, 1976,1987). During the 1920s, owing to high 
unemployment, the unemployment relief funds were subject to severe financial strains. 
Membership dues were consequently increased and the terms of compensation were 
tightened. Unions which did not have such funds were reluctant to establish them, 
'[r]equests for government assistance to the UI system became commoW JBj6rklundet 
al., 1991). 
Although the Swedish labour movement acted as a noticeable force in economic and 
political life, it is questionable to conclude that the sole influence of the trade union 
movement on the introduction of UI of 1934 based on the Ghent system was decisive. 
As the stringent terms of insurance under the Ghent system were 'unprofitable' for the 
trade unions, during the latter part of the 1920s they supported the compulsory system 
instead. After its establishment in 1934 (during 1935-40), only 13 of the unions attached 
to LO joined the state subsidised system. The choice of the Ghent system, despite 
considerable resistance from some unions, was the Social Democrats' strategy to get the 
support of the Liberals because they would only accept a compromise solution within the 
framework of this system (Edbalk, 1975, p. 317). 
The Role of the Social Democratic Party 
The Political Aim and the Reformist Feature of the Pgrly 
Although the Swedish Social Democrats' direct political influence had been not 
prominent during the 1920s, they were aware of the importance of social policy for social 
integration and the necessity of developing the party's own policies in this field. The 
leading figures of the party, such as Mbller and Wigforss, played a remarkable role in 
this searching process and based on solidaristic principles, they put a stress on need, 
rather than performance, as the criterion for distribution (Esping-Andersen and Korpi, 
1984, pp. 11-12). M61ler did not consider social reforms as the general or even long-term 
main purpose of Social Democratic politics, but took them as necessary preparation 
before nationalisation of industry could take place and socialism be introduced. Through 
a large number of social reforms, ensuring the right to pension, free education, 
unemployment insurance, health care etc., the productive and human forces of society 
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were hopefully developed and ready for the transformation to socialism (Rothstein, 
1985, p. 156). 
After the Social Democrats came to power, with the assistance of a powerful and well- 
organised trade union movement, there was a very narrow margin of popular support the 
government had over its opponents during the formative period of the Swedish welfare 
state. The former was compelled to pay attention to the opinion of the latter in relation to 
the legislation to be enacted, and adopted the ready-to-make-compromise tactic at 
negotiation table. Thus the Social Democrats combined adaptability and rigidity, and 
typically adopted a problem-focused approach based on empirical detail and sought 
specific solutions to concrete problems. 'Me counterpart to adaptability was a highly rigid 
and structured way of developing policy in the Swedish political tradition; pressures for 
change were organized and channeled in quite stable, predictable, and orderly routines 
(Heclo and Madsen, 1987, pp. 8-9). 
Instead of nationalising the means of production, the Social Democratic government 
chose 'socializing incomes' as its policy in the early stage, because it believed that private 
enterprise could efficiently guarantee the economic growth needed for welfare. The SAP 
favoured a 'social market' model which meant a competitive market economy in an 
international free-trade system, combined with social reforms to redistribute the fruits of 
production. By choosing a middle-way, the Party managed to keep a balance between its 
political preference and the needs of other parties; and with this the Party gained 
necessary support for its welfare policy. The Party's pragmatic stand also refers to its 
attitude to Marxism in the context of setting up its political target. Although the first 
generation of the Party made use of Marxist terminology until the late 1920s, its approach 
was practical rather than dogmatic and they were less influenced by Marxism than their 
European counterparts. 
The aim of the SAP during the 1930s was to insure the whole population through general 
reforms. Ibis was related to the extended poverty and citizens' fear of insecurity. It also 
resulted from the Party's consideration of the humiliating feature of public aid which 
required special examination of a person's need for help. Many, within the labour 
movement, involved in the poor relief programme, realised that not only was the process 
demanding for those seeking assistance from public agencies, but also these people 
tended to become dependent on the public sector. The idea of security thus had a high 
priority during the course of the first social reform and it became 'the politically most 
stable ideal in the philosophical development of Swedish social welfare policy. ' (Koblik 
(ed. ), 1975, p. 353). 
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The reformist party used social policy as its main political strategy for substituting 
democratic distribution for market exchange; i. e. social rights for property rights. By 
extending social rights gradually, the Social Democrats made efforts to reduce the extent 
to which wage earners were bound by market forces and ensure that individuals and 
families achieved living standards which were acceptable to society, regardless of their 
performance in the labour market. The universal coverage of social policy programmes 
eliminated not only the internal divisions and conflicts within the working class, but also 
those between manual workers and salaried employees. Besides, it implied forming 
broader class alliances with workers, farmers and urban petite-bourgeois groups rather 
than the consolidated traditional cleavages which induced new separate interests. By the 
established solidarity, more citizens would be mobilised for politically collective action 
for a more extensive social change (Heimann, 1980; Kaleck, 1972. See Esping-Andersen 
and Korpi in Goldthorpe (ed. ), 1984, p. 184). 
However, due to the political situation as discussed already, the implementation of these 
ideas by the Social Democratic Party in the 1930's needed to form an alliance with the 
Liberal and Agrarian Party in order to implement its welfare policy. Despite 
dissimilarities between them, these parties accepted, to various degrees, the general 
principle of state intervention in social security, the health services, services for the 
elderly and education (Marklund, 1988b; 1992, p. 3). 
Because of its working class peculiarity, the UI was confronted with contests from other 
parties (Olofsson, unpublished book, pp. 95-6), and the influence of liberal parties in 
society and the intention of the Party to gain the support from them through compromise 
were also important factors in choosing the form (union based) for the scheme. Besides, 
M61ler, influential figure within the party, was seeking a way to cope with the 
administrative problems of the Welfare State. He did not trust the old bureaucracies to 
implement his social reforms and preferred to let public administrative issues be handled 
by local and popularly established organizations; the UI scheme is the foremost example 
(Rothstein, 1985, pp. 152-158). The close relationship of the SAP with the LO also 
provided the Party with the advantages for its policy, as it could make use of the LO's 
self-help tradition when it developed the Unemployment Insurance programme. In 
addition, the full employment policy, which was the first priority of the party, had a 
substantial impact on the UI system. 
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The Partv's Commitment to Full EmI21gyment as a High Priorily 
Heclo (1974) describes the Swedish approach to social policy as pragmatic. Policies 
were in general introduced to '[remedy] the defects perceived to be emerging from the 
previous policy change', the growth of pensions and unemployment insurance was in 
particular connected to reactions against the Poor Law (Heclo, 1974, pp. 63-64). Wilson 
(1979), however, argues that this pragmatic nature is likely to be exaggerated, and certain 
strongly held basic principles have had a strong influence on the course of developments; 
one of which that individuals as citizens rather than employees earn their rights by 
contributions was the basis of developing social benefits (p. 19). The other principle is 
solidarity which has been pursued by the labour movement with an impetus to create 
wealth and prosperity for all (Davidson, 1989, p. 122). All these can be related to the 
Swedish concept of full employment. 
C. J. Ratzlaff, American economist, said that Sweden, like other Scandinavian countries, 
had fully recognised the need for the coordinated machinery of cash payments, insurance 
benefits and public works, which were adopted by the government to relieve the 
depression during periods of abnormal unemployment (see Childs, 1936, pp. 155-7). 
Poor relief, unemployment insurance and the construction of work programmes were 
three basic means used to alleviate the hardship caused by unemployment for the labour 
force. While the first two were regarded as 'passive' or 'benefit' policy, the last was 
'active' or 'work policy'. According to Olofsson, both 'active' and 'passive' policies 
contributed to keeping the working class homogeneous, the former was concerned with 
the realisation of full employment, the latter with transferring income (Olofsson, 
unpublished book, pp. 139-40). 
The Swedish Social Democratic Party traditionally emphasised full employment and 
social welfare Weidner, 1980; Ginsburg, 1983). It has been used in Sweden as an 
important means of increasing the output of goods and services by using otherwise idle 
resources. In 1908, Huss said: 
It should be emphasised that in the creation of jobs one should, if 
possible, arrange so-called extra work, that is, work that would be done 
in any event but not at just that point in time. From both a theoretical 
and practical point of view, both the municipalities and the unemployed 
themselves should see that the work carried out is unequivocally useful 
to society and worthwhile in itself. It therefore follows as a 
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consequence that this work is paid at the going rate, to the extent that 
these labourers are as qualified as the average labourers; in their field. 59 
The Swedish trade unions had been positively committed to policies of full-employment 
and unemployment protection. Early unions found that unemployment was the cause of 
poverty, and therefore the problem of the labour market has always been at the centre of 
attention. For the labour movement, unemployment meant destitution of the unemployed, 
reliance on the poor relief system and loss of the civil and political rights. Accordingly, 
the Social Democrats regarded the establishment of the social welfare programme as an 
unconditional citizen's right as one of their objectives. They argued that, by equalising 
the distribution of social resources and raising the capacities of citizens, firm social rights 
and broad social services would constitute a necessary pre-condition for economic 
growth, labour productivity and economic efficiency (Korpi, 1990). 
The Swedish UI was the last major insurance scheme established in western Europe. 'Me- 
reason why Sweden did not set up her own state unemployment insurance till 1934 was 
partly because they adopted a 'reserve worle system. Most of the unemployed were 
absorbed into the projects operated within the system in normal periods. The principle 
underlying the labour market policy was not only to help the unemployed to maintain 
their consumption standards, but also, more importantly, to provide them with work 
opportunities. By operating this policy, an efficient settlement between labour demand 
and labour supply could achieved. Cash benefits are sought only when the above 
methods fail (AMS-National Labour Market Board, 1986, p. 7). While the state was 
mainly concerned with creating employment, the trade unions, with the state supervision 
and subsidies, offered compensation for the unemployed. 
The Influence of Foreign Experience and the Role of the Liberal 
Intellectuals 
Heckscher (1984) points out that two questions should be taken into consideration: one is 
the effect of the international experience and the other is the significance of national 
tradition on the process of social reform. Ile making of the Swedish welfare state has its 
own particular historical development which is quite different from its European 
counterparts, this being especially true for the development of employment measures and 
59. G. Huss (1908), "Promemoria angfiende arbetsl6sheten i Sverige h6sten 1908 samt kommunala 
fitgfirder i anledning av arbetsi6shet", (Memorandum on Unemployment Autumn 1908 in Sweden and 
Municipal Measures duo to Unemployment). Meddelande frfin kungl. Civildepartementet. Stockholm. 
Quoted in Wadensj6,1989, p. 15. 
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income maintenance. Initiation of sustained policy discussion on Swedish unemployment 
insurance suggests the importance of international influences and of the small circle of 
Liberal reformers in Sweden. Besides, Sweden carried out its discussion of the initial 
policy of unemployment insurance in the international context from which it learned some 
lessons from its European counterparts. 
Sweden, like other Nordic countries, had a close relationship with Western Europe, 
especially Germany. The pioneering experience of Germany under Bismarck in the 19th 
century and the British reforms by the Liberal government in the first decade of the 20th 
century were swiftly reacted and studied by their Swedish counterpart (Wilson, 1979, 
p. 20). The Swedes were also very familiar with the ideas of Marx and Engels and Mill 
and their discussion was influenced by the political arguments of socialists and anti- 
socialists and other new social trends originating in Germany and the Continent 
(Heckscher, 1984, p. 28). 
When Ernst Wigforss questioned the relationship between wage reductions and cures for 
unemployment, he argued that it was underconsumption rather than excessive wages 
which constituted the problem. Unemployment benefit, rather than cash relief, 
constituted a good social policy and a good economic policy with regard to its function of 
stabilizing workers' purchasing power. But unemployment insurance was inferior to full 
employment and should not override the latter as was the case in the Social Democrats' 
policy proposals. According to Heclo (1974), Wigforss was influenced decisively by 
British debates on unemployment, and was particularly impressed by the British Liberal 
Party's 1928 proposals, making a point of citing Keynes' writings to support his 
arguments (Heclo, 1974, pp. 99-100). 
In early 1933, the Ministry of Finance headed by Wigforss, consciously produced an 
effective counter-cyclical unemployment programme costing 200 million kroner, four 
years before the publication of Keynes' General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (1936), this made Sweden the first country to accept modem stabilisation 
policies. 'During the next three years an average of 60,000 people were directly 
employed by special government programmes. Since then, employment policy has 
occupied a central position in Social Democratic programmes and in the Swedish political 
economy. ' (Mendes, 1990, pp. 40-1) The fiscal plan was based on lessons they had 
learned from the Labour Government in Britain who lost office in 1929, according to 
Wigforss, because they pledged to fight the crisis using traditional economic policies. 
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One reason why the Swedes did not adopt the State-administed unemployment insurance 
in 1934 as Britain and Germany did was that they saw the 'catastrophes that had beset the 
German and British state-run schemes in the World depression in the early 1930's, 
(Olofsson, unpublished book, p. 112). Their experience showed the shortcomings of the 
compulsory system which was likely to degenerate into a system of pure assistance and 
consequently create problems for state finance and flexibility of wages (Edebalk, 1975, 
pp. 314-5). The liberal British unemployment system from 1911, which was both 
individually comprehensive and covered larger parts of the population, did not influence 
the Swedish legislation Merborn et al., 1978, p. 47). 
Although Bismarckian legislation on workers' insurance in Germany stimulated and 
influenced parliamentary debate and inquiry in Sweden since the end of the last century, 
the Swedish reformers (elite administrators and politicians) adopted a more open policy 
process than did the Germans, the German's impact on the eventual introduction of social 
insurance programmes was diluted. Childs (1980) argues that in Sweden all important 
reforms were always preceded by innumerable commissions. They went through many 
processes of studies and compromises for each welfare proposal prior to its presentation 
to the Riksdag and the public and final adoption as law (p. 5). Heckscher (1984) argues 
that in Scandinavian countries, the welfare state was established through the politics of 
compromise and the machinery of compromise is part of the political framework (p. 193). 
The structure of the Left and the Centre / Right forces in politics and the role played by 
bourgeois parties and the employer' confederations are fundamental in explaining the 
development of the Scandinavian model (Olofsson, unpublished book, p. 22). 
Heclo (1974) suggests that it was party competition rather than the different intellectual 
bases that determined the development of policy (pp. 104,215). It is incorrect to claim 
that the introduction of the scheme in 1934 gave the Social Democrats an intellectual 
advantage in the unemployment debates because they accepted the Keynesian theory 
around 1930. During the period when the UI was discussed, only Ernst Wigforss and 
Gunnar MYrdal seemed to have linked the unemployment insurance with Keynesian 
theory, and the Social Democrats were not influenced by Keynesian ideas in the debates 
at the beginning of the 30s nor in their 1934 proposals. According to Davidson (1989), 
the ideological strands of liberalism and socialism coexisted within the Social Democratic 
party from the 1930s onwards, and the Swedish welfare state took its shape in the 
unresolved contradiction between the two. But in contrast to Britain, Swedish 
economists played a relatively small part in the actual policy-making process (Davidson, 
1989, pp. 20,124). The build-up of the welfare state was favoured by economic, social 
and political exigencies. The 1930 depression caused the trade unions and local Social 
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Democratic politicians to campaign actively for the introduction of an unemployment 
insurance system (Edebalk, 1975, p. 318). 
However, to underestimate the influence of the Swedish economists seems to me 
inconsistent with the whole process of the welfare policy development. The Party's 
founder, Branting, who gave direction to party policy in the succeeding years, was 
surrounded by young intellectuals who mostly had bourgeois (the middle class) origin 
and they exerted an influence in the party (Childs, 1980, p. 9). The Swedish Liberals 
were active in formulating the principles of the earlier unemployment assistance scheme. 
The influence of Swedish economists in the 1930s was partly due to their involvement in 
theoretical discussions since the middle of the 1920s and the beginning of the 1930s. 
Based on the official statistical work in the first decade of this century, a team of 
investigators, which marked the emergence of the Stockholm economic school, met in 
Stockholm and established the statistical and economic basis for the measures used to 
combat the cyclical downturn (Landgren, 1957, pp. 11,14). In 1934 when the SAP 
introduced its unemployment insurance bill, the Swedish Liberals held key positions in 
Parliament and the views of the relatively few liberal members were influential in 
adopting a Ghent system for the UI which satisfied their demands (Edebalk, 1975, 
pp. 314-5). The bill passed turned out to be very restrictive -- with a meagre government 
subsidy to the unemployment relief funds. The arrangment provided a compromise 
between the two contradictory demands from the opponents and proponents of social 
insurance: the former insisted on means tested relief programmes for the poor and the 
latter campaigned for the right to compensation. Within the relief funds the members 
earned the rights to compensation through the membership dues, but the government 
gave subsidies to the relief funds according to the needs. Relatively higher subsidies 
were to be given to relief funds with relatively high unemployment as well as to those 
funds whose members had relatively low wages (ibid., p. 315-6). 
Part Three: Conclusion: 
Faced with a deteriorating economic situation, high levels of unemployment and the 
apparent disadvantages of the previous relief system, the Swedish Social Democrats 
established the Unemployment Insurance scheme as one part of a programme to combat 
mass unemployment. A fundamental feature of Swedish social welfare policy during the 
1930s was to insure the whole population of the society through general reforms which 
attempted to do away with those forms of public aid which required a special examination 
of a person's need for help. However, the voluntary character of the 1934 scheme, 
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combined with limited state subsidies, originated from the Party's strategic decision to 
obtain the support of the other non-socialist parties for its proposal. Therefore the final 
outcome of the lengthy political debates and the decision making process reflected the 
strong liberal influence. It can be regarded as a compromise between the different 
political parties and the mixed ideology of liberalism and socialism within the Social 
Democratic Party (SAP). 
Four sets of political and institutional arrangements resulted in pre-conditions for the 
Party to put their concessions into practice in the case of Unemployment Insurance. 
First, in Sweden, the normal procedure for introducing major legislation begins with the 
setting-up of a Commission. The Commission was composed of a group of experts, 
Members of Parliament, of the Government and the Opposition, representatives of 
organisations (labour, management, etc. ) and intellectuals and administrators. Its tasks, 
which were approved by the Government, were to carry out investigations into the 
problems concerned and produce a report. Various administrative agencies and non- 
governmental organisations were invited by the Ministry concerned to comment on the 
report, these assembled opinions and public discussions were used as background to 
Government bills to Parliament. Members of Parliament could discover whether or not 
the Government had followed the recommendations of party representatives or of the 
organisations they favoured. 
Thus, the decision-making process in Sweden was conducted in a corporate and 
relatively open political atmosphere in which the different parts of the society were given 
access to make contributions to the task, and the opinions representing the interests of the 
various parts were available to the Government. Such organised decision-making 
resulted in policies and programmes which ultimately reflected compromises between the 
various groups of society, most of which were formally represented through the system 
of interest group articulation. 
Second, related to the above, the Social Democratic Government's political concession 
was crucial. The rural, classes constituted the largest group among the electorate and, 
following World War 1, the farmers had re-emerged as an independent political force. In 
a country where industrialisation was still in its early stages and the farmers' interests 
were clearly dominant, any expansive programme which was only concerned with the 
interests of industrial workers was unlikely to be politically acceptable. It would have 
been impossible for any labour or left-wing party to structure the welfare state alone. The 
Social Democrats had to take the farmers' interests into account. The formulation of the 
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'red-and-green' political coalition in the 1930s was the base of what came to be known in 
Sweden asfolkhem ('home of the people'), i. e. a modem welfare state for all, which 
was introduced by Per Albin Hansson, Prime Minister in the Social Democratic 
Government in 1928. The concept reflected the Social Democrats' attempt to stress its 
political alliance with the Agrarian Party rather than the needs of the working class on 
their own. Social Democrats were dependent on alliances with other parties to achieve a 
majority in Parliament. 
Third, a distinctive characteristic of interest group representation was the extremely close 
political and organisational collaboration between the SAP and the LO which established 
the foundation for the unique welfare system which subsequently emerged. In Sweden, 
the close links with the SAP influenced the LO's support for a welfare state based on full 
employment. There was a distribution of functions between the two pillars of the 
working class movement in which the trade unions sought to increase the prosperity of 
their members through wage bargaining, while the Party tried to improve the situation of 
the whole population through welfare state action. The voluntary, union-based 
Unemployment Insurance scheme of 1934 also provided the trade unions with a very 
important role in the administration of the scheme and reflected the fact that the 
historically close link between the SAP and the LO gave the former the political flexibility 
to deal with difficulties, and make use of the already- established trade union 
unemployment funds when it set up the Unemployment Insurance scheme. 
Last, the Social Democratic Party regarded policies for full employment, wage solidarity 
and the fiscal policy as their priorities. A policy of wage solidarity had been increasingly 
advocated since 1922. The Social Democratic party and the Confederation of the Trade 
Unions did not consider cash provision for the needy, as manifest in the Unemployment 
Insurance scheme, to be their primary aim in the construction of a modem welfare state. 
As a result, the scheme was never at the centre of welfare policy. The dominant parts of 
the welfare system were work oriented and based on income reward for the employed 
rather than on cash payments for the poor and the unemployed. Full employment was 
essential to the LO's wage-solidarity policy. The idea behind the policy was that the 
unions should strive for a solidaristic wage structure -- i. e. a general equalisation of 
wages as well as 'equal pay for equal work irrespective of employer' -- and the 
government should support that wage policy by implementing labour market policies. 
Providing a job for everybody able to work was not only seen as the best way of 
preventing poverty and reducing social inequalities but also as the best way of improving 
overall standards of living and economic efficiency. 
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Although Swedish parties did reflect different ideological positions, none of them was 
very dogmatic in their political practice in the welfare field in general and in their attitudes 
to Unemployment Insurance in particular. It was the interplay between the politicians and 
interests groups which determined what position the parties adopted. Proposals for social 
insurance in Sweden were linked to political realities more than philosophical principles. 
It is probably fair to say that the Swedish Unemployment Insurance developed through a 
series of political compromises and piecemeal solutions to practical problems rather than 
as the result of ideological blueprints championed by the Social Democratic Party. 
The final outcome of the decision making concerning Unemployment Insurance in 
Sweden in 1934 was very much influenced by the views of a relatively small number of 
the Liberals. As a result, it turned out to be very modest. It reflected the influence of the 
Liberals and the SAP's concern over the support from the other political parties for its 
proposal. In its union-based system, the coverage was extensive as the members of the 
trade unions were obliged to join the Unemployment Insurance funds and the 
membership of trade unions in Sweden was high. It did not imply, however, that any 
employee was eligible for benefits, coverage was limited and selective and certain 
marginal groups were excluded. The compensation for the loss of income was based on 
the earnings-related principle. Contributions to the funds were made by employees, 
employers and the State but the employee's contribution was the most important part. 
The State's subsidy varied among the qualified benefit societies and, in particular, 
according to the rate of unemployment. 
Compared with the Liberals, the trade union movement did not play a decisive role in 
terms of the adoption of the measures for the Unemployment Insurance scheme, although 
there was exceptionally close collaboration between the SAP and the LO. It was partly 
due to the political situation in Sweden and the SAP's political strategy as I have 
discussed, partly due to the SAP's ideology of the welfare policy which tended to give 
priority to a full employment policy, as it believed that this was the best way to realise 
solidarity, reduce poverty and increase the living standards for the nation. 
However, it is inappropriate to argue that the SAP's ideological position had more 
influence than political considerations in its Unemployment Insurance. The SAP's choice 
of the Ghent system for its Unemployment Insurance proposal resulted from their 
intention of getting political support and for the sake of legislation. The Party was 
pragmatic rather than dogmatic in dealing with the unemployment problem during that 
period, it was not constrained by any particular theories or ideologies. The 
Unemployment Insurance was introduced by the Social Democratic Party as an 
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experimental measure to solve the problem, but not as a complete blueprint of their long- 
term welfare system. 
Although in the 1930s, the principles of the Ghent system had been abandoned abroad in 
favour of compulsory unemployment insurance and the Swedish bourgeoisie had 
supported compulsory unemployment insurance since the late 1920s, the experience of 
England and Germany around 1930s showed the shortcomings of the compulsory 
system which were likely to degenerate into a system of pure assistance and this 
reference can be influential in the Swede's decision concerning its Unemployment 
Insurance. The use of foreign experience and reaction to its influence had to be in line 
with tradition and political need. 
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Chapter Five 
Unemployment Insurance Programme of the 1935 Act of the United 
States of America 
In this chapter, I discuss the formulation of the unemployment insurance scheme in the 
Federal Social Security Act of 1935 in the United States of America. For the purpose of 
making a comprehensive study of Unemployment Insurance in a country which has a 
powerful tradition of individualism, in the first part of this chapter I look at the nature of 
the measures which were adopted for poverty relief and the response to unemployment 
before the 1935 Act was formulated. I particularly concentrate on the process of 
establishing the Unemployment Insurance scheme in the context of the interactions 
between different political and ideological interests and the competition for dominance 
between them. The rivalry between the advocates of the Wisconsin plan and the Ohio 
plan reflected the two major approaches to the issue of unemployment. In the second part 
of the chapter, I discuss the main features of the 1935 Act and seek to establish how the 
scheme emerged in that way. The different roles played by the various groups which 
participated in the debate over the formulation of the scheme will also be considered. The 
main conclusions are drawn together in the last part of the chapter. 
Part One The Policy Context 
Section One A Brief Introduction to the United States of America 
The USA is a federal republic comprising 50 states and the District of Columbia, each of 
them having internal self-government. The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 instituted a 
separation of responsibilities between the national (Federal) and state governments and 
indicated a compromise achieved between those who were seeking a more effective 
central government and those who were aware of the necessity of defending the powers 
of the state authorities. In order to safeguard the diverse interests of the states and avoid 
the smaller states' interests from being threatened by the larger ones, a bicameral national 
legislature was set up. The House of Representatives was directly elected by the people 
and its membership assigned according to the size of a state's population. The Senate, 
which is known as the 'Upper House', was intended to represent all the states equally 
with two indirectly elected members for each regardless of size. Through the 1913 
Constitutional Amendment, the senate was converted into a directly-elected chamber with 
each member being chosen in state-wide popular elections. State governments have a 
wide array of functions. All state legislatures but one (Nebraska) have two Houses. Each 
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state has its own constitution which derives its authority not from the Congress but from 
the people of the state. The Governments of the 50 states have structures closely 
paralleling those of the federal government, each of them has its own Governor and other 
executive officials and its own judicial system. 
The separation of powers system was further accommodated within the national 
government in order to prevent a concentration of power and the creation of an autocracy. 
By the 1787 constitution, the government of the United States was entrusted to three 
separate authorities, the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The powers of 
making laws, and executing or administering them were accordingly divided among these 
separate groups of people; no-one could be a member of more than one branch of the 
federal government at any one time. Since the Constitution was framed, other institutions 
have developed to act as connecting links between the three main branches of government 
and help the system to operate. The President is the head of the executive branch and is 
elected for a four-year term by an electoral college elected directly from each state by 
direct and universal suffrage. 
The Congress was given the function of law-making in the Constitution. It was granted 
legislative power to levy taxes, borrow money, regulate interstate commerce, declare 
war, determine members' seats, discipline its own membership, and determine its rules 
of procedure. Apart from initiating and scrutinising legislation, the Congress was to act 
as a check on the executive branch of government, including the examination of the 
President's requests for legislative action and the administrative activities of the 
government departments; it was designed to question the executive's requests for public 
money and reflect the interests of the whole society. Congress consists of two bodies: a 
435-member House of Representatives elected for two-year terms by citizens who are 
qualified to vote for members of the state legislature, and a 100-member Senate elected 
for six-year terms. 
The House of Representatives and the Senate maintain equal powers over the initiation 
and passage of laws. Bills can be introduced in either house, and before a Bill is passed 
to the President, it is necessary for both houses to give their approval of it in exactly the 
same form. Bills introduced by members in the House of Representatives are considered 
by standing committees, which can amend, expedite, delay, or defeat the Bills. Most 
important legislative works are carried out by standing specialist committees of the Senate 
and the House, and they have long been regarded as the control centres of legislation. 
They examine Bills and decide whether they should be considered by the full chamber, 
and therefore they can decide the fate of a proposal. In both houses, committees dealing 
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with taxation and government spending have higher status and more influence; among 
the most important committees are the Appropriations. Committee, the House Ways and 
Means Committee, and the Rules Committee in the House which has a vital control 
over legislation. 
There are two major political parties in the U. S., the Democratic Party and the 
Republican Party. The two major parties tend to be moderate in their political 
orientation (for the sake of winning votes from all sections of society) and this blurs the 
differences between them, but within each, there are both conservative and liberal 
wings which have distinctive emphases in their policies and programmes. For the 
voters, the Republican party is 'the party of the rich and business' and the Democrats 
'the party of the ordinary people or the workers' (Grant, 1986, p. 183). As the more 
conservative and business-oriented party, the Republicans dominated American politics 
until 1932. The Great Depression in the period 1929-31 and the 'New Deal Coalition' 
established by Franklin D. Roosevelt transferred the traditional Republican dominance 
in American politics into the normal Democratic one and since the 1930s, many 
Americans have obtained middle-class status but retained their Democratic party 
identification on a long-term basis. From 1932 to 1980, the Democratic party controlled 
both houses of Congress with the exception of two Congresses of 1947-8 and 1953-4. 
The adoption of a two-party system in America possessing the diversity of social, 
ethnic, and regional interests rather than multi-party systems which are commonly seen 
in liberal democracies is due to the historical, cultural, constitutional, and social 
experience of the country. There was a rivalry between agrarian and commercial 
interests in the debate over the adoption of the Constitution that tended to divide the 
country into two broad coalitions, and this dual division was reinforced by the slavery 
issue and the Civil War. Other parties have occasionally challenged the Democrats and 
the Republicans but without long-term success. To win a national election, a party must 
appeal to a broad range of voters and to a wide spectrum of interests. 
American party organisations are very decentralised and lack a strong central authority 
as a result of the federal system and of using the state and local levels as the basis of 
elections and party politics. State and local organisations have their own followers and 
areas of independent action free from external control; the national parties exist mainly 
to contest presidential elections every four years, and in between their quadrennial 
national conventions, they are little more than loose alliances of state and local party 
organisations. The main function of political parties is to dictate the structure of the 
institutions. In order to accomplish its ends, each higher level of the party needs 
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collaboration with the lower layers. This co-operation relies on a common sense of 
purpose rather than the execution of commands from national to local units in the 
structure, as each successive layer has its own concern with elections within its area of 
authority (Key, 1964, p. 316). 
The early colonists had both a Protestant background and a tradition of individualism and 
resistance to authority. The group of VASPs' (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) was, 
and is still, in a powerful and responsible position in American society. America has a 
'capitalist' economic system in which its Constitution was established to protect private 
property rights, yet it can not be described as a7aissez: faire' economy as even during the 
1880s and 1890s the federal government passed considerable regulatory legislation to 
establish the economy, while leaving the means of production in private hands. As 
opposed to the experiences of direct nationalisation of industries in Europe, the American 
government supported specialist agencies and boards to introduce regulation to business 
and commerce. In the 20th-century, the USA became the chief industrial nation in the 
world, with vast mineral and agricultural wealth, a highly diversified economy, and an 
advanced system of communications and transportation. In the 1930s, the intervention of 
the federal government in the economy increased considerably because of large-scale 
unemployment and the economic stagnation. In order to attack the worst effects of the 
Depression, various measures, under the name of the 'New Deal', during the Roosevelt 
Administration were brought about. 
One of the major characteristics of the United States is its great variety, physically, 
racially and culturally. The total area of the USA is 3,615,122 square miles, making it the 
fourth largest country in the world in area. The total population in 1930 was nearly 123 
million of whom 56 per cent were urban and 44 per cent were rural. There was marked 
heterogeneity and diversity in the ethnic groups in America as a result of the 'open-door' 
policy of immigration in the nineteenth century, when millions of immigrants arrived 
from Europe and the Far East. The various ethnic and racial groups that together made up 
the population of the country turned the USA into what was often called a 'melting poV. 
Due to the heterogeneous ethnic and national background of its people, the interest 
differences between its territorial regions and the complexity of its economy, America 
became a country with a rich social diversity 4nd various pressure groups. 
The settlers in the USA intending to seek a better life and standard of living for 
themselves and their families, have made the country geographically and socially a 
mobile society. To a large extent, the continuously expanding economy, the size and 
wealth of the country,. the scarcity of labour, and the abundance of migratory 
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opportunities in a land with abundant natural resources has contributed to enhance social 
mobility in the past. Many people have been able to gain a middle class lifestyle. Partly 
due to the nation's historical background, with the absence of established hierarchies and 
aristocracy, hereditary landed wealth and titles of feudalism and fierce class divisions and 
without the need to struggle for universal suffrage and basic political and economic rights 
for the working classes, class consciousness has not been as prominent as in most 
European countries. 
Section Two Political Debates and Measures Taken by the Parties on 
Unemployment prior to the Introduction of the UI Scheme 
This section gives an account of the situation in America when unemployment became 
recognised. as a critical problem and public demand grew for the introduction of measures 
to reduce the distress and misery of the unemployed and their dependants. First, I 
provide a historical account of popular reports of unemployment and the steps which had 
already been taken in response to the problem. 
The Individualistic Tradition and the Policies for the Relief of Poverty 
Before the 1930s 
The American relief system developed slowly in the nineteenth century against the 
strongly-developed commitment to individualism. Individualism created a peculiar 
obstacle for the working class, in particular for its security and well-being. The 
formulation of the idea of the welfare state in the twentieth century has largely grown out 
of the theory of Vibetalism and reactions to it. In the USA, both the states and the 
government lagged behind Europe in utillsing social insurance methods. Two factors 
helped to nurture the individualistic belief and delay the introduction of state-organised 
collective measures. One was the agricultural system. Except in the south, independent 
farmers worked their own land. The other was the late but rapid development of 
industrialisation which was more or less absorbing the growing population and did not 
bring such economic distress that it led to serious outbreaks of disorder and therefore 
provoked relief concessions (Piven and Cloward, 1972, pp. 45-6). 
The doctrine of self-help through work was strongly held by poor and affluent alike. 
Liberalism appealed to craftsmen, merchants and farmers, who needed protection for 
their stock and commerce and freedom to pursue their interest in expanding their markets 
and stood to gain most from the process of the industrialisation. As a theory of social 
organisation brought by the settlers, liberalism was the founding doctrine for public 
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policies about underlying social problems. In the country where ample opportunities for 
work and independence from state interference were believed to be ensured, 
unemployment was widely regarded as an individual fault, the practice of the almshouse 
or workhouse was gradually adopted as the solution to the problem of poverty caused by 
industrialisation. 
Unemployment relief became an issue in American politics in the nineteenth century 
when the fear of imminent catastrophe during the depression at the end of the century 
was widespread. The unemployed were seen as falling into three categories: the 
temporarily unfortunate worker, the industrially unfit or handicapped, and the 
professional pauper. The awareness of differences among the unemployed and of the 
social origins of poverty in the early twentieth century, suggested, on the one hand, the 
need to experiment in teaching the 'incompetent' to become accustomed to the 
competitive industries and, on the other hand, it acknowledged a case for limited social 
rather than individual responsibility for mass unemployment. The involuntarily 
unemployed had to be treated differently from the voluntarily unemployed. However, the 
principle that poor relief, if it was to be given at all, was a local rather than a state or 
federal responsibility, was firmly established. The local relief arrangements remained 
until the Great Depression struck in the 1930s. In many places, private charities were the 
sole recourse for the destitute. 
By 1934 nearly all European governments and some in the British dominions, South 
America, and Asia had developed a variety of state operated and subsidised social 
insurance institutions. In explaining the creation of the unemployment insurance system 
in the United states, Nelson (1969) argues, it was mainly the reformers' effort to adapt a 
European approach to the American situation and to bridge the gap between the 
requirement for measures to deal with the devastating phenomenon of unemployment 
with the public belief in business' ability to correct industrial problems (p. 219). 
ne Charijy Organisation Socia 
A paradox became evident in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Social 
Darwinism, based on orthodox liberalism and the Protestant ethic, found a wide appeal. 
Its core sought to justify the progress of industry and its inevitable inequalities in terms 
of a grand philosophy of life, in which successful competition in the marketplace was 
likened to the biological struggle for survival of the fittest. The idea was particularly 
attractive to the business community. Yet artisans, country people, and middle-class 
'philanthropists' supported the slow but significant growth of 'labour legislation' and 
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economic regulation which was taking place by 1900. They held a different belief from 
the former which insisted that policy must follow the best scientific understanding of 
human affairs. 
There were two ways to resolve the paradox. One was through private charities which 
later became subordinated to the Charity Organisation Society. Motivated by the 
economic depressions of the nineteenth century (the last between 1893-98) and the fear 
of uprisings and moral deterioration of the pauper class, the well-to-do, like their 
European counterparts, set up voluntary organisations of private charities. 'Me Society 
had been set up in to give some formal structure and direction to the provision for 
dependent people relying on the traditional means of good works. The other was the 
gospel of wealth which sought to provide better opportunities for wealth creation and 
more equal access to them. It was championed by the captains of industry and finance, 
men capable of princely benefactions. 
By its nature, the charity organisation movement was ameliorating, its leaders stressing 
individual responsibility and private charity. They attributed the cause of pauperism to 
personal unfitness, a disregard for the economic virtues of industry, sobriety and thrift 
(Turner (ed. ), 1977, p. 1506). Be aware of the disadvantages of the Elizabethan English 
system of poor relief which often tended to stigmatise its recipients and failed to make 
distinctions among indigents, some reformers emphasised the case work method which 
looked for particular causes of poverty in the individual and his situation, and attempted 
to cure it through his rehabilitation. They declared that the individualistic and voluntary 
case-method was the proper alternative to unemployment insurance. 
Despite the highly individualistic and voluntary attitudes of some relief and charity 
workers, the welfare workers' leading organisations such as the National Conference of 
Charities and Correction and the American Public Welfare Association, provided forums 
for discussing the relief programmes. By 1900 broad economic and social reform were 
actually being pursued by the enthusiastic reformers of the'progressive movement'. The 
progressive movement abandoned dogmatic lalssez: faire and advocated positive state 
action against the underlying social problems. They argued that depressing conditions 
were inevitable under unregulated modem capitalism and that the remedy should start 
with legislation. In their statistical reports and surveys, unemployment was identified as 
one of the common causes of poverty and dependence. Therefore, they argued for 
restoring opportunities to the mainstream of American workers. Unemployment 
compensation as a remedy was rejected but the workman's compensation for industrial 
accidents was adopted. By 1920, with support from industry, forty-three states had 
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enacted such laws (Schlabach, 1969, p. 75). However, the schemes were run by private 
insurance companies and the benefits were usually inadequate and subject to time limits. 
Business and Labour in this Capitalist SocieLy 
Business: At the beginning of the century, there was a polarisation in the industrial and 
financial world, with the larger corporations, railroads and banks on the one hand and the 
small and middle-range manufacturers and merchants on the other. During the 
Progressive Era (1900-1920), a climate for change was emerging as a result of 
dissatisfaction with the dividing society and the declining influence of some social 
classes. By 1918, the leaders of the large corporations and banks accepted and led a new 
politics known as the new Nationalism and the New Freedom. The new politics were 
related to the fact that the leaders in politics and big business argued that the stabilisation 
of the social order was dependent upon general social concern and social responsibility 
(Weinstein, 1968, pp. 3-4). 
As the most important single organisation of the big businessmen and their academic and 
political theorists who had a wide range of social concerns, the National Civic Federation 
(NCF) was organised in 1900 for educating the businessmen in the changing business 
system of America and the changing needs in political economy. The goal of the 
organisation was to establish a rational and conciliatory extra-political system which was 
based on cooperation among representatives of organised workers, farmers, academics 
and reformers, and to deny any form of class interests or politics. The small and middle- 
range manufacturers, the leading group in the National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM) after 1902, were opposed to the new liberalism developed in cooperation 
between political leaders and financial and corporation leaders in the NCF and hostile to 
organised labour in any form (ibid., p. 15). 
Their hostile attitude to the trade unions aroused general concern in the NCF as it was 
becoming obstructive for political stability. For the leaders of the NCF, the political and 
economic stability of the emerging system of large corporations was associated with how 
the problem of the relationship between capital and labour was treated. The trade unions 
were a powerful force against socialism. The development of the NCF in its first 12 
years went through three distinctive periods. In the first phase (until 1905), the 
Federation regarded a direct mediation in labour disputes as its main task and sought to 
build a mutual trust between the labourer and the employer. In the second stage (after 
1905), the Federation organised welfare programmes and composed bills on workmen's 
compensation, minimum wages and public utilities for its state councils. The welfare 
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work was, to some extent, successful in changing the attitudes of anti-union employers. 
The last period was characterised as the Federation's active interference of in the political 
economy. It supported reforms, which represented a consensus of business, trade unions 
and others, with the purpose of inhibiting the growth of Socialism and instructing the 
business leaders to accept their responsibilities in the rationalisation of large corporations 
(ibid., pp. 37-9). 
Labour: The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded in the middle 1880s. In 
the United States, where a party was not based on a single interest but on a range of 
interests, there were a number of difficulties for the organised labour to become an 
independent political party. First, an labour votes were shared between different political 
parties; Second, geographically speaking, organised labour concentrated in only ten or a 
dozen of the fifty states; Third, state laws favoured the existing political parties and 
traditional voting habits worked against the development of the organized labour into a 
new party. New parties, in many states, had to meet extraordinary obstacles to get onto 
the ballot; Fourth, the autonomy of American unions from their national bodies and the 
lack of much centralised control of political parties over local officials would have made a 
national labour party difficult to control; Last, the ability of the existing American political 
parties to establish political links with union leaders reduced pressure from organized 
labour to organise a rival political organisation and made it difficult to interest them in 
independent labour or workmen's parties (Haber (ed), 1966, pp. 253-4). 
Compared with unions in other industrialised nations, the American unions historically 
faced more difficulty in gaining acceptance. The efforts by workers organised in trade 
and labour unions to improve their income and living conditions were bitterly opposed 
from the start in the United States (see the discussion on the relationship between 
business and labour in America in Part One). The interesting fact is that it was not the 
promoters of the new doctrines who confronted the bitterest resistance by employers but, 
rather, the workers who sought to influence their terms of employment. 
The policy of the AFL was shaped in its early period by its President, Samuel Gompers. 
He believed that organised labour should use its votes to reward its friends and defeat its 
enemies as well as engaging in lobbying. The advantages of the policy were that it made 
the influence of the labour vote considerable in elections, it concentrated organised 
labour's resources on bargaining to achieve economic gains, it avoided undue hostility 
toward the AFL, and it led to the establishment of beneficial relationships between the 
AFL and state and local political machines. Because of the satisfactory relationship 
between organised labour and the dominant political machine in many local areas in the 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the lack of class consciousness among most 
workers, independent political action made little sense to the early American labour 
unions. 
Yet this policy mainly represented the interests of skilled workers and the gap of the 
economic power between the organised skilled workers and unorganised unskilled 
workers remained intact until the late 1920s when both skilled and unskilled, organised 
and unorganised lost their jobs. The organisation set a high value on American capitalism 
and rejected socialism as a means of achieving its goals. It embraced collective bargaining 
and independent political action in order to realise the labour movement's goal of 
improving the lot of the worker. After failing to change the AFL's orientation, the left 
wing (the socialists and the communists) was relatively unsuccessful and collective 
bargaining triumphed over more radical strategies. 
The American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL)'s A1212roaches to Deal With 
Unemployment 
The AALL recognised that the government had to adopt some policies to prevent and 
relieve large-scale unemployment, as personal incompetence was only a small part of the 
problem. In 1914, it worked out its programme which was composed of four methods. 
First, the establishment of public employment exchanges ensuring the rationalisation of 
the labour market in order to prevent unemployment. Second, adoption of regular and 
emergency public programmes in periods of economic decline. Third, the regulation of 
industry, making each business a steady rather than speculative one. Fourth, the adoption 
of social insurance, a technique which would apply constant financial pressure on 
employers to control unemployment. 
The ideal of labour market rationalisation through public employment exchanges enjoyed 
a great deal of support in the early twentieth century. It was advocated by people such as 
John R. Commons of Wisconsin, who was one of executive committee members of the 
Commission on Public Ownership of Public Utilities which was created by the National 
Civic Federation (NCF) in 1905. In 1907, Commons set up the principles of the 
Wisconsin public utilities law. The principles included: public utilities would be best 
conducted by legalised, regulated monopoly; franchise grants to corporations should be 
for fixed periods and subject to purchase at fair price; utilities should be subject to 
regulation and examination under a system of uniform records and accounts by an 
independent administrative agency etc. (Weinstein, 1968, p. 25). The principles approved 
more successfully in the private agency; employers and labour unions did not cooperate. 
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The indifference of employers and workers to labour market organisation, (the former 
were not committed to the abolition of labour reserves and the latter did not wish to be 
decasualised), was the major explanation for the failure of the ideal in the United States in 
the early twentieth century. 
As it became clear that a national exchange system had failed to achieve prevention in the 
1920s, public works, the second item on the AALL's programme, attracted considerable 
interest as a counter-cyclical device. People who were in charge of public works put 
aside financial reserves in times of prosperity for the purpose of improvement and 
expansion in times of depression. With the public work fund, 'we would at the same 
time diminish the time of booms' (Quoted in Lubove, 1968, p. 158). The public 
employment and public works in the 1920's had the significance of making Americans 
prepared for the relief and social security programmes in the 1930's. 
But a more important measure to prevent mass unemployment, compared to public 
exchanges and public works, was employment stabilisation through employer initiatives 
in the 1920s. It was regarded as the American's contribution to the theory and the 
prevention of unemployment. The advantage of job security through efficient industrial 
management, over the first two approaches, was that it relied upon the efforts of 
businessmen rather than government. Employment management was regarded as an 
outstanding feature of industrial development, and a primary means to deal with 
unemployment by philosophers of welfare capitalism and economic reformers. It implied 
a positive responsibility on the part of industry to provide job security by adjusting 
production to demand. The idea of the regulation of industry through employers' efforts 
in particular, in order to prevent unemployment, was popular in the discussion of the 
AALL about the approaches to deal with the problem of unemployment. 
In the first decade of this century, a relatively small circle of reformers had been 
advocating social insurance and had won some response. For example, in 1907 the 
legislature of Massachusetts created the Commission on Old Age Pensions, Annuities 
and Pensions. Between 1911-1915 newly two-third of the states enacted workmen's 
compensation laws (Schlabach, 1969, p. 75). One of the difficulties, however, faced in 
the United States by advocates of social welfare legislation in general and unemployment 
insurance in particular was popular indifference, if not hostility, to European experience. 
The prevention theory's prevalent position in the debate of relief programmes made any 
idea which had similarity with the earlier British or German legislation unacceptable. 
They believed that the British system was unworkable and that prevention was a 
preferable goal. In 1917, Samuel Gompers, the leader of the AFL, argued that 
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compulsory arrangement would allow government to grab the power from the workers 
and weaken their spirit and virility (see Lubove, 1968, pp. 76-7). The National Industrial 
Conference Board urged in 1921 that unemployment insurance 'should not be applied 
until a fair chance has been given management to reduce unemployment to the minimum 
through stabilisation of industry and efficient distribution of the labour supply. ' (ibid. 
p. 16 1). In their pre-World War I proposals, the reformers such as Professor Henry R. 
Seager of Columbia University and the Boston'people's attorney', Louis D. Brandeis, 
either called for non-compulsory governmental welfare institutions or favoured company 
welfare plans. In 1928-29, voluntary unemployment insurance plans covered some 
106,723 workers, and one-third of them were dependent upon union rather than 
company benefits. 
In contrast to this hostile attitude to European experience, businessmen were believed to 
have the potential to bring efficiency and order back to industry. 7he reformers' aim to 
introduce unemployment insurance was not just, or most importantly, to seek the relief of 
the unemployed but mainly to enable the businessmen to show their responsibility by 
using their power to combat the economic disorganization. The employers accepted some 
ideas concerning prevention, especially if this might allow them to reduce their costs to 
an unemployment insurance fund. Industrial workers 'put their confidence in political 
bosses and religious leaders whose views of middle-class reformers were skeptical if not 
hostile' (Leiby in Turner (ed. ), 1977, p. 1522). The slow progress of social insurance in 
the United states was partly related to the fact that people were less anxious about dire 
poverty and its relief than people in other industrial nations and also because it was 
believed that the poor had private insurance or philanthropy to fall back on. It was only 
with the increasing joblessness of the 1930's that Americans were prepared to consider 
their European counterparts' experiences. 
The Great Depression and the Reactions of Society 
The Hoover Govemment's Measures to Deal With the Economic Challenge 
When unemployment began to rise in the late 1920s, it was firstly defined as a temporary 
business downturn, with the belief that the resulting distress could be handled by the 
traditional methods of individual self-help and local efforts. After 1932 the nation began 
to recognise that a depression was occurring. By the Spring of 1929, the number of men 
out of work approached 3 million; by January 1930, the figure topped 4 million; in 
September, 5 million; by the Spring of 1933, about 15 million men had become jobless 
(Piven and Cloward, 1972, p. 49). The 'long depression' (1929-42) did not just cause 
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massive unemployment and spread material hardship to different classes but also 
increasingly discredited the existing system and shattered the dominant ideology of 
laissez-faire capitalism and voluntary welfare provisions. In contrast, the views of 
socialist critics suddenly became acceptable. 
Confronted with economic catastrophe, the Federal government at first remained aloof. 
The Hoover government's only action was to support and encourage bankers, railroads, 
companies and farmers by establishing a federal loan agency, the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC), in Janurary 1932. Its policy was based on the belief that the 
business cycle was self-correcting, these entrepreneurial groups would make the 
economy run again. However, even these feeble steps were ruined by doctrinal 
reservations about governmental interference with the economy. The government was 
preoccupied with the need to create a profit margin for businessmen in the face of falling 
price levels so that business could bring the return of prosperity to all Americans. 
For the unemployed, Hoover limited himself to offering encouragement to local charity 
efforts. In August 1931, the President's organisation of Unemployment Relief replaced 
the Emergency Committee for Employment. But without either funds or powers, its 
function was mainly to promote the need for charity, to reaffirm the virtues of local 
responsibility, and to call for better coordination of local efforts. In a message to 
Congress in December 1931, President Hoover insisted on local initiatives to provide 
employment and other measures against distress. He argued against any direct or indirect 
government dole, as he believed they were partly responsible for breakdown and so 
increased unemployment. He said, 'our people are providing against distress from 
unemployment in true American fashion' (Quoted in Piven and Cloward, 1972, p. 53. ) 
The increase of unemployment and widespread hardship made society recognise the 
inadequacy of the traditional belief. The pressure for public responsibility to deal with the 
problem using unemployment insurance was increasing. Legislation, introduced by the 
Democratic Senator Robert F. Wagner in 1931, called for two billion dollars for Federal 
public works, federal employment services, and federal unemployment insurance. 
Congress passed the first two measures (later rejected by Hooverl but voted down the 
last. A bill introduced by Senators Robert A La Follette, Jr. and Edward P. Constigan 
in February 1932, which called for a Federal grant of 375 million dollars to the states for 
unemployment relief, had the same destiny. Many however in Congress shared the view 
that it was naive to expect to be able to end the depression through legislation alone 
(Schesingler, 1957, p. 226. See Piven and Cloward, 1972, p. 54). In 1932 another 
committee concluded that, at most, the Federal government should grant income tax 
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credits to employers in return for unemployment compensation contributions. In 
November 1932, even the trade union organization, the AFL, declared that it was 
virtually impossible to have one uniform national system. The states should separately 
pass measures suited to local conditions, with basic protections for unions and other 
minimal standards. 
By the end of 1932, twenty-four states were providing some form of financial aid to 
localities for relief. When the numbers of the unemployed increased, more and more 
people came to the local relief agencies to seek aid, yet many of their applications for 
financial provision were rejected because local public and private relief agencies were 
incapable of carrying such a burden. Local officials showed their sympathy for the plight 
of those who had lost their jobs. There were two reasons for this. One was that the 
spread of distress on all sides led people to question the customary American view which 
identified the poor with laziness and improvidence. Instead, they defined their hardships 
in terms of industrial failure, they attributed it to faults in 'the system' and regarded it as a 
collective disaster which aroused protest. The other was the local politicians' fear of the 
possibility of the unemployed people's political defection. The unemployed were also 
voters. In industrial towns, in particular, the workers were often in a majority as well as 
unemployed. 
The SwinR to the Democrats and Roosevelfs Different Method 
By 1932 the crisis had three main elements. The first was widespread destitution; the 
second was the municipalities' claim to be forced to the verge of bankruptcy due to 
increasing relief costs; while the third was the inevitability of refusing relief and the threat 
of disorder arising from the desperation of people throughout the country wanting jobs, 
money and food. The Depression thus gave rise to the largest movement of the 
unemployed in the history of the USA. Political disaffection meant people's hostility to 
their leaders and to the regime. It also was a test of the responsiveness of political leaders 
and the adaptability of the regime. In his acceptance speech as the Democratic candidate, 
Roosevelt proclaimed that the President had greater responsibility for the relief of 
unemployment. 'Me Democratic victory in the election of 1932 provided a mandate to 
deal with economic catastrophe and attempt economic recovery. 
The 1932 victory did not yet signify the achievement of political stability at a national 
level. After assuming office, the Roosevelt administration sought to overturn the already 
crumbling traditional principles of American relief-giving and launch a variety of 
measures to deal with the different facets of economic breakdown and to cement political 
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allegiances with many sectors of society. Measures like the National Industrial Recovery 
Act (NIRA) of June 1933 were designed to support and conciliate businessmen. This Act 
granted businessmen government backing for agreements to stabilise production and 
prevent price slashing (it permitted the fixing of prices and production to halt deflationary 
trends). Under the programme of the Federal Emergency Relief Act signed by hime on 
May 12,1933, Roosevelt adopted both means of assistance programme for business for 
the sake of recovery and made reimbursements to the states for payments to people in 
need and for the cost of administrating local programmes. It allocated 500 minion dollars 
as grants-in-aid to the states for unemployment relief, administrated by state and local 
agencies in cooperation with the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). It 
was the first time in the history of America that the Federal government undertook 
responsibility for relief with substantial funds. 'Me relief grants were directed to all needy 
unemployed persons and/or their dependents and to employed persons who did not have 
adequate resources to support themselves and/or their dependents. This Federal 
programme can best be understood as the government's response to a massive electoral 
upheaval and its intention to deal with the inadequate purchasing power of many workers 
and their low share of national income by legislation. 
When the Federal relief started, there was a growing concern over direct relief. Many 
civic leaders realised that direct relief alone was insufficient to prevent individuals and 
communities from deteriorating and became more aware of the dangerous growth of 
helplessness and dependence. In 1933 when the debate about replacing poor relief with 
unemployment insurance was at its height, less than I per cent of the nation's industrial 
workers were protected by voluntary unemployment insurance. Plans were often 
actuarially and financially unsound, and proved unreliable in the Depression. Gomper's 
successors in the union movement, and employers who had experience with voluntary 
plans increasingly advocated compulsory government social insurance. However, the 
assumption that any insurance scheme had to be voluntary was still quite common in 
1933. 
The Different Ideas of Unemployment Insurance in America 
In the United States, there were two main different approaches which occupied a 
prominent position in the process of enacting the Federal unemployment insurance 
scheme: one was the Wisconsin and the other was the Ohio models. The following are 
the accounts of the major differences between these two approaches 
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The Wisconsin Plan 
Based on a philosophical stance which reflected the dominant American values of 
individual initiative, competition, and thrift, the proponents of the Wisconsin model built 
their unemployment compensation system on the concept of prevention. Ile goal was to 
prevent unemployment rather than deal with unemployment after it occurred. As fellow 
students of John R. Commons, who was a key figure of the Wisconsin plan for 
unemployment protection, 60 Paul Raushenbush, his wife Elizabeth Brandeis, Harold 
Groves and Andrews tried to design reforms basic enough to prevent the industrial 
causes of workers' hazards, not merely to alleviate their effects. Instead emphasising the 
redistribution of wealth through relief and compulsory insurance, they sought to induce 
managers to reduce the economic hazards to industrial workers in capitalist institutions 
themselves. For Andrews, the British system suffered from the 'suicidal imposition of 
Govemment 'doles', which were promptly confused with genuine insurance by all 
enemies of progressive social insurance legislation. ' It 'did not approach the matter in a 
business-like way for the purpose of preventive work. '61 
In 1931, Groves, Raushenbush and Miss Brandies developed a bill in which their basic 
idea was to credit each firm's contributions to an individual account in a state-managged 
fund, and then to charge the benefits paid out to the unemployed against the account. 
Firms with stable employment would maintain adequate accounts and therefore reduce 
and even discontinue contributions. The Wisconsin plan indicated the prevailing 
assumptions of individual employer responsibility and applied it to the power of 
businessmen in economic life, asserting that employers had a financial incentive to 
mitigate unemployment and act to prevent it. It maintained that insurance in America 
should follow the economic processes of competition and profit maximisation, with only 
minimal income redistribution. 
60. As far back as 1921, Commons devised the Huber Bill in Wisconsin. According to the bill, insurance 
would be organized by a state-supervised but employer-operated mutual company. The company would 
have authority to adjust rates according to the level of unemployment in different industries and firms. It 
had a distinctive feature of limiting contributions to employers only. Commons wanted to make 
employers feel the social costs of unemployment and consider the costs before discharging workers. 
Payment for the unemployed was low as Commons wanted to avoid the socialist and paternalistic 
characteristic of European unemployment insurance schemes in his plan, and hoped to establish a 
'capitalistic scheme' which would make efficient labour management profitable. It was rejected by 
successive Wisconsin legislatures during the 1920's. 
61. John B. Andrews to Charles E. Pellow, March 24,1922, American Association for Labour 
Legislation . Quoted in Lubove, 1968, p. 168. 
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Although employers resisted its enactment, as an expression of their commitment to 
stabilisation or in order to thwart alternative, more radical proposals, insurance was 
abandoned altogether in favour of an individual employer reserves system. The bill was 
passed in January 1932, with the support of the Governor, and a Wisconsin Committee 
for unemployment and farmer organizations. 'Me law took effect in July 1934 to become 
the first American public unemployment compensation law, the only stable one to be 
enacted before 1935 (Schlabach, 1969, pp. 88-9). 
ne Ohio Plan 
The Wisconsin plan was challenged by the report of the Ohio Commission on 
Unemployment in November 1932 which emphasised maximising and assuring worker's 
benefits and proposed worker contributions and pooling in one state-wide fund. As 
experts on foreign insurance systems, Isaac Rubinow before World War I, and Abraham 
Epstein in the 1920s, advocated the principle of spreading the risk not just among 
workers, but also to employers and to the state. They asserted that wages were too low 
for individual workers to cover their risks through saving. Although both of them agreed 
that employee contributions distinguished social insurance from relief and dole, they 
supported the idea of financing benefits from the public treasury, as it would readjust the 
distribution of the national product. 71eir attitude was related to the view that insecurity 
was not an individual problem but was inherent in the social and economic structure. 
In 1933 Abraham Epstein and Issac Rubinow introduced a pooled-fund bill in the New 
York legislature. It was based on the British system, with contributions from the public 
treasury and from both employers and workers. (As the leader of the expert-lobby group, 
Rubinow had hoped to apply insurance principles to the risk of unemployment well 
before World War 1, but had feared its effect on doles and relief. ) 
The plan was a challenge to the Wisconsin plan. The Ohio Commission showed a 
preference for insurance over reserves which was advocated in the Wisconsin model. For 
them, individual employer reserves could not provide adequate economic security for 
people subject to risk. The risk itself was inevitable and not dealt with by means of 
reduction. In contrast, pooled insurance was the soundest and most economical form of 
cover and was able to maintain purchasing power in periods of depression with large 
funds for the widest spread of people. In the Ohio plan, both employer and employee 
were required to make contributions, of two and one per cent respectively. Benefits, as in 
the Wisconsin plan, were limited to 50 per cent of weekly wages, but fifteen dollars 
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rather than ten dollars was set as the maximum and the benefit period was sixteen rather 
than ten weeks. 
However, the principle of the Ohio Plan was criticised by Ohio Chamber of Commerce 
on the ground that it deviated from the essence of the American system, which stressed 
individual responsibility, by'foisting upon the United States foreign ideals and foreign 
practices. '62 The report of the Ohio Commission helped to stimulate a change in public 
attitudes toward unemployment compensation. In 1933,68 bills were introduced in 25 
states, with the Ohio plan gaining an edge over the Wisconsin plan. Among 
unemployment compensation bills which passed one of the legislative houses in seven 
states, four made provision for a pooled fund. 
In May 1933, the Andrews group introduced an amended 'American Plan for 
Unemployment Reserves', (the first was advocated about 1930), which used the device 
of segregated employer reserves. In his added response to the Ohio Commission report 
under pressure from the growing strength of social insurance advocates of the Ohio 
reformers, Andrews argued for voluntary employee contributions and pooled funds of 
industries: he regarded these two important clarifications as a useful safeguard to the 
Wisconsin plan. The amendments approved the introduction of pooling by the authorities 
administering unemployment compensation, provided that the accounts of too many 
employers fell below a certain level and workers made voluntary contributions for better 
benefits. Andrews hoped that the modifications would establish the American Plan as an 
acceptable compromise between the Wisconsin and Ohio positions. But this effort proved 
vain. As Raushenbush commented, there was no practical middle ground between the 
two camps on the questions of employee contributions and p6oling of funds (Schlabach, 
1969, pp. 89-90). 
The role of an employer in the prevention of unemployment was a controversial topic 
between the Wisconsin and Ohio schools. Some people, like Commons, Andrews and 
their followers, maintained that neither the government nor the wage-earner in a free 
enterprise system could determine the conditions of employment. Businessmen were the 
only people who could ensure the conditions of regularisation, and thus a business-like 
way to deal with the problem of unemployment was appropriate. Yet, for others like 
Rubinow, Epstein and Douglas, the presumption that individual employers were able to 
determine stabilisation was rather doubtful as knowledge about the causes and the ways 
62. Ohio Chamber of Commerce, Critical Analysis of the Report of the Ohio Commission on 
Unemployment Insurance. Prepared by the Committee on Stabilization and Unemployment. (2nd., 
Columbus, December 1932), 5,6.24. Quoted in Lubove, 1968, p. 172. 
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of counteracting economic crises was uncertain. Rubinow attacked the argument that 
insurance, as a European method to deal with the problem of unemployment, was 
ineffective and stabilisation was America's solution for it. Rather he believed, like 
Beveridge in Britain, insurance had a different function from prevention. In this process, 
Beveridge's analysis of unemployment in environmental rather than an individual's point 
of view stimulated the American economists and social reformers. Beveridge's 
prevention theory and idea of different treatments for voluntary and involuntary 
unemployment also provided the foundation upon which his American disciples could 
build. 
Lubove (1968) argues that the difference between the Wisconsin and, Ohio approaches 
lay in a battle over the place of redistribution in social insurance (p. 24). Since the 
Wisconsin school emphasised prevention and employer incentives, the role of 
redistribution in this form of social insurance was quite insignificant. The architects of 
the Ohio plan, Epstein and Rubinow, argued for the concept of social adequacy in social 
insurance and social assistance programmes. The real purpose of social security should 
be to provide adequate financial support for the unemployed, through the pooled 
employer reserves instead of individual ones, higher benefit levels, and a governmental 
contribution financed out of general revenues in order to maintain consumer purchasing 
power in the 1930s. However, Sinfield argues that the debate over the two models in 
1935 focused on the issue of financing. The legislators, planners and most others were 
particularly concerned with the role the employers could play in establishing a rational 
market order and various taxation devices which were embodied in the schemes were 
intended to give employers incentives to provide stable employment (Sinfield, 1976, 
p. 29). 
The Strategies Adopted for Enacting Legislation and the Establishment of 
the 1935 Act 
Until 1934 the federal government did virtually nothing directly for general social 
security. By 1934, as the Depression wore on and little improvement of conditions was 
evident, national income was only half what it had been in 1929 and one quarter of the 
labour force was out of work. Various dissident leaders, who commanded large 
followings within different sectors of the emerging New Deal coalition, including the 
unemployed, provided organisational form and coherence for the emerging unrest and 
built a political movement which was intended to shape the future of the United States. 
Economic suffering and the consequent political turmoil created the possibility of social 
change. Against this background, Roosevelt acted decisively to deal with the underlying 
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cause of disorder and insurgency, i. e. the breakdown of the economy. He sought to 
promote economic recovery through a series of reforms and to swing the dissidents 
behind the New Deal and thereby restore the political stability. Roosevelt said, 'I am 
looking for a sound means which I can recommend to provide one security against 
several of the great disturbing factors in life-especially those which relate to 
unemployment and old age. '63 
The congressional elections of 1934 ended with the victory of the Democrats. Temporary 
economic improvement, the easing of distress by direct relief and the New Deal brought 
large segments of the public behind the new President. Roosevelt called for the enactment 
of novel measures like social insurance. But who and what would establish a social 
policy response to the demand 'appeared to be up for grabs'? (Cates, 1983, p. 22) The 
two models of social insurance, the conservative or anti-redistributional model of 
Wisconsin and the liberal or pro-redistributional model of Ohio, as they have been 
described above, dominated the discussion over the different approaches to state 
unemployment compensation policy before the establishment of the 1935 Social Security 
Act. 
The Various Reactions to the Two Plans from the Different GLoups 
Between 1933-1935, politicians and administrators, as devisors of an unemployment 
insurance scheme for the Roosevelt Administration, had difficulties in finding a middle- 
road solution among the well-defined alternatives. The reformers found it hard to reach 
agreement on the role businessmen should play and how much control the state would 
permit, as different groups adhered to their own various beliefs. Politicians were aware 
of the necessity to take immediate action for long-term reform as well as short-term relief 
and to maintain as much support as possible from businessmen, advocates of a national 
system, and Congress itself. This was difficult because a bill which favoured one group 
would almost certainly face the risk of protest and opposition from the others. 
An influential group of businessmen and intellectuals, with Andrews and Raushenbush 
as their spokesmen, believed prevention was the only legitimate goal and insisted that 
employers should only be responsible for their own workers. Their prevention plan 
gained the approval of nearly every national employers' organisation by 1932. They 
regarded unemployment reserves as an integral part of their stabilisation policy. Hendry 
Harriman, from the Chamber of Commerce, argued that'industries which can so regulate 
63. Roosevelt: a message to Congress on June 8,1934. Quoted in Schlabach, 1969, p. 74. 
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themselves that ... employment is reasonably constant should not be burdened 
in order to 
pay for the cost of reserves for less well managed industries. '64 
The intellectuals, social workers, clergymen, and reformers, by contrast, who were 
influenced by the European model, pursued a comprehensive national system for social 
insurance. They regarded a genuine insurance program with uniform benefit standards as 
the best way to cope with unemployment and insecurity. They wanted contributions from 
the different groups, arguing that pooling more money would lead to higher benefit 
payments. Paul Douglas and Aaron Director had stressed the importance of contributions 
by both employees and employers as early as 1931. Otherwise, they thought, it would be 
difficult to provide adequate benefits and state legislators would lose interest in 
preserving the taxes because of inter-state competition and because employers would 
challenge more claims. An additional advantage of employee contributions was the 
greater interest shown by workers and the general public (Douglas, 1935, p. 491. Quoted 
in Sinfield, 1976, p. 31). 
The major obstacles to the acceptance of the idea by society were the American suspicion 
of social insurance and the opposition from supporters of the prevention approach. 
Getting their potential supporters to stand up for their programme would be a crucial 
factor for their success and they decided to oppose what they regarded as an undesirable 
bill. However, the main problem which made Epstein and his supporters' position 
uncertain was that the leaders of organized labour, their major political source, were 
neutral and union leaders disapproved of the Epstein faction's advocacy of employee 
contribution. 
ne Wagner-Lewis Bill 
During the Hoover years most politicians and administrators had given relatively little 
consideration to the question of unemployment insurance. Senator Robert F. Wagner, 
one of the congressional leaders, was one of a few reformers who showed interest in it. 
From March 1933 on, when the programme of the Hundred Days (Roosevelt's 
inauguration legislation) sought to solve the problem of unemployment by the re- 
employment of those who were out of work, Wagner had explained his support for the 
unemployment insurance system established by the individual states and private 
employers. In June 1933, Congress passed the Wagner-Peyser Act which included two 
measures. One was a coordinated federal-state employment office system, the other was 
64. "The Stabilization of Business and Employment, " American Economic Review, 23 (Mar, 1932). 
Quoted in Nelson, p. 194. 
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tax incentives to employers for the establishment of private unemployment insurance 
funds. Congressional approval of the Act was a very important step in his approach 
toward unemployment insurance legislation since it provided the administrative 
framework for a programme of unemployment insurance. 
On February 5,1934, Senator Wagner and Representative David J. Lewis of Maryland, 
president of the United Mine Workers of America, sponsored a tax-offset bill for 
unemployment compensation in Congress. It was drafted by Paul Raushenbush, 'Momas 
Eliot, the Wisconsin reformer and Associate Labor solicitor, latterly working closely with 
the Secretary of Labor Miss Perkins. According to the bill, the employer was allowed a 
reduction on his pay-roll tax, provided that he made contributions to an approved state 
unemployment compensation scheme with minimum benefit standards even if the 
contributions were less than 5 percent. In order to avoid bitter controversy among 
advocates of social insurance, the Bill permitted either pooled or segregated reserve 
funds. But the uniform federal tax would limit inter-state competition and would also be 
regarded as supporting the Wisconsin plan by basing the unemployment insurance 
system on state rather than national legislation. 
The Wagner-Lewis Bill won praise from experts on social insurance as well as from 
labour legislationists: at a conference on unemployment insurance and labour legislation 
organised by Secretary Perkins. Yet it created a controversy as to what uniform standards 
the federal government should impose on the states. The conference revealed further 
divisions between representatives of the Wisconsin and Ohio plans. Although declared 
their support for the Wagner-Lewis Bill, Epstein and his followers called for tripartite 
contributions and adequate benefits for the unemployed and persisted in their hostile 
attitude to the Wisconsin plan. 
At the hearings in March and April, the majority of businessmen urged delay and a 
reduction of the five per cent pay-roll tax, on the grounds that most businessmen 'have 
so many problems to consider in the present depression that they cannot be very 
interested in providing reserves for future depressions. '65 Their objections to 
unemployment insurance legislation and to new taxation increased in the context of an 
economic upturn in early 1934. 
Roosevelt failed to give decisive support to the Bill, although he publicly stated that it 
established a suitable role for the national govemment in relation to unemployment 
65. Hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee, 1934, p. 70. See Nelson, 1969, p. 202. 
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insurance. He was afraid that social insurance might become a dole or a burden to the 
public treasury and accepted the suggestion of Tugwell, one of his advisers, to postpone 
the Bill. The decision revealed his doubts about the probability of the Bill's being enacted 
in that session, and his hope of preparing a more comprehensive programme for the next 
session and of reconciling the various groups with an interest in social insurance. His 
decision to set up an inquiry for a thorough social insurance study won explicit approval 
from his cabinet in the Spring of 1934. Following his announcement to Congress in 
June, a new Committee on Economic Security (COES) was set up on June 29. 
Witte and the Committee on the Economic Securijy Bill 
The aims given to the Committee on Economic Security, which was composed of social 
insurance experts selected from universities, foundations, business firms and elsewhere, 
were to carry out an interim study of social insurance and to formulate proposals for the 
new Congress. 
On July 24 1934 with Edwin E. Witte, then Director of Unemployment Compensation in 
Wisconsin, was invited by Arthur Altmeyer, Assistant Secretary of Labor and a prot6g6 
of Commons, and by Secretary Perkins, Chairman of the Cabinet Committee, to head the 
research staff and take immediate charge of all investigations and studies. Witte was 
interested in the risk of unemployment as an industrial labour problem and his concern 
was increased by the worsening Depression; his interest was much shaped by his 
experience in Wisconsin. In the 1920s, pressure groups in Wisconsin had done more 
than similar groups elsewhere to keep interest in unemployment compensation alive. 
During a European trip in 1931, he carried out a careful study of British unemployment 
insurance. He accepted his new post on the understanding that his task was to develop a 
legislative programme rather than conduct extensive research, or gather new information, 
and to come up with measures that would win the broadest possible support. 
Above the Committee was the 'Technical Board' composed of twenty administrative 
officials and advisers. Witte declared that the outside experts should not recommend 
policy but should carry out the wishes of the Technical Board. Since there were divided 
opinions among the social insurance advocates regarding federal and state roles, the 
assignment was a test of his powers of conciliation. He had to reduce new 
misunderstandings and personal clashes within the committee and settle arguments over 
social insurance doctrines that grew out of fundamental social and economic beliefs 
'within the narrow limits imposed by the American political, social, and economic 
structure' (Schlabach, 1969, p. 97). 
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There were four policy questions which were considered by the Committee from August 
until well into November. One was the function of social insurance, i. e. whether it 
should be used as the measure to deal with the individual's Problem of security or as a 
tool to refashion the total economy. Witte and followers agreed that their major concern 
was not the total economic recovery but simply the protection of the individual against 
distress; a recovery programme lay largely outside the Committee's task. They believed 
that a social security programme should be sound fiscally, large increases in 
governmental welfare expenditures had to come from current taxation as relief 
expenditures had already strained the general Treasury almost to its limit. 
The second broad policy question was how much to emphasise social insurance as 
opposed to public relief and other approaches to social welfare. Witte and the Technical 
Board included relief in their studies, in recognition of the fact that economic security is a 
much broader concept than social insurance and social insurance alone could not 
guarantee complete security. Witte declared in October that the solution to unemployment 
was more private employment plus unemployment insurance. Witte and his colleagues 
also decided that unemployment must not become a dole through the mingling of 
insurance and relief. The proposal included 'assistance' for various classes of 
unemployable people, but kept work relief separate from insurance, and made no 
provision for 'extended' unemployment benefits. 
A third broad question was which programmes to recommend immediately to Congress, 
as the cabinet committee preferred the concept of traditional social insurance, with 
separate systems for separate risks, while Witte advocated one unified system. Top 
priority for unemployment compensation was never in doubt, since unemployment 
insurance was the favoured policy of Miss Perkins and her Labor Development group. 
The fourth and most troublesome question concerned the proper balance between federal 
and state action. Management and labour lined up on opposite sides. Employers 
concerned themselves only with their own or their own industries' employees and 
advocated segregated funds, while organised labour sought the added protection of the 
broad pooling of risk. The question was particularly controversial, dividing opinions 
sharply among Witte and his staff. The Committee was broadly in favour of the German 
and British systems in which the Federal government would operate and administer. 
Eliot, the co-sponsor of the Wagner-Lewis Bill, was the leading spokesman for state 
administration within the committee. Witte himself was sceptical of both the wisdom and 
the constitutionality of national administration. He believed that the national government 
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could do little more than stimulate state action through devices such as the Wagner-Lewis 
offset tax. 
The tension between Witte and his staff was kept alive. Witte feared that 'the violent 
opposition of either group was likely to mean trouble' and, characteristically pragmatic, 
be therefore tended to make compromises. 66 In the face of conflicting advice, the 
Technical Board decided to consider national as well as state administration. In the report 
drafted by Witte, they suggested three major alternatives. One was a fully national system 
that would completely ignore the states as administrative units; the second and third ones 
were both federal-state plans. One was the Wagner-Lewis offset tax proposal and the 
other was a 'subsidy' or 'grant-in-aid' plan. 
A national system promised the advantages of uniformity in unemployment compensation 
and easy protection for workers who moved between states. It would be administratively 
more efficient than a state system. Under the subsidy plan, the federal government would 
collect a pay-roll tax and distribute the money to the states which operated unemployment 
compensation systems. It would also let the states collect as well as distribute benefit 
money. Witte and the Technical Board pointed out that the subsidy plan held greater 
possibilities than the Wagner-Lewis plan for national control and for holding back some 
money for a nationwide pooling of risk. But of the three plans, the Wagner-Lewis plan 
would fare best in Congress. 'Me Technical Board warned that either the straight national 
scheme or the subsidy system might put great pressure on Congress to subsidize 
unemployment insurance from general Treasury funds. 
On November 9,1934, the Cabinet Committee decided to recommend federal-state 
collaboration, and expressed a tentative preference for the Wagner-Lewis plan over the 
subsidy method. Witte and the Technical Board pointed out that the Wagner-Lewis 
scheme enabled it to evade the segregation versus pooling issue. Roosevelt endorsed the 
federal-state approach in his National Conference Speech on November 14. The 
Committee's decision and Roosevelt's speech were important turning points in the battle 
between champions of national and of state administration. 
Yet the battle was not over. Bryce Stewart, staff member who favoured an exclusively 
national plan, invited a group of such prominent experts as Rubinow, Douglas, 
Rushenbush and Andrews, to a national conference, at which nearly all of the 
participants were from outside the committee organization. On the issue of national 
66. Witte, "The Government and Unemployment, " American lahor Legislation Review, 25 (March, 
1935), 5-12. Quoted in Schlabach, 1969, p. 123. 
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versus state administration, the discussion turned in favour of a straight national plan 
which Roosevelt had precluded in his speech. In the end, Witte and his colleagues 
confronted the 'maze of machinery and conflicting personal interests' in Washington with 
their pragmatism. For old-age insurance they chose national administration; for 
unemployment insurance they chose federal-state collaboration (Schlabach, 1969, 
p. 122). 
In late December 1934, the COES produced federal unemployment insurance legislation 
in the form of a weakened Wagner-Lewis Bill. Nelson (1969) argues that because the 
Committee report involved many people, it did not just engage the various reformers but 
also aroused public interest in the economic security bill. To help it get through in the 
courts, they decided to give the states as much freedom as possible in the final bill which 
did not include any national benefits standards, or employee contributions although states 
could require them, and no restrictions on individual reserve plans. However one-third of 
the employer's 3 per cent tax would be paid into a state pooled fund. 
The Congressional Debate on the Bill and the Passage of the Social Securily Act 
The Congressional struggle for unemployment insurance in the United States began with 
Roosevelt's statement to congress on January 17,1935. In his message, Roosevelt 
announced the Administration's Economic Security Bill. The unemployment insurance 
provisions included a possible tax credit for employers who established an 
unemployment insurance scheme with the credit constituting 90 percent of the uniform 
federal tax. Except for the requirement that employers pay one per cent of their pay-roll 
into the state pool, no benefit standards or other requirements for states were included. 
States were given a choice between the Wisconsin or the Ohio plan. In order to provide 
an incentive for employment stabilization, an experience-rating system was used in the 
payment of unemployment benefits: the amount of tax paid by an employer as thebenefit 
account' was linked to the claims of his ex-workers; the higher the rate of j ob-loss among 
his employees, the more benefit claims he would have and as a result, the bigger the 
contribution he was required to make. The bill established 'additional credits' for 
employers who had good employment records who could pay less than the 2.7 per cent 
standard tax under state experience-rating provisions after five years. 
The bill aroused different reactions from different groups. For advocates of social 
insurance, like social workers and labour legislation experts, the programme was 
disappointing, because it was not based on a national system and contributions were not 
as high as they had expected. Epstein frankly confessed his antagonism and sought the 
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repeal of the bill, arguing that it would just set reform off on a tangent that would get 
nowhere. The COES Advisory Council was divided into two parts, one employer- and 
the other employee-oriented. The split was not over principle but over the details of the 
Administration programme. It was impossible for the two groups to reach a compromise 
because they had different conceptions of the objective of unemployment insurance and 
their dispute grew more bitter as the stakes increased. The former recommended 
employee contributions for unemployment insurance in a report to Roosevelt in April, 
1935. This was supported by a majority of a committee of the Business Advisory 
Council. 
The businessmen generally accepted the Wagner-Lewis approach, yet they disapproved 
of the absence of incentives for stabilisation and of its inclusion of employee 
contributions in the Bill. However, the businessmen's objectives were relatively weak. 
James Emery, general counsel of the National Association of Manufactures (NAM) 
argued that social security taxes would merely increase unemployment. He preferred 
temporary legislation for those who were actually indigent. Henry I. Harriman suggested 
that some amendments, e. g. a small employee contribution and the continuance of 
existing company plans with provisions, should be made to the bill in order to make it 
more acceptable to the business community which was very much concerned with 
unemployment insurance at that time. 67 Marion Folsom, treasurer of Eastman Kodak, 
member of the Business Advisory Council and advisor to the Economic Security 
Committee, Reybum, the chairman of the National Retail Dry Goods Association, 
assured legislators of their general support. And with Witte, Folsom exerted considerable 
influence in convincing the legislators that a social insurance programme was a practical 
proposition. 
The bill did not get the whole-hearted backing of organised labour. Although the AFL 
continued to support a federal social insurance programme, their displeasure with the 
Administration because of Roosevelt's policy over collective bargaining stopped them 
from giving any assistance to the bill in the decisive stage in Congress, and their support 
was a vital ingredient in the passage of reform legislation. The lack of contact between 
the unemployed and the unions and the lack of interest from the labour movement as a 
whole were the important obstacles to Congressional backing for unemployment 
insurance legislation. 
67. Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, 1935, pp. 913-5. See Nelson, 1969, pp. 2134. 
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Although the prospects for the bill were not very favourable, the loyalty of Doughton, 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, to the Administration and Miss 
Perkins' and Andrew's efforts ensured that it received the support of that Committee. In 
the House, President Roosevelt showed his forceful determination in fighting for the 
unemployment insurance and old age provisions in his bill. Witte continued his own 
crucial effort to convince congressional conservatives that the administration programme 
was a practical one and warned the business group on April 18 with a prediction that 
social legislation would soon come and they should not be short-sighted. On April 19, in 
the House of Representatives, the Democrats secured a victory over the opposition by 
372 votes to 33 enacting the Ways and Means Committee version of the Social Security 
Bill. 
Afterwards, Perkins, Witte and Andrews pressed the Senate Finance Committee to act on 
the one hand, and conducted a campaign for labour legislation experts to appeal to the 
Committee to support the passage of the bill on the other. On May 17th, the Finance 
Committee approved the bill with some important amendments. The changes included: 
retaining the individual reserve funds as in the Wisconsin plan; replacing the 1 percent 
contribution to a pooled fund by large variations in the tax rates of individual employers 
and allocating the administration of the act to the Labor Department rather than the Social 
Security Board. 68 On June 19 the Senate passed its version of the bill by a lopsided vote 
of 77-6. The President affixed his signature to the Social Security Act on the 14th of 
August which included the federal-state unemployment insurance programme., The 
concession in the 1935 Act to the Wisconsin Plan may imply its conformity with the 
individualistic tradition of the country and show that the use of alien models, like the 
British system, should also follow the tradition, otherwise, it would become 
inapplicable. Witte attributed its passage primarily to timely intervention by Roosevelt 
and to skillful legislative management. 
68. Witte, Department of Social Sources Act, pp. 14042. See Nelson, 1969, p. 218. 
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Part Two: The Features of the 1935 Unemployment Insurance 
Scheme and the Policy Making Environment of the United 
States 
The Social Security Act of 1935 reflected the changing view of the public about the role 
of the government, especially the federal government, in provision of security. For the 
first time in American history, the Federal government introduced a range of social 
measures. It included federal aid for the aged, retirement annuities, unemployment 
insurance, aid for persons who were blind or crippled and aid to dependent children. The 
statute also laid a foundation on which the subsequent congress widened the coverage 
and increased the benefits and many unions, through collective bargaining, were able to 
manage to supplement the profits enacted in governmental old-age pensions and 
unemployment insurance for workers. 
In this part, the central question is: Why were unemployment insurance schemes initiated 
with their particular features? The role played by different groups and their ideologies 
will be given particular attention. 
Section One The Unemployment Insurance Schemes 
As one of the programmes in the 1935 Social Security Act, unemployment compensation 
adheres to the insurance principle in which payments are not related to needs -- benefits 
vary according to the percentage of wages paid and to the length of time for which they 
are available. The programme relies on a tax on employers and is administered at state 
level. Employers pay different taxes in different states in order to equalize their 
competitive positions. As in other countries, the involuntarily unemployed must have had 
certain amount of earnings or employment in some specified period to qualify for benefit. 
Federal - State Co-operation 
In general, each state was free to establish its own unemployment insurance programme, 
but this had to meet certain requirements in order to receive Federal grants administrated 
by the state which could be offset against the Federal tax for employers. The purpose of 
these Federal requirements was to ensure that a state participated in the programme with a 
fairly administered, financially secure unemployment insurance system. According to 
Federal law, employers in industry and commerce who employed four or more people 
for at least twenty weeks of the year, paid a tax of 3.1 per cent on the first $ 43,000 of 
annual wages of each employee. The state collected taxes from all industrial and 
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commercial employers to finance the approved plan. Employers opposed state action on 
unemployment insurance as for them it would have meant paying more taxes and putting 
them in a disadvantaged position in comparison with employers in other states. 
However, under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, the establishment of a state 
programme enabled the employers in the state an offset 2.7 per cent of the 3.1 per cent 
Federal tax. The remaining 0.4 per cent Federal tax was collected by the Federal 
Government and used to cover the cost of federal and state administration. The state taxes 
were placed in state reserve funds in the Federal Treasury. The Federal tax removed the 
original obstacles to the state action. 
It was one of the statutory requirements that the state should store all contributions (the 
unemployment insurance's taxes) in an unemployment trust fund held in the Federal 
Treasury. Each state had a separate account to which its deposits and its share of interest 
on investments were credited and could withdraw money from the account at any time to 
pay benefits. In the case of unemployment insurance, benefits were paid exclusively 
through a public fund, and no private plans could be substituted for the State plan. From 
these funds the state made weekly payments to unemployed persons for specified periods 
(U. S. Department of Health, Education, And Welfare Social Security Administration, 
1973, p. 56; Schottland, 1963, pp. 80-1). 
Although each state had to comply with Federal requirements, each state was responsible 
for deciding the content and development of its unemployment insurance law, i. e. the 
amount and duration of benefit, the coverage and contributions (with minor limitations) 
and the eligibility requirements and disqualification provisions. For example, the worker 
should not be denied benefits if he refused to accept inappropriate employment. The 
states were also responsible for administering Unemployment Insurance. 
In as large a country as the United States, differences in per capita income among the 
states are great. Some have an income that is twice that of others. This makes a single 
comprehensive system such as the British system, based on uniformity, much more 
difficult, even on a minimum basis. Besides, the political structure comprises a federal 
system and the states tend to resist federal intervention and control. Some of the 
American social security programmes are the joint responsibility of the federal 
government and the states. Although the Federal Government has authority to provide 
grants to the states, to help them bear the costs of administration, it will face strong state 
resistance if it lays down conditions or standards for receipt of a grant. Bums argues that 
it is essential to seek a compromise between the desire for equal access to basic security 
and for similar treatments in similar circumstances and the framing of high centralized 
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and control by the federal government. If the setting up of the federal standard is too 
different from state interests or values, the state will not have to participate in the scheme. 
The states are primarily responsible for unemployment insurance. 'Me states are granted 
power to adopt any level of benefits they wished, to set any waiting period, and to fix the 
maximum period of benefit. 
Coverage 
The unemployment insurance provisions passed under the Social Security Act in 1935 
covered only certain classes of workers in certain occupations. Only about 80 per cent of 
all employed workers were covered by the federal-state programme of social insurance. 
The system covered all employees in private industry and commerce and Federal 
Government employees. But low-wage industries, agriculture and domestic service were 
exempted. Some casual labour, employees in some governmental and non-profit 
agencies, and employees in firms of fewer than four workers were also excluded. Only 
workers who had a sustained record of participation in the workforce but were out of 
work due to job retrenchments could establish their eligibility for aid (Piven and 
Cloward, 1972, p. 114). Most of the states did not include workers in employment except 
that covered by Federal law. But in most states, those excluded could be covered at the 
discretion of the employer. Based on the constitutional prohibition of Federal taxation of 
state governments and their local subdivisions, the Act did not cover state and local 
government employees. However, the states did provide some provision for them. The 
employees of the Federal Government came under the state systems but railroad workers 
had a different system. The coverage varied between the states and some were more 
wide-ranging than others. 
The self-employed were excluded from unemployment insurance altogether. This was 
due to the fact that the system was primarily for those who worked for wages and 
suffered from loss of wages due to unemployment, but also due to the difficulty of 
deciding when a self-employed person was unemployed. Sinfield (1976) has argued that 
the operation of unemployment insurance probably increased inequality rather than 
reducing it. 'Ibis is due to the fact that the needs of the lower-paid worker were quite 
persistently ignored and were opposed positively by many measures ( p. 16). 
The arrangement that different states have different schemes results in unequal access of 
all Americans to minimum security. Some people are denied any socially provided 
income, because they failed to fall in the specific 'categories' that had been recognised as 
'deserving' relief. These gaps and anomalies also refer to the different treatment of 
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people in very similar circumstances. In terms of the unemployment insurance 
programme, the differences in the amount and duration of benefits paid to workers with 
similar employment histories very greatly from one state to another. Secondly, the 
programme does not cover all workers exposed to risk. 
Eligibility for Benefits 
Despite the provisions of the 1935 Act, the states were free to determine eligibility for 
benefits and there were therefore great variations from one state to another. However, 
there were a number of general eligibility requirements: a person who qualified for 
benefits had to be unemployed, to be able and available for work and to be seeking such 
work. His/her unemployment must not have been voluntary and without good causes, 
the job must not have been lost due to misconduct or to a strike, lockout, or other labour 
dispute. He/she must not have rejected an offer of suitable employment, and must be 
making reasonable efforts to obtain suitable employment. In order to be eligible for 
benefit, the claimant had to prove that, for a required period called 'the base period', 
he/she had worked in covered employment, or that he/she had earned a minimum amount 
in that period, or both. All persons seeking unemployment insurance had to register for 
work at a public employment office. Disqualification usually applied for a specific 
number of weeks. In a few states it could result in the termination and reduction of 
benefit. 
Benefit Payments 
The 1935 Act did not prescribe any necessary standards of benefits, and there were great 
variations between states in benefit levels. The weekly benefit, the duration of benefit, 
benefits for dependents, and other matters were based on the states' decisions. In 
general, the worker received a benefit equal to approximately 50 per cent of his/her 
weekly wage, and benefits were wage-related with maximum and minimum benefits set 
by state law. In some states, the maximum was so low that benefits could not reach the 
50 per cent target. 39 states based benefit levels on the highest aggregate wages earned in 




In order to give a clearer discussion of the financial aspects of the 1935 Act, I divide my 
description into two Parts: 1. Segregated or pooled funds; 2. Subsidy plan versus tax 
offset. 
1. Segregated or Pooled Funds 
One distinct feature of the American unemployment insurance programme is that in most 
states it is financed completely by the sole contribution of employers for the entire costs 
or taxes of Federal law and the various state programmes. The amount of the payment of 
each employer is determined by the benefits his own employees have drawn. About four 
out of five wage-and salary-workers are covered by unemployment insurance but 
workers in two states pay contributions. Only nine states ever collected employee 
contributions out of eleven states which enacted such laws (Schottland, 1963, pp. 86-7). 
In his June the 8th message, Roosevelt required federal custody of the funds and also 
suggested financing social insurance through pay-roll contributions rather than general 
taxation for the sake of the cautious use of social insurance for control and counter- 
cyclical spending. 
As I have discussed before, there were two different types of state fund prior to the 
Social Security Act. One was a separate 'reserve account! for each individual employer in 
Wisconsin. Unemployed workers of such an employer could only get payment from this 
account. Ile other was a 'pooled plan! developed in Ohio in which all contributions were 
placed in a single state-wide 'pooled fund' and all benefits were paid out of it. The Ohio 
system was adopted in the Federal Act. 'Mere remained a highly technical problem: the 
Economic Security Committee could not entirely escape the issue of segregated versus 
pooled reserves for unemployment compensation when they tried to work out a 
recommendation, as it involved broad social considerations. On the side of segregated 
reserves was the concern for perfecting the capitalistic wage system by making 
employment stabilisation profitable to the employer, and the concept that an employer 
was responsible primarily for protecting only his own employees. On the side of pooling 
was the concern for guaranteeing maximum benefits to the worker, and the concept that 
social responsibility for the unemployed was as broad as the nation's economic system. 
There were basic contrasts between the two sides. One side spoke of 'unemployment 
insurance', the other was careful to speak of 'unemployment reserves'. Epstein reasoned 
that segregated reserves provided too little protection to workers and gained no popular 
support. Rubinow declared that the social purpose of unemployment insurance was to 
166 
relieve the distress of workers without charity and doles. Raushenbush and his 
colleagues argued that the purpose of Wisconsin law was (a) to encourage the stimulation 
of more regular employment as far as possible and (b) to make the payment of 
unemployment benefits to workers idle through industry's failure. These differences, 
each side recognised, involved fundamentally different views of how the economy 
worked. While the Wisconsin plan was individualism modified by social responsibility, 
as Raushenbush wrote, the Ohio plan implied, Epstein argued, that unemployment was 
inherent in the present social structure and both employers and workers were the victims 
of the system of production. He indicated that it was impossible to eliminate 
unemployment without changing the disorganised system. 
2. Subsidy Plan versus Tax Offset 
The average tax paid by employers for unemployment insurance benefits was about 1.7 
per cent, less than the amount set by Federal law which was 2.7 per cent. Many 
employers paid even substantially less than this average. This was due to one of the most 
controversial practices in the unemployment insurance programme, namely experience 
rating. The main idea behind this was that the tax paid by an employer should correspond 
with his benefit-payment experience over a period of time. The tax would be reduced if 
the employer had little or no unemployment. There were various plans for States to meet 
certain minimum Federal requirements for a rate reduction to be granted to an employer. 
In most states, a certain amount of the fund was required before a reduction was made; in 
some states, it was related to the benefits paid; in other states it referred to a percentage of 
payments in a specified period. These arrangements resulted in substantial reductions but 
also in variable rates to different employers. Minimum rates based on experience ratings 
ranged from zero to 1.2 per cent. Maximum rates on the most 'favourable schedules' 
ranged from 0.5 per centlo 2.6 per cent (Schottland, 1963, p. 88). 
Section Two The Different Influence on the Introduction of the 1935 Act 
As has been said in Section One in the first part of the chapter, the Democrats see 
themselves as 'the party of progress', advocating experimentation and social change, 
governmental regulation of the economy and large spending programmes for achieving 
welfare, security, and national prosperity. They favour a strong federal government 
which is able to introduce intervening policies and push state and local governments to 
implement them (Grant, 1986, p. 184). Since the Great Depression, there has been a 
growth of the Presidency; people expected the Presidents to use techniques such as 
changes in the tax structure, administration of the federal budget, credit controls, and 
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public works programmes, to maintain economic stability. The Democratic party has 
managed to gain support from a disparate and heterogeneous coalition of groups, and the 
New Deal programmes made the party responsible for the security and welfare of the 
poor, the unemployed, and the ordinary worker. 
During the Great Depression, political leaders were aware of the crisis engendered by 
economic distress. In order to recapture the allegiance of disaffected groups and win 
votes at election time, they would try to use the power and resources of government to 
intervene in the institutional arrangements and to expand relief programmes. If they did 
not do so, they would have had to lose office to rivals who were seen by the disaffected 
blocs of voters to come up with more effective measures. The initiation of a national 
public welfare system in the United States during the Great Depression can, in large 
measure, be understood in these terms (Piven and Cloward, 1972, pp. 40-1). It was the 
rising surge of political disorder that accompanied this economic catastrophe more than 
any other factor which led government to provide relief on an unprecedented scale. The 
passage of the Social Security Act on August 14,1935 was seen as effecting to these 
aims and unemployment insurance was, as we have sepn, one of three main proposals 
contained in it. 
The United States is usually described as a 'liberal democracy' in which thousands of 
different factions compete to influence the formal institutions of government in order to 
promote their own interests and objectives. Due to the heterogeneous ethnic and national 
background of its people, the interest differences between the regions of its territory and 
the complexity of its economy, America is a country which has rich social diversity and 
various pressure groups. 'Me constitutional system also encouraged the growth of the 
pressure groups. The decentralised and diffuse nature of American government provides 
the pressure groups with opportunities to exert their influence in the decision-making 
process. 'Iberefore the examination of this continuous process is of major concern in the 
study of American politics and an understanding of the role of pressure groups in the 
system 'is essential for a proper appreciation of policy making' (Grant, 1986, pp. 1,140, 
143-5). 
In part, the different roles played by different groups have already been presented in the 
earlier discussion of the debate which preceded the 1935 Act. Various groups and 
representatives of various interests were involved in the enactment of the legislation. 
Tleir respective influences varied according to how effectively they managed to defend 
their interests, and how willing they were to bow to political compromise. While some 
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saw doctrine as being of paramount importance, others were willing to pursue a more 
pragmatic line. 
Administrators 
Bureaucrats have a considerable amount of political power in the policy-making process. 
They cannot be thought of merely as neutral administrators of politics formulated by 
politicians, rather they possess great discretionary authority on how laws will be 
enforced, and whether policies should be suggested to Cabinet Secretaries and the 
President for consideration. Their knowledge, experience and special skills make their 
impact on the political leaders in many areas important (Grant, 1986, pp. 104-5,145). 
Neustad (1964) argued that although a President has plenty of constitutional authority, 
yet, '(t)he essence of a President's persuasive task is to convince such bureaucrats, 
Congressmen, etc. that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for 
their own sake and on their own authority' (p. 34). 
The conservative features of the 1935 Social Security Act reflect the considerable 
influence of the Wisconsin anti-redistributional approach and this influence effected the 
administration of the Act when it became law. The representatives of this approach, like 
Witte, played crucial roles in drafting the legislation. Appointed as Executive Director of 
the Committee on Economic Security with Perkins as its Chairman, and Secretary to the 
Technical Board, the main advisory council, and the Cabinet Committee itself, Witte 
formally selected questions to be studied, prepared the agenda, and drafted the leading 
reports. In this way, he was able to transmit decisions upward from the staff, through the 
Technical Board and advisory groups, and finally to the Cabinet Committee. Witte's 
competence t6 evaluate alternatives with care and to synthesise ideas into practicable 
proposals was impressive and cabinet committee members expressed confidence in his 
judgment. This, in turn, helped to achieve a consensus on key issues. 
In October 1934, Epstein gave his advice to the Economic Security Committee, arguing 
for the need to subsidise social insurance from the general treasury in order to redistribute 
wealth and guarantee uniformly high standards. With the lobbying of his American 
Association for Social Security, twenty-four of the most prominent advocates of 
unemployment insurance urged the Senate Finance Committee to adopt some 'subsidy' 
arrangement. After November 9,1934, there was a dispute between those who preferred 
the subsidy plan and those who advocated tax offset. The promoters of subsidy plans 
said that stronger national control would result in higher benefit standards. Under 
experience rating, the individual employers would try to hold down benefit provisions. 
169 
On this side there were staff members Stewart and Mrs. Armstrong who had favoured a 
straight national plan. They won the support of the advisory council. On the opposing 
side, there was Witte supported by the most important insiders-Altmeyer, Eliot, and, by 
Hansen' sub-committee. 
Witte argued that the tax offset device was politically safest. He assured members of 
Congress and the public that the tax offset plan would equalize unemployment 
compensation costs but still allow flexibility and efficiency of administration. The tax 
offset provisions ensured the necessary minimum standards and guaranteed that every 
dollar of contribution would actually go towards unemployment compensation. He also 
declared that the subsidy plan was not as different from the tax offset plan as its 
supporters thought, since the plan contemplated no contributions from the general 
treasury. 
Sensing opposition from Congress, the Cabinet Committee rejected Stewart's favoured 
programme. At the behest of Miss Perkins and Witte, on January 17,1935 the 
Committee produced its final form of the Bill for Roosevelt. In relation to unemployment 
compensation, it suggested that 1 Per cent of pay-roll taxes be pooled, but approved 
either segregation or pooling of reserve funds. It favoured the tax offset type of law 
which allowed considerable State autonomy, except for crucial requirements that all 
money credited against the offset tax go for unemployment compensation and that States 
require companies to have relatively high reserves before allowing them to reduce 
contributions. Witte's attempt to restore company reserves as a 'necessary' amendment in 
the report to the President fitted Roosevelt's own strong concern that unemployment 
compensation could provide an incentive for stabilization. -He was reluctant 
to place 
financial responsibility for social insurance on the general public through subsidies from 
the general treasury. Witte and his followers had won Roosevelt's backing for their more 
cautious unemployment compensation programme under a tax offset law. 
Witte played the same role in educating and convincing congressmen and senators, and 
this was probably his most crucial contribution to social security (Schlabach, 1969, 
p. 103). Informally it was the Labor Department which was trusted to give advice to the 
Cabinet Committee members and Witte was taken into the confidence of the Labor 
Department insiders. Wilbur Cohen, Witte's former student and research assistant, 
observed that a decision was 'ninety-eight per cent won' if Perkins, Altmeyer, and Witte 
agreed upon it. 69 This was a source of annoyance to other experts who had strong policy 
69. Frances Perkins to Schlabach, Oct. 26,1964; "Memorandum from the Secretary to Mr. 
Altmeyer, " July 20,1934, box 154, Perkins files; memorandum, C. E. Wyzanski, Jr., to Altmeyer, 
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opinions and sought a voice in policy-making (Cates, 1983, p. 25). From February 1935, 
Witte attended all executive sessions of the Congressional Committee and the 
Congressional Hearings held for the Social Security Bill. He explained the Bill's logic, 
clarified its details, and anticipated objections and proposals for amendment at the joint 
House-Senate conferences. 
The relatively modest social security proposals, which was lack of national government 
control and any redistribution of wealth through subsidies from the general treasury, 
were opposed by many groups. Organised labour approved financing unemployment 
insurance by any form of pay-roll tax. The National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM) simply rejected the idea that industry should have to pay taxes for the social 
security of its employees. Yet on April 19,1935, the House of Representatives passed 
the rewritten Social Security Bill by a massive vote 371 to 33 in favour, Roosevelt's 
programme substantially kept intact. Witte continued his persuasion at every opportunity 
as he became aware of increased opposition from business interests and southern 
senators and feared that conservatives and reactionaries would either block the entire bill, 
or emasculate it and pass only the old-age assistance provisions. He repeatedly 
intervened in Congress, insisting that the bill's congressional managers keep it intact and 
calling publicly for its passage. Senator La Follette successfully led the Senate Committee 
attempt to restore individual reserves and stabilisation credit provisions and the Senate 
retained these provisions in its Bill as passed on June 19,1935. 
Witte himself was influenced by his former teacher, John Commons, who was also a 
Wisconsin labour economist, providing the intellectual and philosophical foundations for 
the conservative Wisconsin model of social insurance. However, he did not pursue 
doctrinal purity by adopting a Commons-style approach which attempted to make social 
responsibility profitable to capitalism's managers, or a more radical effort to achieve a 
massive redistribution of wealth. Rather, he and his followers made the most of their 
decisions with constitutional, political, fiscal and other technical considerations, and 
made the programme politically acceptable. Instead of claiming superiority for either 
pooled or segregated funds, he favoured the co-existence of two systems, tried to 
conciliate the various groups and factions and to encourage experimentation and 
disapproved of the schisms among advocates of unemployment insurance. His 
pragmatism led him to insist on the Wagner-Lewis Bill which resembled a federal-state 
system. 
June 30,1934, box 56, CES files; interview with Wilbur Cohen, July 28,1964, Washington, 
D. C. Quoted from Schlabach, 1969, p. 102. 
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The Labour Movement 
The involvement of American labour organisations in political activities in the United 
States is understood in terms of the pattern of pressure group politics rather than party 
politics. This was consistent with the basic structure of the American political system and 
its ideology and traditions. From the 1880s onwards, the political tactics of the American 
workers were supplementary to rather tfian in competition with, the political parties. 
Although from the beginning, the organised labour understood that many problems 
facing them could only be answered by government as only the government could 
determine the well-being of the working population, they recognised the need to 
influence government decisions. The leaders of organised labour made constant and 
vigorous efforts to affect legislation in the state legislatures and in Congress. 
As opposed to their European voters, most American workers were less class-conscious. 
The traditional exhibition of no clear-cut ideological differences among American parties 
has reflected the fact that there is a broad national consensus and lack of strong class 
divisions in the United States. Workmen believed in their ability to become members of 
the middle-class and were therefore reluctant to show much interest in the labour 
movement. In addition, the heterogeneity of wage-earners' characteristics, the free 
interference of employers in labour organisation, the states' acceptance of restrictions on 
the labour movement and the government's legislation which fostered the popular 
mistrust of the labour movement as a collectivist force -- all inhibited the development of 
the American labour movement. 
However, between 1933 and the start of World War II, the growth of the American 
labour movement was spectacular and the 1930s was a significant decade for the 
American labour movement. This was due both to government encouragement and to a 
modest economic recovery from the worst years of the depression. The attitude of the 
Government to the labour movement changed from toleration to positive encouragement 
and the Great Depression had a considerable impact on the American trade-union 
movement and eventually caused fundamental changes in its structure. The labour 
movement started to become a vital and powerful force on the American scene. 
Compared with the crucial role of the administrators, social workers and intellectuals in 
determining the very features of the unemployment insurance provisions in the 1935 Act, 
the influence of the labour movement was relatively negligible. Although at a crucial 
time, labour spokesmen subsequently made it clear to Senators that they wanted the 
administration's bill passed, William Green of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) 
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lobbied their preference for the subsidy system and compulsory pooling, and their belief 
in the futility of state experimentation. There has not been the close historical and 
institutional links between the Democratic Party and the trade union movement that one 
sees in Britain between the Labour Party and organised labour (Grant, 1986, p. 155). 
Their lack of enthusiasm for participating in discussions, their traditional role as a 
pressure group rather than an independent political party and the disadvantages they 
confronted stemmed from popular mistrust of unions and restrictive state laws. All these 
factors combined to prevent organized labour from becoming an influential group in the 
formulation of legislation which usually effected its interests. 
Organised labour, in general, believed that the role of government should be limited. This 
attitude partly reflected philosophy and was partly based on their own experiences of 
being treated in an unfriendly way by society. Even unemployment insurance was seen to 
exemplify a strategy of a government which sought to enslave the wage-earner. The 
political tactics of the labour unions were related to their presumption that the worker was 
a free citizen rather than a member of a special class and to their general belief in the 
potential of the American economy. For American labour leaders and their followers, the 
next year would always be better than the present one and the remedy for any discontent 
could always be forced within the framework of American political life. Their attitude 
was related to the fact that, to a large extent, the continuous expanding economy and 
wealth of the country enhanced the social mobility caused by people's seeking a better 
life and standard of living for themselves and their families. 
The Business Circle 
According to the 'elitist' explanation of the American political system, the American 
system has in practice a much greater concentration of power, although it is based on the 
theory of decentralization of authority. As far as the important issues are concerned, only 
a closely knit group of economically powerful leaders can exert an effective control over 
policy making (Grant, 1986, p. 142). During the debate concerning segregated reserves 
or pooled funds for unemployment compensation, the employers' demand to fit an 
unemployment insurance system to their own needs had considerable impact when the 
social security bill was discussed and the final outcome contained the considerations of 
the President and people such as Witte with the interests of businessmen. Most 
businessmen preferred to contribute only to their own firm's fund. A few others, who 
had already established voluntary unemployment benefit plans, had an interest in 
individual reserves. 
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During the formulation of the programme, Roosevelt and Witte, Director of COES, were 
careful to consult the business leaders who made up the Commerce Department's 
Business Advisory Council. Ile Committee's failure to recommend a national uniform 
system for unemployment insurance was evidence of the fearfulness of the Roosevelt 
administration in the face of the opposition of employers. Witte and his followers 
allowed segregated unemployment reserve funds, as, firstly, it was employers' almost 
unanimous preference; secondly, it suited Roosevelt's principles of social insurance 
which were to provide an incentive for employers to stabilise employment, and not lead 
to deficit financing and subsidies from the general treasury. The aims of the reformers to 
introduce unemployment insurance were not just to provide relief for the unemployed but 
also to encourage businessmen to improve economic efficiency. 
The social security bill went through several important changes in Congress in order to 
win support from conservative and business circles. Congress made Tittle 1, which 
provided a 50 per cent subsidy for state pensions to the elderly poor, more acceptable to 
conservatives by removing essential federal standards. Congress made the 
unemployment compensation titles more conducive to the individual employer reserves 
even than the original bill, which most of the dissenters, such as the supporters of the 
Ohio plan, disliked. The final bill even omitted the requirement that 1 per cent of the pay- 
roll (one-third of the tax offset contribution) be pooled. 
Part Three Conclusion: 
The relatively late introduction of social security legislation for the unemployed in 
America was due to the individualistic tradition, the territorial diversity of the country and 
the lack of political pressure from organized labour and in particular from the 
unemployed. Although its relatively late industrialization started to cause some problems 
for society at the end of the last century, their negative effects were not apparent. People 
still believed in the opportunities to improve their living standards. Because poverty was 
normally regarded as the result of individual faults, local and private relief rather than 
state or federal support were encouraged. From the first decade of the century, social 
insurance was advocated by the small groups of reformers, as they realized that the 
personal factor was only a small part of the problem of unemployment and that social 
welfare should provide minimum security for people. When social reformers campaigned 
for positive state action to deal with the social problems in the 1920s, the compensation 
laws adopted in most states of the country were financially inadequate and unstable. 
Employment stabilisation through the efforts of the individual employers was regarded as 
a relevant means of Preventing unemployment at that time. The advocates of 
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unemployment insurance still believed that it should be voluntary based in order to avoid 
too much government intervention. 
Although both the Democratic and Republican parties have a tendency to adapt to 
changing situations and accommodate various orientations which reduce the ideological 
differences between them, the former is more likely to seek social change, and support 
government interference and a strong role of presidency in the country's economy and 
welfare programmes. Ile Republican Party under Hoover maintained a different attitude 
from the Roosevelt administration of the Democratic Party in dealing with the country's 
economic problems during the Great Depression. Based on his belief in laissezfaire 
policy, Hoover introduced relief programmes for the people in need which relied on local 
charity efforts and assistance programmes for businesses to urge their initiative in 
economic recovery. 
After the Democratic Party won power, the new President adopted a series of steps, in 
the name of the New Deal, to achieve his political goal and restore the economic 
confidence of society. The various methods the Roosevelt's administration adopted to 
deal with deteriorating living standards revealed the influence of conventional ideas 
before the Great Depression. 'Mis may also be regarded as one of the reasons for the late 
introduction of federal legislation. A voluntary insurance scheme was still commonly 
supported in 1933. However, economic depression did not just bring about distress for 
those who lost theirjobs and their dependents; it also provided an opportunity for putting 
unemployment relief measures onto the agenda. Aware of changing social attitudes to the 
problem and the potential danger of political disorder, Roosevelt committed himself to 
giving security to people during the election campaign and suggested introducing social 
insurance to protect the individuals. 
During the discussion of formulating unemployment insurance in America, participants 
were basically divided into two groups: the Wisconsin and Ohio. While the former 
focused on prevention of unemployment by pursuing individual employers to stabilise 
job security and alleviate the economic crisis, (therefore, redistribution should have been 
insignificant, ) the latter reflected the influence of the European model which argued for 
the redistribution of income with three-parts contributions and the Federal government's 
intervention. The Ohio group maintained that the individually reserved funds of the 
Wisconsin model would not be able to provide adequate benefits for the people in need. 
Social insurance was accepted as a necessary measure but to find a middle way between 
these two different approaches was not an easy task for people who were responsible for 
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setting up proposals of the programme, as businessmen preferred the Wisconsin plan 
while social workers and reformers gave their support to the Ohio plan. Witte and his 
colleagues from the Committee on Economic Security were aware of the danger of 
gaining support from one group and opposition from the other. In order to secure the 
approval of different groups, businessmen, labour, social reformers, insurance experts 
and Congress, for their idea, it was crucial for them to make some compromises. 
However, the conservative Act reflected the anti-redistributional style of the Wisconsin 
plan, as one criticism of pressure group politics in America argues that the diffuseness of 
the formal structure of government and the checks and balances in the system give those 
groups, who wish to prevent change, some opportunities to obstruct the social reform 
desired by the majority of the nation (Grant, 1986, p. 158). 
During the legislative debate on the social security programme, the President and some 
administrators, like Witte and Miss Perkins, played decisive roles leading to the passing 
of the Bill. Witte's capacity to perceive the possibility of agreements between the 
different approaches to unemployment insurance and the influence of his position as 
director of the COES were noticeable. They based the proposal on constitutional, 
technical and political rather than doctrinal considerations. 
The detailed character of the final programme reflected a distinctive political system in 
America in which state autonomy was a key feature. Thus, federal-state cooperation was 
an important precondition for the operation of policy. In the 1935 Act the state was 
granted freedom. In its final form, the only condition contained in the bill, which was 1 
percent pay roll tax as the employer's contribution to the state pooled funds, was 
excluded; states were allowed to fix different tax rates for the individual employers. This 
was connected to the pragmatic thinking of Witte for the sake of the passage of their Bill, 
as support from the different states was crucial and the variety of their situations could 
not be ignored. This arrangement was also compatible with Roosevelt's idea of the state- 
federal cooperation for the unemployment compensation programme. The political 
structure of America made it impossible to lay down uniform requirements and standards 
in terms of unemployment benefits. The scheme provided economic incentives, namely 
experience-rating, for individual employers to maintain full employment and to take 
responsibility for their employees, as the Wisconsin model preferred. Unemployment 
benefits which reflected the individual needs of the employers were a response to the 
pressure from the business group. The President and others involved in the formulation 
process of the programme made predictions of the possible reactions the employers might 
have to the directions they were taking. 
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Pressure groups are different from political parties in that, as organised forces, they 
attempt to influence government policy rather than, as institutions, control the 
government and enter candidates in elections for office. In a democratic system, the 
importance of pressure groups is connected with the two-way process of political 
communication between the ordinary American citizens and the decision makers; they can 
convey demands, ideas and reactions of the former to the latter. Pressure groups such as 
business executives, trade union leaders, farmers, and professional bodies all have a 
particularly significant impact on decisions in the domestic field. As 'interest groups', 
they have important economic power whose primary goal is to protect, defend, and 
promote the interests of their own members rather than securing the interests of society as 
a whole. 
However, compared to the crucial function of the President, administrators and some 
economists, the pressure groups did not have a remarkable impact on the outcome of the 
political debate over the unemployment benefits legislation. Organised labour in America 
focused on economic gain rather than independent political action. Unlike its British and 
Swedish counterparts, it did not have close link with the Democratic Party, the party of 
'people'. It lacked systematic philosophy and class consciousness, and rejected socialism 
as the means of achieving its goals. The labour movement was therefore different from 
the notion of a 'pressure group' referring to all those organisations which seek to 
promote political objectives; distinguished from the many social groups, their objects 
have political content (ibid., p. 141). 
Since the beginning of the century, the organisation of the big businessmen, the NCF, 
had been conscious of the social problem and sought to build a harmonious relationship 
between labour and employer, by promoting the sense of social responsibility of 
employers and setting up some welfare works and uniform state legislations. It was 
concerned with the possible cooperation between organised labour and socialism. The 
force of the labour movement was weakened. As far as the enactment of the 1935 
legislation is concerned, organised labour did not exert much influence and did not 
participate in the decision-making process, although the introduction of unemployment 
insurance clearly affected their interests. The Ohio group which was seeking to provide 
sound payments for the unemployed by its pro-redistributional programme failed to get 
sufficient support from organised labour. In the final stage of the process, some of the 
business group were dissatisfied with the programme; however, the Social Security Bill 
passed through Congress without any changes. 
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Chapter Six 
Comparative Analysis of the Original Unemployment 
Insurance Scheme of Britain, Sweden and the United States 
In this chapter, I undertake a comparative analysis of decision making process in the 
initial unemployment insurance schemes of Britain, Sweden and the United States. The 
discussion consists of four parts. Part One provides a brief discussion of the advantages 
of social insurance in contrast to social assistance, while Part Two attempts to give an 
explanation of the similarities and differences between unemployment insurance schemes 
in the three countries under investigation when they were established. Part Three aims to 
explore and identify the reasons for the differences described in the previous part; In Part 
Four, a conclusion is put forward. 
Part One The Basic Principle of Social Insurance in 
Unemployment Compensation 
In this part, I discuss some basic principles of social insurance systems and their 
advantages in comparison with the other welfare systems. 
The basic principles of social insurance provide grounds for allocating benefits to 
individuals or groups and rules for determining how the benefits are to be allocated. They 
are different from the reasons and motives for introducing the benefits which are derived 
from complex interactions of socio-psychological and economic and political factors and 
are often only subsequently developed in the process of policy formation (Bolderson and 
Mabbett, 1991, p. 29). 
Compared with social assistance, the principles of social insurance incorporate a strong 
link between eligibility and participation in the labour market. Benefits correspond to 
contributions and thus to work and employment (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Eligibility is 
therefore not triggered by the mere presence of a social right, it is rather earned through 
contributions. As far as unemployment insurance is concerned, the unemployed are 
eligible to claim benefits, provided that they have worked for a substantial period, and are 
capable of and available for work. Payment to the claimant prevents him from becoming 
destituted and when he draws unemployment compensation, the worker can maintain his 
self-respect (Haber and Murray, 1966, pp. 28-9). Recipients are entitled to payments 
from funds to which they have contributed during their working lives as respectable 
workers and wage earners. Hence, the industrial working class is awarded a dignified or 
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upgraded social status (Olsson, 1990, p. 42). Unemployment insurance does not attribute 
fault or blame. 
In social insurance, eligibility is determined on the basis of the categorical assessment of 
need. In his conclusion to his discussion of justifications for making social security 
payments in response to the recognised needs, Barry (1990) argues that this is based on 
the idea that 'those who suffer through no fault of their own have a valid claim against 
the more fortunate' (p. 101). Payments for recognised risks are based on strong 
entitlements and resource allocation is made by political, bureaucratic and professional 
processes, while transaction are realised through impartial administrative provisions 
rather than through personal relationships (Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991, p. 24). 
Contributory insurance schemes have their roots in bilateral market exchanges. 11ey are 
restricted to those who are considered to be in need by virtue of a recognised contingency 
and their contributions, and entitlement therefore is related to the rewards of the market 
system. The importance of this criterion in social insurance is that, while providing 
security for those whose income is inadequate, it can maintain incentives for work (ibid., 
p. 174). 
The instruments of social insurance provide the modem welfare state with a mechanism 
for treating its members equally. The principle governing the provision of benefits is 
based on the concept of equal protection against risks, the rules determine entitlement to 
benefit being based on a category of recognised risk. It ensures the state's intervention in 
dealing with the problems of risk and misfortune and permits a fair redistribution of 
income (Baldwin, 1990, p. 2). Social insurance involves a pooling of risks rather than 
resources; it involves less of a redistribution of wealth than a reapportionment of the 
costs of risk and misfortune. Redistribution is primarily horizontal rather than vertical 
and involves transfers between risk categories (from healthy to sick, employed to 
unemployed, young to old and so on) rather than between classes or income strata (from 
middle class and working class, rich to poor etc. ) 
Although social insurance is based on the principle of horizontal redistribution, it 
invariably involves vertical redistribution as well. In contrast to Persson, who argues that 
the redistribution is 'between risk-groups, types of households, and over the life-cycle of 
households' (Persson, 1986, p. 13), Esping-Andersen and Korpi (1987) assert that the 
development of social welfare state has been concerned with redistribution between 
classes in society, responding in particular to the interests of the working class. Through 
the pooling of risks in the community, the individuals no longer bear the burden of 
uncertainty alone but rather as equal members of a larger group or even possibly of 
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society as a whole. Insecurity and the means of moderating its effects are not decided on 
a private bases but in accordance with standards of equity accepted by society as a whole. 
Part Two The Similarities and Differences between 
Unemployment Insurance Schemes in Britain, Sweden and the 
United States 
In this part, I give a brief description of the different features of the unemployment 
insurance systems in the three countries under review and examine the significances of 
the different experiences of the three countries in their efforts to deal with the problem of 
unemployment by enacting social insurance legislation. 
In his identification of three highly diverse regime-types, Esping-Andersen (1990) 
claims that the first welfare-state regime-type, the 'liberal' welfare state, is characterised 
by means-tested assistance, limited universal transfers and modest social insurance 
schemes. Rights are not so much attached to work performance as to demonstrable 
needs. Yet, entitlement rules are strict, benefits are typically meagre and associated with 
social stigma, in order to maintain the dominance of the market. Private welfare schemes 
are frequently subsidised by the state. The 'liberal' model shows a strong influence of 
traditional, liberal, work-ethic ideology which was precisely reflected in the nineteenth- 
century poor laws in many countries. 
The second regime-type is the conservative and strongly 'corporatist' welfare state. In 
this type, the state replaces the market as a provider of welfare, hence, private insurance 
and occupational fringe benefits play a marginal role. However, because the preservation 
of status differences is of central importance in this model, rights are connected to class 
and status, and the extent of redistribution level is low. 
The third regime-type is labeled 'social democratic', since dominant social democratic 
force are frequently associated with social reform in this model. Unlike the other regime- 
clusters which preserve the dualism between the state and the market, 70 different strata of 
70. Among nations which adopt either a social-assistance or a universalistic Beveridge-type system, there 
are two alternative models with regard to the political choice of whether the market or the state is 
supposed to provide adequacy. Beveridge predicted the development of private insurance system as a 
supplement to the basic subsistence benefit. However he started with the presumption that the vast 
majority of the population regarded modest, egalitarian benefits as adequate. However, once the prosperity 
of working class is growing and the new middle class is rising, they will inevitably seek for private 
insurance as a supplement to modest social insurance benefits. As a result, there is a dualism as in the 
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society in this model are incorporated into one universal insurance system. Benefits are 
related to normal earnings, which means that benefits levels are fixed in accordance with 
the requirements of the middle classes. A peculiar feature of social democratic regimes, 
compared with the other two regime-types, is their commitment to full-employment as an 
integral part of the welfare-state, based on the belief that the combination of work and 
welfare is the best way to maintain solidaristic, universalistic welfare programmes 
without causing serious social and financial problems (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 28). 
Based on Esping-Andersens description of the three welfare state models, the United 
States and Sweden can be regarded as representatives of the first and third respectively, 
while Britain is characterised as a mixture of the two (Ginsburg, 1992, p. 23), or, 
alternatively, as 'liberal' but in less extreme ways than the United States. The 
classification is helpful for our analysis of the distinctive features of the welfare 
programmes in different countries. At the same time, however, it is worth mentioning 
that each of the three models identified by Esping-Andersen may offer a better account of 
the subsequent development of social security than of its original establishment. If so, an 
analysis of the three types of welfare state will be less appropriate for an understanding 
of a single programme, such as unemployment insurance, in its early stages. Secondly, 
although it is relevant to focus on the differences contained in the three welfare state 
regimes, this does not imply that there are no similarities between them. Esping- 
Andersen himself argues that the three regime-types may share some characteristics. For 
example, Scandinavian social democracy has embraced important aspects of liberal 
regimes, and the liberal American welfare state had some social democratic characteristics 
in its early, New Deal phase. However, his classification of the distinctive features of the 
three types is largely based on the 'quality of social rights, social stratification, and the 
relationship between state, market, and the family', rather than on 'scales of more or less 
or, indeed, of better or worse' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 29). 
Therefore, instead of analysing the diversity of the three welfare state regimes in general 
terms, I will pay attention first to the individual unemployment insurance programmes in 
the three chosen countries, and, in particular, examine how they were initially dealt with 
by policy makers in these countries and what were the similar and dissimilar features of 
the decision making process in each case. Redistributive decisions in unemployment 
insurance of Britain, Sweden and the United States were taken in different historical and 
social-assistance state: 'the poor rely on the state, and the remainder on the market. ' (Esping-Andersen, 
1990, p. 25). In Britain and most of the Anglo-Saxon world, there has been an emergence of dualism in 
which the state furnishes essentially modest levels of benefit and the market is allowed to satisfy middle- 
class aspirations for superior welfare. 
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national circumstances. Complex interactions between groups in society, due to the 
varying patterns of income, different risk profiles and divergent demographic trends, the 
different attitudes of decision makers in the three countries influenced by their different 
ideologies, and the divergent basis of class supports for the governments, were reflected 
in the unemployment insurance schemes of each of those different countries in various 
ways. 
During the policy making process, politicians take into consideration a range of policy 
choices. These alternatives determine what benefits are to be offered to whom, how these 
benefits are to be delivered, and how they are to be financed (see Chapter One). Gilbert 
and Specht (1974) express the four major dimensions of choice in this framework in the 
form of the following questions: 
1. What are the bases of social allocations? This refers to the choice 
among the various principles upon which social provisions are made 
accessible to people and groups in society. 
2. What are the types of social provisions to be allocated? This refers 
to the forms in which benefits are delivered. 
3. What are the strategies for the delivery of these provisions? This 
refers to the alternative organizational arrangements among 
distributors and consumers of social welfare benefits in the context 
of local community systems. 
4. What are the methods of financing these provisions? This involves 
the various sources through which social provision flow, usually in 
the form of cash, and the conditions placed upon this movement up 
to the point of distribution. Some of the major alternatives in 
financing social welfare policies concern whether the funding source 
is public, private, or mixed; the level of government utilized, and 
types of tax levied for public financing (pp. 28,30-32). 
The provision of benefits can be categorised into three main approaches. The first is the 
payment of benefits as a right, without a means test, to people in defined categories when 
they encounter specified contingencies. The benefits may be financed from general 
revenues, special taxes, contributions by employers, or by workers or by a combination 
of these in varying proportion. The second which uses a means test and varies the 
benefits according to individual circumstances, is designed to provide only for the 
subsistence of the poor. The system is non-contributory and the funds required are 
provided from the ordinary public revenues. The third is to provide benefits to all 
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members of the community which can be financed from ordinary public revenues or 
special taxes (Richardson, 1980, pp. 40-41). 
According to the contributory principle, benefits should be provided as far as practicable 
from revenues to which the beneficiary contributes a substantial amount, either by special 
taxes or by social insurance contributions. 'Mere are two types of contribution under this 
principle, one is public and another is private. Usually, public types are compulsory and 
clearly constitute a form of tax. They involve a pooling of risks, with contributions and 
benefits being calculated for subscribers collectively and usually on a pay-as-you-go 
basis. These social security taxes 'are imposed on the "benefit" principle' and 'should be 
related to the whole tax system to ensure that taxation is distributed equitably among the 
different sections of the population. This will assist in determining the proportions in 
which the cost should be borne by individuals in the beneficiary classes, by employers 
and business corporations, and from general revenue' (ibid., p. 46). The argument for 
this is that it can provide greater protection, resources will be transferred from the richer 
to the poorer sections of the community and benefits can be increased to reflect higher 
standards of living, and escape inflationary effects. But public provision gives rise to the 
problems of higher taxation and a poor return for higher earners (Adler, Lecture Notes, 
1989). 
By contrast, 'private provision' is usually voluntary, with contributions and benefits 
being calculated for each individual subscriber and the funds are usually invested. One 
advantage over public provision is that taxation can be kept down, and subscriber can 
select schemes to suit his or her preferences and can reap dividends if the funds are 
invested well. However, private provision is less redistributive, provides poor protection 
for poor risks. On the other hand, there are problems with inflation proofing and in 
providing increases to reflect higher standards of living. 
In the context of the non-contributory principle, public assistance is the main means of 
dealing with people's problems. It is the successor of the old 'Poor Law' system, in that 
payments are made only to the poor on evidence of severe need and from ordinary public 
revenues. Public assistance is normally required when people become the victims of 
society, so that they and their dependents can manage to subsist. In any community, 
public assistance is an inevitable and permanent feature of any system of social security. 
There will always be some people whose circumstances are such that at times they will be 
in need of assistance, and no individual provision or collective system of social insurance 
will be comprehensive and flexible enough to meet all the uncertainties and contingencies 
that life involves. These uncertainties and contingencies can be met only for special 
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circumstances. Although the non-contributory principle has merits, it encourages people 
to depend upon public assistance which can engender stigma and an administrative 
burden due to the costs of means-testing. Thus, it is often reserved for a residue or 
minority of people and regarded as a last resort. 
In Britain, the 1911 unemployment insurance system was financed by contributions from 
employers, employees and the state, contributions and benefits were both flat rate. The 
tripartite contributions took into account the experience of the pension scheme introduced 
three years previously which indicated that a comprehensive non-contributory scheme 
(financed only by general taxation) was impractical. The level of flat-rate benefits was set 
low, at a minimum level, in order to maintain work incentive and not discourage 
voluntary provisions. 
The Americans adopted experience (merit) rating system for their 1935 unemployment 
insurance scheme, i. e. the tax an employer was required to pay was related to his 
unemployment benefit payments. Only employers could make contributions to the 
scheme. Payments of taxes by employers varied in the different states in order to reflect 
local circumstances. Unemployment insurance benefits were earnings-related, paid as a 
percentage of the wages which the unemployed had earned. In order to qualify for 
benefit, the unemployed must have had certain amount of earnings and period of 
employment. The states which established financially sound unemployment insurance 
allowed their employers to gain the rights of tax off-set from the Federal government. 
The American style of contributions by the employer alone indicated that the employer 
was expected to compensate employees who lost their jobs and therefore to bear the 
responsibility for their employment. 
In Sweden, voluntary unemployment insurance funds (UI funds) were the main means 
of unemployment compensation. They were organised by the unions and dependent upon 
the contributions from employees and employers as well as state grants which could be 
applied for, provided the fund was approved by the state. Employers' contributions were 
paid as a percentage of the total payroll. Government subsidies varied considerably 
between the UI funds, especially according to the rate of unemployment. The LO and 
SDP accepted the idea of eamings-related benefits preferred by the Liberals. Although 
the funds were formally associated with labour unions, the government decided the most 
important regulations of the funds, such as the rules regarding the benefit levels. In order 
to get state support, the funds had to follow stringent rules. As a result, most of the 
societies chose to stay outside the state-supported system in the 1930s. For new entrants 
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in labour market, who were not covered by the UI funds, the government operated cash 
benefit assistance, a secondary compensation system. 
In the United States, the Wisconsin and Ohio schools represented two different ways of 
addressing the redistributive role of social insurance and the financing of unemployment 
insurance. The Wisconsin plan, which reflected the individualistic tradition in American 
society, laid a stress on the prevention of unemployment rather than the amelioration of 
its effects. It assumed that individual employers had the capability to stabilise 
employment. In order to maintain their incentive to regulate employment, individual 
employers were to bear the financial responsibility for unemployment compensation. 'Me 
unsuccessful experience of the British unemployment insurance scheme in the 1930s 
strengthened the belief of the Wisconsin reformers that European approaches to 
unemployment were unsuitable across the Atlantic. Ile problems of the British system in 
the 1930s were caused by higher benefits and extended coverage after a series of 
revisions in the 1920's. 71 In contrast to the Wisconsin school, the Ohio school argued 
for the British type of unemployment insurance which included contributions from 
employees and stressed the need for adequate levels of financial support for the 
unemployed. Although preferred by intellectuals, social workers, clergymen and 
reformers, the Ohio plan, however, failed to get the support of organised labour. The 
final form of the Bill produced by the Committee on Economic Security, which was set 
up by the President in 1934, supported the tax offset. 
The contributory principle contained in unemployment insurance schemes implies that 
benefits were strongly based on the eligibility the recipients could themselves eam. The 
unemployed must have worked and built up a record of contributions in order to be 
71. The original British unemployment insurance act was limited in its coverage and benefits because of 
its experimental nature. Thc duration of modest weekly benfits was limited to a maximum of 15 weeks 
in a 12-month period and was further limited to one week of benefits for each five weeks contributions. 
In 1920, the British government made amendments to the original Act by extending its coverage and 
increasing benefits. All workers between age 16 and 65, except those in agriculture, domestic servics, 
civil servants, railway and public utility employees, and while-collar workers earning over 9250 a year, 
were brought into the programme. Benefits of 15s. for men and 12s. for women were introduced. Yet, 
almost soon after the 1920 act took into effect unemployment began to increase. During the next 19 
years, unemployment rate was 12.7 percent on average and rose to 21.1 percent in 1931. 
As local government was unable to finance local relief which was used as an alternative programme to 
unemployment insurance for the large numbers of unemployed, conditions for unemployment insurance 
benefits were relaxed and the duration of benefits was extended. Nearly all workers under contract of 
employment who were carning modest wages were then covered by the scheme. As the result, spending 
on the scheme was increased and became an important component of government expenditure. 
Unemployment insurance was under a great financial pressure and levels of benefit became inadequate by 
1931 (Haber and Murray, 1966; Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991. Also see later). 
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entitled to the state benefit. This arrangement reflected a mixture of the collectivist and 
individualist thinking: first, the state accepted responsibility for protecting anyone who 
was qualified for insurance benefits and treated everyone with that contingency equally. 
Second, individuals' rights for the benefits were related to their previous employment 
and contributions received. In this sense, they could be regarded as independent. State 
intervention became necessary only when the causes of problems were not the 
individuals' faults and were beyond their personal control. 72 
Flat-rate benefits which are based on attempts to treat all beneficiaries equally are rather 
more redistributive than earnings-related benefits (Adler, Lecture Notes, 1989). Yet, flat- 
rate benefits are usually related to the standards of income of unskilled and other low 
income groups and do no more than meet basic or subsistence needs. They therefore 
encourage dependence on private or occupational provision. By this means, they require 
people with higher incomes to take responsibility for making supplementary provision 
for themselves and, as a result, they suffer from insecurity. This is because, when they 
are working, their standards of living are adjusted to their incomes, and if their incomes 
fall, they will find it difficult to adapt themselves to the standards which a flat-rate benefit 
provides. If the level of the benefits is too low, it will lead people with low incomes or 
people without private or occupational provision to depend on means-testing; if the level 
of the payment is high, it will impose a heavy financial burden on the government and 
thus on the taxpayers. 
Beveridge in 1942 recommended three principles for social insurance scheme: universal, 
comprehensive and adequate. The first referred to the coverage of the whole population, 
irrespective of employment status, occupation or income, the second implied the 
inclusion of all contingencies resulting in interruptions or cessation of earnings while the 
last meant the provision of sufficient benefit levels without further resources to provide 
the minimum income needed for subsistence in all normal cases. 
Stein (1976) argues that these three principles reflected the three goals of the Beveridge 
plan. The first goal was that social security benefits should be paid out as a flat rate, the 
rate being regarded as a social minimum. The second was that all needy families should 
receive this level of income and the third was that insurance benefits should be preferable 
72. Beveridge argued in his 1942 Report that 'social security must be achieved through co-operation 
between the State and the individual. The State should offer security for service and contribution. The 
State in organising security should not stifle incentive, opportunity, responsibility; in establishing a 
national minimum, it should leave room and encouragement for voluntary action by each individual to 
provide more than that minimum for himself and his family. '(Beveridge, 1942). 
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to assistance benefits. As a central element of Beveridge's welfare state, the 'social 
minimum' of welfare based on contributory insurance principles emphasises the 
importance of people's making their own private welfare provisions over and above the 
minimum. For Beveridge, compulsory contributions which went beyond the social 
minimum would offend against the individual's right to determine how best to spend his 
money (George and Wilding, 1985, p. 64). Subsequently, the subsistence level in 
contributory benefits became the'norm', while means-tested assistance was available, in 
the short-term, to those who had not accrued sufficient contributions, or to those with 
special needs. 73 There was, Stein (1976) argues, however, conflict among these goals. 
Since the benefits of both social assistance and social insurance were set at a 'minimum' 
level, this was inconsistent with the assumption that assistance should be less desirable 
than insurance and that should offer lower benefits (pp. 40-1). 
Under the earnings-related principle, benefits are made according to the previous income 
and contributions of the person. This leads to equal proportional sacrifices, and reduces 
need for voluntary provision and the dependence on means-testing. At the same time, 
however, it reflects the inequalities of market place and reflects the philosophy of the 
market economy: rewarding success and punishing failure. Applying this principle, 
unemployment insurance should not encourage recipients to be lazy or 'work-shy', or 
result in their moral deterioration. However, payments based on earnings-related 
principle have a tendency to reinforce the unequal economic status of recipients. This 
conflicts with one goal of welfare state, equality, and beside this, earnings-related 
schemes are more complex and difficult to understand (See Richardson, 1980). 
As far as the coverage of the schemes in the three countries is concerned, the British 
scheme made it compulsory for all workers in some industries which were vulnerable to 
cyclical or seasonal unemployment. To include everyone in the state scheme was 
regarded as administratively efficient and had the political advantage of appealing to the 
unions and the Labour Party (Harris, 1972). Selective coverage of industries in 
73. As one of Beveridge's 'pillars of Social Security', the contributory National Insurance Benefit was 
the first protection for the unemployed. This theory has based on the high post-war level of employment. 
However, since the mid to late 1970s, mass unemployment, with social and demographic changes and 
low economic growth have fundamentally undermined the rationale for a social security system based on 
the contributory principle. Over the last decade it provided significantly less support for the unemployed 
than in many other countries and the value of the benefit fell very considerably in comparison to 
earnings. As a result, in recent years, there had been a marked shift towards means-testing in social 
security schemes, more and more unemployed and their families were forced to be dependent on means- 
tested benefits which had become more restricted and limited; as a result means-tested benefits, rather than 
occupying the residual role predicted by Beveridge, have increased as a proportion of social security 
spending (Sinfield, 1991, p. 12). 
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unemployment insurance of Britain resulted from the practical concerns of decision 
makers about the running of the scheme and its experimental nature: guaranteeing the 
necessary resources in order to finance the scheme. The restrictions on the industries 
covered and the adoption of the contributory principle ensured the actuarial viability of 
the scheme (Harris, 1972; Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991, p. 65; Derthick, 1979). 74 
Unemployment insurance in Sweden was in principle voluntary for the individual 
employees. Since almost all workers and officials belonged to unions and, for most 
labour unions, membership of the Unemployment Insurance Funds was obligatory for 
their members, in practice, the coverage of unemployment insurance was very extensive. 
At the same time, union membership was not compulsory for members of the UI funds, 
but anyone, who worked in a field covered by a UI fund and wanted to join a union, had 
the right to become a member. 
This arrangement originated from the Party's pragmatic strategy of gaining the support of 
the Liberals for its proposals. The Liberal reformers (Cassel and the CSA -- the National 
Association of Social Work) and civil servants in Sweden initiated the discussions on 
unemployment insurance. As early as 1911, they accepted the voluntary idea as the basis 
of the social welfare system and their preference had a significant impact on social policy 
discourse in Sweden. The shortcomings of the compulsory schemes of Britain and 
Germany in the 1930s also encouraged the Swedes to choose a voluntary type. In 
addition, despite the country's traditional paternalism which was maintained during its 
rapid industrialisation, trade unions and employer's associations attempted to restrict 
government intervention to a minimal level. 'Me Swedish approach attempted to ensure a 
close linkage between unemployment insurance and the trade unions and to encourage a 
high level of union membership. Those who were employed wanted to join unions and 
those who became jobless still wished to maintain their union membership. The linkage 
also gave the trade unions a motive to fight for lower unemployment because they 
represented a large labour force. 
In the United States, unemployment insurance was only available for certain classes of 
workers in preferred occupations. T'he 1935 Act covered only about 80% of aH employed 
workers (certain groups of workers in certain occupations); employees in low wage 
74. In the British 1911 law, every effort was made to avoid Treasury responsibility and the principle of 
self-financing social insurance was maintained as late as the Beveridge national insurance scheme. The 
three-part contribution of the British scheme originated from the calculations by the Liberals of actuarial 
viability and the relationship between the eligibility and contributions. The national compulsory system 
reflected the Liberal's dual thinking: government was held responsible for alleviating the problems caused 
by economic change, but self-reliance was retained. 
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industries, casual labour, employees in non-profit agencies and self-employed were 
excluded from the scheme. 
The selective coverage of unemployment insurance schemes in these three countries 
meant that not all workers were entitled for the benefits. This principle marginalised those 
who needed protection from the state and enhanced the privileges of the better-off, and 
therefore strengthened inequalities among the members of society. The gap between the 
rich and poor was enlarged, while solidarity, promoted by the labour movement, was 
weakened. 
As far as the solidarity embodied in social insurance is concerned, Baldwin (1990) 
argues that there are four elements which can be taken into account. They are: 
universality, tax-financing, the contributory principle and flat rate benefits. The first 
factor includes all citizens and implies that they should be treated in the same way despite 
of their different social status. It promises a common pooling of risks by rich and poor 
and to dissolve the stigma which welfare measures may otherwise bring to the poor 
(pp. 51-2). Solidaristic policy can be regarded as advantageous for the unfortunate. It 
represents the triumph of the interests of the poor and the working class. But it is also 
accepted by self-reliant groups who may for various reasons lose their capability for 
independence and hope to benefit from solidarity as well. These two aspects can be used 
to explain the success of solidaristic social policy in Scandinavia since the 1930s and the 
Beveridge plan and Labour's reforms in Britain (ibid., p. 24). 
In terms of the role played by ideologies in the historical development of the Swedish 
social policy, Samuelsson (1975) argues that the idea of solidarity emphasises 
responsibility for and responsibility to -- a common responsibility of a society for all 
citizens. 75 According to this view, society is responsible for the existence of inequalities 
and poverty and for providing security for all citizens (Samuelsson in Koblik (ed. ), 
1975, pp. 345-6). To decrease inequality between different groups by increasing 
(extending) security for (to) neglected groups will benefit the goal of integration and 
solidarity in society. As Esping-Andersen (1990) argues, serving the interests of the least 
fortunate as much as the better-off in measures for providing protection against 
insecurity, irrespective of prior earnings, entails strong mobilisation of cross-class 
75. Samuelsson points out that the following five ideas can be regarded as the philosophical basis for 
this development. They are: humanitarianism or mercy; resocialisation or rehabilitation; integration; 
solidarity; equality and justice; and social security (see Korblik (ed), 1975, p. 335). 
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solidarity (p. 25). 76 The Beveridge reform in Britain, similarly, embodied an egalitarian, 
comprehensive and all-inclusive social policy and attempted to provide the best protection 
in the interest of the least fortunate (Baldwin, 1990, pp. 6-7). Yet the concept of solidarity 
starts with a presumption that, a large majority of the population is supposed to regard 
modest, egalitarian benefits as adequate. However, once the prosperity of working class 
start to grow and the new middle classes start to increase, they will inevitably turn to 
private insurance to supplement their modest insurance benefits. As a result, a dualism 
occurs: 'the poor rely on the state, and the remainder on the market. ' (ibid. ). 
In Britain, unemployment insurance was administered by central government. According 
to Brown (1971), in contrast to Gilbert, 77 this owed much to the influence of the Webbs. 
In the Minority Report of the 1909 Poor Law Commission, they argued that social 
welfare programmes should be based on national administration. They believed that, in 
order to tackle unemployment, a national system of labour exchanges should be set up 
and the poor law authorities should be replaced by a Ministry of Labour, with 
responsibility for organising the national labour market. Ilieir recommendation received a 
positive response from working-class groups. In Sweden, the labour unions were 
responsible for managing the unemployment insurance scheme with subsidies from the 
government. As part of a long and strong tradition in Sweden, the Unemployment 
Insurance Funds served administrative functions. The Social Democrats made use of 
these already existing self-help societies to provide the administration of unemployment 
insurance. In the United States, the administration of Unemployment Insurance was 
based on cooperation between the Federal and state governments i. e. it was administered 
at the state level but granted by the Federal government. 
In the course of developing unemployment insurance in the United States, the proper 
balance between federal and state governments was a delicate question. The Committee 
on Economic Security and its director Witte adopted a compromise system in the 
Economic Security Bill. 'Mis reflected pragmatic considerations -- to avoid resistance 
from either the Wisconsin or the Ohio schools. According to the scheme, states that set 
76. With regards to the Beveridge model, Swedish social policy showed signs of universality well in 
advance of the appearance of the new social policy model in wartime Britain, due to its peculiar condition 
-- rural backwardness and industrial modernization -- in early 20th century. The existence of a large 
agricultural population alongside a growing semi-urban working class was an important precondition for 
the steps the Swedes took. Both of these two groups were mobilized in the process of transforming poor 
relief into welfare policy (Olsson, in Elliott, Mayadas, Watts and Thomas (ed), 1990). 
77. Gilbert argues that the features of the Unemployment Insurance had nothing to do which the 
proposals of Sidney and Beatrice Webb and the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor 
Law (Gilbert, 1966, p. 234). 
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up unemployment insurance would get the tax back from the Federal government; 
employers who made contributions to the state unemployment compensation scheme 
would get a pay-roll tax reduction (the tax offset). The subsidy system required no 
standard national benefits or employee contributions and this indicated the impact of the 
Wisconsin school. In the 1935 Act, the individual reserve funds advocated by the 
Wisconsin school remained, the various tax rates for individual employers replaced the 
original one percent contribution to a pooled fund. The states had freedom to decide the 
amount and duration of the benefits, and the coverage and the level of contributions. The 
rejection of a uniform national system in the Act reflected the Roosevelt administration's 
concern with the possiblity of a hostile reaction from the business community to the Act. 
The different administrative frameworks for unemployment insurance of these three 
countries indicates that it is possible for a small country to adopt a uniform policy 
regarding welfare provision. However, in a big country, like the United States, where 
politics, economy and ethnicity are greatly diversified, the operation of welfare 
programmes is likely to be decentralised. Local governments will have autonomy to 
decide the specific regulations under the general direction of central government. The 
American unemployment insurance scheme reflected the constitutional separation of 
powers between the federal and state governments. American political parties lack a 
strong central authority and have a tendency to become broadly-based coalitions of 
interests which are organised in a decentralised way rather than in a tightly hierarchical 
structure. The advantage of a de-centralised system is connected to its sensitivity to the 
different needs of beneficiaries and its ability to reflect the different situations of the 
different states (or areas). However, it inevitably increases the differences between states 
and people in similar positions can be treated differently. 
When unemployment insurance was established in these three countries, politicians 
argued about the relationship between job creation and cash assistance for the 
unemployed, i. e. about which of these two was more efficient in dealing with 
unemployment and should be given priority. The Americans and Swedes took the 
maintenance of full employment as their main political goal. Employers were encouraged 
to play an important role in achieving this goal. Compared with full employment, 
unemployment insurance was regarded as of secondary importance in their political 
agenda. This was related to their belief that work was the best way to maintain an 
individual's dignity. Witte believed that economic security was a broader concept than 
social insurance. Social insurance alone could not guarantee complete security; the 
solution to unemployment depended on the combination of private employment, 
unemployment insurance and emergency relief. 
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In Sweden, after the World War I, the Liberals (the CSA) stressed job-creation instead of 
cash support for the unemployed, and the Social Democrats accepted full employment as 
their major commitment. Wigforss, the leading figure in the SDP, used Keynesian 
economics to tackle the problem of joblessness. He argued for the provision of work for 
the unemployed by the government based on the market wage in order to enhance 
purchasing power. His idea exerted considerable influence on the Swedish model of 
Welfare and was accepted by the SDP as the basis of their unemployment policy in the 
1930s. In 1934, the idea of public work was advocated by some members of the 
Committee on Unemployment and the SDP. They realised the importance of combining 
cash payments, insurance benefits and public work to tackle unemployment. Cash 
benefits were only available after the provision of a job for the unemployed had failed. 
The state was fully occupied with full employment while the LO took charge of the 
unemployment insurance. 78 
In Britain, policy-makers concentrated on making the labour market work smoothly. 
They believed that wholly nationalised labour exchanges scheme would enhance labour 
mobility, control casual and irregular employment and consolidate collaboration between 
capital and labour. 79 Beveridge saw the exchanges as the key for a universal plan to test 
unemployment insurance claims, subsidise union insurance and extend unemployment 
protection to the non-unionised workers. Legislation was passed in 1909 after very little 
debate and no division of the House (Harris, 1977, pp. 145-67). Unemployment 
insurance in the 1911 Act focused on the most unstable and uncertain areas, of 
employment. 
In the beginning of this part, I outlined Esping-Andersen's three welfare state regimes. 
They are inappropriate in explaining the outcome of the Unemployment Insurance 
scheme of Britain in 1911. It is implausible to argue that Britain's 1911 Unemployment 
Insurance scheme had already embodied those characteristics of the Liberal regime type 
described above; as I argued in chapter Three, the scheme was basically a Liberal 
experiment. To some extent, it reflected market-oriented liberalism, combining the 
78. As one of the peculiar features of the Swedish unemployment compensation, ambitious labour 
market policies are closely related to unemployment compensation (Bj6rklund, Havernan, Hollister & 
Hohnlund, 1991) -- See Chapter Four. 
79. Stein (1976) argued that there were some common historical traditions between Britain and the United 
States in terms of work and welfare. Both countries emphasised the work ethic which attached a stigma to 
welfare dependency and gave income from work and property a higher status than social security 
payments. This common characteristic can be attributed to the fact that both descended from the 
Elizabethan Poor Law (p. 28). 
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traditional self-reliance principle with state assistance. In contrast to Esping-Andersen's 
argument, white-collar workers as a rising political force did not yet constitute an 
essential part of the political majority and did not exert much influence on the 
consolidation of the British welfare state before World War H. 
The Liberal reforms which eventually led to the establishment of labour exchange and 
Unemployment Insurance were introduced for various reasons. They were: the influence 
of the philosophies of Bentham, Green and Mill on public opinion in previous 20 years; 
international competition; the failure of the Poor Law to provide help for those in need 
and public faith in state to cure social problems (based on the experience of the Victorian 
period). Harris (1972) argues that it is difficult to connect the liberal reform to any single 
theory, rather it was based on pragmatic decisions. (She gave three reasons for the 
changes in the Liberals' attitude, see Chapter Three). Although the Government realised 
the need to respond the demands of the Labour Party in order to stay in power, the social 
reforms of 1906-1911 should not be attributed primarily to the labour movement. The 
British government was managed by a small elite at the turn of the century. The political 
and economic situation pursuaded the Liberal government to make the cabinet changes. 80 
The resulting shift of power in the Party gave Liberal figures such as Churchill and Lloyd 
George, important positions to put their reforming ideas into practice (for more detailed 
discussion see later). 
Although Esping-Andersen's arguments about social democratic regime-type have some 
validity, they are more applicable to the 'Swedish Model' which was established in the 
post-war period than to the Unemployment Insurance scheme introduced in 1934. The 
Swedish Unemployment Insurance scheme was, in some aspects, an exception to the 
general character of the Swedish welfare programmes and quite separate from other 
social insurance programmes. 
Contrary to popular views, Sweden did not shape its modem welfare system as a 
reaction to the economic crisis of the 1930s. Although modemisation was already in 
progress in the mid-1930s, the welfare state came much later. Most of the welfare 
reforms were initiated in the relatively prosperous period after 1945. The basis for 
Sweden's reputation as a model of the welfare state, the so-called active labour market 
policy involving a crucial link between economic and social policy, was first developed 
80. The deteriorating unemployment stirred up the hostfle reaction from the unemployed. The Labour 
Party and the trade unions demanded change of the government policies. The Labour Party's Unemployed 
Workmen's Bill of 1907 (reintroduced in 1908) acted as pressure for the Liberal government to take more 
positive action. 
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by the trade union economists G&sla Rehn and Rudolf Mcidner in the late 1940s. 81 It is 
t1wrufore incorrect to argue that the Social Democrats already had a complete blueprint for 
lite modern welfare state in the 1930's. Social reform was a top priority for the Social 
Democratic depremion cabinas. but, by and large, political energies were concentrated 
on the inimediate problems of crisis management and economic relief. The essential 
characteristics of its welfare state appeared as a result of politicians' willingness to 
overcon-ou- imnxxiiatc difficultiLz rather than an attempt 'to real isesysternatically conceived 
ideas of the gocxl society' (Davidwn. 1989, p. 1 27). In order to meet the societal demand 
to solve the problem of unemployment and protect the well-being of the working class in 
a newly establi. shoM democratic system, the Social Democratic Part), had to build up the 
programme in a way which would be politically acceptable to other parties and pressure 
groups. and was financially possible. 
11te Swedish "Mird Alay' finst appeawd in the pre-war period, in the form of a 'people's 
home' (follhend litxTatLxJ from class conflict and social injustice. In the early 1930s, 
policy was ba. me'd entirely of) tile values ofsocialsolidarity, equality and fraternity which 
provided the NL%is for newsocial welfare programmes. Ilic aim was to create a general 
safely net that would eliminate tile need for humiliating means-tested forms of assistancc. 
I IOIA'cvcr. it was only after tile Sevond World War that these programmes were gradually 
put into practice, and as a result of profound economic and social changes, the 
Govcrnment allempted to find a socio-political middle way suitable for conditions of 
wlidarity. 
According to L'sping-Andemen, the American welfare -system is regarded as 
in the 
'libcral' style which is associated with indi%, idual independence and limited public 
Support-1110 Unemployment compensation programme of the 1935 Act complied with the 
dominant ideology of tile society. I lowever, in order to understand better the reasons 
%%'fly the SclICITIC had these features, we should look at the political structure of the 
cOuritf)""Id OP-1 Mgmatic thinking of the people involved in the policy making process. 
'I'lle 1935 Social Sccurit), Act reflLvied the changing attitude of the public to Federal 
government involvement in social measums. Political disaffection caused by the hardship 
of tlw dcprmsion pa. suld(. xl tile F,. -dcral government to take more positive action to tackle 
81-71w Id" W- diul It -A as thsi at any particular limc. tll(* level of demand varies considerablybcm-cen 
di(hicni x"itwi of jlý, - LN%xxxtl)-. it, jjr"blo Senimal measures to stimulate demand in order to 
n3aintain full c-11111loynx-111 %vuld 1,:.,, d 10 ju, inflaticx1ary overlicaiing of 1he ccononl)'. It is themfore more 
Wickni to malnuln a m(ACIA10 ovel-All lo, cl of demand in the economy. and to combine this with 
WICtIltv taNxg Jnxl,, j lx4jCi, 3 &IJJ) a% public u-(vks lipjccls dimclex! towards particular areas and sectors 
% 411 VnIplo) mcill problan%. 
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unemployment. I'he political supporl which President Roosevelt gained from the large 
number of rvcipieaý of his various unemployment relief programmes can be regarded as 
an important basis for the 1935 Act. With these measures, fie attempted to restore the 
confidence of the economic sector and achieve political stability for the nation. 77le 
requirements of the time, particularly the need to solve the economic crisis, demanded 
strong action from an activist President and Executive. During the years of the 
deptewiion. the 1kniocratic Party controlled both the Congress and the Presidency for its 
major part. and legislators tended to support dynamic presidential initiatives (Grant, 
1986. pp. 68.72). 8-' Although Democrats and Republicans had different styles and 
Approaches, there were no deep differences in ideology between them. Both parties 
responded flexibly to mxial change and in abiorbing minor parties to broaden their 
coalitions. tletwcen 1933-1935. politicians were cautious in dealing with the two 
alternative niodels for financing unemployment insurance which had been put forward, in 
order to riot of(cnd either of their supporters and gain the support of businessmen who 
insisted on the idea of prevention since this gave individual employers incentives to 
regulate tinployment. 
People. such as Witte. Andre%vs. Perkins and the members of the Committee on 
Economic Security. coniposed of by university intellectuals, businessmen, 
representatives of foundations, exerted significant impact on the decision making 
proccm. by Influencing political leader-., with their kno%%, Icdgc and experience. They did 
not filake their decisions on the basis of social welfare doctrines, but on the basis of 
CoMstilutional. political. financial and other technical concerns. Witte's tax offset device 
won Nuppon from Rm). sevelt. who was concerned with the financing of social insurance 
and W- icvLtl that uni. -Illployment coniptnsation could promote stabilisation. Ile choice of 
tile tax Offiset device was attributed to Witte's and the Committee's belief that it would 
prob3bly niect lcm resisiance froin busine&s. 17he passage of die Economic Security Bill 
in Congm-_. j was. to a large extent, due to their efforts, as it failed to get support from the 
bu. siness community or from organised labour and disappointed the advocates of social 
ilLsurancC. Such as mWial workers. labour legislation experts. Although Witte played a 
remarkable role in tile whole process, neverilieless. as Miss Perkins claimed, it was not 
expens but Congrcv; and tile prt., ý, idcnt %yho ultimately decided social insurance policy 
G. ". later). 
h2. Mk-ri: art: dithuni ctxsývjxicxi% t)f 11W Ix)le aniong Deviccrals and 114.1mblicans. II)c former 
tcg, udcd a Sums as 11W rum, lif, cly nictli(xi c)f securing what they saw as much needed 
ruforim. % fill, 11W lalwy Suilklicd a far nuwv limited rule for the federal government in the economic and 
JWX: IAI WAII-11 U IlIC C(KInIf)' AVId (111tised large and, in t1lis view, inflationary spending programmes 
(Ci(Ant. l9h6. 
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The discussion of the different introduction of Ul in Britain, Sweden and the United 
States reveals that, on one hand, the introduction and development of social insurance 
reflected some common social principlei and aims, on tile other hand, it was also 
constrained in practice by specific circumstances. When the initial Ul scheme was 
established in the. se three countries, policy makers demonstrated their preference of job 
creation to cash suppon in providing help for those who were more vulnerable to 
unemployment. In addition. they also strmsed the strong link between eligibility and 
participation in the labour market and the cooperation of state assistance and individual 
rtzponsibiliq- in maintainingsocial security. Yet due to the different historical legacies, 
policy makevs in thm, three countries made their own final decisions concerning 
financing, coverage, benefit levels and administration of the initial U! scheme, on the 
basis of the, political and financial grounds. For example, the decentralised administration 
of tht, American Ul scherne i%-js adopted by the policy makers in reference to the political 
and economical diversitics in the country and the constitutional seperation of powers 
W- wc-cit lk, 1-*Wcn. I and t1w. stale govemniciMs. 
Following the abo%'c account. it can be funher argued that tile generality of common 
principles Underlying policy call alwayi be challenged by the complex reality. For 
example. flat-rate benefits are usually low and therefore encourage dependence on 
Volu'llaryproviMorts. Earnings-related benefits, in contrast, reduce need for voluntary 
ProVision arid and are related to previous standards of living. Yet, in 
countricýi where wage differentials W- ween skilled and unskilled workers and between 
different industries and regions are narrow. flat-rate benefits are more suitable than in 
cOu"Itic-S where theynie wide. In countries %%-here til  wages of skilled workers are much 
higher than thow of un. %killed, it may I),. - preferable to have two or three rates of benefit 
irwead of a single uniforin rate. each rate will be for different grades of workers with 
APpropiriate carning-s in order to relate benefits more closely to eamings. In this case, 
11OWeVer. the administration of thesystern will necessarily be more complicated and the 
number of diffivent gradej should. therefore, not be too large. In addition, eamings- 
r4: 1311-A bOO-11.1i reflect arid reinforce tile ineclualities of market place. 
'I'lle W' ective coverage of Ul scheine in these three countries resulted either from the 
Policy makets, Concerns for its actuarial viability or from their concessions to their 
political rivals. It howevey had a tendency to weaken solidarity promoted by the labour 
MOVV11011 and, wi a rtýsult, to increaw disparity among the memebers of society. In 
contm%t, all ijjclu. si%,,: policy, which treat.,; all citizens on an equal footing regardless their 
different social staju.,,, %%. ill be in favour of the integration of society. However, if the 
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policy assumes that modest benefits are adequate for the majority of the population as did 
the Beveridge reform, it will encourage a dualism in provision of the benefits, i. e. the 
poor have to rely on the state and the better-off on the market. 
Part Three The Reasons for the Different Characteristics of 
Unemployment Insurance of the Three Countries 
Based on the earlier discussion of factors which were important for the decision-making 
in respect of unemployment insurance in Chapter Two, in this part I look at possible 
explanations for the differences in this legislation in these three countries. 
The differences in the original unemployment insurance systems of the three countries 
indicate that, due to the free political institutions and the open competition of ideas, and 
different policy making contexts in the different countries, similar patterns of response, 
formulation and implementation appeared in one policy area can not be easily found. The 
realisation of the egalitarian principle by the welfare system is varied between different 
nations at given time and the different periods of welfare development of any one 
country. The flexibility of the democratic policy process enables us to see how countries 
treat social policies in an innovative, dynamic way and how political and administrative 
forces shifted their goals, priorities and resources within the institutional constraints 
(Ashford, 1986, p. 312). 
The significance of making broad comparisons, (in addition to detailed comparisons as I 
did in Part Two), is that it can help us see more clearly the unique contributions of each 
country to advancing the notion of the welfare state. We can also understand better how 
each country invented its own arrangements in the development of welfare programmes 
83 to realise social justice, cross-class equality and political control, how the institutional 
regulations represent the underlying and persistent political values of the system. The 
following discussion focuses on the different experiences these countries had in dealing 
with the problem of unemployment. From this account, I attempt to discover the causes, 
motivations and social constraints for the specificity of their Unemployment Insurance 
schemes and gain a better understanding of the decision making process in the field of 
unemployment compensation. 
83. Social security can be regarded as a good arena in which comparisons of different approaches and 
functions between different countries can be made (Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991). 
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To compare social security policies of Britain, Sweden and the USA is a complex task in 
which the attribution of welfare state development to a single powerful causal force 
would be unsound (see previous discussion in Chapter Two). The governments of these 
three countries were all confronted with a serious problem of unemployment and this 
problem became an important issue of political dispute between the major political 
parties. Due to the inadequacy of earlier methods for dealing with the problem, 
formulating legislation in this field which was different from the traditional policies 
proved to be necessary. However, because of differences in the policy making process in 
the three countries, the discussions of unemployment insurance scheme were carried out 
and influenced by different figures or groups, holding different ideologies, political 
attitudes and aims, and limited by policy legacies and power structures. As a result, they 
produced policies with distinct features. The elements which played important roles in 
different ways in these three countries should be stressed in comparative analysis, 
(although they all have been dealt with in my country-by-country accounts, and therefore 
some repetitions are inevitable). 
Section One The Recognition of Unemployment as a Problem of 
Industrialisation and the Advantages of Unemployment Insurance as the 
Best Means of Dealing With the Problem 
The modem welfare state was strongly influenced by the translation of political ideas into 
policy. The process through which opinions passed into action was very complex and 
was linked to the advance of knowledge about social problems at the time. 'Beneath the 
actual response of governments to social questions [lay] the murky question of how 
social and political philosophies,... [provided] the setting for a re-examination of the role 
of government and [entered] into the actual transformation of democratic 
practices. '(Ashford, 1986, p. 34,44). In this case, the role of people who promoted 
changes in society and how they fitted into the politics of the day are crucial in 
understanding how welfare states developed. 
Unemployment is an endemic problem in industrial society. For various reasons, 
increases in productivity, changes in technology and the failure of displaced workers to 
get suitable jobs, all bring about the dislocation of labour. For Beveridge, 'full 
employment' did not mean everyone working all the time. The enormous changes in the 
economy brought about a certain level of unemployment and some wage-earners 
experienced a period of unemployment before they could be re-employed (Haber and 
Murray, 1966, p. 3). In concluding his comparison of British and Swedish social 
policies, Heclo argues that problem recognition is an essential part of how governments 
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change (Heclo, 1974). We should therefore find out the reasons for the different 
understanding of similar problems by different governments. 
By the turn of the century, all the industrial nations began to discuss and seek to establish 
a welfare system, because of, first, the evidence of unemployment, the deterioration of 
human potential and other industrial problems and, secondly, the consequences of 
democracy in which the early labour organisation were recognised as political forces by 
even the most conservative politicians. Apart from the impact of socio-economic changes 
on the emergence of welfare states, questions such as how society was reacting to these 
changes and how these changes were linked to developing social policies, should be 
taken into account. The establishment of workable links between these two factors relied 
first of all on new ideas. As intensive searches for new social values had started in the 
late nineteenth century, the early social policy makers actually sought new ideas and new 
values they could bring to the management of the state. Changes in politics were related 
to the ways in which the policy makers perceived and formulated social policies. Each 
government was influenced by the perceptions of policy makers both in defining the 
problem and in devising workable policies. 
Around 1900, policy changes and new ideas about the welfare state were influenced by a 
few key figures. Since the turn of the century, remedies for social problems based on 
traditional liberalism gradually became untenable. The situation was most acute in 
Britain. In the late nineteenth century, officials and academics did not have any clear idea 
of what unemployment meant (Harris, 1972, p. 35). Unemployment was an entirely new 
problem for the democratic state. To devise policies to deal with the problem was 
technically and conceptually a more demanding event than were earlier security proposals 
for the poor (Ashford, 1986, pp. 196-7). Self-reliance and self-improvement were major 
presumptions which prevented many people from taking a collective view of society. The 
values of sobriety, thrift, self-help and temperance dominated the early debates to a 
greater degree in Britain than elsewhere. The British political philosophers, Hobhouse, 
said that in a proper society, '(i)dleness would be regarded as a social pest, to be stamped 
out like crime. ' (Quoted in Collini, 1979, p. 139). 
The British Conservative Party proved itself to be non-interventionist from the 1880s 
until the First World War. It was not attracted by the idea that progress relied upon 
positive government action. Instead, it upheld voluntary methods with regard to 
employers' liability in the 1890s, and introduction of the national insurance in 1911. It 
was reluctant to accept proposals from the Salisbury and Balfour governments to expand 
the role of government into the economic and social spheres and exerted attacks on left- 
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wing policies at the time. All these indicated that the political activity of the party was still 
dominated by the belief that the advance of civilisation. was derived in large measure from 
'individual face-to-face action' guided by Christian concepts. Thus, the Conservatives 
found themselves in a dilemma: on one hand, they recognised the necessity of adopting 
reform policies and tried to avoid 'revolution through the ballot box' urged by the New 
Liberalism and Labour, yet, on the other hand, they were afraid that to do so would 
offend the party's beliefs and injure its allied interests. 
The new liberals in the Edwardian period were fully aware of social decline and started to 
re-examine the temporary solutions of Victorian Britain to social problems and to ask 
fundamental questions about the organisation of British politics and society. This was 
associated with the intellectual analysis of the causes of social distress and industrial and 
urban conditions in the twentieth century, which protested against the popular belief that 
economic hardship resulted from immoral habits and vicious tendencies. The advocates 
of insurance accepted the intellectuals' arguments that the recipients should not be blamed 
as need arose and that demoralisation from the provision of benefits should be controlled. 
The Liberals saw the need for social and economic policies and had clearer ideas than the 
Labour or Conservative Parties did about them. This left the way open to more 
opportunistic politicians like Lloyd George and Churchill. The former's decision to be 
People's Benefactor (see Chapter Three) symbolised the approach of the Liberals 
towards their collective arguments during the 1910 general elections. 84 
Unemployment insurance in the 1911 Act focused on the most unstable and uncertain 
areas of employment, as it has been mentioned before. 85 Two principles should be taken 
into consideration in understanding the introduction of the British Unemployment 
Insurance in 1911. The first was the realisation. of the need to reduce the effects of 
hardship caused by economic change, although the response to hardship was not to 
obstruct the process of the change. The principle was also accepted in the USA and its 
development resulted from the system of economic management adopted by the 
government. The second was the creation of rights and entitlements through paying 
84. In a speech of 1909 at Limehouse, the would-be Chancellor of the Exchequer made the statement in 
the statist vein of the provision 'for the aged and deserving poor, and of 'raising money to provide against 
the evils and suffering that follow from unemployment' (The Times, 31 July 1909, p. 9b, d). 
85. The British policy-makers, Beveridge among them, concentrated on making the labour market itself 
work smoothly. ne labour exchanges were regarded as a whoUy nationalized scheme to link workers to 
jobs. Beveridge saw the exchanges as the keystone for a universal plan to test unemployment insurance 
claims, to subsidize union insurance, and to extend unemployment protection to the non-unionized 
workers. The Law was passed in 1909 with very little debate and no division of the House Beveridge 
criticized unemployment insurance in 1911 for its omission of prevention and treatment of government 
as a 'bottomless purse'. (Hanis, 1972, pp. 145-67). 
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insurance contributions. The importance of rights to benefits had been heightened by the 
operation of the Poor Law. The able-bodied poor got indoor relief at the expense of 
losing citizenship. Ile fierce resistance to the sever principles of the Poor Law exerted a 
powerful influence on the development of alternative systems of relief. With a 
contributory system, claimants could provide evidence of a history of industriousness 
(Harris, 1972; Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991, p. 63). Despite its constraints in restrictions 
and scope, the 1911 scheme embraced the principle of insurance which enveloped both 
individualistic and collective values. 
When unemployment became a more visible social problem in Sweden and the United 
States during the Great Depression, their solutions to the problem dealt with a different 
situation from that faced by Britain at the beginning of the century. The countries had 
become accustomed to big government, large social services budgets and the growth of 
social spending as a normal pattern of government operations (Ashford, 1986, pp. 111- 
6). 86 This was the most crucial period for radical social change in which Social 
Democratic Party in Sweden and the Democratic Party in the United States gained power 
and the development in each case of the welfare state took place. In*the midst of the 
unparalleled realignment of world power and search for an enduring peace during the 
interwar period, social policy attained a new significance. 
In Sweden and the United States, unemployment insurance, as response to the problems 
of industrialisation, was not seen to be as important as it was in Britain. In Sweden, the 
politics of poverty never had much chance to achieve prominence because the nature of 
transformation from rural to industrial society provided less opportunity for severe 
poverty to occur (Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991, p. 181). 
The peculiarity of Sweden was related to the agreements over wage policy which 
preceded the development of more generous social benefits. Sweden inverted the usual 
historical cycle of unemployment through first constructing a concept of wage solidarity 
which could use wages for the purpose of income redistribution before major social 
programmes were launched. As early as in 1922, the LO pointed out its preference of 
'wage solidarity' over competitive wage bargaining. The establishment of the voluntary 
86. During this period, the major difficulties for the nationalization of social policy were overcome. 
First, the liberal refuge of private or charitable assistance proved inadequate. It became clear that even 
modest solutions to unemployment exceeded local resources and capabilities. The public suspicion about 
local governments as agency of social protection and social services was raised. Second, the private 
insurers had to acknowledge that many serious social problems exceeded the capacity of actuarially sound 
insurance. 71fird, professional groups eventually became part of national social security programmes. 
Fourth, the agricultural interests gained the protection of the state (Ashford, 1986, p. 107). 
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UI scheme in Sweden was due to the preference of both the SAP and LO to wage 
solidarity. The LO excluded the scheme from its high priorities, because unemployment 
relief was used by the SAF to defend lower wages since World War I and the scheme 
would endanger the possibility of wage solidarity which came into existence in 1932. 
The union-based scheme also showed, on the one hand, the important role of the LO in 
supplying benefits for its members and its close relationship and similar ideology with 
the SAP, and, on the other hand, the SAP's political strategy of avoiding the Liberal's 
protest against the scheme. Expansive programmes for industrial workers were not 
appealing, SAP and the LO declared to make UI the major threshold in the construction 
of the modem welfare state, as the agrarian parties' support was essential for the SAP's 
parliamentary victory in the early 1930s. 
In contrast with most European countries, the United States was optimistic about 
rationalising social distress. 87 Greater mechanisation, enormous advances in scientific 
management and full employment resulted in a rising Gross National Product (per capita 
GNP rose by 73 percent in the first thirty years of the century). All of these factors made 
the majority of Americans believe in a better life for the future, despite brief recessions 
and inflation (Axinn and Levin, 1975, p. 116) (see Chapter Five). The concept of 
unemployment did not even exist when the early industrial recessions took place in the 
1880s and the early 1900s (Ashford, 1986, p. 314). The refon-n activities of the 
Progressive Era (1912-1924) were specially concerned with improvements in social 
conditions for the underdogs and with labour legislations. By creating opportunities for 
the less fortunate through the provision of government programmes and services, the 
individuals could assimilate into the mainstream of society and enhance their potential for 
a better life. 
At the beginning of the depression in the United States, alleviation of the hardship caused 
by unemployment was largely left to public charity. But in most places, public relief was 
poorly organised and, as a result, the unemployed suffered a great deal. This indicated 
how unprepared the nation was for economic recession. Until the 1930s, when the 
inadequacy of public relief became apparent, unemployment insurance was not seriously 
considered in the USA (Haber and Murray, 1966, p. 28). Case Studies o 
Unemployment, published by the Unemployment Committee of the National Federation 
of Settlements in 1931, and the finding of the Relief Census, conducted by the Federal 
87. The development of the modem welfare state in the USA was derived from two 'short bursts' of 
popular pressure and social reform, the 1930's the New Deal and the 1960's the Great Society era. The 
former brought benefit mainly to the middle class, the farmers and the organised, predominantly white 
urban working class (Ginsburg, 1992, p. 98). 
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Emergency Relief Administration in October 1933, showed that the inhuman experience 
of unemployment was connected to industrial rather than individual causes. They did not 
only promoted the eventual acceptance of federal participation in emergency relief 
measures, but also pointed to the necessity of permanent insurance against the risks 
associated with industrial society (Axinn and Levin, 1975, pp. 162-3). 
However, compared with Britain, unemployment insurance was not regarded as an 
important element in social security provision for the unemployed during the Depression. 
Americans attempted to achieve social security through economic controls rather than 
cash benefit provision (Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991, pp. 69,72). Stein (1976) argued 
that the British welfare state generally put heavier emphasis on distributive justice than on 
economic growth as the means toward a better society, while the American regarded 
economic growth as the basic way to reduce poverty (p. 35). The choosing of merit-rating 
principle of the UI system in temns of contribution and eamings-related benefits reflected 
the American's emphasis on economic control for social security. Ilie argument that the 
employer should be responsible for the provision of unemployment insurance benefit 
was made more strongly than in other areas of social security. Related to this argument 
was the freedom which was to be given to employers to organise their work-force. The 
exercise of this freedom was subject to the condition of creating employment for their 
employees (see earlier discussion in Part Two). 
To summarise the section, I would like to argue that at the beginning of this century and 
during the Depression in the 1930's, associated with the publication of research about the 
degenerating living standards of the unemployed and public acknowledgment of 
unemployment as a serious problem of industrialisation, understanding about the causes 
of unemployment changed from an individual to a social problem. Accordingly, the 
appropriate measures of coping with the situation also changed -- from dependence on 
the punitive Poor Law and public charity to reliance on governmental programmes. When 
the inhumanity of the Poor Law became too self-evident and the financial vulnerability of 
charitable measures became apparent, state intervention into unemployment relief came to 
be regarded as necessary. The private sector failed to resist welfare state policies very 
effectively. However, compared with Britain, unemployment insurance in Sweden and 
the United States was a less prominent political issue. In Sweden, both the SAP and the 
LO avoided making unemployment insurance the main feature of the Swedish welfare 
state. They made fiscal policy and wage solidarity rather than unemployment insurance 
the primary aim of their policy for coping with the pressures caused by the Depression. 
In the United States, the decline of living standards and the increasing political turmoil 
caused by the Depression, persuaded the Democratic Party under President Roosevelt to 
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reassess traditional unemployment compensation policies. The political debate on 
unemployment insurance was associated with a different understanding of the causes of 
unemployment and a recognition of the inadequacy of local or private assistance 
programmes. However, the final form adopted for unemployment insurance showed the 
strong influence of conventional ideas: the stress was to be on the individual employers' 
responsibility for preventing unemployment rather than on the redistribution of income 
which was commonly accepted in Europe. 
Section Two The Power Structure of the Three Countries and Its Effects 
on Their Unemployment Insurance Schemes 
In accounting for the importance of political forces in the formulation and development of 
welfare state, some analysts have emphasised the correlations between the levels of 
welfare expenditure and the different political composition of governments in the West. 
Esping-Andersen (1990), for example, has pointed out that some significant political 
factors are connected with the performance of the benefits system. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, the nature of class, especially working class, mobilisation, the structure of 
class-political coalitions, the degree of 'left-wing power' in government and the historical 
legacy of regime institutionalisation, were all particularly important. 
Yet to emphasise the political importance of the working class or of left-wing parties 
should not lead to the conclusion that the labour movement exhibited the same strength in 
different countries, or that the working class mobilisation. and any labour or left-wing 
parties are alone capable of structuring a welfare state, or that the labour movements 
exerted their effects on the development of social policy solely through their direct 
demands. (See earlier discussion in Part Two). Working-class organisations were 
historically structured in divergent ways and they held different aims, ideologies and 
political capacities. These differences decisively affected the articulation of political 
demands, the extent of class cohesion and the scope for cross-party action. In the 
following part, I discuss the relationship between the labour movement and the 
establishment of unemployment insurance schemes in the three countries. 
1906-1911 was a period of reform in Britain in which a rapid development towards the 
welfare state took place. The initiatives of the New Liberalism were accompanied with a 
development of the labour movement, in which trade union membership was growing 
continuously. 'Me influence of socialism as a doctrine was increasing amongst unionists 
and industrial unrest among organised Labour was rising sharply. At the 1906 election 
which was won by the Liberal Party with a big margin, 29 elected candidates were 
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supported by the Labour Party. The Labour Party increased its strength in the House of 
Commons to forty MPs by 1910 and began to issue some radical manifestos. All these 
factors produced a warning for the established political parties and, to a certain extent, 
'Liberal social reform was an attempt to counter the electoral threat from Labour . .... The 
rival parties of the Left fought to establish the orientations of politics. ' (Fforde, 1990, 
p. 106). Yet, the Liberal reformers in Britain in the early twentieth century were not 
particularly alarmed over the appearance of the Labour Party. 
According to Ashford (1986), the new Labour Party could not been influential in 
parliamentary politics in West Minster because of the institutional limits on minor parties 
in Britain. There are two essential factors which determined the labour movement's 
ability to develop its political aims to increase its role in social policy making. First, when 
its policy concerns were developed, the movement had to be relatively free from direct 
political and industrial attacks in order to not be weakened; second, it had to be able to 
anticipate possible changes to society and the economy and to adjust itself to the changing 
circumstances. In this context, the British unions were under a continuous threat between 
1910 and 1945. On the one hand, the political elites of Edwardian Britain had almost no 
knowledge of, and very little sympathy with, unions, both the policy-makers and the 
administrative elite showed little interest in having direct arrangement with either the new 
industrial elites or with union leaders when social questions arose. Few ministers, except 
Churchill who consulted TUC leaders on Labour Exchanges, wanted direct contact with 
union officials. On the other hand, the rising leaders of the Labour Party were either not 
much better prepared, or failed to display their ability, to deal with a transition of their 
surroundings (ibid., pp. 213,214,215). 
The apparent class divisions of the country were not easily mobilised to affect the 
emergence of the welfare state. Organised labour did not have a decisive voice in the 
social legislation of 1911. Instead, like other governmental measures at that time, it was 
promoted by Lloyd George and Winston Churchill (see Part Two). They did so because 
of their political concerns with the prevailing influence of socialism among the working 
classes, the health of the people, the hostile attitude of society to the Poor Law and the 
increase of their own popularity (Fraser, 1979, p. 306). Compared with their influence, 
the Labour Party supported but did not introduce the scheme in Parliament, and the 
impact of the organised labour was at most indirect (ibid. ) The transition from liberal to 
welfare state was therefore much more the product of the contest between 'conventional 
liberal and old conservative' political forces, neither of which, however, was able to 
recognise the long-term institutional consequences of their actions (Ashford, 1986, 
pp. 13,175). 
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By contrast, the Swedes utilised labour market measures rather than benefits to modify 
the labour market and assist people who were vulnerable to unemployment. As far as the 
political indicators mentioned above are concerned, the Swedish welfare states gained 
support from strong working class mobilisation in government and, subsequently, the 
Social Democratic Party successfully formed class coalitions with other groups such as 
farmers. 88 
Sweden, unlike the United States, never experienced political pluralism. A strong link 
between the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the union confederation (LO) was 
developed in the first decades of the century. Unlike most countries, this alliance was 
formed in the process of obtaining universal suffrage which was achieved in 1918. 
Although the failure of the 1909 general strike forced these two organisations (SAP and 
LO) to separate from one another, and their ability to combine each other's policy 
objectives in the interwar period was not as easy as was displayed during the 
development of the Swedish welfare state in the 1950s, the political links were much 
closer than those found in Britain at the turn of the century. In 1912, for example, 80 
percent of SAP members were also LO members (Johnston, 1962, pp. 26-31). 
While leaders of the left in most countries, such as the organised labour in the United 
States, had to fight for recognition, the labour movement in Sweden became integral 
component of democratic development well before the welfare state emerged. Once 
democracy was established, the working class could focus on developing workable 
public policies and set up its own research and policy-making capacities long before its 
British counterpart. Due to the existence of a close political and organisational 
relationship between them, the trade unions and the Social Democratic Party were able to 
agree on a set of policies that would result in full employment. 7hus, compared with 
Britain and the United States, the structure of labour movement in Sweden was much 
more functional. 
In Sweden, although unions were relatively weak, their leaders were able to anticipate the 
advantage of social insurance for the workers and, to some extent, to participate in the 
process of policy formulation. In contrast, the British workers' own organisations were 
88.7bere never had the political complexity of 'country versus city' as common as in British politics 
which could therefore become an obstacle for developing a more advanced form of the welfare state 
(Ashford, 1986). In the United States, the Democratic Party established a similar coalition in the New 
Deal, 'but with the important difference that the labour-intensive South blocked a truly universalistic 
social security system and opposed further welfare-state developments. ' (Esping-Andersen, 1990, pp. 30- 
I). 
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very powerful because they were concerned with protecting their own independent 
rights, feared state competition and resisted contributory social insurance (favouring 
instead uniform benefits paid from general revenues). They acted as the major obstacle 
rather than positive force in policy development in the first forty years of this century. 
They were isolated from Whitehall and West Minster and had few opportunities to 
acquire a role in the emerging British welfare state. As a result, Britain produced 'one 
false start (non-contributory pensions) and an ad hoc mixture of two other insurance 
programs, one run by the state for particular categories of workers and one heavily 
influenced by the private-sector societies' (Heidenheimar et al, 1983, PP. 216-223). 
The collaboration between organised labour, capitalists and the state, on which the Social 
Democratic hegemony had been based since the 1930s during its construction of the very 
unique Swedish welfare state, did not exist in other welfare states (Ginsburg, 1992, 
p. 64). Partly because of the concentration of ownership of Swedish business but also 
because of a highly-organised private sector required by late industrialisation, the 
Swedish Employers' Association (SAF) was a nationally-organised body and able to 
conduct well coordinated lockouts to humble the LO. There was a violent confrontation 
with the LO and the SAF in the 1920's which had negative effects on the country. After 
its defeat in the 1928 election, the SAP was forced to abandon Communist support in 
order to establish the political grounds for peaceful industrial relationship, as a good 
relationship between the LO and the SAF was crucial for the LO's wage policy. And the 
Social Democrats' adoption of an unemployment insurance scheme could be regarded as 
a strategic measure to avoid the employers' and liberals' resistance to their wage policy. 
Because of the close linkage between the trade union movement, the Social Democratic 
Party and members of parliament, Sweden could adopt the active labour market policy, 
formulated by the trade union economists, G6sta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner, which 
united the interests of labour, capital and state in the economic modernization in Sweden. 
The active labour market policy is important for understanding the 'Swedish model' 
(Olofsson, unpublished book). The Swedes used this policy to complement the 
'solidaristic wage policy' of the trade union movement, from which people got the same 
payment for the same type of jobs. 
As far as the second case is concerned, from 1932 till 1976, the Liberal Party in Sweden 
never managed to develop a social base and become an alternative to the Social 
Democrats (Dangerfield, 1965; Verney, 1972, pp. 42-59). That was because, first, 
Sweden was still a primarily agrarian country in the early 1930's, and, unlike the Social 
Democrats, the Liberals never developed their strong roots in the rural areas; secondly, 
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an alliance of the Social Democrats with the agrarian parties avoided the development of 
an influential rural class apart from social democracy and in the 1930s agrarian interests 
appeared best served by this alignment (Esping-Andersen, 1984). The Swedish liberal 
provision of some basic social benefits, which were prior to the rise of the Social 
Democrats, was easily overshadowed by the political coalition of industrial and agrarian 
interests assembled by the Social Democratic Party and by the aims of the labour 
movement and the Party. Nations like Sweden, where industrialisation occurred at an 
earlier stage, faced a crucial problem of dealing with the rural classes. Since it usually 
constituted the largest single group in the electorate, the Social Democrats had to form a 
coalition with the farmers if they wanted to constitute a political majority. Because of the 
weaker labour movement and the more autonomous agricultural sector, the Social 
Democrats could not rely on the power of the left, but needed a political alliance with the 
farmers to fashion a compromise between wages and welfare. 
Among the so-called 'liberal' welfare states, there was, as Esping-Andersen (1990) 
argued, a lack of working class mobilisation for the left. In terms of power, the American 
working class was divided by racism, religion and migration in the pluralist setting of 
American politics and by employers' opposition to the unionisation of production 
workers. Ilis lasted until the 1930's and the Great Depression when political awareness 
and the growing class consciousness of the workers were aroused by the operation of the 
American capitalist system, and the right to organise was established by the National 
Labor Relations Act (Fraser, 1979, pp. 303,308). Yet, the labour movement had never 
been able to get the working class united (Ginsburg, 1992, p. 100) and, due to political 
and presidential systems, it had proved impossible to set up a Labour Party in the United 
States. From the turn of the century until the depression of the 1930s, there was a 
concentration of wealth and income. Apart from the increasing gap in the living standards 
between the working class, the middle class and those on the top level, there was a 
notable difference of payments between the skilled and unskilled within the working 
class. T'hus, the central state did not need to develop the capacity to confront and respond 
to the demands of a politically and nationally unified working class. 
The early response of the country to the problem of unemployment was influenced by 
internal trade interests, the industrial structure and the labour movement. According to 
Rimlinger (1971), the success of the 'struggle for the establishment of modem social 
rights'- relied strongly on 'the full support of organised labor' (p. 8). However, social 
reform failed to gain support from the American Federation of Labor (AFL) -- 
representing craftsmen organisations -- as the AFL preferred a voluntaristic policy agreed 
by employers (they accepted occupational welfare schemes as 'welfare capitalism') and 
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objected to social insurance for giving effect to governmental requirements (Fraser, 
1979, pp. 307-8). 
The American labour movement was not involved in the establishment of the 1935 Act. 
Although the labour movement was a keen promoter of New Deal social insurance 
schemes89 and obviously benefited from the Bill, it did not result from labour unrest nor 
was it a part of aim of reconstructing the labour market. Those responsible for the Bill 
wanted to sustain the American myth of the individual's independence from the 
government and to reduce the significance of the government intervention. During the 
hearings on the Bill, the Labor Committee was not selected by Roosevelt out of fear that 
more radical Congressmen might extend the scope of the Bill. The intention of excluding 
the Labor Department from the Committee on Economic Security was to include the 
business community. The law was a typical product of 'American pluralist politics, 
working in conventional ways among the well known pitfalls of party coalitions and 
Congressional politics. ' (Ashford, 1986, p. 238). 
In the case of the development of unemployment insurance schemes in the three 
countries, it would be wrong to conclude that the workers or the unemployed, who were 
supposed to be the beneficiaries of the system, exerted a direct and decisive influence on 
the final outcome of the policy making process. The policy makers' concerns with the 
reactions of the middle-class or the farmers or the liberals (in the Swedish case) to their 
proposals, their pragmatic stance in terms of choosing certain features for their UI 
schemes in order to gain the political support from different parties and/or groups, the 
different attitudes among the labour movement to social insurance and the different power 
structures of the three countries, all explained a great deal. 
What the Liberal experience in Britain showed was that, unlike the other countries, the 
welfare state was introduced at the beginning of the 20th century without popular support 
or political coherence. In many respects, it was a product of political opportunity 
(Ashford, 1986, p. 77). The creation of the liberal welfare state did not originate from a 
critical election or from organised pressure outside government, rather, the conversion of 
ideas into proposals for the welfare state took place within the administrative system. The 
British administration enjoyed a virtual monopoly in planning the emerging welfare state 
at the turn of the century, and discussions of the proposals and problems were held 
among small circles of ambitious reformers and their political friends who were able to 
simplify social and other policy problems in order to find political solutions and to amend 
89. I'lic united labour gave its support to the Democrats at the 1932 election which the realignment of 
American party politics took place (Fraser, 1979, p. 308) 
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the weakness of experimental legislation. The lack of support from the early Labour 
Party and unions' was surely a major cause for Lloyd George and Churchill devising 
their own strategies for launching the British welfare state. 90 
According to Baldwin (1990), the incidence of risk and the capacity for self-reliance were 
two variables which confined the appeal of any particular group at a given time to the 
redistribution programmes. While the risk-prone communities sought for the means of 
reallocating the effects of uncertainty, the better off might insist on their independence, 
and the political conflict between these groups as risk categories over the formulation of 
social insurance had significantly affected the nature of welfare policy (p. 17). In Britain, 
the Friendly Societies provided services for middle and low income groups, and the 
solidarity of members was reinforced by the fraternal character of the societies. Rooted in 
working class self-reliance, they were opposed to the development of social insurance, 
and this helped to prevent the British labour movement from playing a more active role in 
this process (Gilbert, 1966). In designing the 1911 Insurance Act, the government was 
aware that although they were economically weak, the Friendly Societies had to be taken 
seriously as their opposition could kill its proposals. Lloyd George consistently preferred 
the incorporation of Friendly Societies and later other organisations as collecting agents 
of contributions in order to reduce the resistance to compulsory contributions. George 
and Wilding (1976) argued that some constituent features contained in the National 
Insurance Act, 1911, e. g. the use of the insurance principle, the level of benefits, 
originated from the conflicts and bargains between the various pressure groups involved, 
as the working class was 'neither so strong nor so proficient in the art of exerting 
pressure as the other groups involved, ... the whole confrontation was taking place 
within an ideological climate that favoured the upper classes' (p. 19). 91 
In the United States, social welfare was regarded as an arena in which represented the 
reform activities of the Progressive Era. Social workers, in response to the reform 
90. Thc 1911 Act was almost entirely the product of a small band of Treasury officials, like Sir Robert 
Bradbury, head of the Inland Revenue Service, Sir Robert Chalmers, a high Treasury officials, 
Masterman, Financial Secretary of the Treasury (Boldcrson & Mabbettt, 1991, pp. 179-80). Part Two of 
the British 1911 Act was passed with little debate, on the contrary, as Beveridge noted, 'no one outside 
the Board of Trade know enough to criticize it in detail. ' (quoted in Gilbert, The Evolution of national 
Insurance, 1966, pp. 2834). 
91. In Britain, the real political fight over developing social insurance arose from the small, voluntary or 
mutual insurance companies. The British and the American large private insurance companies had great 
influence in designing social insurance. By 1908,1059 unions in Britain, with nearly 2.5 million 
members, had made provisions against unemployment (Ogus, 1982, p. 186). However, compared with 
national insurance against unemployment, they had a number of disadvantages: limited coverage of only 
the elite of the working classes, ignorance of the responsibilities of employers and encouragement of 
only local and haphazard labour mobility (Harris, 1972; Fulbrook, 1978). 
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movement, established a leading role in promoting social legislation and expressing 
society's will for social change. Their demands for compensation for industrial accidents 
and diseases, for the provision of compulsory education, for the introduction of social 
security against unemployment, retirement, etc., reflected their understanding of the 
environment and the problems caused by it (Axinn and Levin, 1975, p. 126). The 
American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) was a single organisation which 
focused their concerns on social insurance. It was directed by labour historians and 
labour experts, like R. Commons and his student John B. Andrews. Andrews' 
organisation in Wisconsin provided most of the experts for the Social Security Act of 
1935. In fact, a skillful team of progressive social insurance experts from Wisconsin 
formed the basis of the American Social Security Administration. 
The role played by the employers in the United States was also noticeable. Big business 
established its influential position in the society by the turn of the century (see Chapter 
Five). In the 1920s, welfare provision by the modem American corporations was 
popular and big business exerted considerable influence over the American economic 
policy. The government sought to limit its power but sometimes encouraged it to provide 
economic security for its workers (Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991, p. 60). By providing 
social protection for their workers, employers could increase loyalty and stability in the 
work-force, weaken the influence of the organised labour and fend off demands for state- 
provided protection. The introduction of Workers' Compensation in most states by 1920 
was a good example which reflected cross-class support for employer-based welfare. 
Corporate welfare was influential in making decisions about the structure of American 
social security, in particular, in the area of unemployment insurance. 'Me adoption of the 
merit-rating principle in the provision of unemployment insurance benefits was related to 
the guarantee of freedom for employers in their business management and, accordingly, 
to their responsibilities for job creation and unemployment compensation to their 
employees (ibid., p. 69). 
In the case of official and popular views toward social assistance and the strong feelings 
of self-reliance among trade unionists, there were some apparent similarities between the 
United States and Britain. However, due to political and constitutional differences 
between these two countries, it was difficult to convert these ideas into national politics in 
the United States (Ashford, 1986, p. 61). Ginsburg (1992) has argued that the most 
distinctive features of the American welfare systeM92 originated from the particular 
92.7bey were the immense variety in policies and practice from one state to another, and the absence of 
a coherent national social policy, a clear separation between social insurance for those regarded as 
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characteristics of the state apparatus, the class structure and corporate capital. As far as 
the first was concerned, it referred to the lack of a powerful central state apparatus. The 
anti-federalism, the decentralisation of power, the absence of a powerful domestic civil 
service, and the separation of powers at all levels of government between executive, 
legislative and judiciary, made the American state bureaucracy different from its 
European counterparts (Amenta and Skocpol, 1986). British local government, for 
example, had little political incentive to take the initiative as the welfare state emerged. 
This encouraged the administration to design policies which avoided effective local 
political control, and national government could ignore local preferences. In the United 
States, local government imposed very different effects on the social security and welfare 
structures from those of their British counterparts. 
The 1935 Social Security Act made specific provisions to permit states to influence social 
policies. Ile Act did not represent a fundamental redirection of the American political 
process though it was a major turning point in American social legislation. It was the 
only New Deal social reform which was entirely administered by the federal government 
providing uniform benefits across the states. However, the federal uniformity, as Orloff 
(1988) described, induced a tension between national standards and co-ordination at 
federal level and state autonomy and diversity. This was particularly in the 
unemployment insurance system. Ile merit-rating principle in unemployment insurance 
allowed for the payment of the different contributions by different employers. Yet, 
because of interstate competition, uniformity in contribution rates was required. Owing to 
the differences between the polity of the United States and those of Britain and Sweden, 
the 1935 Act adopted a complicated federal-state cooperation system in its unemployment 
benefit provision: the amount of a uniform national pay-roll tax by employers could be 
reduced by the employers' payment to a state insurance scheme. The states were granted 
autonomy to decide rules governing eligibility, duration and amounts of benefit and 
employers' contributions, yet they had to meet certain requirements. The states also 
received grants from the federal government for administering the scheme (see Part 
Two). 
To summarise this section, it would appear that we can not attribute the different welfare 
outcomes to one single powerful force, i. e. the role of the labour movement, rather we 
should also take some other factors like the nature of class mobilisation, the structure of 
the class political alliance into account. It is however incorrect to argue that labour 
movements and labour parties in these three types were equally powerful and therefore 
deserving, and means-tested programmes for the poor, and the essential part played by private charitable 
and commercial interests within the welfare state (Ginsburg, 1992, p. 100). 
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exerted more or less similar political influences on the emergence of welfare systems. As 
organised forces, they were accepted by society, or more precisely, by the ruling class, 
more easily in one country than the others. This was due to different historical legacies 
and power structures. 
As far as the introduction of unemployment insurance schemes in the three chosen 
countries is concerned, the Swedish labour movement, due to its special relationship with 
the Social Democratic Party, played a more direct and influential role than its British and 
American counterparts. In Britain, the power and influence of small groups within the 
administrative elite was remarkable. In the United States, although the President and 
some administrators played crucial roles in the process of decision making, the failure of 
the Ohio group to obtain support, especially, from organised labour, for its pro- 
redistribution policy in this field reflected the decision makers' concern. with the interests 
of the business. So, in these two cases, which were lack of powerful labour movement, 
the impact of other groups on unemployment insurance and welfare policy in general 
needs to be given a appropriate consideration. 
Section Three The Historical Heritage, Ideology and the Characteristics 
of the Unemployment Insurance Scheme 
Ginsburg (1992) argued that the British welfare consensus in the post-war period could 
be described as 'liberal collectivism'. It was 'liberal' because its architects, Keynes and 
Beveridge, were liberally-oriented; it was 'collectivism' as there was a development of 
'direct public provision of welfare benefits and services, the commitment to universal 
access to those benefits and services, and the national uniformity of the system'. Yet in 
reality the precise extent of the state obligations and the welfare rights of citizens were 
subject to political pragmatism and social struggle (p. 141). 
Actually, the liberal collectivism of the British welfare state in this period was already 
evident at the turn of the century. Beveridge himself was a participant of the new 
liberalism in the Edwardian era -- the time when social insurance was introduced in 
Germany and the elements of the Bismarkian social policy were accepted as a 
modification of free-market liberalism. In dealing with social problems, like 
unemployment, in an international context in the early years of this century, the British 
decision makers held to their traditional individualistic beliefs but adopted some 
collectivist thinking in order to win a privileged position over their political opponents 
and more electoral support at home, and, internationally, to preserve the national 
powerful position of the United Kingdom as one of the leading societies in the world. 
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Since the 1890s and, in particular, after the Boer War, British leaders shared common 
anxieties about British politics. The new generation of Edwardian policy makers was in 
close contact with the new social philosophers, and the 'new liberalism' which became 
the hallmark of Edwardian thinking about society and politics was influenced by Green 
(1836-82), English idealist philosopher, and other thinkers of that age. It provoked 
political concerns within Whitehall and West Minster but did not question British political 
traditions. British concepts of state and society and the new relationship between the 
individual and the state were relatively untouched during the early stages of Edwardian 
social legislation. This was largely concerned with 'morality' and feared that social 
reform which involved state aid to the poor would underrnine forever the self-reliance of 
a class and lead to the moral destruction of the next generation. 
The thinking of the Edwardian reformers in the period between 1886 and 1914 was thus 
increasingly divided, along thinking inside the main political parties, into two polarities: 
on one side were the left-oriented reformers who were supporting the emerging 
collectivism, and on the other the right-oriented thinkers who were committed to the 
individualistic tradition. Compared with the left, the right was more influential and 
pervasive. Its thinking was based on two concepts: freedom from the state intervention 
and individual duty. Whereas the right looked to moral values as solutions to social 
problems, the left advocated a change of the system. They believed that society was 
composed of socially and economically conflicting groups and that the increased 
governmental action was necessary for individual fulfillment, in particular, to benefit of 
the less advantaged. 
'Me emergence of socialism at the end of the 19th century constituted a fierce challenge to 
the fundamental tenets of the conservatism; it threatened what the conservatives valued, 
but could not initially find a place in the political and constitutional structure of Britain. At 
the turn of the 20th century, the British left had no political motive to adopt militant 
socialism, nor were the leaders influenced by the intense socialist debate. In their overall 
assessment of socialism, the Tories argued that the socialist idea was not adaptable to 
British traditions, as in a socialist society, the state as the universal employer would lead 
to inefficiency and poverty and to 'the disruption of all private property and profit,. 93 
British socialists had little influence over social policy in Edwardian Britain. As Freeden 
93. NUCAS, I'lic Campaign Guide (Edinburgh, 1909, p. 335). For Ashford, in spite of the connection 
between the transforming process of the liberal state to welfare state and the intensive feeling aroused by 
the rise of socialism, (he Liberals' motive was to harmonize the basic doctrine of liberalism with an 
elaborate and growing set of social policies (Ashford, 1986, p. 10). 
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(1978) writes, socialism emerged as 'one of the most elusive, vague, and diverse 
concepts' in British social and political thought (p. 15). 
It is therefore incorrect to conclude that the development of welfare states in Britain was 
the fulfillment of socialist ideology. Unlike Sweden, the British welfare state has never 
been dominated by social democratic ideology. The elitist character of British policy 
making was, from a policy-making perspective, one reason why the British welfare state 
never became a radical departure from British political traditions. The new leaders like 
Smith, Morant and Beveridge were also skillful civil servants, who had never been 
excluded from power, and their understanding of the poor never needed to be translated 
into radical political action. Collini (1979) argued that the new liberal thinker 'wants to 
have his cake of socialism and to eat it in accordance with liberal principles. ' (p. 134). 
Laisscz: faire liberal assumptions were manifested in new social legislation, in the design 
and extension of social benefits and in the persistence of the Poor Laws. The 
individualistic assumptions prevailed over new liberalism in the British debate. Though 
there had been an accumulation of social legislation throughout Victorian Britain and the 
Tories responded pragmatically to the pressure for change in unemployment policy which 
emanated from the Liberal or Labour parties in the early 1900s, the commitment to 
massive state intervention came rather suddenly, since as late as 1906, the Liberals had 
no formed views about social policy. 
According to Ashford (1986), the Edwardian intellectual dispute provided the context for 
launching the British welfare state. Yet there was only a vague connection between these 
ideas and the policies that emerged in 1911; the major actors among the Liberals, such as 
Lloyd George, were only caught up with their experience of grating poverty (pp. 76-7). 
However, behind their social reformist ideas also lay the voluminous researches by social 
scientists in which social problems were described in great detail and collectivist 
solutions were mooted. Ile early investigators of social issues, such as Mayhew, Booth 
and Rowntree, believed in the idea that the advance of society could be realised through 
alternative socio-economic structures by the government. They argued that empirical 
evidence of poverty should be translated into public policies without delay, and presumed 
that government and Parliament were capable of finding rational solutions to social 
problems. 
While the establishment of the welfare state in Britain at the beginning of the 20th century 
involved a great deal of moral debates and therefore had a stronger philosophical 
foundation than elsewhere, the major intellectual effort for advocating expanded social 
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insurance and the new proposals for social legislation in both the United States and 
Sweden in the 1930's were more linked to political realities than to new or changing 
values. This may be related to the fact that, during the period when these countries were 
involved in discussions of governmental measures for dealing with industrial problems, 
the backgrounds against which their social insurance systems were to be established 
changed. After the political and administrative moves of the 1920s and the 1930s toward 
a fully developed welfare state, political forces in Sweden and the United States gradually 
manoeuvred to bring about the massive policy changes of the 1930s (Ashford, 1986, 
P. 109). 
As mentioned before, there were differences between Sweden and the United States in 
terms of their political power structures. As far as Sweden is concerned, it is important to 
recognise that the possibility of more ambitious approaches to welfare policies was 
dependent upon its unique historical and political circumstances. In contrast to the United 
States, where a pluralist political system prevailed, the social reforms promoted by the 
Social Democratic Party in Sweden in the 1930's were designed by a small group of the 
socialist thinkers. 
The Social Democrats' policies then were influenced by three eminent ideological factors. 
First was the famous phrase, 'the People's Home', created by the party leader Albin 
Hansson in 1928, with the idea of fostering 'equality, concern, cooperation and 
helpfulness' in the welfare society of the future (see Part Two). References to the people 
rather than the working class reflected the party's strategy of forming a coalition with the 
Farmer's Party. Second was the related idea of 'solidarity, to restrain competition and 
develop economic democracy, political accountability and social equality. Ernst Wigforss 
saw 'socialism as the logical extension of liberalism rather than its antithesis. ' (Tilton, 
1977, pp. 505-20). Third were counter-cyclical economic policies of Keynes, using 
public employment and labour market policies to limit unemployment. The Social 
Democratic Party leaders were able to take advantage of the early development of 
Keynesian concepts by Wicksell, who was regarded as the founder of demand-based 
economics in Sweden. Both sides of industry recognised the interdependence of 
increased productivity and redistribution. The influence of social democratic ideas in 
Sweden, championed by Bertil Ohlin and the Stockholm school, was powerful and led 
the Social Democratic Party towards a new vision of social harmony. More importantly, 
the severe depression of industry and agriculture in the 1920's made the uniting of 
workers and farmers behind the SAP in the 1930's possible. 
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The leading figures in the Party abandoned orthodox Marxist thinking after the party's 
defeat in 1928 and were anxious to construct an entirely new framework for the welfare 
state in the context of the severe political and economic vulnerability of the 1930's. 
Political uncertainty was more important in deciding the terms of the 1934 Act than 
orthodox socialist enthusiasm. Small contributions by employers was one of the 
government's strategies of avoiding the protests against the unemployment insurance 
proposal from the Liberals. This points to the influence of populism, which aimed to 
achieve a popular authority and to secure the electorate's support in order to build up a 
coalition between social groups and interests which were hostile to socialism. 'Socialist 
ideology and rhetoric remain the rationale for the party's existence and a bench-mark for 
ideological renewal, but populist pragmatism and political realism shape much of the 
party's policies in government. ' (Ginsburg, 1992, p. 31). It was not until the socialists' 
power base became firmer in the late 1930s and the LO achieved firmer control over the 
labour movement in the early 1940s that the studies which led to the development of an 
entirely new system, which would later be called'the Swedish Model', took place (see 
Part Two). The gradual development of social welfare in Sweden reflected a political 
tradition of compromise and coalition in an ethnically homogeneous society. 
Compared with Sweden, the United States presented an opposite approach in its effort to 
redefine the role of the state in society. In the United States, due to its immense social 
and economic diversity, it was virtually impossible to formulate an embracing ideology 
of social change. The idea of the welfare state was much less securely established than in 
Western Europe, and the proposals for social reform were relatively isolated from 
political controversy. Although a new approach to thinking in this field emerged in the 
United States early in the present century, and Americans had become as aware of 
poverty and social inequality by 1914 as most of their European counterparts, social 
security did not challenge the political pluralism of the country, rather it left the liberal 
political foundations essentially untouched. But without the institutional capacity, the 
Americans could not translate social concern into legislation. They kept their faith in 
laissez faire and self-help, favoured the private economy over the public and valued 
individual choice over collective choices. Thus, they were reluctant to accept the goal of 
redistributing resources from the 'haves' to the 'have-nots', as for them, social welfare 
programmes were not suited to the tradition of the country. I 
Since the early twentieth century, along with economic development, there was also a 
change concerning values. A society which was based on a model of competition 
between small business firms and individual achievement met a challenge from the 
emerging corporations or trusts engaged in monopolistic market control. In the corporate 
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society, collective interdependence was recognised as a new social doctrine and the virtue 
of laissez-faire began to be questioned. In terms of social reform, while the prominent 
social theorists of the nineteenth century assumed individual improvement as its basis, 
their successors in the twentieth century argued for a reform of institutions to enact legal 
regulations to deal with social and political problems (Axinn and Levin, 1975, pp. 121- 
2). Corporate capital which was dominant in the economy started to interfere with many 
aspects of welfare. As a result, social engineering became a dominant theme in the 
country and, as was mentioned in Chapter Five, led to big business promoting the idea of 
a agreeable relationship between capital and labour in the corporate welfare programmes 
in the United States. 
Until the depression of the 1930s, the United States went through a period in which 
many American achieved individual prosperity as it has been discussed earlier. High 
levels of employment and wage increases made the Americans ignore the problems of 
those less fortunate. rMe doctrine of laissez-faire was proclaimed by those who believed 
that what was good for business was good for the nation. The solution to poverty was 
closely related to the effort to encourage business rather than corporate regulation, social 
insurance or public welfare. People believed that the very possibility of the imminent 
disappearance of poverty was associated with economic growth and affluence in the 
1920s. Iley regarded prosperity as an important achievement of many of the goals of the 
reform movement and thus decreased the pressure for further social legislation. Character 
reform of people in need rather than social reform renewed its prominence among the 
advocates of reform who expressed suspicion of public relief and of relief recipients. 
American society preserved its liberal character by avoiding any suggestion that social 
security was in fact related to wage and labour problems (Harpham, 1986). 
When the social insurance system was adopted at a time of radical political change and 
innovation in America, it was not a centre piece of the New Deal. Also because of the 
influence of the model of corporate welfare of the 1920s, the design of the American 
social insurance system was different from Britain. Ile impact of the major financial and 
industrial corporations on the construction of the American welfare state was quite unlike 
anything in Western Europe (Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991, pp. 55-6). The 'liberalism' 
of the industrial and financial corporations exerted a powerful influence during the period 
when America was building up its modem welfare state. In a combination with 
1voluntarism', 'liberalism' functioned as the basis of a certain social policy consensus 
after the 1930s onwards (Ginsburg, 1992, P. 100). 94 In addition, the development of the 
94. While the former referred mainly to two principles, (first, the belief that individual families, with the 
support of private agencies, should almost entirely control their own welfare; second, that public welfare 
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British unemployment insurance scheme in the 1920-30s and the problems regarding the 
financing of the scheme caused by the policy changes were also used by the supporters 
of Wisconsin to argue that their approach was a better choice for unemployment 
insurance in the United States (see earlier discussion in Part Two and Chapter Five). 
Britain, in contrast to the USA, made more efforts to extend the system of relief than to 
provide programmes of public works. The nature of the original national insurance 
scheme, which was the product of the political economy of laissez: faire and the historical 
legacy of the Poor Law, was transformed following World War I and the depression of 
1921. During the 1920s and 1930s, a dozen or more unemployment laws were passed. 
This resulted from the politicians' suspicion of the government's ability to reduce 
unemployment and their inconsistency to the 'no relief without work' principle. The 
failure of Britain to adopt radical economic policies was due to the lesser influence of the 
depression in the country than in the United States. When unemployment became severe, 
British policies focused on this single issue. They devoted more legislative time to the 
relief of unemployment than to its reduction (Tomlinson, 1990, p. 119; Bolderson and 
Mabbett, 1991, pp. 66-7), ensuring provision of assistance to the increasing numbers 
who were excluded from unemployment insurance. The liberalisation of the 
unemployment insurance programme undermined its solvency which was built up under 
the favourable economic conditions which existed before 1920. After 1920, the receipts 
and expenditures became seriously unbalanced and unemployment insurance came under 
a considerable financial pressure and had become quite inadequate by 1931. 
The summarise to this section, I would like to suggest that the establishment of 
unemployment insurance schemes in the three countries revealed the impact of ideology 
on the different outcomes of the same programme, and showed that there was no 
necessary link between socialism and unemployment insurance programmes. However, 
while we recognise the importance of ideology in the development of social policy, we 
should also be aware that its role may be more precisely assessed in the context of the 
political power structure and the institutional constraints in the countries under 
investigation. 
intervention should help individuals and their families to reconstruct self-sufficiency rather than rely on 
public support), the latter, which had a particular meaning in the US, implied the necessity of positive 
intervention in order to meet social needs, of pressures from different interest groups, the poor, the 
middles class, the labour movement and the business corporations and so on, to introduce social policies. 
The former had'been tempered and blunted throughout US history' by latter (Ginsburg, 1992, p. 100). 
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Decision makers made policy choices according to their beliefs, but, due to the 
complexity of decision making process, they also had to adjust their beliefs to the 
prevailing circumstances in order to get approval for their proposals from other groups. 
Thus, it became necessary for them to make pragmatic changes to their basic ideological 
positions on governmental intervention. Also because of the long term effects of 
historical legacies, politicians were constrained by previous legislations. As 
Ashford(1986) has argued, in their efforts to launch the welfare stite between 1906- 
1911, the British Liberals, like their political rivals, the Conservatives, were not well 
prepared to choose between p olicy options. Social policy was an area in which politicians 
were unable to predict many of the political consequences of their actions and made many 
decisions from the short-term perspective of normal democratic politics (Ashford, 1986, 
pp. 13,217,312). 95 Apart from these considerations which influenced the outcomes of 
the unemployment insurance scheme in the three countries, we also need to take the 
experience of the scheme in Britain, which was a precedent in this field, into account. 
The development and changes the British made to their initial scheme, during the time 
when the issue was discussed in the other two countries, reinforced the decision makers' 
belief, especially in America, that they should introduce an unemployment insurance 
scheme which would be different from the British one. 
Part Four Summary and Conclusion 
In Chapter Two, I presented the different approaches to comparative studies in social 
policy and outlined some basic factors which should be given special attention in 
analyzing the process of decision-making in unemployment insurance. Although these 
approaches have contributed some valuable insights into the establishment and 
development of the welfare state, they all have been criticised for shortcomings in their 
explanations. In spite of the merits and shortcomings of the approaches, it would be 
wrong to conclude that they are totally independent to each other or that they do not have 
any theoretical value. Rather it is important to try to connect them to the different 
experiences of the different welfare states. We may find that, while one approach is 
suitable to one policy in one country at a certain period, it is less useful than other 
95. The 1911 Act's limitation to those trades which had seasonal fluctuations and which were neither the 
most stable nor the most prone to chronic unemployment, reflected the framers' consideration about the 
actuarial uncertainties in insuring against unemployment and the possible injustices to some employers 
of not risk-rating. 7be flat-rate contributions and benefits rather than carnings-related design avoided the 
opposition of the Friendly Societies and other advocates of privates provision and their adoption enabled 
the more skilled workmen to top up their basic state benefits by voluntary insurance, and aimed at 
preventing want amongst the poorest as replacements for the Poor Law (Gilbert, 1966; Harris, 1972; 
Hennock, 1987; Bolderson and Mabbett, 1991). 
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approaches to explain some other policy in other countries at a different period. Thus it is 
important to apply these various approaches to the same policy area in different countries 
in order to discover which explanations are more appropriate for interpreting what has 
happened in this field. While some factors have clearly played important roles in the 
decision making process, their actual importance in the different countries can be very 
different. 
In order to make a comparative study of decision making in unemployment insurance 
schemes in Britain, Sweden and the United States, I have tried to choose certain angles 
as dimensions for making comparison. Based on my discussions in Chapter Two, I 
focus on two elements as starting points; one is the political power structure and the other 
is the ideology of the participants in the policy making process. 'ne choice of these two 
elements is partly for practical reasons. Since it is impossible to include all the basic 
influences on decision making in a doctoral thesis, economic factors have been given less 
attention than political and ideological ones. In addition, in terms of political factors 
mentioned in the discussions of the different approaches, I have not adhered to any view 
which regards either the working class movement or powerful individuals or institutions 
as being decisive in the process. Instead, I have used a general term, the political power 
structure, in my analysis, in order to take all the different political actors into account and 
examine differences among the three chosen countries in this study. In relation to this, 
the different ideologies of the various participants in decision making process and their 
impacts on the outcomes have been given particular attention. 
Referring to the above and the questions which are listed in my framework chapter, I 
have constructed my comparative analysis from three aspects in order to discover the 
reasons for the similarities and the differences of unemployment insurance policy in the 
three countries. First, I have studied the historical context of the three countries in which 
unemployment was recognized as a social problem. The acceptance of unemployment as 
an economic and political issue was basically connected with the general economic 
situation of the country. Yet, the answers to questions such as when, how and by whom 
the problem entered into debate went beyond economic consideration. The influence of 
different groups in relation to their position in the power structure became important. 
Their attitudes and opinions about the causes of and remedies for unemployment 
influenced the adoption by the government of a particular policy in this field. In addition 
to understanding what the groups or figures were and whose interests they represented, it 
is also important to understand their basic beliefs concerning the relationship between the 
state and the individual. 
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Based on my discussion, I have argued that although unemployment insurance was a 
matter which concerned the working class most, it is wrong to conclude that the working 
class had the final say about the outcome of legislation. In Sweden, due to its special 
relationship with the Social Democratic Party, the LO appeared to exert more influence on 
unemployment insurance than Britain and America. The roles of the organised labour in 
these two countries were replaced by small circles of ambitious reformers in Britain, and 
by some skillful experts in this field who represented the interests of business and of the 
President and his advisors in America. As far as influence of ideology on the outcome of 
the unemployment policy in the three countries is concerned, I have included two 
elements in my discussion. One is the basic beliefs of the people who were important in 
the decision-making process, and their connection with the national legacy, e. g. cultural 
traditions and the consequences of previous legislation, the other is the interaction 
between these beliefs and the actual political situation. From the former, it would seem 
that the decision makers' ideologies were somehow constrained by and associated with 
the dominant ideas of the society; from the latter, it is important to understand how 
people made changes to their basic beliefs for pragmatic reasons and how these changes 
affected the final formulation of the unemployment insurance schemes. Although the 
policy makers in the three countries held or were influenced by different ideologies, -- 
Ginsburg (1992) points out that decision making in Sweden was influenced by the social 
democracy; in the United States by voluntarism and liberalism, and in Britain by liberal 
collectivism, in each case small groups of individuals played key roles and compromises 
were made on political, financial and administrative grounds. 
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Chapter Seven Findings and Conclusions 
Following the previous case studies and the comparative analysis of the introduction of 
unemployment insurance in Britain, Sweden and the United States, in this chapter, I 
provide conclusions to my work by spelling out some findings regarding the different 
introduction of unemployment insurance scheme (UI) in the three countries under 
investigation. They are carried out under three sections: research methods, 
unemployment insurance and policy making. Following the summary of what I have 
learned about programmes of unemployment insurance and about policy-making from 
studying the establishment of UI in the three countries, the final part of this chapter will 
be devoted to conclusions. 
1. The Validity and Deficiency of the Research Methods Used in This 
Study 
This section discusses the merits and shortcomings of my research methods. On the basis 
of the discussion, possible avenues for the future research in the field of social policy are 
suggested. 
Easton's theory was utilised as the basis for developing'an analytical framework in this 
study. The theory was useful because it accounts for the dynamic nature of political 
system in terms of the interaction between the system and its environment. However, the 
value of the theory is undermined by its failure to offer a convincing description of the 
operation of the system in which 'demands' and 'supports' as inputs turn into policies as 
outputs. In order to understand how the system functions, i. e. the way in which inputs 
are transferred to outputs, it is necessary to know what the demands and supports are, 
who constitutes them, how successful their efforts are and what responses those in 
power will make. In this context, the term power structure has been introduced. Through 
the analysis of power relationships between the different segments of society, the 
different roles they played in establishing specific policies, such as unemployment 
insurance, can be assessed. 
Studying the roles of the political parties and pressure groups inevitably involves 
analysing their ideologies, which are largely ignored in EastoWs theory. By examining 
the influence of ideology on policy making, we saw how the basic beliefs of the 
participants in the policy process affected their understanding and acceptance of 
unemployment as a political problem. Their ideas of the correct relationship between the 
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state, society and individuals were reflected in their proposals. In addition, we took into 
account the dominant ideology, which originated from the national historical and cultural 
legacy of the country, and analysed its impact on policy makers. Furthermore, the 
connection between the ideology of a group and its position in the power structure was 
also considered. 
Ile inclusion of these two factors, as additional criteria to those suggested by Easton's 
theory, challenged the assumption that decisions are a purely functional response of the 
system to changes in its environment and are the product of value consensus among the 
different groups in society. In the field of social policy, the functionalist approach tends 
to regard the creation of the welfare state as functionally necessary, historically inevitable 
and similar in its characteristics in all advanced capitalist states. As a result, it neglects 
variations between countries and does not take into account that public policies are the 
outcome of choices. 
In contrast to the functionalist perspective, this study not only explained why the 
introduction of UI became necessary, but also analysed how policies in this area were 
initiated in different policy contexts. It argued that although the acceptance of 
unemployment as an economic and political issue was generally caused by the economic 
situation of the sample countries, adequate explanations to those matters, such as when, 
how and by whom the problem was placed on the agenda, relied on the accounts for the 
political and ideological elements in policy-making process. 
In terms of the first factor, the power structure, the varying influence exerted by the 
working class organisations, elite groups, political parties and business groups on 
unemployment insurance was examined. With regard the second factor, ideology, the 
basic beliefs and policy preferences of the individuals, groups and parties who 
participated in the process, and the impact of national social policy legacy in each 
country, were studied. The approach adopted in this thesis analysed the different 
elements and their sophisticated relationships in the specific historical context of each 
country and viewed unemployment insurance as the result of policy choices. The 
different interpretations of social problems by different groups in society and their 
significance were assessed. Other factors, such as the state of public opinion, the political 
situation, financial concerns and assumptions regarding the possible effects of policy on 
society were given particular attention. 
The thesis also argues that, instead of analysing social policy only on the basis of 
theoretical assumptions, it is more fruitful to apply a historical and comparative approach 
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to the subject under investigation. The analysis of the process of policy formation was 
divided into two stages. The first examined whether or not legislative change took place 
in the context of social, economic and political elements. The second considered the 
actual form and shape of legislation as the outcome of the policy making process in terms 
of political and ideological considerations and national institutional legacies. rMe case 
studies accordingly were each composed of two parts. The first was a historical review 
of both the social, economic and political elements which brought the debate on 
unemployment relief onto the agenda and previous measures adopted by-governments in 
order to deal with unemployment. 'Me second analysed the characteristics of Ul schemes 
in the three countries and explained the causes of their differences in terms of political 
and ideological factors and national institutional legacies. 
The chronological account, which was employed in the historical analysis, helped us to 
assess the significance of 'social policy legacies' in establishing UI schemes in the three 
countries. It enabled us to see the consequent chains of policy development and the 
influence of the national institutional framework through the process of policy feedback. 
Within the framework, the problem of unemployment was dealt with by different parties 
and groups in different ways. During the 'political learning process'.. the historically 
ingrained institutional arrangements affected the elaboration of the interests of these 
groups, and the possibility of the government translating its political imperatives into 
public policy. The existing national institutional framework and social policy tradition 
shaped and defined the agenda of reform, influenced the state's capacities for political 
action and informed policy choices and policy outcomes. 
The comparative study of the three countries under investigation highlights the diversity 
in establishing and developing welfare policies in different countries. It also demonstrates 
the importance of cross-national variations in the same policy area. Being the sample 
countries for my empirical study, Britain, Sweden and the United States share several 
common charactristics as well as major differences (see Chapter One). According to 
Esping-Andersen, these three countries are representative of the three welfare-state 
regime-types. The United States and Sweden can be regarded as 'liberal' and 'social 
democratic' respectively, while Britain is characterised as 'liberal' but in less extreme 
ways than the United States. Expla&tions of the distinctive features of UI in the 
different countries can be found in their different national political economic, 
institutional, cultural and historical contexts. 
Due to the open competition of ideas, and the flexibility of the democratic policy making 
process, it is impossible to discover similar patterns of response, formulation and 
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implementation in a single policy area or to attribute the development of welfare policy to 
any single cause. By studying the power structure, the dominant ideology, the aims of 
powerful groups in society and the priorities of policy makers, we were able to identify 
how different countries provided different forms of protections for the unemployed. 
Their UI schemes revealed distinctive national characteristics in policy making and 
reflected different approaches to social justice, political control and wealth redistribution 
which were involved in the welfare system. The different responses to the same problem 
in different countries enabled us to see the unique contributions a single country can 
make to advance the notion of the welfare state. 
Despite the above advantages of the research methods utilised in my case studies of the 
origins of UI in the three countries, their disadvantages are also apparent. The following 
are the limitations and, based on which, a few suggestions about research approaches in 
this field are put forward. 
A. As far as the importance of political factors in the process of policy-making is 
concerned, this study used a general term, the political power structure, in order to 
include all the different segments in the power structure of society in the analysis. jnstead 
of associating with any view which regards either the working class movement or 
powerful individuals or institutions as being decisive in this process, this study aimed to 
relate the different features of unemployment insurance schemes in the sample countries 
to varieties of the political power structures and to examine the differing roles played by 
the different sectors of the societies in the policy-making process for UI. 
However, as the result of the empirical study, the thesis argued that a group of powerful 
figures demonstrated an essential influence in the process. The UI schemes in these 
countries embodied their assessment of the costs of the schemes and their assumption of 
its possible effect on politics (see Section Three for a more detailed discussion). It can 
be, therefore, suggested that, instead of focusing on both the power structure and the 
dominant ideology of society, research in this field needs to explore the impacts of the 
powerful elites on policy-making process. In order to carry out an in-depth analysis of 
their role in such a process, it is important to define the elites and investigate the 
interactions between them and society. Their functions cannot be just interpreted in terms 
of their ideological stands but also the constraints which society imposes on them. 
B. rMe adoption of a chronological account allowed the researcher to analyse the different 
introduction of UI in the three countries in reference to national background and to 
investigate the development and effect of various government measures introduced in 
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these countries to deal with the problem of unemployment. It also demonstrated the 
different 'legacies' of the three countries and the different 'learning process' they went 
through. However, this type of account is prone to one problem, i. e. the inclusion of 
those historical events, which were thought as significant to the policy-making for UI in 
these three countries, into the historical review. While the experience of one country with 
the previous legislation concerning unemployment compensation acted as important 
reference for policy makers in designing UI scheme, the influence of other policies on the 
scheme was less crucial. Yet the judgment about their importance and contributions to the 
introduction of UI in these sample countries should be subjective. For the sake of 
efficient study, the opposite way, which allows the detailed analysis of the characteristics 
of the UI schemes in the three countries prior to a historical review in this field, might be 
worth attempting. 
C. In order to explain the dynamics behind the selection of some alternative and available 
policy choices in the initial unemployment insurance in Britain, Sweden and the United 
States, questions such as how the initial proposals were discussed and how state 
provisions were finally formulated, were given particular attention. Thus, instead of 
providing a mere description of the features of unemployment insurance of the three 
countries, such as financing, coverage, benefit level and administration in each case, I 
concentrated on the relationship between the characteristics of the schemes and their 
causes. Such arrangement enabled me to see the extent to which the differences in the 
designs of UI were largely determined by the political and social traditions and doctrines 
in each country, but not to understake a detailed analysis of the similarities and 
differences between UI schemes in the three countries and their possible impact on the 
life of those unemployed. 
As identified in Chapter One, this study was descriptive and interpretative and based on 
the secondary sources obtained from libraries in Britain where the research was 
undertaken. Although during the course of the research, I made a one-month journey to 
Sweden where I gained more resources on the Swedish welfare system and interviewed 
some Swedish experts, information and the holdings of the subject in libraries were 
limited in some respects. First, many of the materials which might be useful had not been 
translated into English. Second, many references dealt with the Swedish model either by 
studying the various schemes of the Swedish welfare system or by comparing it with 
other welfare systems. These systematic discussions, focusing on a long historical span, 
demonstrated how this model was originally set up and how it developed. Yet they 
seemed to treat the initial Swedish UI scheme as a small part of the studies, and the 
connection between the causes of the scheme's features and the background knowledge 
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was not always clear. Therefore, the considerations about the very period of the 1930s 
with respect of establishing the Ul scheme in this country and the evidence on the 
reasons for its characteristics were not sufficient. The similar argument could also be 
applied to the other two sample countries, especially the United States. In the light of 
these difficulties, the strength of my discussion of the different characteristics of Ul 
schemes in Britain, Sweden and the United States were inevitably undermined. 
D. In Chapter One and Two, I have argued that a historical and comparative study is 
important as it indicates that it is not possible to explain social welfare development in 
terms of a single cause or the similar pattern represented by the functionalist approach. In 
addition, the study of the three countries' historical experience not only helps us to 
understand current development in policy for the unemployed in three countries in 
question, but also has a wider implication for developing countries, where 
unemployment is emerging as an important issue. As the structural transformation of 
society caused by the industrial process has brought about the same problems as it did in 
the developed societies, the experiences of Britain, Sweden and the United States in 
dealing with unemployment could be of use for the less developed countries. 
Developed in line with pluralist thinking, this study examined the origins of UI schemes 
in Britain, Sweden and the United States with multiple causes and various approaches. 
Such method was employed on the basis of the assumption that some factors clearly 
played important roles in the decision making process, yet their actual importance in the 
different countries was very different. While one approach was suitable to one policy in 
one country at a certain period, it was less useful than other approaches to explain some 
other policy in other countries at a different period. By applying different approaches to 
the same policy area in different countries, I attempted to discover which explanations 
was more appropriate for interpreting what happened in this field. 
Yet, as addressed later, the experience of these three countries in establishing UI schemes 
highlights the important role exerted by a group of powerful elites and their pragmatic 
considerations in relation to national legacy. This indicates the danger of overestimating 
the applicability of pluralist thinking in analysing the development of welfare policies. In 
addition, pluralist thinking, which stresses the variety of policy-making process in 
different countries, may have a tendency to undermine the validity of the experience of 
the three countries under investigation in establishing UI scheme for other developing 
countries. In this context, it may be more fruitful to choose one developed country and 
one developing country as research targets. By examining the origins of UI in the 
developed country and comparing the different policy-making contexts between these 
228 
two countries, more relevant materials can be available for the developing country where 
unemployment insurance scheme is on the agenda. 
2. The features of the Ul Schemes and Their Significance 
At the start of this thesis, I identified central questions regarding the development of UI 
schemes in the three countries. These questions were divided under two categories. One 
concerned the specific features of the original Ul scheme in Britain, Sweden and the 
United States, while the other dealt with various factors which appeared in the different 
policy-making contexts of these countries in order to discover the causes of the different 
designs of their UI schemes. Due to the time limit, I focused on those choices concerning 
financing, coverage, benefit levels and administration of the scheme in my study. 
The establishment of unemployment insurance is a result of the insecurity of wage 
employment and the inadequacy of private and other traditional forms of support. The 
schemes incorporated a strong link between eligibility and participation in the labour 
market, relating benefits to contributions and thus to employment. In order to be entitled 
to the state benefit, the unemployed person must have worked and built up a record of 
contributions. The right to the benefit is therefore earned by the individual recipients and 
their self-respect is maintained. It thus involved a pooling of risks rather than resources, 
and involved less a redistribution of wealth than a reapportionment of the costs of risk 
and misfortune. Through the pooling of risks in the community, the individual no longer 
bore the burden of uncertainty alone. 
The contributory principle embodied in UI schemes in Britain and Sweden attempted to 
encourage individuals to take responsibility for their own security, while their American 
counterparts provided for the employer contribution only in order to urge employers to 
regulate employment. These arrangments thus reflected a mixture of individualistic and 
collective thinking. On the one hand, the state is responsible for protecting anyone who is 
covered against a particular contingency, and those in need are treated equally. On the 
other hand, the individual's right to benefit is related to his/her past employment and 
contributions, and therefore must be regarded as independent. State intervention comes 
into play only when the causes of problems are not the fault of the individuals concerned 
and are beyond their personal control. In addition to the individualistic thinking of the 
policy makers, the problems faced by the early non-contributory pension scheme in the 
UK and the unsuccessful experience of the UK in departing from the contributory 
principle in the 20s and 30s, were also important for British policy makers and their 
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Swedish and American counterparts. They realised that, in order to be nm successfully, 
it was necessary to base their UI schemes on the contributory principle. 
As far as earnings-related benefits in the Swedish -and American UI schemes are 
concerned, the payments were made according to the previous income and contributions 
of the claimant. Earnings-related benefits have a tendency to reinforce the unequal 
economic positions of individual beneficiaries and reflect the philosophy of the market 
economy in which the individuals' earnings are related to their capabilities. In Sweden, 
the earnings-related principle was also adopted by the SDP for political reasons: such 
policy was consistent with the Liberal Party's preferences and its support was crucial for 
the SDP in the 1930s. 
In the United States, eamings-related benefits were consistent with the individualistic 
tradition of the society and reflected the influence of the Wisconsin group who insisted 
on the importance of unemployment prevention rather than the amelioration of its effects. 
The tax off-set device ensured that the employer's tax payment was related to his record 
of compensation payments for unemployment among his employees. 'Ibis maintained 
the incentives of individual employers to stabilise employment. The costs of extended 
coverage and higher benefits of the British Ul scheme in the 1920-30s and its subsequent 
problems strengthened the belief of the Wisconsin group that the British approach, which 
emphasised the concept of adequate benefits, greater income redistribution and employee 
contributions, was unsuitable for the USA. 
Flat-rate benefits contained in the British UI scheme attempted to treat every beneficiary 
equally and were more redistributive than earnings-related benefits. The egalitarian 
principle contrasts with the income-related approach to social insurance, which associates 
wealth with economic power and perpetrates the inequalities of market place. -However, 
the level of the payment, based on the flat-rate principle, was low and this came to be 
regarded as a social minimum. Beveridge believed that most of the population in the 
nations which adopted a universalistic social insurance system, would regard the modest 
and egalitarian benefit as less than adequate and that private insurance systems would 
operate as a supplement to the basic subsistence benefit. If the benefit level was higher, it 
would impose a heavy financial burden on government. In addition, there was a concern 
that UI should not encourage laziness and make the recipients 'work-shy' since that 
would lead to moral collapse. If benefits were close to earnings in work, they would 
have a negative effect on people in employment and on the incentives of the unemployed 
to find employment. 
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Thus, flat-rate benefits in the British UI scheme encouraged individuals to seek other 
supplementary, private provisions in addition to social insurance. With a low level of 
flat-rate benefits, those who were more privileged would find their needs inadequately 
meet. 'Mis reinforced a dualism in which the state offered modest levels of benefit for the 
poor and the market satisfied the needs of the middle class for higher levels of welfare 
provision. Although it satisfied individuals' needs better, private provision was less 
redistributive. It also provided little protection for poor risks and against inflation. Those 
without private provision had to rely on means-testing. In spite of allocating benefits to 
those with greatest financial needs, however, means-tested benefits created a social 
stigma for those who were eligible to claim. 
In keeping with the above, the thesis argues that, if wage differentials between skilled 
and unskilled workers and between different industries and regions of one country are 
narrow, it makes sense to adopt flat-rate benefits. In contrast, if the differences between 
different regions and different professions are wide, it makes more sense to introduce 
different rates of benefits, rather than a single uniform one. In this case, benefits can be 
related more closely to the incomes of the recipients, and reflect their living standards 
more closely. In addition, the impact of benefits on work incentives for the unemployed 
is likely to be less severe. However, earnings-related benefits reflect the inequalities of 
market place as mentioned above and increase the complexity of administration. in 
countries where contributions are jointly paid by employees and employers and standards 
of living are high, the policy of relating contributions and benefits to wages will be more 
extensively applied, and uniform subsistence rates will be challenged. 
As far as the coverage of the initial UI schemes in the three countries is concerned, not all 
the workers participated in the programme. Only certain industries, i. e. those which were 
subject to the seasonal unemployment in Britain and groups of workers in certain 
occupations in the United States, were included. In Sweden, the programme was 
voluntarily based. The SDP simply used the already existing self-help organisations 
among the unions to administer its UI programme. But coverage in practice was 
extensive, as their membership was very high and it was obligatory for the members of 
most unions to join the unemployment insurance fund. 
The arrangements for coverage originated from the practical (technical) concerns of the 
decision makers with the running of the programme. In the British case, for example, the 
selective coverage of certain enterprises, which were vulnerable to seasonal 
unemployment, was related to the experimental nature of the scheme and the financial 
concerns of the policy makers to guarantee the necessary resources in order to finance the 
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scheme. Ilie voluntary nature of the Swedish scheme was based on the political concerns 
of policy makers with the reaction of the Liberals, who were in favour of voluntary social 
welfare programmes, to their proposal. 
The significance of partial coverage, together with earnings-related benefits in Sweden 
and the United States, was to strengthen inequalities among members of society. Those, 
who were more vulnerable to unemployment, who most needed protection from the state, 
were likely to be marginalised, while the privfleges of the better off were enhanced. As a 
result, the gap between rich and poor among workers was enlarged and, at the same 
time, the solidarity principle, promoted by the labour movement, was weakened. One of 
the important elements of solidarity fostered by social insurance was universality, which 
ensured that all citizens were treated in the same way regardless their social status. This 
principle was advantageous for the poor and represented an enhancement of the interests 
of the working class, and also was, at the same time, beneficial for social integration. It 
emphasised the importance of the state to provide security for all citizens and thereby 
reduced the inequality among the different segments of society, and the common pooling 
of risks among the poor and the rich. 
Regarding the administration of the initial Ul scheme in Britain, Sweden and the United 
States, there were basically two types, i. e. one was central government controlled, and 
the other was de-centralised. The UI scheme in the United States reflected the delicate 
question of keeping a proper balance between federal and state government. Policy 
makers had to operate within a very diverse society and a federal system in which the 
state and local levels were extremely important. Thus, in the 1935 Act, no standard 
national benefits (or employee contributions) were introduced. The states were given 
freedom to determine the amount and duration of the benefits as well as the coverage and 
the level of contributions. Ile original one percent contributions to a pooled fund by the 
individual employers was replaced by a range of different tax rates. In Britain, 
unemployment insurance was administered by central government. This was 
recommended by the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission, which argued for 
national administration in order to tackle unemployment efficiently. In Sweden, although 
the unions were the basic administrative bodies of the UI scheme, due to the close ties 
between the SDP and the LO, however, the control of the central government was still 
firm. In theory, the UI funds could apply for government subsidies on condition of being 
approved by the government. In practice, this meant they had to follow the stringent rules 
set up by the government. 
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The different administrative arrangements for the initial unemployment insurance 
schemes in these three countries indicate that the choice made by policy makers were 
related not only to their understanding of the different political and social structures of the 
country and the influence of national traditions, but also to their political concerns 
regarding the relationship between the state, the individual and society. While it was 
conceivable for a country like Sweden, which was ethnically homogeneous and socially 
unified and a relatively small country like Britain, to introduce a uniform UI scheme, in a 
large country, like the United States, which was politically, economically and ethnically 
diversified, the operation of the Ul scheme was bound to be decentralised. In the USA, 
the state was seen as the major tier of government in most domestic issues. Local 
government had the autonomy to decide the specific regulations while central government 
provided general policy guidance. The absence of a uniform national system in the Act 
also reflected the influence of the Wisconsin school and the Roosevelt Administration's 
concern with the reaction of the business community. The advantage of such approach 
relied on its sensitivity to the different needs of beneficiaries and different local 
situations. However, it had a tendency to treat people in the same positions differently, 
and differences between the regions were increased due to the diversity of the policy. 
The establishment of unemployment insurance in Britain, Sweden and the United States 
also involved the preference of the policy makers of work creation over cash support in 
providing social security to wage earners and their understanding of the contribution of 
unemployment insurance. This played an important role in the final design of their UI 
schemes . 
Compared with Britain, Sweden and the USA regarded Ul as a less prominent political 
issue. The politicians and the business community in the United States believed that, 
instead of emphasising income redistribution, employers should be given incentives to 
stabilise employment. In Sweden, the SAP and LO gave priority to fiscal policy and 
wage solidarity and adopted full employment as their main political goal. The aim of 
Swedish welfare policy in the early 1930s was to build up a general safety net that would 
eliminate the need for a humiliating, means-tested form of assistance. It was however not 
until after the Second World War that these policies were put into practice. In the 1930s, 
the Swedes concentrated their political energies on crisis management and economic 
relief, rather than on constructing a blueprint for the modem welfare state from which the 
Swedish model eventually emerged. 
Policy makers in the United States believed that real social security for the unemployed 
depended on job creation and national economic growth rather than cash support. 
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Security depended on the combination of private employment, UI and emergency relief. 
The Swedes' commitment to full employment was based on their assumption that, in 
order to achieve solidaristic and universalistic welfare programmes without causing social 
and financial problems, it was necessary to combine work and welfare; work was the 
best way to maintain the individuals' dignity and their security. Their British counterparts 
also focused on the national labour exchanges system when they established their UI 
scheme. This reflected the strong influence of the traditional, liberal work ethic ideology 
among policy makers. Cash benefits were only available after the attempt to provide a job 
for the unemployed person had failed. Thus, compared with work creation and 
employment policy, cash provision and income redistribution were regarded as of 
secondary importance in dealing with social security. 
Based on the above description of the different characteristics of UI scheme in Britain, 
Sweden and the United States, it can be argued that Esping-Andersen's classification of 
the three welfare state models was helpful for our analysis of the distinctive features of 
the welfare programmes in different countries. However his theory referred to the 
subsequent development of the welfare systems rather than to the initial introduction of 
social security schemes, which did not, at the outset, contain all the characteristics of the 
relevant regime-types. 
Britain's 1911 Unemployment Insurance scheme was basically a Liberal experiment and 
it is implausible to argue that it had already embodied those characteristics of the Liberal 
regime type. To some extent, it reflected market-oriented liberalism, combining the 
traditional self-reliance principle with state assistance. In contrast to Esping-Andersen's 
argument, white-collar workers as a rising political force did not exert much influence on 
the consolidation of the British welfare state before World War II. 
Esping-Andersen's arguments about social democratic regime-type are more applicable to 
the 'Swedish Model', which was established in the post-war period, than to the 
Unemployment Insurance scheme introduced in 1934. The Swedish Unemployment 
Insurance scheme is, in some aspects, an exception to the general character of the 
Swedish welfare programmes and quite separate from other social insurance 
programmes. Universal coverage, for example, has been held to be one of the trademarks 
of the Swedish model in which every citizen, regardless of social status, is entitled to 
benefits of social insurance. 11is universalism in social policy was in effect implemented 
by agrarian parties and the salaried middle class after the Second World War. Social 
reform was a top priority for the Social Democratic depression cabinets. Yet in order to 
deal with the economic crisis of the 1930s and protect the well-being of the working class 
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in a newly established democratic system, the Social Democratic Party had to build up the 
programme in a way which would be politically acceptable to other parties and pressure 
groups, and was financially possible. Most of the welfare reforms were initiated in the 
relatively prosperous period after 1945, in which the basis for Sweden's reputation as a 
model of the welfare state -- the so-called active labour market policy -- was first 
developed. 
According to Esping-Andersen, the American welfare system is regarded as in the 
'liberal' style which is associated with individual independence and limited public 
support. 'Me unemployment compensation programme of the 1935 Act complied with the 
dominant ideology of the society which was individualism-oriented. Yet, it also reflected 
the changing attitude of the public, in the wake of the hardship of the depression, to 
Federal government involvement in social measures. In order to understand better the 
reasons why the scheme had these features, we should look at the political structure of 
the country and the pragmatic thinking of the people involved in the policy making 
process, i. e. they made their decisions in relation to their constitutional, political, 
financial and other technical concerns. The final decision in unemployment insurance 
rested not with experts but Congress and the President. 
In keeping with the above, the following section intends to analyse the ideological 
influence of the elites and the role played by groups, such as political parties, trade 
unions and business organisations in the policy-making process for UI in the three 
countries. Through such an examination, the connections between the different 
introduction of UI in these three countries and their different social, economic and 
political contexts are identified. 
3. Policy Making Process 
Social policy is not just a fruition of the economic, political and ideological systems 
which are found in different countries, but is also related to people who are identified 
with a particular social status, profession and/or region whose interests are affected by 
the policy. Interactions between different groups and parties, different ideologies which 
influence the attitudes of decision makers and different bases of class support for the 
government, are reflected in public policies. 
Unemployment insurance schemes in Britain, Sweden and the United States were 
initiated in different national and historical circumstances. Although the ideologies of the 
participants were crucial in accounting for policy making in UI in the three countries, the 
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national legacy was even more important. The adoption of ideological positions by policy 
makers was constrained by the national legacy, by cultural tradition and by the 
consequences of previous legislation. In addition, their policy choices were also 
influenced by the political situation and by the experience of other countries in this area. 
Their interpretation of a problem as a political issue and their adoption of a certain policy 
to deal with it were not only related to their basic political beliefs but also predictions of 
the reactions of their political rivals and other pressure groups. Those involved in the 
process found it necessary to adjust their policy aims, based on their political beliefs, to 
complex political situations and to adopt pragmatic approaches whenever this was 
necessary. Thus they were often forced to adopt a short-term perspective. 
Using the 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches, the thesis argues that the final 
outcome of the policy process has not only determined by the political preferences of 
policy makers, but also by the attitudes and assertiveness of different groups in society. 
Through this comparative study, it is clear that organised labour did not always have an 
important influence on the outcome of the policy-making process. Organised workers' 
ability to pursue their political aims through political parties varied from one country to 
anothcr. 
This is due not only to their disadvantaged position in the national power structure, but 
also to their basic belief about the role of the state in relation to their own interests. Due to 
different historical legacies and different power structures, the labour movement and 
labour parties were accepted by society in different ways and exerted different roles in 
terms of the establishment of UI in these three countries. While the Swedish trade unions 
played a relatively more influential role in introducing U1, because of their close political 
and ideological ties with the SDP, their British and American counterparts exercised, at 
most, an indirect or marginal influence. 'Ibis was either because of their skeptical attitude 
towards government in protecting their interests or because of a sense of political 
impotence which prevented them from acting as powerful participants in the process of 
social reform. 
As far as the British case is concerned, although the 1906-11 social reforms were 
influenced by the Government's awareness of the demands of the Labour Party, they 
should not be attributed to the efforts of the labour movement. Compared with their 
Sweden counterparts, the British unions did not act as a positive force in establishing 
unemployment insurance. The American labour movement in general lacked a clear 
philosophy to inform its activities. The early realisation of the workers' right to vote and 
the expanding economy, which provided a long-term means of raising standards of 
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living, engendered less pressure on the great majority of workers in the USA to demand 
a special organisation for the sake of improving their conditions. 'Meir indifferent attitude 
towards the establishment of the 1935 Ul scheme reflected their mistrust of government 
policies and the individualistic tradition of the nation. 
In contrast to the workers, who failed to exert a decisive impact on the issue that 
concerned their interests most, other groups, such as the business community and 
farmers, exercised considerable influence. However it was influential figures from 
administrative circles in Britain and the United states, who were responsible for the final 
formulation of the policy. Small groups of powerful individuals or institutions in these 
two countries were decisive in the process. As Grant (1986) has argued, the 'elitist' 
perspective assumes that in practice there is a great concentration of power in the 
American system; as far as the important issues are concerned, only a closely knit group 
of economically powerful leaders exert effective control over policy making. The design 
of the 1935 Act, for example, the tax offset device, to a large extent, originated from the 
efforts of people from the Committee on Economic Security led by Witt. They used their 
knowledge and experience to influence the President and Congress, as the Economic 
Security Bill did not get support either from the business community or organised labour, 
it also disappointed the advocates of social insurance, i. e. social workers, labour 
legislation experts. The British UI scheme was introduced in response to various 
pressures: public opinions prior to its introduction, international competition and the 
failure of the Poor Law to provide help for those in need. However, it was the shift of 
power within the Liberal Party that gave Churchill and Lloyd George the opportunity to 
put their reforming ideas into practice. 
Ile change in public opinion was due to their interpretation of social problems and the 
inadequacy of traditional methods of dealing with them. Along with their understanding 
of the social causes of unemployment, based on research on the unemployed and their 
social environment, the measures adopted in western nations for tackling it moved from a 
mix of traditional Poor Law and private charity to governmental programmes. As the 
complete elimination of unemployment from society proved impossible, there would 
always be a certain number of people who were under threat of losing their job. Whether 
the total number was large or small, such people were obviously in great need of help. 
Thus, the need for unemployment relief measures would always exist. When the 
inhumanity of the Poor Law and the financial vulnerability of private charity became too 
self-evident, state action in this area came to be seen as necessary. Being aware of the 
potential threat to the existing social order caused by economic hardship and the growing 
strength of industrial working class as an organised force, ruling elites introduced 
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welfare policies in order to provide help to the unemployed and preserve the stability of 
society. In the United States, for example, disaffection with the regime during the Great 
Depression persuaded the government to adopt more positive action to tackle 
unemployment as discussed above. 
The possibility of developing welfare policies against unemployment emerged from the 
screen of political opportunity, turning new thinking into political action and finally, 
through bargaining and concessions, into policies. How people defined and interpreted 
the problems and how they got their ideas onto the agenda are crucial in understanding 
the development of welfare policies. Ile step-by-step account in this study indicates that 
the consequences of earlier attempts at policy making and implementation influenced the 
formulation of subsequent policy in this area. Policy makers often sought to achieve a 
balance between their own political preferences and constraints imposed by the policy 
making environment and the historical background they were facing. Thus, policy 
makers made decisions not only on the basis of social welfare doctrines, but also in the 
context of constitutional, political and financial concerns. They had to predict the 
feasibility of the financial and administrative arrangements which the implementation of 
the policy would require and its political effects. Ilus, the pragmatic approach of those 
in powerful positions were clearly important. 
In Britain, ambitious figures in the Liberal government committed themselves to social 
reform and were keen to introduce welfare policies. Yet, their collectivist thinking was 
infused with traditional individualism and other practical concerns. Thus, dramatic 
changes in politics were not always possible. The Swedish Social Democratic Party had 
to take the Liberal Party into account since its support was crucial for the SDP in the 
1930s. In order to realise its political strategy of establishing a coalition with farmers and 
getting support from the Liberals for its UI proposals, the SDP was forced to make 
concessions. Its constitution also made co-operation and compromise between the 
various parties and groups possible. In the United States, the outcome of the Ul showed 
the influence of the anti-redistributive model of the Wisconsin school, and reflected the 
concerns of the Democratic Party with the attitudes of the business and employers. 
4. Based on the above discussion of the policy-making for establishing unemployment 
insurance in the three sample countries, the following are the conclusions of my study. 
A. In Chapter Two, I argued that ideological differences are reflected or embodied in 
governmental policies. Since various sectors of society occupy different positions within 
the power structure, a party or pressure group, which holds a favotfrable economic and 
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political position, is more likely to impose its beliefs on the formulation of policy than 
others. In order to adequately answer questions such as why certain decisions have been 
taken, it is important to understand who makes the decisions, how problems are defined, 
which remedies are considered, which aspects of each solution are assigned greater 
priority and how priorities are determined. 
My analysis thus focused not only on the ideological motives underlying decision making 
process, but also the power structure and political relationships among the parties 
involved. As UI was meant to offer compensation and serve the interests of some groups 
in society, politicians did not only assess the circumstances of those who were vulnerable 
to unemployment, but also took into ' 
account the availability of resources and the possible 
effect of this programme on their governance. The concept of political and financial 
feasibilitics was crucial because the concerns of policy makers about feasibility, 
effectiveness and costs of state provision influenced their choice between several 
alternative solutions, and helped us understand why one remedy was introduced rather 
than another. 
This thesis concludes by emphasising that, although policy makers' ideologies influenced 
their policy preferences, our assessment of the impact of ideology on the development of 
social policy must also be based on more relative terms. Although it is important to 
consider prevailing public opinion at the time when unemployment insurance schemes 
were introduced, it is also dangerous to draw cause-and-effect relationships between 
dominant ideologies and the outcomes of decision making in this field. Pragmatic 
considerations of those involved in the process have been an important element in policy 
choices: their decisions were made not only on the basis of beliefs but also on political 
and financial grounds. 
B. In relation to the above discussion, one question is raised: among these two elements, 
people and power, what will the decision makers have to take into account first -- a battle 
for the possession of power with their political rivals and the practice of their political 
beliefs, or for the interests of the people who need help and protection? In connection 
with this question, the participation and influence of those at the grass-roots on policy 
making need also to be considered. 
Based on 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches, this study attempted to see if the 
entire process of public welfare programmes involved an interaction between the ability 
of the elite to adequately respond to emerging problems from above and the ability of the 
working class to present its interest through building alliances with other groups or 
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classes from below. Ilus, in addition, the adoption of a policy reflected not only the 
political preferences of policy makers, but also the assertiveness of those who demand 
their rights. 
While in theory it is essential to consider the impact of organised labour on the policies 
most closely related to their interests, the experience of these three countries highlights 
the danger of overestimating its role in the policy making process. This study has 
revealed that the 'bottom-up' approach of policy making does not apply to the 
introduction of unemployment insurance schemes in the three countries under 
investigation. Though initially interested in social reform, mistrust, disenchantment and a 
sense of impotency often prevented organised labour from acting as a full participant in 
the process of social reform. 
Referring to the discussion in Chapter Two, studies in the field of welfare policy 
examine not only decisions made by those in power but also non-decisions. As many 
benefit recipients of welfare programmes are in a disadvantaged position in the power 
structure, they feel unable to make their voice heard by the decision makers, or they are 
indifferent to the issues which are related to their interests due to their skepticism of those 
in power. As a result, decisions based on the political beliefs of the decision makers and 
influenced by the better-off in society, may fail to. meet the needs of the recipients and 
solve their problems. 
By contrast, other factors, such as the non-socialist parties, business groups, 
administrators, experts and, in particular, the elites, exercised considerable influence 
over the final outcome of the policy making process in UI was significant. The elites, 
who were often concerned about maintaining political and social stability, actively 
campaigned for and organised the introduction of unemployment insurance. Instead of 
simply responding to the economic and social pressures, they demonstrated their own 
preference and ambitions as how to construct their activities and sustain their own relative 
independence in the spheres of activities for administrators and experts. They formulated 
proposals and made necessary compromises frequently in order to gain the support of 
other influential parties, such as the business community and in the case of Sweden, the 
farmers. This in turn influenced the shape of the final legislation which affeted the 
interests of the working class. 
C. In addition to introducing ideology and power structure as two complementary 
elements in order to increase the power of Easton's theory, the historical legacy of the 
country under investigation, as the thesis reveals, is of crucial importance in explaining 
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the outcomes of the policy making process. Previous legislation concerning 
unemployment relief and the nation's experience with the earlier measures have had an 
impact on the policy makers. The cultural tradition of society is equally influential. In 
setting up proposals for dealing with the problem of unemployment, the policy makers 
will take into account the feasibility of certain policy in the light of the consequences of 
the historical ingrained institutional arrangements and comply with the national tradition. 
Once institutional solution is discovered and implemented, it will become a 'social fact, 
which constrains the subsequent political strategies and have a far-reaching and long-term 
effect on the stability and integration of society. 
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